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Water is a vital resource.2 Water, along with air, is, in fact, a
resource without which life could not exist.3 Access to acceptable air is
arguably of greater immediate importance since one has no choice in
whether to use this resource at a given location and point in time.
Alternative sources of air are obviously not available. In contrast,
another surface waterbody or subsurface aquifer could in theory be
substituted for a particular source of water. Nevertheless, water is
essential since it provides sustenance for all living things.4
Water is important to humanity for many other reasons. It supplies
power, serves as a coolant,5 is used in manufacturing processes,6
provides a transportation corridor, facilitates recreational activities,' isan important source of protein,' and plays a role in various religious
2. See Dennis R. Delaney, Federal Guidance: A Middle of the River Approach to
Water Conservation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 375 (1996). "[Wiater is fundamental to the
existence of the human race." Id.
3. The California Supreme Court noted: "The conservation of other natural
resources is of importance, but the conservation of waters of the state is of transcendent
importance. Its waters are the very life blood of its existence." Chow v. City of Santa
Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (Cal. 1933). Also, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1976 noted in part:
We, as human beings, are part of a complex array of living creatures that
started to deploy on earth about three billion years agoand has never stopped
diversifying. The only life system we know of and we are part of is based
on carbon chemistry and cannot develop without water[.]
Am. Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting Jacques-Yves
Cousteau).
4. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES,
CONSIDERING ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESsMENTs 31 (1999)
[hereinafter EIA] (discussing the importance of water to the ecosystem).
5. See Letter from Jim Ross, Manager of Environmental Affairs, Eastman
Chemical Company, to Mark Bradley, Engineer Supervisor, NPDES Permits Branch,
Water Division, Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology (Dec. 13, 1995)
(referencing a Batesville, Arkansas facility's use of White River water for cooling
purposes) (on file with author). The Arkansas Department of Pollution Control &
Ecology's ("ADPC&E") name was changed to the Arkansas Department of
Environmental Quality ("ADEQ") in 1999. See 1997 Ark. Acts 1219 § 2(a).
6. See Letter from Jim Ross, Manager of Environmental Affairs, Eastman
Chemical Company, to Mark Bradley, Engineer Supervisor, NPDES Permits Branch,
Water Division, ADPC&E (Dec. 13, 1995) (referencing a Batesville, Arkansas
facility's use of White River water in manufacturing process) (on file with author).
7. See Save the Streams, Mine for Gravel Elsewhere, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Feb.
21, 1995, at 6B (noting that "[flisherman spend $286 million a year in Arkansas" and
valuing "stream-based recreation" at $4 million a year).
8. See Rudi Wild, Aqua Culture Needed to Nourish World Demand for Protein,
AGRIBUSINESS WORLDWIDE, Nov. 1990, at 23 (referencing importance of water dwelling
creatures as source of protein).
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activities.9 Water literally provides a home for countless creatures.
These aquatic ecosystems are often self-regulating and self-sustaining
units.' However, even a non-aquatic habitat may rely on water. It can
often provide an interconnectedness among ecosystems."
The importance of water is perhaps most obvious when it is in short
supply. It is not uncommon for the volume of water available in a
particular area to be insufficient to satisfy one or more uses. The
inadequacy may be a function of a limited supply. There may, for
example, simply be a historical shortage in an area or region. As likely
is a shortage that develops because of an increase in one or more uses.
12
However, the water available in an area or region may be inadequate for
a reason other than available volume.
Every surface waterbody receives pollutants resulting from human
activities and/or natural events. A river, stream, or lake's ability to
satisfy certain uses may be-eliminated by the presence of one or more
pollutants. 3 While waterbodies have the ability to naturally cleanse
themselves, their capacity to do so will vary. 4 Consider the following
example.
A waterbody must maintain a certain concentration of dissolved
oxygen ("DO") 5 to support a cold water fishery. The concentration of
9. See State v. Sharp, No. E 97-229-1 (Chancery Court, Marion County, June 8,
1999). The Arkansas chancellor's post-trial decision noted in a dispute regarding the
ownership of certain portions of Crooked Creek in Newton and Marion Counties that
"[i]t is known however, through cultural customs and patterns, that these tribes used
waterways for drinking, cooking, fishing and for religious purposes." Decree at 5.
.10. See generally An Ecological Context for Biological Monitoring, in BIOLOGICAL
MONITORING OF AQUATIC SYSTEMS 3 (Stanford L. Loeb et al. eds., 1994).
11. See EIA, supra note 4, at 32.
12. See Richard Orr, Dwindling Water Supply Can't Keep Pace with Rising Demand,
Study Says, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1997, at 3 (noting that "between 1950 and 1990...
water use increased by more than 200 percent in North and South America").
13. A Senate subcommittee noted in the 1960s:
Pollution degrades the physical, chemical, biological, bacterial, and aesthetic
qualities of water, the degree depending upon the kind and amount of
pollution in relation to the extent and nature of reuse. Pollution can be just
as effective as a drought or a consumptive withdrawal in reducing or in
eliminating a water resource.
Robert F. Blomquist, "To Stir Up Public Interest:" Edmund S. Muskie and the U.S. Senate
Special Subcommittee's Water Pollution Investigations and Legislative Activities, 1963-66-A
Case Study in Early Congressional Environmental Policy Development, 22 COLUM. J. ENVrL.
L. 1, 24-25 n.60 (1997); see also Wild, supra note 8 (noting slowing growth of fishery
production because of both water pollution and overfishing).
14. See United States v. Johnson, 886 F. Supp. 1057, 1066 (W.D. Nev. 1994). The
same also may be true with air. See id
15. Fish require the DO in the water to sustain respiration. See KAREL
VERSCHUREN, HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL DATA ON ORGANIC CHEMICALS 46 (2001).
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DO will be reduced by the waterbody's receipt of organic materials.
Organic materials consume oxygen at varying rates. If the rate of
oxygen consumption exceeds the replenishment rate, the DO concentra-
tion will drop. A reduction of DO below a certain point will eliminate
the waterbody's ability to support a cold water fishery. Therefore, in
reality, a stream or river lacking the required DO concentration is
unavailable for such use.
Regardless of the cause, a shortage of water can be a serious
concern. 6 Activities and facilities in the area or region may compete for
the finite supplies of usable water.'" Conservation and/or more efficient
use of water can expand the available supply. Equally importait,
however, is the maintenance or future attainment of the ambient water
conditions or criteria necessary to support the desired uses (e.g.,
drinking water, recreation, fishery, etc.). 8
The primary federal statute that addresses the protection and
remediation of surface water is the Clean Water Act ("CWA").' 9 Its
focus has generally been the control of point source discharges of
pollutants2" by imposing limits and standards through a permitting
As the Second Circuit noted:
DO is a water quality constituent that, in appropriate concentrations, is
essential not only to keep organisms living but also to sustain species
reproduction, vigor, and the development of populations. Organisms
undergo stress at reduced DO concentrations. This stress makes them less
competitive and less able to sustain their species within the aquatic
community.
California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. EPA, 553 F.2d 280, 282-83 n.7 (2nd Cir. 1977).
16. See Farmers Resort to Salty Water, PRESS J., Aug. 15, 1998, at 14A (reference to
Arkansas drought conditions forcing farmers to use potentially harmful salty well water
on crops); Water Shortages to Increase Worldwide Report Says, WATER ENvTL. & TECH.,
Nov. 2000, at 17 (referencing a report which projects that the number of people living
in countries facing severe or chronic water shortages will increase fourfold over the
next twenty-five years).
17. See Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison
of Legal Tools for Augmenting Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1996)
(referring to the conflict in California between water withdrawals for irrigation and
municipal water with water volume needed to sustain native aquatic species).
Competition is even possible between similar uses. James Splett, Personal Watercraft
Use: A Nationwide Problem Requiring Local Regulation, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 185
(1999) (discussing the conflict between lake recreationalists such as personal watercraft
users with those engaged in canoeing, fishing, and sailing).
18. See generally Delaney, supra note 2.
19. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
20. Water conservation has, to date, played a minimal role in the CWA programs.
The statute does not specifically address water conservation. See generally Delaney,
supra note 2. Cf 64 Fed. Reg. 39,564, 39,568 (1999) (expressing EPA concern that
CWA pretreatment concentration limits, as opposed to mass limits, impede an
550 [Vol. 23
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program.2 Likewise, Arkansas operated its own water permitting
system for many years before assuming control of the federal CWA
program. 22
Since the 1972 enactment of the CWA, water quality has improved
in many United States waterbodies.2' In 1972 one-third of the country's
lakes met water quality standards ("WQS").24 A late 1 980s report stated
that 70% of rivers and 60% of lakes met WQS.2 Tens of billions of
dollars have been expended by both the government and industry to
achieve these results.26
industrial facility's effort to reduce water use).
21. In addition to its permitting system, the CWA includes several other programs.
Further, other federal statutes may either directly or indirectly protect surface water.
This article does not address in a comprehensive manner all of the CWA or non-CWA
programs developed to protect surface water. The excluded CWA programs include
the Spill, Prevention, Control and Countermeasure ("SPCC") regulations and the oil
spill response and reporting program. The SPCC regulations are found at 40 C.F.R.
§112 (2000). Section 311 of the CWA addresses the oil spill reporting program. See
33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994). It requires that the National Response Center be notified of
certain releases of oil that enter surface water. The same section of the CWA provides
the federal government the authority to remediate releases of oil and recover the costs
of such work from persons or entities designated as "responsible parties." This
program has been used to remediate sites in Arkansas. See, e.g., United States v. Gurley
Refining Co., 788 F. Supp. 1473,1476 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (referencing use of section 311
ofthe CWA to address an Edmondson, Arkansas site). Likewise, the section 404 CWA
program regulating the discharge of dredge or fill (primarily administered by the United
States Corps of Engineers ("Corps")) is not addressed in any detail. See 33 U.S.C. §
1344 (1994). Section 404 of the CWA requires that a permit be obtained from the
Corps prior to the discharge of dredge or fill into a "water of the United States." Id.
The term "water of the United States" includes areas deemed by Corps regulations to
constitute "wetlands." See 33 C.F.R. § 328 (2000). The breadth ofjurisdictional terms
such as "dredge or fill" and "wetland" have required that a 404 permit be obtained prior
to the initiation of a variety of activities. An overview of the section 404 program is
found in Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Travis J. Morrissey, Arkansas Facility/Real Property
Redevelopment in the Year 2000: Tools Available to Resolve Environmental Issues, 52 ARK.
L. REV. 751, 818-27 (2000).
22. Various portions of the Arkansas Water Pollution Control Program are found
in ADEQ Reg. Nos. 2, 5, and 6.
23. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New
Framework to LinkEnvironmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 811, 815
(1997) (discussing scientific indicators of water quality that demonstrate reductions in
discharges from point sources have led to improvements in several water quality
indicators and citing CouNciL OF ENvL. QUALITY, 1992 REPORT).
24. Seeid. at815.
25. See id
26. See Richard A. Smith et al., Water Quality Trends in the Nation's Rivers: Effects
of Municipal Waste Treatment, Highway Salt, Nitrogen Fertilizer, Leaded Gas Consumption,
235 SCIENCE 1067 (1987) (referencing the expenditure of more than $100 billion in the




The federal and state water pollution control activities have
arguably increased the amount of water available for various uses.
Despite the improvement in water quality, many lakes, rivers, and
streams do not meet designated "WQS." The 1998 EPA National Water
Quality Inventory Report to Congress states that of the 23% of the
United States' rivers and streams that have been assessed, 35% do not
fully support water quality standards or uses.27 The federal agency has
also stated that 42% of the lakes, ponds, and reservoirs (excluding the
Great Lakes) do not fully support water quality standards or use.28
There are three issues often cited as impediments to additional
progress. First, while various activities and facilities are discharging
less pollutants, national increases in both population and gross national
product have off-set those reductions.29 In other words, the individual
reductions are mitigated to some extent by an aggregate increase in the
number of facilities or facility activities that cause the discharge of
water pollutants. Second, future additional incremental discharge
reductions3" may in many instances be much more difficult and/or
costly. The initial controls placed on many sources resulted in signifi-
cant discharge reductions. Further reductions may in some instances be
significantly more expensive because of the law of diminishing
returns.3 Also generating significant costs are the more intractable
sources such as combined sewer and sanitary sewer overflows. Finally,
several of the activities excluded from the CWA's mandatory controls
affect water quality. For example, diffuse discharges denominated as
27. See 65 Fed. Reg. 43,587 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
122-24, 130). EPA states an additional 10% are "threatened." See id.
28. See id. Nine percent are also stated to be "threatened." See id.
29. See generally Debra S. Knopman & Richard A. Smith, 20 Years of the Clean
Water Act, 35 ENV'T 16 (1993) (arguing CWA has generated benefits by keeping water
quality constant in view of population and gross national product increases).
30. One commentator notes in regard to these initial controls: "The day of
pointing the finger at a given stack or a given industry and blaming it as the culprit are
largely behind us. We have picked the low hanging fruit with regard to stationary
sources and point sources." Michael Zagata, 25th Anniversary of the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation: Past and Future Challenges and Directions:
Commissioner's Comments, 7 ALB. L. J. SC. & TECH. 149, 151-52 (1996).
31. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1978)"As one
would expect from the law of diminishing returns, each successive increment of waste
treatment was less efficient." Id. The court in SDC/Pullman Partners v. Tolo Inc., 60 Cal.
App. 4th 37, 48 (1997), noted: "Yet the elimination of pollution is subject to the law
of diminishing returns. The cost of eliminating every last molecule otherwise toxic in
larger quantities is necessarily prohibitive." Id.
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non-point sources fall outside the scope of the CWA permitting
program.
32
The CWA has since the early 1970s had a structure in place that, in
theory, forces the attainment of WQS by all waterbodies. Regardless,
the complexities and costs associated with the attainment of WQS for
some waterbodies have made it difficult to implement these standards.
Because of recent developments, the federal and state agencies might no
longer have a choice. Various groups are utilizing the CWA citizen suit
authorities to force the agencies to attempt to undertake the research
necessary to determine the reason for a waterbody's impairment and
execute a plan for its recovery. Agencies will have to decide how
pollutant loadings entering the waterbody will be reduced. This
previously under-utilized ambient component of the CWA is analogous
to the Clean Air Act's approach to addressing air pollution.33
The process in some instances generates tension between various
types of pollutant sources concerning who can and should be forced to
assume some or all of this responsibility. Arkansas will be participating
in this renewed effort to attain WQS in impaired waterbodies. The
participation of Arkansas groups such as environmental organizations,
agricultural operations, municipalities, industrial facilities, etc., will be
critical in the process. Decisions such as the application of particular
water quality criteria, designation of certain uses, allocation of loadings,
and judgments about the impacts of particular pollutants can affect
activities in a particular watershed.
To put these issues in context, an examination of both the federal
and Arkansas water pollution control programs is appropriate. This
article will therefore examine both the federal and Arkansas water
pollution control statutes and regulations. To better understand the
rationale for the various programs and their operation, Part II of this
article provides an overview of the associated technical issues. The
types and sources of water pollutants along with the applicable methods
of control, monitoring, and assessment are also addressed. Because
changes to the baseline federal regulations and policies determine key
aspects of the Arkansas program, they will be addressed in Part III. To
provide some historical context, Part IV will chronicle the evolution of
32. See Smith, supra note 26, at 1607 (referencing assessments indicating pollution,
from diffuse sources (i.e., non-point sources) such as urban and agricultural runoff, may
prevent achievement of national water quality goals even after complete
implementation of planned point source controls).
33. See generally Robert W. Adler, IntegratedApproaches to Water Pollution: Lessons
from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 203 (1999).
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the Arkansas water pollution control program. This part will also
discuss various issues associated with the current program. The relevant
statutory provisions, regulations, policies, and judicial decisions will
therefore be examined.
II. THE ARKANSAS SURFACE WATER RESOURCE: AVAILABILITY, USE,
AND IMPAIRMENT
A. Availability of the Resource
Arkansas is generally divided into six major river basins: (1) Red
River Basin; (2) Ouachita River Basin; (3) White River Basin; (4)
Arkansas River Basin; (5) St. Francis River Basin; and (6) Mississippi
River Basin.34 The state has approximately 87,000 miles of rivers and
streams and 514,245 acres of lakes and reservoirs.3"
B. Use of the Resource
Arkansas is known for the abundance and quality of its surface
water. These surface water resources are important state assets.36
Various activities important to the state's economy occur only because
of the presence of this high quality surface water. These activities
include tourism3" and agriculture. 38 By way of example, it is unlikely
that Arkansas would be a major rice producer without high quality
.34. ADPC&E, ARKANSAS NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION ASSESSMENT REPORT 6,12
(undated).
35. ADEQ, STRATEGIC PLAN DRAFT 14 (2000) [hereinafter Strategic Plan].
36. See Duane C. Wolf, Impact of Human and Animal Waste, PROCEEDINGS OF IRE
SECOND ANNUAL AGRICULTURAL ISSUES SYMPOSIUM (1990) "[A]bundances and quality
of water in Arkansas have been major assets for the development of all areas of the
state's economy." Id
37. The importance of certain surface waterbodies to tourism is evidenced by an
agreement entered into by Arkansas and Missouri. The two states executed a
Memorandum of Agreement to address water quality issues in the Upper White River
Watershed. See Memorandum of Agreement between the Arkansas Department of
Environmental Quality, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, and the
Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission, Cooperative Agreement to
Address Water Quality in the Upper White River Watershed (1999) [hereinafter White
River MOA]. The agreement notes the economic importance of the river. See id.
38. See Wolf, supra note 36 (referencing agricultural usage of surface water).
Many Arkansas surface waterbodies support multiple uses. Such uses may on occasion
conflict. See Taylor Bay Protective Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 687 F. Supp. 1319, 1326
(E.D. Ark. 1988) (addressing allegations by White River Taylor Bay residents and
recreational users that levee district pumping stations impaired fishing, boating, and
skiing because of increase of silt and sediment).
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surface water." Approximately 47% of the state's population use
surface water as a drinking water source.'
C. Impairment of the Resource
There is concern that threats hang over some waterbodies or
watersheds. 4' A May 2000 EPA report summarized the number of
shoreline miles of streams/rivers and acres of lakes/wetlands in
Arkansas that it believes are not meeting applicable CWA WQS.4" The
report also included a state-by-state breakdown of the data. Arkansas
streams/rivers were stated to be impaired by:
* Sedimentation; 910 shoreline miles
* Nutrients; 213 shoreline miles
* Pathogens; 218 shoreline miles
• Toxics/Metals/Inorganics; 45 shoreline miles
* Toxics/Organics; 79 shoreline miles
* Mercury; 555 shoreline miles
* Pesticides; 0 shoreline miles."'
Arkansas lakes/wetlands were stated to be impaired by:
" Sedimentation; 3,045 acres
" Nutrients; 4,924 acres
" Pathogens; 35 acres
0 Toxics/Metals/Inorganics; 4,413 acres
" Toxics/Organics; 0 acres
* Mercury; 25,853 acres
" Pesticides; 0 acres."
39. See D.C. Wolf& T.C. Daniel, Water Quality, ARK. FARMREs., Nov.-Dec. 1989,
at 4 (referring to Arkansas' role as a leading rice producer because of high quality
ground and surface water).
40. See Strategic Plan, supra note 35, at 14.
41. The degradation of Upper White River Watershed water quality motivated
Arkansas and Missouri to enter into an agreement to work together to protect it. See
White River MOA, supra note 37. The agreement notes, "[w]hile water quality in the
Upper White River Watershed is generally good, some signs of degradation have been
appearing during recent years." Id.
42. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ATLAS OF AMERICA'S POLLUTED WATERS
4 (EPA 840-B-00-002) (2000). The report based its conclusions on 1998 data that





The contamination or pollution of surface water by human activities
is not a strictly modem phenomenon. References to the loss or
impairment of waterbodies due to the activities of man are found
throughout recorded history. Nevertheless, arguably only since the
beginning of the second half of the twentieth century has there been a
general recognition of the aggregate effect of various pollutant sources
on surface water resources.45
A. Effects/Types/Sources of Surface Water Pollutants
Countless types of substances or materials continuously enter
United States surface water. Such substances may be in the form of
liquids, solids, or even gasses. They are generated or discharged
directly or indirectly by almost any human activity. The only difference
between washing one's hands and manufacturing automobiles in terms
of water pollution is likely the degree of impact. Both activities will
result in the discharge of pollutants into area surface water.
1. Effects
The physical effect or impact of a given discharge on surface water
quality will depend on the quantity and characteristics of both the
pollutant and the body of water/environment it enters.' Adverse
45. For example, a Florida appellate court noted in 1970:
Historically, the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the State of
Florida have dealt rather gingerly with industries and governmental agencies
who have been guilty of defiling our environment. An applicable aphorism,
"Sometimes things have to get worse before they can get better," is
appropriate when considering the problems oftoday's environment. Ecology
is the "IN" subject of today's citizenry, as well it should be. An airplane
pilot can readily recognize the tremendous increase of smoke and haze over
the cities of Florida, which only a few years ago enjoyed clear and unlimited
visibility. A fisherman in the streams of this state has difficulty escaping
floating garbage, noxious odors, and beer cans by the grass. Our beaches,
especially those situated in an area where a city pumps its sewage into the
ocean, are uninhabitable. These are conditions that confront us today. Man,
of all animals, pollutes his habitat the greatest.
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Florida Air & Water Pollution Control Comm'n, 237 So. 2d 797,
798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
46. A waterbody can also be affected by activities that do not involve the discharge
of pollutants. Withdrawals from a waterbody and/or their reconfiguration or
manipulation can cause impacts. See Joanna M. Miller, City's Thirst Poses Threat to
556 [Vol. 23
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
waterbody impacts may range from depletion of oxygen47 or a change
in pH,48 to the receipt of substances which pose a hazard to various
organisms (including humans) if ingested. These conditions may
respectively stress an aquatic ecosystem,49 make it uninhabitable for
certain species of fish,5" or eliminate a waterbody as a drinking water
source.
The severity of the impact on a waterbody of a given discharge will
vary. Some discharges may have no effect on a waterbody habitat or
species that occupy it. In contrast, a series of discharges, or in some
instances a single spill,5 can reduce or eliminate one or more species in
a particular waterbody habitat. Even small spills of common substances
can have significant impacts in some circumstances.52
Waterway; Environment: The Ventura River Serves Urban Water Needs, but Siphoning Affects
the Life It Supports, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1994, at IA (discussing the potential impact
of Ventura, California water withdrawals on Ventura River fish population). An
example might be withdrawals from a waterbody that threaten one or more species. See
id. (referring to impact on steelhead in Ventura River). Likewise, the construction of
a dam can affect flow patterns adversely affecting a river ecosystem.
47. If oxygen levels are reduced below a certain point in a body of water, the
survival of the fish inhabiting it may be threatened. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The level of oxygen a particular fish needs to
survive is dependent on the species. See id. at 163.
48. See Seth Norman, Seven Great Comebacks: River Comebacks, OUTDOOR LIFE,
Apr. 1, 1999, at 48 (noting coal-burning plants' emissions affected pH of Cranberry
River).
49. One author notes:
A stress on an aquatic ecosystem can be categorized into one of three types:
(1) physical, (2) chemical, or (3) biological alterations. Physical alterations
include changes in water temperature, water flow, substrate/habitat type, and
light availability. Chemical alterations include changes in the loading rates
of biostimulatory nutrients, oxygen consuming materials and toxins.
Biological alterations include the introduction of exotic species. Activities
that result in a change in any of these environmental characteristics can lead
to the deformation of an organism's niche space, possibly leading to its
extinction.
Loeb, supra note 10, at 4.
50. See Norman, supra note 48, at 48 (noting emissions lowered pH at Cranberry
River to mid-4 levels).
51. Some spills have had dramatic impacts. An example is a large spill that
occurred on January 31, 2000 in Baia Mare, Romania. One hundred thousand cubic
meters of cyanide contaminated water flowed into three European rivers when a gold
mine tailings dam ruptured. See Aaron Schwabach, The Tisza Cyanide Disaster on
International Law, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,509 (2000). The Tisza River was reportedly
rendered lifeless for a distance of over 1,000 kilometers. See id. at 10,519.
52. An example is a fish kill (150,000 fish) that occurred in Rock Creek in
Washington, D.C. See Harry Jaffe, Sanctuary, WASHINGTONIAN, August 2000, at 62.
Federal and local officials determined a pesticide mix used to kill termites had entered
Rock Creek from an unknown source. See id. at 145. A federal agency official noted
5572001]
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Water pollution control programs generally recognize that a
particular stream or lake will receive some amount of pollutants. 3
Therefore, they tend to focus on the amount and types of pollutants a
given waterbody can receive and still support certain designated uses.
For example, what amount of a particular metal can be discharged
without threatening the aquatic life inhabiting the waterbody? 4
Likewise, an assessment of the various discharges' effect on a stream's
fecal coliform count will determine whether it is suitable for certain
recreational activities. Whether these and other uses can be maintained
depend upon both the characteristics of the discharge and the physical
aspects of the waterbody. The quantity of pollutants that a waterbody
can accept and still maintain the desired or designated uses is known as
its assimilative capacity. Assimilative capacity is therefore an important
component of the calculation that is undertaken to determine the
controls that the federal or state water pollution control programs may
impose on a discharging facility.
2. Types
The CWA generally places pollutants or parameters into three
categories: conventional, toxic, and non-conventional.
a. Conventional Pollutants/Parameters
Total suspended solids ("TSS"), biological oxygen demand
("BOD"), fecal coliform, high or low pH, oil, and grease are denomi-
nated conventional pollutants or parameters." These substances absorb
oxygen from water. 6 Parameters such as BOD, chemical oxygen
demand ("COD"), or TSS are indicators or markers for the presence of
certain pollutants.
in regard to the amount of pesticide mix involved: "It didn't take much," says Park
Service resource specialist Bill Yeman. "It could have been somebody cleaning out a
bucket." Id.
53. The federal CWA language referencing the elimination of all discharges by
1985 is a goal as opposed to a binding mandate. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994).
54. See, e.g., Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. EPA, 954 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1992)
(determining impact of wastewater containing copper on waterbody).
55. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4)(1994); John C. Dernbach, The UnfocusedRegulation
of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8 n.20 (1997).
56. See Dernbach, supra note 55, at 8.
57. In explaining the term "parameter," the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
noted that the term:
has been used to describe BOD, TSS, pH and similar measures because of
[Vol. 23558
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1. Biological Oxygen Demand/Chemical Oxygen Demand
Organic materials consume oxygen as they break down or decay in
a waterbody. Organic compounds in various oxidation states may be
referred to as "total organic carbon" ("TOC").3 Carbon compounds can
be oxidized further by biological or chemical processes.59 The term
BOD refers to a measurement of the oxygen requirement exerted by
microorganisms,' ° and COD refers to the amount of an oxidant that
reacts with a sample of the water under laboratory conditions.6' It
quantifies the amount of oxygen consumed by various microorganisms
in metabolizing organic matter in wastewater.62
2. Total Suspended Solids
The measurement of TSS is used as an indicator of the physical
quality of the waterbody.' The term TSS refers to the amount of solid
matter suspended in the water." An excessive amount of TSS can
inhibit light transmission in the waterbody which is needed for
photosynthesis.'
their function. In mathematics, a parameter is defined as an "arbitrary
constant," a variable that keeps a constant role in a formula as it takes on
different (arbitrary) numerical values .... For all EPA regulations, BOD
and the like keep a constant role in what they are, and how they are
measured, stay the same even as they take on different numerical values for
the acceptable level in each industrial category depending on the available
technology for that category.
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Tests for BOD or
other parameters are often used to develop engineering criteria in the design of
wastewater treatment plants. See VERSCHUEREN, supra note 15, at 46.
58. See AM. PUBLIC HEALTH ASs'N, AM. WATER WORKS ASS'N,WATER ENV'T FED'N,
STANDARD METHODS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF WATER AND WASTEWATER 5-18 (20th ed.
1998) [hereinafter STANDARD METHODS].
59. See id.
60. See id. at 5-1. For example, BOD5 is a reference to the oxygen-depleting
capacity of effluent over a five day period. See id. at 5-3 to 5-6.
61. Seeid.at5-13.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 2-54.
64. See STANDARD METHODS, supra note 58, at 2-54.




Fecal coliform are bacteria that indicate the presence of pathogenic
microorganisms." Such microorganisms are associated with waterborne
diseases such as typhoid fever, amebic dysentery, gastroenteritis, and
cholera.67
4. pH
The parameter pH is a measure of the activity of the hydrogen-ions
in solution." The pH range is usually represented as ranging from 0 to
14.69 It is desirable to control pH within a range favorable to the
organisms involved in the wastewater treatment process and the
discharge's receiving stream.
5. Nutrients
Algae are a naturally occurring component of the aquatic commu-
nity. 0 They depend on nitrogen, phosphorus, and other nutrients in a
waterbody.7 An algae population may expand as nutrient loadings are
increased.' Nutrients pose a problem if a waterbody receives excess
amounts of them.' The excess nutrients may stimulate excessive plant
growth. Problems may also develop when the algae die. 4  The
66. See Letter from Marysia Jastrzebski, Engineer Supervisor, NPDES Branch,
Water Division, ADPC&E, to L. Garrison, Lieutenant Malvern Water Works, NPDES
PermitNo. AR0034126 (June 5, 1995) (pointing out presence of fecal coliform bacteria
is an indicator of potentially dangerous bacterial contamination) (on file with author).
67. See id. Chlorination is a commonly used method to reduce fecal coliform
levels. Id. at 1203. See also Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 501 F. Supp. 1007, 1009
(E.D. Mich. 1980).
68. See STANDARD METHODS, supra note 58, at 4-86. The measurement reflects the
negative base ten log of the hydrogen ion concentration. See id Consequently, lower
values correspond to higher hydrogen ion concentrations, or the water is more acidic;
and higher values correspond to lower concentrations, or the water is more basic, or
alkaline. See id. at 4-87.
69. See id. Obviously, other pH values are possible, albeit unusual in
environmental settings. See id.
70. See STANDARD MEHODS, supra note 58, at 8-41.
71. See id. at 8-46.
72. See id
73. See Gabriel Calvo, Comment, VoluntaryPublic-Private Source Pollution Projects:
A Welcome Response to Regulatory Shortcomings Under the Clean Water Act, 3 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOuRCES J. 159, 161 (1999).
74. An article describing concern about the potential effect of a growing suburban
population on the Fox River in Illinois notes: "[wle've seen intense algae bloom from
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decomposing plants will utilize some portion of the waterbody's
oxygen." Therefore, DO concentrations may be lowered to unaccept-
able concentrations as the population dies.76
Strategies to control or manage algae growth often focus on the
"limiting nutrient."" This refers to a nutrient needed for plant growth
that is in the least supply." Consequently, management strategies focus
on reducing inputs of the least available nutrient as opposed to the one
in greatest supply. 9
b. Toxic Pollutants
The CWA denominates toxic pollutants as those that, alone or in
combination with other substances, will cause death, disease, behavioral
abnormalities, genetic mutations, or similar problems in organisms or
their offspring.8"
c. Non-Conventional Pollutants
Non-conventional pollutants are those which are neither conven-
tional nor toxic.8 The term includes ammonia, chlorine, color, and
iron.
2
all the phosphorous that's passing through. All those dams slow the water and increase
temperature. In summer especially, this allows the nutrients to stew, the algae to bloom
and the water's oxygen to decline. John Husar, Fox River Has Improved, but Trouble May
Lurk Upstream, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 1999, at 8.
75. See id.
76. See id. The effect will obviously vary depending upon several factors including
the size and nature of the waterbody, size of the algae population, weather conditions,
presence of toxins, and many other variables. See STANDARD METHODS, supra note 58,
at 10-1.
77. See Husar, supra note 74, at 8.
78. See id.
79. Seeid.
80. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994); see also Dembach, supra note 55, at8.
81. See Roy A. Hoagland & Jean G. Watts, Federal Minimums: Insufficient to Save
the Bay, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 635, 646 (1995).
82. See id.; see also Mary Liz Brennikmeyer, Comment, The Ones That Got Away:
Regulating Escaped Fish and Other Pollutantsfrom Salmon Fish Farms, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.




A perception persists that pipes extending from the stereotypical
factories or manufacturing facilities represent the overwhelming source
of water pollutants in a given lake, river, or stream. In reality, such
facilities are not the sole, or in some instances, even the primary source
of pollutants entering a particular waterbody.Y Agricultural,"
silvicultural, construction," service,"M medical,"" food preparation/
83. An example of the array of activities that can to varying degrees affect a
particular waterbody is found in a study undertaken by Oklahoma of the Illinois
River/Baron Fork Watershed. The sources determined to affect this watershed
included:
" Poultry litter and poultry production;
" Production of other livestock (cattle, hogs);
" Reduced or poorly maintained riparian zones;
" Streambank erosion;
" Poorly functioning private septic systems;
" Municipal permitted point source dischargers;
" Nutrient loadings from soil erosion;
" Recreational users (primarily canoers and swimmers on the river);
" Gravel mining operations;
- Commercial nurseries operating within the watershed;
" Solid waste disposal.
OKLAHOMA CONSERVATION COMSSION, WATERSHED RESTORATION ACTON STRATEGY
(WRAS) FOR THE ILLINOIS RIVER/BARON FORK WATERSHED 13 (1999).
84. An interesting example is a winery. Wineries generate wastewater during
barrel washing and bottling. See Glenn Wensloff, Winery Wastewater Update, WINES &
VINES, Sept. 1, 2000, at 68, 68. The wash-down water contains sugars from the grapes
which raises its BOD levels. See id.
85. See Joel Kirkland, Biologists Give Mud Creek a Check Runofffrom Construction
Sites Fuels Fears for Overall Health of Waterways, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, June 29,
1999, at 8B (discussing impact of construction activities on northwest Arkansas creek).
86. See James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack. Environmental Protection in the
Service Economy, 47 UCLA L. REV. 411 (1999) (discussing generally the environmental
consequences of shift from manufacturing to service economy).
87. For example, some hospital wastewater discharges may include a toxic
substance such as mercury. See James Harvie, Eliminating Mercury Use in Hospital
Laboratories: A Step TowardZero Discharge, PUB. HEALTH REPORTS, July 1, 1999, at 353.
An overview ofthe various environmental regulatory programs applicable to healthcare
facilities is found in Margaret M. Menicucci & Cheryl L. Coon, Environmental




processing,"' mining, 9 transportation,"° and even recreational 9' facili-
ties/activities can be the source of pollutants entering some waterbodies.
a. Point Sources
1. Public Owned Treatment Works
The United States has invested' heavily in water pollution
treatment facilities known as public owned treatment works
("POTW").93 Many municipalities have had rudimentary collection and
treatment systems in place since the late 1880s or early 1900s." The
88. See Andrew W. Donaldson et al., Pollution Prevention, Industrial Wastewater,
May/June 2000, at 27 (referring to wastewater discharged by deli food and condiment
producer).
89. See Julie Titone, Mines Must Decrease Metals Runoff. Rules Setfor CDA River, TE
SPoKANE SPOKESMAN REV., Aug. 22, 2000, at IA (discussing limits placed on mine
wastewater discharges).
90. Aircraft maintenance and service facilities are an example of transportation
sector activities that generate wastewater. See Ratana Kanluen & Sultan 1. Amer,
Friendly Skies and Waters, 11 ENVTL. PROTECTON 52 (2000). The wastewater may
contain kerosene, jet fuel, emulsified oils, acid/alkaline cleaners, solvents, suspended
solids, and heavy metals. See id.
91. See Splett, supra note 17, at 190 (referring to discharges of unburned fuel by
personal watercraft).
92. One estimate is that more than $76 billion has been spent in the United States
on new or expanded sewage treatment. Ross Anderson, Millions for New Sewage Plant,
and Nobody's Making a Stink, SEATTLE TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1999, at IA. The United States'
need for POTW treatment capacity has not been satisfied. A 1987 article noted that
$118 billion dollars needed to be expended on POTW treatment capacity during the
remaining years of the twentieth century. Smith, supra note 26, at 607 (citing 1978 and
1982 EPA reports). One Congressman noted that deteriorating drinking water and
wastewater infrastructure will be a priority in the 107th Congress. See Congress to
Address Infrastructure Crisis Through Bipartisan Initiative, Boehart Says, 31 ENV'T REP.
2026 (2000) (noting the Congressman's concern that over the next two decades the gap
between current expenditures and the amount required to continue similar efforts is $23
billion).
93. The reference to "public" is not always accurate. Besides municipalities, a
POTW owner or operator could include quasi-government authorities and private
companies. Martin Darrell, Criminal Prosecution at POTWs and the Environmental
Regulatory Partnership: Effective Deterence but at a Cost, NATL EN TL. ENFORCEMENT J.,
Dec. 1999-Jan. 2000, at 3. The EPA submitted a 1992 report to Congress providing an
estimate of the future investment required to address the nation's POTW treatment
needs. See U.S. ENvTL. PROTECnON AGENCY, 1992 NEEDs SURVEY REPORT TO CONGRESS
(EPA832-R-93-002) (1993) [hereinafter 1992 Report]. POTW infrastructure/treatment
processes that were identified included secondary treatment, advanced treatment
infiltration/inflow correction, replacement/rehabilitation, new collector sewers, new
interceptor sewers, combined sewer overflows, and stormwater. See id. at 7.




facilities receive, treat, and subsequently discharge a significant
percentage of the wastewater generated in this country.95
POTWs have a unique operational challenge. The wastewater they
receive arrives from numerous or different off-site sources,96 and it
varies in its volume and characteristics. The sources of the POTW's
influent are many of the industrial, commercial, and other facilities
generating wastewater in the community or region. These facilities have
chosen' to discharge into a POTW as opposed to an area waterbody."
This circumstance might pose a problem because many POTWs were
initially designed to treat domestic or residential sewage.9 A POTW
might be unable to effectively treat other types of wastewater without
adding or expanding certain controls/processes."°
95. An EPA attorney noted another unique aspect of POTW operation: "... while
they have one foot in the regulated community due to their discharges to surface
waters, they also regulate the wastes entering their systems for treatment." Darrell,
supra note 93, at 3.
96. Facilities are allowed to discharge into the POTW in accordance with a permit,
authorization, or agreement that contains various limits and monitoring requirements.
However, a particular concern is individuals or companies illegally discharging
pollutants and contaminants into the sewer system. Wastes and contaminants are
sometimes illegally released into the system to avoid the costs of legal disposal or
treatment options. See, e.g., United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336 (11 th Cir. 1997)
(addressing criminal CWA prosecution of individual dumping petroleum substances
into sewer). Illicit discharges do not solely originate from dumping materials into the
system. POTWs occasionally have to contend with facilities that are authorized to use
the system but surreptitiously discharge prohibited materials. See Dan Herbeck,
Troubled Waters; Polluter Awaiting Jail Admits He 'Made Mistakes , BUFFALO NEWS, Apr.
24, 2000, at IA (reporting that facility bypassed its monitoring system through
installation of hoses and pipes to discharge acid waste into sewer system).
97. Some facilities might have an incentive to discharge certain materials to a
POTW because their disposal by this method may exempt them from being classified
as a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") hazardous waste. Section
1004(27) of RCRA exempts from the scope of the statute "solid or dissolved materials
in domestic sewage." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1994). This provision is known as the
Domestic Sewage Exclusion. SeeNatural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, No. 89-
2980, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5334 at *7-8 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1991). The exemption
includes industrial wastes that are domestic sewage and discharged into POTWs. See
id. at *8. The exemption's purpose is to avoid redundancy of subjecting hazardous
waste mixed with domestic sewage to RCRA management requirements ifthe materials
are already subject to appropriate CWA pretreatment. See id. at *8 n. 16.
98. See Tod A. Gold, EPA's Pretreatment Program, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 459,
460 (1989). The term POTW encompasses treatment facilities and sewers and pipes
that convey wastewater to the treatment facility. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.3(o) (2000).
99. The term "domestic sewage" means "untreated sanitary wastes that pass
through a sewer system." 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(IXii) (2000).
100. See Gold, supra note 98, at 462. Basic POTW processes are generally designed
to treat so-called conventional pollutants such as BOD, TSS, pH, fecal coliform, and
oil and grease. See id. Some compounds may be toxic to the microorganisms used in
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A POTW's sewer and drain system may also receive significant
amounts of stormwater and snowmelt."'0 This series of pipes and drains
is known as a combined sewer system ("CSS"). "2 The combined receipt
of both wastewater and wet weather flows may exceed the capacity of
the CSS in some municipalities and other areas. These systems utilize
overflow discharge points known as combined sewer overflows.0 3 Such
overflows can have a significant impact on water quality."° The
discharge from these points may include untreated wastewater during
some wet weather events. 0 5
Eliminating such overflows does not necessarily require a techno-
logically advanced system or fix. An overloaded system may simply be
replaced with separate conduits for wastewater and precipitation
runoff."° Such work is, however, expensive;0 7 it can involve extensive
construction and demolition.'" Municipalities and other governmental
entities may therefore have to pass significant costs to system users.1 9
EPA has estimated that nationwide replacement of CSS's would cost
$40 billion."0
certain POTW treatment processes. See VERSCHUEREN, supra note 15, at 49.
101. See Jeff Mann, Economic Infeasibility and EPA 's 1994 Combined Sewer Overflow
Polity: A Successful Solution in Massachusetts Still Leaves a Turbid Understanding Between
State and Federal Officials, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 857,858 (1999).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Other local conditions such as the presence of a high water table can contribute
to overflows. See Andrew G. Wright, Miami Looks for Alternatives to Blue-Chip Sewer
Overhaul, ENGINEERING NEws-REcoRD, Jan. 1, 1996, at 22 (reporting shallow depth of
groundwater is likely to make compliance more difficult).
105. See Mann, supra note 101, at 858.
106. See Ross Sandier, Environmental Mandates: Water and Sewer Fees Rise as Capital
Costs Increase, CrTYLAW, July/Aug. 1998, at 73, 76. Another option is the construction
of large holding tanks. See id.
107. See id. (noting that the high costs of New York City's water and sewer
improvement program made even environmentalists "fret").
108. See id.
109. See Wright, supra note 104, at 22. The City of Miami expected to spend $1.1
billion to rehabilitate its wastewater collection and treatment system, doubling city
residents' water and sewer bills. See id.
110. See id. The size of municipal POTWs and their associated collection system
will vary. The City of Los Angeles POTW and its associated collection system consists
of four plants and 6,500 miles of mainline sewers with a treatment capacity of 550
million gallons per day. See Farhana Mohamco et al., VOHAP Emissions from a
Wastewater Collection System, Presentation at the Air & Waste Management
Association's 93rd Annual Meeting (June 2000). A small community may simply have




Countless numbers of facilities and activities discharge pollutants
into surface waterbodies. However, not all point source discharges are
a result of a planned process or activity. An example might be small
spills of petroleum products that occasionally occur when transferred
between above-ground tanks at a bulk storage plant. "' The spillage can
mix with rainwater to become part ofa discharge."' Such discharges are
unplanned but nevertheless occur."'
b. Non-Point Sources
The EPA has stated that non-point source pollutants are normally
associated with agricultural, silvicultural, and urban runoff."" A
substantial portion of such discharges tend to be generated by soil
disturbance and sedimentation."5 A 1992 EPA report noted non-point
source pollution "generally results from land runoff, atmospheric
deposition, drainage, or seepage of contaminants.""" The stormwater
runoff or flow can mobilize various pollutants such as metals, oil and
grease, and nutrients.""
111. See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 68 (3rd Cir. 1990).
112. See id.
113. Many rivers and streams are occasionally impacted by pollutants caused by
accident or mishap. A National Park Service official noted the variety of substances
released by accidents that affect the Buffalo River in Arkansas: "[in the past few years,
vehicle wrecks along the riverway have sent gasoline, diesel, liquified chicken fat and
blood into the water. .. ." Jason B. Harmon, Officials Scramble to Halt Sludge from
Entering River, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Dec. 13, 2000, at 5B.
114. See Calvo, supra note 72, at 1 10 (citing U.S. ENV'L. PROTECTION AGENCY,
REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, NON-POINT SOURCE GUIDANCE 3 (1987)).
115. See id. For example, non-point source stormwater runoff can cause the
discharge of a nutrient such as phosphorous by dislodging sediment and organic matter
from pervious and impervious surfaces. See Bryan G. Wigginton, Dealing With the
Deluge, ENVTL. PROTECTION, Nov. 2000, at 26. The discharges will include material
from the urban/residential setting such as fertilizers, decaying yard debris, and animal
wastes. See id.
116. See Calvo, supra note 73, at 160 (citing U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
NATIONAL WATER QuALrrY INvENTORY (1992)).
117. See Debra K. Rubin et al., U.S. Faces aDraining Experience, ENGINEERINGNEWS-




The insertion of pollutants into surface water by atmospheric
deposition is significant in some areas." 8 Atmospheric pollutants can
deposit on the land surface and migrate into a waterbody and/or
mobilize the migration of pre-existing surface contaminants."9 They
can also deposit directly into a waterbody."2 °
B. Water Pollution Reduction/Prevention
1. Control/Treatment
A variety of control and/or treatment techniques are available to
reduce or eliminate the discharge of pollutants into surface water. The
technique or process used depends upon the type of pollutant(s) to be
recovered and/or collected. Further, the complexity of the technology
can range from simplistic treatment ponds to a complicated metals
removal process.
Many water pollution control techniques are not new. Various
facilities were required to install initial controls years ago by both
federal and state programs. These controls and techniques have
eliminated or reduced the discharge of a significant amount of pollut-
ants. Nevertheless, the federal and state programs continue to press for
the removal of a greater percentage and/or additional types of pollutants
from various discharges of wastewater. Achieving these advanced rates
or expanded removal can entail disproportionately greater costs. In
other words, the ability to remove additional increments of pollutants
can be expensive."
118. See, e.g., Robinson Shaw, Acid Rain Eats Away at Virginia Trout Streams (visited
Feb. 2,2001) <http://www.enn.com/enn-news-archive/2000/10/10252000/acidstream
39541.asp> (suggesting that acid rain caused by nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide
emissions is adversely affecting trout in Virginia streams).
119. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 168 F.3d 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The
General Motors Corporation ("GM") alleged that atmospheric deposition of metals
(copper, lead, and zinc) was causing one of its plants to exceed its NPDES stormwater
permit limits for these parameters. See id. at 1379. Specifically, GM alleged that some
of the metals in the plant stormwater originated in part from atmospheric deposition
and/or caused metals to leach from the roof of the building and gutters. See id
120. See id.
121. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
court noted in regard to BOD removal: "The first step treated a pound of BOD most
cheaply; each successive step removed a pound of BOD in a more costly manner than
the previous step." Id.
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This discussion primarily addresses efforts to remove specified
pollutants from wastewater prior to being discharged in a lake or stream.
Any discussion of water pollution control techniques cannot, however,
overlook the ability of a waterbody or other natural media to assimilate
pollutants." Every river, creek, or lake has the ability to treat or
assimilate some amount of pollutants. Unfortunately, a waterbody's
ability to maintain the desired ambient conditions may be overwhelmed
by the volume and/or type of pollutants received. Therefore, the
assimilative capacity of a waterbody will be an important determinant
of the types of controls applied to various sources discharging into it.
a. Levels
1. Primary Treatment
Primary treatment is generally understood to mean the lowest level
of wastewater treatment."2  It usually denominates the physical
treatment of effluent through screening and gravity settling. 24 The
treatment process is initiated after wastewater flows through a pumping
station into the facility. 25 Both screening and grit removal operations
are typically employed to remove debris and other unwanted
122. Natural bodies or media can assist in removing pollutants from wastewater
generated by a public or private wastewater. For example, some municipalities have
used the pollutant removal capabilities of a marsh or wetlands as a component of their
POTW's wastewater treatment system. See Lynn MacDonald, Water Pollution Solution:
Builda Marsh, AM. FORESTS, July 1994, at 26 (discussing municipalities' nationwide use
of system of marshes to treat wastewater). The 1994 article estimated that more than
300 municipalities use natural treatment systems. See id. Some POTWs and other
facilities utilize natural media such as wetlands to treat to some extent their effluent;
for example, in Arkansas there are approximately twenty facilities that have constructed
wetlands as part of the treatment process. See Memorandum from David Ramsey,
Water Division, ADEQ, to authors (Dec. 5, 2000) (on file with author). The majority
of the facilities are small municipalities. See id. There are also several treatment
systems at small non-municipal facilities. See id. The importance of natural cleansing
is illustrated by the consequences of paving or otherwise covering large areas with an
impervious surface. One author notes that such coverage prevents percolation, thereby
impeding the natural pollutant processing that normally occurs in the soil. See Chester
L. Arnold, Jr. & James C. Gibbons, Impervious Surface Coverage: The Emergence ofa Key
Environmental Indicator, J. OF THE AM. PLANNING ASS'N, Mar. 22, 1996, at 243.
123. See Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (D. Ha.
1993).
124. See id.
125. See Howard County v. Davidsonville Area Civic & Potomac River Ass'ns, Inc.,
527 A.2d 772, 776 n.12 (Md. App. 1987).
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Secondary treatment generally involves the use of biological
techniques (i.e., digestion by microorganisms) subsequent to the
primary (i.e., physical) treatment. 2 The biological treatment process
may take place in a lagoon or other containment 9 facility. 3 ' The
effectiveness of these biological systems will vary depending on factors




Advanced treatment procedures encompass efforts to further reduce
pollutants in the wastewater such as nutrients.3 3 The additional
processes might include the addition of chemicals for purposes of
settling and coagulation of suspended solids. 33  In addition, the
procedure might include a nitrification process to convert ammonia into
nitrates and nitrites to reduce the discharge of oxygen demanding




128. See Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 821 F. Supp. at 1373.
129. One can utilize a variety of containment devices or enclosures. See Wensloff,
supra note 84, at 68 (referring to biological treatment systems known as bioreactors
which utilize cement vaults or tanks).
130. See Steven M. Lane, Muddy Waters, WATERENV'T&TEcH., Nov. 2000, at 57-60
(discussing use of lagoon systems by small to medium sized wastewater treatment
facilities).
131. See id.
132. See City of Sarasota v. EPA, 813 F.2d 1106, 1108 n.4 (1 th Cir. 1987).
133. See Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 821 F. Supp. at 1373.






Treatment techniques involving filters and/or settling are often used
to remove solids suspended in the wastewater. 36 POTWs and other
facilities usually employ a biological treatment process'37 whereby
primary clarified sewage is applied to a filter bed filled with stone
media.'38 This process is called a trickling filter.'39 Pollutants are
converted into a form that will settle out in clarifiers. 4 ° The clarifiers
are designed to remove suspended solids and organic materials through
sedimentation to the bottom of a tank and move floatables to the
surface. 4 '
A plant's biological treatment activity is affected by various factors:
cold temperatures slow bacterial activity; 42 supplies of air and food
must also be adequate; and the pH of the wastewater is also important.43
2. Chemical
Wastewater may be treated by the addition of chemicals to remove
or destroy certain contaminants.'" An example of this process is
136. See R.F. Becker, Sustainable Development Through Recycling Wastewater and
Achieving Zero Discharge by Using a Unique Distillation, Presentation at the 93rd Annual
Air and Waste Management Association Meeting 2 (June 2000). Another common
treatment technique is air stripping. See VERSCHUEREN, supra note 15, at 51. Examples
might include the use of an air-sparged vessel or dispersed air flotation. See id.
137. The court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Refining &
Marketing, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1992), noted in referencing a facility's
biological treatment process that it: "... actually eats the pollutants contained in the
water."
138. See In re Application for a Renewal and Modification of a State Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("SPDES") Permit (NY 0020265) pursuant to Article
17 of the Environmental, Conservation Law ("ECL") by the Village of Delhi, DEC
Project No. 41850397, 1987 N.Y. ENV LEXIS 27 (October 23, 1987).
139. See id.
140. See id
141. See Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 821 F. Supp. at 1373.
142. See Texaco, 800 F. Supp. at 5.
143. "The measure ofpH provides an estimate of the acidic agent (hydrogen ion)
and the basic agent (hydroxide ion)." United States v. WCI Steel, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d
810, 813 n. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1999). See also supra notes 68-69.
144. See generally Becker, supra note 136, at 2. For example, because solvents are
less soluble than water they may be used to extract certain organic compounds from
wastewater. See VERSCHUEREN, supra note 15, at 51.
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Various costs"4 and/or liabilities" are associated with the discharge
of wastewater by a facility or activity. Consequently, an increasing
number of agencies or industries are questioning whether in certain
circumstances it may be more prudent to invest in the process changes
or equipment modifications necessary to reduce or eliminate such
discharges.'" The motivation to reduce or eliminate a discharge may
increase if the regulatory or permit limits applicable to a facility's
discharges are tightened. 49 However, more stringent limits may entail
greater treatment costs. Regardless, the cost-savings derived from
pollution prevention/reduction efforts will be compared to the financial
outlay necessary to achieve it.'50
145. See In re Borough of Naugutuck, Connecticut NPDES Permit: CT0100641,
1998 EPA ALJ LEXIS 67, at *5 (Aug. 26, 1998).
146. See E. Susan Roothaan et aL., Pollution Prevention in the Metal Finishing Industry,
EM, Dec. 2000, at 23 (estimating that environmental expenses are typically 10-25% of
a facility's total production costs).
147. Liabilities might include penalties for regulatory violations or common law
actions for damages related to the discharge.
148. See generally Ted Wett, Entering Zero Limits; Chemical Companies Increasingly
Rely on Special Chemicals to Eliminate Wastewater Effluent; Water Treatment '96, CHEMICAL
MARKETING REP., Oct. 2, 1996, at SR12. "Other factors encouraging zero discharge
involve higher costs for freshwater makeup sources, pretreatment and discharge, and
local regulations, which may dictate that a given facility not discharge any waste
process streams." Id.
149. For example, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency noted in a 2000
guidance document that a new federal EPA analytical method had the capability to
measure mercury at very low levels in wastewater. See OHIO EPA, DIVISION OF SURFACE
WATER, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AS INDUSTRIAL LOCAL PRETREATMENT
LIMITS, PRETREATMENT GUIDANCE 1 (2000) (citing EPA Method 1631). This enhanced
detection capability was believed to allow the agency to determine compliance with
much lower effluent limits. See id. The Ohio agency therefore noted: "[w]ith the limits
becoming more restrictive, Ohio EPA is looking for alternative methods of regulating
pollutants ofconcem. Ohio EPA promotes pollution prevention rather than high-priced
end-of-pipe treatment technologies that may or may not meet the desired limits." Id.
150. See Roothaan, supra note 146, at 23.
Even with the economic benefits, many metal finishers have yet to make full
use of pollution prevention in their day-to-day business processes. There are
two main reasons for the general lack of implementation: First, there is a
lack of available capital; and second, the complexity of metal finishing




Pollutants may be eliminated in a number of ways. For example,
a facility might reconfigure its process to recycle the wastewater which
results in a closed loop system.' In the alternative, a plant might
determine it is possible to produce the product or provide the service
without generating wastewater.
5 2
Congress has mandated that EPA ensure its programs encourage the
prevention or reduction of pollution whenever feasible. 3' The agency
has interpreted this requirement to include an assessment of whether a
particular CWA categorical effluent limit will encourage pollution,
prevention, or reduction. " Such activities reflect the agency's attempt
to integrate source reduction into its programs. 5 If prevention or
reduction is not feasible from a technical or economic standpoint,
recycling or reuse of the captured material is encouraged. 56
151. See Rick Marette et al., Growth Without Discharge, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 25
(describing a power tool manufacturer that eliminated discharge by reusing the
wastewater). In order for a facility to reuse or recycle wastewater treatment may still
be required. See id (referring to treatment needed to reuse wastewater in facility
process). However, a facility may be able to treat the wastewater to less stringent
standards if recycled as opposed to discharging to an adjacent stream or POTW where
WQS or pretreatment requirements apply respectively. See id. (providing motivation
for POTW's water reuse to avoid the stringent POTW pretreatment standards).
152. Examples include various hospitals' efforts to address mercury discharges.
The hospital will capture the substances and/or use less harmful alternatives. See id.
153. See Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 13101 (1994).
154. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 50,388, 50,390, 50,391 (Sept. 21, 1998) (discussing an
EPA review of pollution prevention/reduction opportunities associated with
pharmaceutical manufacturing category effluent limits).
155. See id. at 50,391.
156. The subsequent handling, reuse, and/or recycling of such materials can
potentially trigger other federal or state environmental regulatory programs. For
example, in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per
curiam), the petroleum industry and EPA disagreed as to whether oil-bearing
wastewaters from which some amount of oil is recovered constitute "solid wastes"
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). See id. at 54-58. See
also 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976). The term "solid waste" is defined at 40 C.F.R. §
261.2(a)(1) (2000). The classification of such wastewaters as solid waste potentially
triggers the application of RCRA permitting requirements to the recycling or recovery
of such substances. Various issues associated with the recycling and/or combustion of
RCRA hazardous waste are addressed in Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Mary Ellen Henry,
Hazardous Waste Combustion: Key Regulatory Developments, Presentation at the Air and
Waste Management Association's 89th Annual Meeting (June 1996).
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2. Water!Wastewater Conditions Assessment/Prediction
a. Sampling/Monitoring
The identification of both the type and amount of substances in a
facility's wastewater is an important component of any water pollution
control program. Sampling results may be used to determine regulatory
requirements and/or compliance with applicable laws. The sampling
and testing methods used will vary depending upon the type of
substance being assessed.
Not all sampling takes place at the end of the pipe.' Waterbodies
themselves are also often sampled. Both EPA and the states use
waterbody sampling data to make programmatic decisions.5 8 Agencies
may, for example, sample a waterbody to determine whether it has
benefitted from previously imposed limits on dischargers.' The
reasons for sampling a river, stream, or lake are varied."W A typical
objective is the determination of the ambient conditions in the
waterbody at a particular point in time. There may also be interest in
157. One author notes that most sampling has traditionally taken place at the end
of the pipe. See Ruth Patrick, What Are the Requirements for an Effective Biomonitor?, in
BIOLOGICAL MONITORING OF AQUATIC SYSTEMS 23 (Sanford L. Loeb et al. eds., 1994).
158. The agency may undertake the sampling itself or rely on sampling results from
other sources if the resources are not available to undertake the desired work.
159. See generally Debra S. Knopman & Richard A. Smith, 20 Years of the Clean
Water Act: Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 35 ENV'T 16 (1993)
(referring to a United States General Accounting Office report noting that the federal
government had no reliable method of measuring environmental effect of spending
$130 billion to construct POTWs).
160. An Ohio Environmental Protection Agency guidance document lists a number
of situations it deems appropriate for placing a mandate to sample
upstream/downstream in a facility NPDES permit:
1. Where "net" limitations are included in the permit the entity will need to monitor
upstream intake water;
2. Where tiered permit limits are included in the permit the entity will need to
monitor the upstream or downstream flow in the receiving stream;
3. Where biomonitoring (bioassay) requirements are included in the permit and the
testing protocols include upstream and/or downstream stations;
4. Where there is a need to assess upstream water quality that is related to the
permit (e.g., hardness and metal limits);
5. Where there is a need to assess downstream water quality that is related to the
permit (e.g., mixing zones); or
6. The other central office directives that recommend upstream and/or downstream
sampling stations for specific parameters (such as hexavalent chromium) that are
included in the permit.
See OHIO EPA, DIvISION OF SURFACE WATER, NATIONAL POLLUTION DISCHARGE




assessing the impact of point and non-point sources. In addition,
sampling of a lake or stream may be undertaken to identify the presence
of substances associated with an individual or multiple discharges or
other activities in a waterbody.
Ambient surface water assessment techniques utilized to determine
waterbody quality may include: (1) physical measurements (flow, 6
temperature, depth, etc.); (2) constituent/parameter measurements
(DO, metals, fecal coliform, etc.); and (3) toxicity/biological measure-
ments.162
161. The source or destination of water in a particular area may need to be
determined. One method used to make such a determination is known as a tracer test.
The Southwestern Electric Power Company ("SWEPCO") proposed a tracer program
to determine the source of certain waters captured by its Arkansas Flint Creek Power
Plant's water recovery system. See Letter from Jay A. Pruett, Manager of
Environmental Affairs, SWEPCO, to Director of ADPC&E (March 26, 1984)
(comprising a Permit Modification Request) (on file with author). An inflow water
source determination tracer evaluation was therefore undertaken. See id. The tracer
was a waterbody that had high sulfate levels as compared to those typically found in
that region of Arkansas. See id. See also Donald Gayla, Permitting and Compliance
Programs for Toxic Discharges; National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, POWER
ENGINEERING, Feb. 1992, at 35 (describing the use of dye to determine flow for purposes
of determining mixing zone).
162. See Gayla, supra note 161, at 35. "Toxicity monitoring" refers to "whole
effluent testing" ("WET"). It involves assessing the impact ofa wastewater discharge
mixed with the receiving waters on certain organisms (minnows, etc.). See id. See also
Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species and What Does That Say About
Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings"?, 80 IOWA
L. REV. 297, 321 (1995). This monitoring can be useful when it is difficult or
expensive to assess effluent that contains multiple chemicals or substances. See id It
helps clarify the fate and ecological effects of one or multiple pollutants. See Arthur
J. Stewart & James M. Loar, SPATIAL BIOLOGICAL MONITORING OF AQUATIC SYsTEMs 94
(Sanford L. Loeb et al., 1994). The information generated enables an agency, facility,
or other parties to make more accurate predictions about relationships between
contaminants and ecological risk. See id. "Biological monitoring" refers to a
comparison ofthe abundance and diversity of organisms in one waterbody with similar
waters elsewhere. See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium
Elektron, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20748, at *6-7 (D. N.J., March 9, 1995) rev'd
on other grounds, 123 F.3d II (3rd Cir. 1997) (referring to a biological study
undertaken to determine the impact of a facility's effluent, if any, on a creek). See
also Pier Francesco & Oscar Ravera, European Perspective on Biological Monitoring, in
BIOLOGICAL MONITORING OF AQUATIC SYSTEMS 35 (Sanford Loeb et al., 1994). An
aquatic biologist contrasted the role of biological monitoring with sampling of single
chemical and physical parameters:
The long-term effects of non-point source pollution have often been
determined through chemical monitoring. But recently, research has pointed
to the importance of biological monitoring .... Traditional water quality
sampling methods have emphasized analyses of physical and chemical
parameters such as dissolved oxygen, pH, temperature, nitrates and




The EPA or a state agency will often mandate the type of sampling
and analytical method that must be undertaken to measure a particular
substance, discharge,'" or condition.'6  A method will specify various
techniques or activities associated with the task. For example, different
preservation techniques are used to prepare a sample for analysis
depending on whether it is a grab or composite sample.'"
a. Grab Sampling
A grab sample is an individual sample collected at a specified
period of time. 67 An analysis of a grab sample provides a measurement
of pollutant concentrations in the wastewater at a particular point in
time.' Grab samples are typically used in the wastewater context when
the characteristics do not vary significantly during the day, and where
there is a need to measure these parameters quickly before the value of
the parameters can rapidly change due to time and temperature
conditions.'69 Examples of such parameters include DO and pH.70
a snapshot of water quality on the day of the sampling, and may provide no
information on recent degraded conditions that have since cleared up.
Melinda Tuhus, Checking on Bugs to Test the Health of the Qinnipiac,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1998, at 17.
163. Different sampling and analytical methods are specified for various analytes.
For example, an atomic absorption spectrophotometer analytical method can measure
metals concentrations in samples taken by sampling methods that include acid
preservation. See Michael C. Newman, Measuring Metals and Metalloids in Water, in
SEDIMENT AND BIOLOGICAL TISSUES IN TECHNIQUES IN AQUATIC TOXICOLOGY 493 (Gary
K. Ostrander ed., 1996). Flame and flameless capabilities allow measurement of
elements present in mg/g to ug/kg. See id.
164. For example, stormwater requires that a facility be prepared to sample
immediately after initiation of a wet weather event. See Rubin, supra note 117, at 34.
165. For example, EPA regulations specify that "grab samples" of volatile organic
compounds must be collected almost instantaneously (i.e., less than 30 seconds of
elapsed time) and properly preserved. 64 Fed. Reg. 39,564, 39,580 (July 22, 1999)
(citing U.S. ENvTwL. PROTECTION AGENCY, COMPARISON OF VOLATILE ORGANIC ANALYSIS
COMPOSrING PROCEDuRES (EPA 821/R-95-035) (1995)).
166. See Int'l Union v. Amerace Corp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (D.N.J. 1990).
167. 40 C.F.R. § 403.7(b)(2Xiv) (2000).
168. 64 Fed. Reg. 39,564, 39,580 (July 22, 1999).
169. See also In re Application of the Superintendent of Fish Culture, Bureau of






A composite sample is formed by mixing discrete samples. 7' in the
wastewater context, the number of discrete samples necessary for a
composite sample to be representative of the discharge depends upon
the variability of the pollutant concentration and the flow."
2. Instrument Capabilities/Limitations
A limiting factor for a particular sampling procedure or method
may be the minimum amount of the substance that can be measured
analytically with some degree of accuracy." I Laboratory analytical
techniques have both detection 74 and quantification limitations.75
Whether an analytical result exceeds either an established detection or
quantification limit can have regulatory consequences. 76 A result that
exceeds the detection as opposed to the quantification limit may
arguably only indicate a substance's presence. CWA enforcement or
regulatory decisions tied to conditions which require accurate measure-
171. 64 Fed. Reg. 39,564, 39,580 (1984). A discrete sample may also be referred
to as an "aliquot." See id
172. Id.
173. An Ohio Environmental Protection Agency guidance document notes:
All analytical methods and systems have a certain level of"noise" associated
with them. This "noise" is due to random variations in the analytical and
detection components of the system. When testing for contaminants at low
concentrations there is a point where the method's test results cannot be
distinguished from the "noise" level of the analytical system. The NPDES
permitting program needs a defined technique to determine whether a
contaminant has been detected, or whether the result may have just been
"noise."
OHIO EPA, DIvIsION OF SURFACE WATER, LIMITS BELOW QUANTIFICATION LEVELS, PERMIT
GUIDANCE 91 (1998).
174. Inaccuracy or variability may occur near the detection levels. See Harry F.
Klodowski, Jr., Complying With Water Quality Permit Limits: The Role of Analytic
Variability, JOURNAL OF ENmrL. REGULATION, Spring 1993, at 293.
175. See id. See also American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (per curiam).
176. See Klodowski, supra note 174, at 293. The author notes:
Because of the legal implications of National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) compliance monitoring, the uncertainty of
data is a legitimate concern. Determination of noncompliance, which could
result in enforcement actions, must be based on data that are highly reliable.
For example, ifunavoidable analytical variability causes a true concentration
of 4 to be measured as 6 and then compared with a present limit of 5, that
variability causes a false impression of non-compliance.
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ments are occasionally challenged as inappropriate.'" If the quantifica-
tion limit is exceeded there is some confidence that the identified
substance can also be accurately measured. Therefore, there may be
greater comfort in using such results to determine compliance.'7
The tendency toward lowering the permissible levels of toxics and
other pollutants has required corresponding analytical techniques that
can accurately identify them. The detection capability of various
analytical techniques has progressed over the past twenty-five years. 79
Detection capabilities continue to advance.'80 However, the available
analytical techniques might not in some instances be capable of
accurately measuring a substance.
A discussion of analytical method capabilities may reference two
terms: Method Detection Limit ("MDL") and Quantification Level
("QL"). The term MDL denominates the testing method's ability to
identify the substance at a particular concentration.'' QL is the
concentration at which the analytical method can both identify and
reliably quantify the amount of pollutant in the sample."
The detection capability of an analytical method may be an issue in
an enforcement action. For example, how are results that are deter-
177. In United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1336 (5th Cir. 1996),
a facility opposed an enforcement action by arguing in part that a number of the alleged
NPDES stormwater exceedances were within the range of measurement error of its
NPDES permit. The court responded that the measurement error was "plus or minus"
and therefore many of the sample results reading below permit limits could have been
exceedances. See id. at 1338.
178. See Klodowski, supra note 174, at 294.
179. See Clem Lay, Environmental Risk Target, Moving, GRAND RAPIDS J., Feb. 1,
1993, at 2.
Back in the 1950s, we were patting ourselves on the back because our
analytical methods could detect a chemical at a one part-per-million (ppm)
concentration. Fifteen years later, we were detecting parts per billion.
Methods that are now in place or under development measure parts per
million and in a few instances parts per quadrillion. I cannot conceive
anything that small. I'm not even sure how many zeros that would be.
Id.
180. 64 Fed. Reg. 39,564, 39,578 (July 22, 1999) (noting the lowered detection
limits resulting from modem analytical methods).
181. See OHIO EPA, supra note 173, at 296. "It's the minimum concentration at
which we can be confident that the effluent concentration is greater than zero." Id.
EPA defines MDL as "the minimum concentration of a substance that can be measured
and reported with 99% confidence that the analyte concentration is greater than zero
and is determined from analysis of a sample in a given matrix containing the analyte."
Id.
182. 65 Fed. Reg. 31,682, 31,701 (May 18, 2000).
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mined to be below the QL treated for enforcement purposes? Agency
positions on this issue may vary. 8 3
b. Modeling
Both the EPA and state water pollution control programs use water
quality models." 4 They answer various questions, support watershed
planning and analysis, and determine the effect of particular pollutants
on a waterbody.' 5 A model might, for example, assess wastewater
discharges by modeling BOD and resulting in-stream DO concentra-
tions. 6
Models can in some instances save time and expense by simulating
or predicting certain ambient conditions. If so, an agency or other group
might avoid some or all of the field work or measurements"" necessary
to reach certain conclusions." In particular, models are often used to
predict the impact of a discharge 9 on a particular waterbody.' 9 This
technique enables one to determine with various degrees of accuracy the
facility effluent limits necessary to support the uses that have been
designated for a waterbody. 9'
183. The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency position on this question is:
For the purposes ofassessing compliance, all sample results less than the QL
are considered to be in compliance. Detected concentrations less than the
QL should be reported on the monthly operating report as the concentration
given by the laboratory. To assess compliance with average limits, consider
all reported values less than the QL as zero.
See OHIO EPA, supra note 173, at 296.
184. Charles D. Case, Problems in Judicial Review Arising from the Use of Computer
Models and Other Quantitative Methodologies in Environmental Decisionmaking, 10 B.C.
ENVTh. AFF. L. REV. 251, 265 n.54 (1982) (referencing U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, SIMPLIFIED MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF WATER QuALrrY (1971)). See also
U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, COMPENDIUM OF TOOLS FOR WATERSHED ASSESSMENT
AND TMDL DEVELOPMENT (EPA 841-3-97-006) (1997).
185. See Case, supra note 184, at 265.
186. See id.
187. There are a variety of reasons that field measurements or sampling are not
undertaken. They include, but are not limited to, cost or timing issues.
188. See Case, supra note 184, at 275. "A computer model can be used to overcome
or at least alleviate difficulties in decisionmaking caused by this lack of data." Id.
189. They can also determine the impact of a structure such as a dam or a
waterbody. The use of Streater-Phelps model to make such a determination was
referenced in City of Springfield v. Illinois EPA, PCB No. 93-135, 1993 Ill. ENV LEXIS
1511, at "15 (Dec. 16, 1993) (Illinois Pollution Control Bd.).
190. A model has been defined as "an abstract, formal representation of a theory
about or empirical observation of, a defined set of facts or system." Case, supra note
184, at 254.
191. For example, modeling played an important role in the development of a
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Models do have limitations. Various types of data must be
incorporated into the model in order to run a simulation." While desk
top models are appropriate,'" the model may need to be calibrated and
verified prior to use."9  The greater the uncertainty or variability'95
associated with one or more model data components'" the more likely
the results will contain errors." The accuracy of a model will therefore
generally increase as data obtained by sampling/measurement replaces
projections/estimates.'" An agency may in certain circumstances
proposed trading program for reduction of nitrogen loads discharging into the Long
Island Sound Watershed. See WATERENVIRONMENT FEDERATION RESEARCH FOUNDATION,
NITROGEN CREDIT TRADING IN THE LONG ISLAND SOUND WATERSHED (PROJECT 97-1RM-
5B) [hereinafter LONG ISLAND]. A hydrodynamic model (LIS 3.0) established the
relationship between the impact of nitrogen sources and the resultant water quality in
this waterbody. See id. at 1-4. The analysis includes the determination of the
differential impact of both point and non-point sources in the watershed. See id.
192. The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency notes in regard to DO modeling:
"DO models require project-specific information and very little can be prescribed in
rules; thus, the rules are very basic." OHIO EPA, DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER, NH 3-N
ToxicITY AND DO MODELING, MODELING GUIDANCE 6 (1998).
193. See Dawson v. Alabama Dept. of Envtl. Mgt, No. 85-09, 1986 AL ENV
LEXIS I (Ala. Jan. 8, 1986).
194. See Hanks v. Costle, 501 F. Supp. 195,201 (E.D. Va. 1980) (referencing EPA
position that the verification and calibration of a model to predict water quality impact
is desirable but not always practical).
195. See William M. Lewis, Jr., "A New Era for the Western Public Lands:" The
Ecological Sciences and the Public Domain, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 279, 288-89 (1994). In
discussing models in an ecosystem context the author notes:
Because ecosystems consist of dozens of sets of interactions that must be
combined to produce equations representing natural processes, uncertainty
ofestimation is propagated along with the calculations. The consequence for
large, integrative models is excessive uncertainty. Various techniques can
be used to suppress variance, but they are unlikely to be successful in
containing it within realistic bounds in complex models involving large
numbers of coupled equations.
Id.
196. A modeling method may specify the number or range of numbers that should
be used for various components of the calculation. For example, EPA specifies in its
National Guidance for the Simplified Method model that the NH 3-N concentration for
a POTW's influent should be assumed to range from 12-35 milligrams per liter. See
OHIO EPA, supra note 192, at 1. See also In re Petition for a Site Specific Rule for the
East Side of Joliet Wastewater Treatment Facility, 1989 11. ENV LEXIS 721, at * 16
(Illinois Pollution Control Bd. 1989) (noting state agency criticisms of BOD model
based on inaccurate assumptions regarding DO in effluent and failure to consider
periodic low flow conditions).
197. See Case, supra note 184, at 275. "[A] lack of data can hamper the accurate
application of a model." Id.
198. An EPA Environmental Appeals Board decision alluded to the difficulty of
determining the impact of two power plants on a river:
The quality of the river water also varied, and there are indications that
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specify or recommend sampling of the effluent or waterbody to confirm
one or more model data components.'"
Like many technical decisions, the agencies' selection of a
particular methodology is generally given some deference by a
reviewing court.2' A searching review of many models in the water or
other environmental context clearly requires a sophisticated techni-
cal/factual analysis.2"' Regardless, the courts have occasionally rejected
an agency's choice of model. 2
several factors which adversely affect water quality, such as nitrates,
hardness and BOD, were on the rise. However, Dr. Gammon's own efforts
to determine water quality in the course of his studies were described by him
as "sporadic." With all these variables at work, it is evident that the task of
isolating and measuring the impact of the two power plants on the aquatic
community was extremely difficult. According to Dr. Gammon:
... [Y]ou begin with a very hazy concept of what that system is
down there. You are up here, it's down there, and you are not
living in that system. The only way you can find out something
about it is to sample, and then try to put little pieces of
information together in a coordinated way, and learn something
about that model.
... If I see something in one year or one time, only, that's
interesting. If I go back the next year and I see it again, well,
that's--that reemphasizes my feeling that I am getting a pretty
good picture of what actually is there and is happening, and if I
can do this the third year, it reenforces it still more, so each year
we had that sort of thing.
In re Pub. Serv. Co., Inc. Wabash River Generating Station Cayuga Generating Station,
1979 EPA App. LEXIS 4, 1 EAB ((U.S. E.P.A. App. Bd.) Nov. 29, 1979). See also
Hanks v. Costle, 501 F. Supp. 195, 200 (E.D. Va. 1980) (noting that a water quality
model may be improved by verification); Gayla, supra note 161, at 35 (pointing out
that "[flield studies and near field mathematical modeling are generally used to
determine the extent of mixing zone"); Lewis, supra note 195, at 289 (noting that field
studies of even well known ecosystems can reveal insights indicating the difficulty of
representing such as equations).
199. See, e.g., OHIO EPA, supra note 192, at 2 (describing the relationship between
BOD, COD, and TOC as highly variable and best determined with site-specific stream
or effluent sampling).
200. See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 830 F.2d 1346, 1355 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
challenge to EPA choice of surface water mixing zone methodology for assessment of
WQS compliance); Amax, Inc. v. Colorado Water Quality Control Comm'n, 790 P.2d
879 (Colo. 1989) (upholding methodology selected by Colorado agency). See generally
Case, supra note 184.
201. One commentator argues that an agency's use of a model makes it more
difficult to engage in a thorough inquiry of the factual basis of the environmental
decision. See Case, supra note 184, at 274. Therefore, the commentator argues models
may increase the danger that incorrect environmental decisions may not be detected
and corrected by reviewing courts. Id.
202. See &parte Fowl River Protective Ass'n, Inc., 572 So. 2d 446,458 (Ala. 1990)
(criticizing Alabama agency use of a two-dimensional model to describe a three-
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1. Key Surface Water Characteristics
a. Oxygen Depletion/Reaeration
DO is obviously a critical component of a river, stream, lake or
other waterbody. Aquatic organisms need varying levels of oxygen to
survive.2 °3 Higher DO concentrations reduce crowding of fish which
lessens their susceptibility to disease and toxicants. An assessment of
the oxygen available in a stream or lake to support aquatic, organisms
will focus on what is known as the "sag point,"2 the period when
oxygen levels are the lowest.2"5 The sag point represents heightened
stress for the aquatic ecosystem's occupants.2°
1. Depletion
The concentration of oxygen27 in a waterbody is affected by both
natural conditions and human activities. Oxygen levels in a waterbody
will be reduced by the receipt of various materials that consume it.
Natural conditions affecting oxygen levels include temperature, water
depth, and stream velocity. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has noted:
dimensional environment).
203. The Fowl River court noted that "[d]issolved oxygen in water is necessary for
marine life, much as oxygen in the air is necessary to life on land .... See id. at 457.
The animals inhabiting well oxygenated waterbodies are the most sensitive to reduction
of DO concentrations. See 65 Fed. Reg. 2,954, 2,955 (]an. 19, 2000).
204. Nearly eighty years ago the United States Supreme Court found that DO
measurements serve as an index of the extent to which a waterbody is polluted. New
York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 311 (1921). The court stated:
There is only one point upon which all the experts called for the opposing
parties agree, viz.: that in the present state of learning upon the subject the
amount of dissolved oxygen in water is the best index or measure of the
degree to which it is polluted by organic substances, it seemingly being
accepted by them all that upon the oxygen content in water depends its
capacity for digesting sewage--that is for converting organic matter into
inorganic and harmless substances by direct oxidation and by sustaining
bacteria which assist in such conversion.
Id.
205. The term hypoxia refers to low DO concentrations. 65 Fed. Reg. 2,954,2,955
(Jan. 19, 2000).
206. See Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269,1273
(5th Cir. 1980).
207. Biochemical oxygen demand ("BOD") is the amount of oxygen required to
oxidize organic matter present in water; it is therefore an indirect measure of organic
water contamination. See STANDARD METHODS, supra note 58, at 5-2.
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The rate of oxygen depletion depends primarily on the volume of
water in the hypolimnion (the more water, the more oxygen is
available for decomposition), its temperature (decomposition occurs
more slowly in cold water and colder water also contains more
dissolved oxygen), and the quantity of organic matter it contains (the
more organic matter, the greater the oxygen demands for decomposi-
tion).20
2. Reaeration
Certain natural events2' and conditions tend to increase oxygen
levels in a waterbody. This increase is known as reaeration. °
Reaeration involves the transfer of oxygen from the atmosphere to a
waterbody. The factors affecting the rate of reaeration include the
depth, temperature, and velocity of the waterbody. 21' Estimates of the
rate of natural reaeration in a waterbody can be a subject of disagree-
ment.1 2
b. Flow
The volume213 of the waterbody and the characteristics and quantity
of the material2 l4 entering it will determine whether a discharge will
208.. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
209. However, techniques can artificially increase DO concentrations. See, e.g.,
Metro. Dade County v. Coscan Florida, Inc., 609 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1992) (proposing
aeration system to increase DO concentrations in waterbody). A detailed discussion
of the various natural activities and conditions that affect DO is found in Alabama
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. ADEM, 1987 AL ENV LEXIS I (Ala. Dec. 16, 1987).
210. This process is also referred to as oxygenation.
211. For example, a state agency concluded shallow streams with high slopes
usually have relatively high rates of reaeration. See OHIO EPA, DMSION OF SURFACE
WATER, ANTIDEGRADATION AND THE WASTELOAD ALLOCATION PROCESS, MODELING
GUIDANCE 5 (1999).
212. See Dawson v. Alabama Dept. of Envtl. Mgt, No. 85-09, 1986 AL ENV
LEXIS I (Jan. 8, 1986).
213. In some instances, a facility plays a significant role in a river or stream's
physical flow. The flow in some waterbodies consists wholly or in part of the discharge
of wastewater from one or more plants. Other facilities may divert and return some or
all of a river or stream's flow instead of originating it. See In re Champion Int'l Corp.,
NPDES No. NC000272, 1992 EPA ALJ LEXIS 516, at *4 (Feb. 12, 1992) (referring
to a diversion of virtually all of a river's flow through a plant's production process).
214. See OHIO EPA, DIvISIoN OF SURFACE WATER, NATIONAL POLLUTION DISCHARGE
ELIMINATION SYSTEM, DETERMINATIONOF SAMPLING FREQUENCY FORMULA FOR INDUSTRIAL
WASTE DISCHARGES, PERMIT GUIDANCE 2 (1988).
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adversely impact a waterbody or otherwise be diluted"5 to the extent
necessary to meet applicable WQS. The flow value applied to a stream
or river will determine the amount of dilution a given discharge
receives. Reducing or increasing the amount of dilution may therefore
affect the stringency of the effluent limits imposed upon a discharger.
Consequently, the flow in a river or stream is a key component of
calculating the impact of a particular discharge. The measurements used
in the calculation will not be limited to normal or average flow
conditions. Water-quality-based limits are to be achieved at a particular
design flow." 6 This is to ensure the desired water quality protection
exists even at low flow levels."1 7 The "critical" or "low" flow that the
stream or river periodically experiences is an important consideration."
The obvious reason for making this determination is the need to ensure
the minimum water conditions necessary to support a particular use will
be in place 365 days a year.1 9 In other words, the maintenance of a
warm water fishery, for example, requires a minimum concentration of
DO at all times for the fish to survive in a waterbody.2'
The periodic minimum flow of a river or stream will often be
described by representative numbers and letters. For example, 7Q 10 is
215. Seegenerally In re Applications of SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc., Permit
No. NY - 0072061 Protection of Waters Application No. 932-99-0091, 1980 N.Y. ENV
LEXIS 13, at *136, ((N.Y. Dep't Envtl. Conservation) Jan. 14, 1980). "[The
availability of sufficient flow in the Niagra River is the critical factor to achieve
adequate dilution and not the volume of the discharge itself." Id
216. For example, 7QI 0 is the relevant flow used in the calculations undertaken in
Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Dept. ofEnvil. Resources, EHB Docket No. 85-41 0-M,
1991 Pa. ENV LEXIS 107 (June 24, 1991).
217. See id. at *38.
218. See generallyCity ofHarrisburg v. Pennsylvania, No. 88-120-R, 1996 Pa. ENV
LEXIS 94 (Dec. 9, 1996). A key issue in this administrative decision was whether the
"low flow" of a particular creek had been correctly determined. See also Alabama Elec.
Coop., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Envtl. Mgt, No. 85-28, 1987 AL ENV LEXIS I (Ala.
Dec. 16, 1987).
219. However, some ecosystems have adapted to a variable flow-therefore, they
need this type of flow. Many species either use or avoid natural high and low flows for
egg hatching, rearing, feeding, or reproduction. See EIA, supra note 4, at 33. For
example, fish in the American Southwest desert can thrive in flash flood conditions
through avoidance of displacement. See id. Fish in seasonal streams that gradually
evaporate are able to emigrate to safety. See id. A stream channel that evaporates
during certain periods may in fact provide habitat for specialized species. See id. at 32.
220. In other words, fish cannot hold their breath for the period of time when DO
concentrations drop below a critical level during a sag or low flow. Stated differently,
will conditions in the waterbody during both the worst time of the year and worst time




the "minimum 7-day low-flow that occurs once in 10 years."2 2' Other
flow criteria may be used in some scenarios.222
Flow information for various rivers or streams is often generated by
either federal or state agencies or others.' For example, the United
States Geological Survey maintains stream gage records which provide
flow information.22 4  Such data is a key variable in calculating a
waterbody's assimilative capacity.
c. Stratification
"Stratification" can occur if water of different densities interact. 5
The term refers to the tendency of deeper waterbodies to separate into
different layers during warmer months.226 The upper layer may be
warmer and is known as the epilimnion.227 This layer is more likely to
be aerated by wind mixing and photosynthesis. 28 The lower level may
be too deep to be affected by wind or support photosynthesis.229 It is
known as the hypolimnion.23 ° Colder weather will cause the two layers
to break up and return to full aeration. 3
Stratification must be considered in any calculation undertaken to
assess the impact of a wastewater discharge on water quality. Stratified
conditions may impede the mixing of wastewater from top to bottom.232
Mixing may be limited to a single layer.2 33 This may reduce in certain
circumstances the volume of water available to dilute a discharge.3
221. This standard is referenced in Marshall Durbin & Co. v. Envil. Mgmt. Comm 'n,
519 So. 2d 962 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).
222. See id. (referencing a proposed use of 30Q5, which is "the minimum 30-day
low flow that occurs once in five years"). See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 (referencing IQIO)
(1984).
223. See Wyant v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Envtl. Resources, No. 84-422-M, 1988 Pa.
ENV LEXIS 160 (Oct. 24, 1988) at *15. Design can be measured using various
devices.
224. See EIA, supra note 4, at 33.
225. See Ex parte Fowl River Protective Ass'n, Inc., 572 So. 2d 446, 457 (Ala.
1990).






232. See Fowl River, 572 So. 2d at 457. See also 65 Fed. Reg. 2,954, 2,955 (Jan. 19,
2000) (mentioning low seasonal DO levels due to water column stratification which
prevents mixing of well oxygenated surface water with deeper water).




An example of the impact of stratification on a waterbody's
capacity to dilute effluent is found in an Alabama Supreme Court
decision. The court in Fowl River concluded that the Alabama Depart-
ment of Environmental Management overestimated how much effluent
could be discharged into a waterbody without violating applicable
WQS.235 This alleged error was blamed on the agency's failure to
consider the effect of stratification.236
d. Temperature
An atmospheric temperature increase will elevate a waterbody's
temperature. Higher water temperatures can affect water quality in
various ways. For example, it can reduce DO solubility or affect
degradation of a pollutant in a waterbody. 37 Temperature can also
stimulate algae growth.238 The temperature of a waterbody will
therefore affect the type of fish and other species that can occupy it.
e. Seasonality
A waterbody's assimilative capacity can change with the seasons.
This is because temperature, rainfall, and other natural conditions affect
a waterbody's capacity to assimilate certain pollutants. These condi-
tions obviously vary with the season. 9 An agency may therefore in
some instances be willing to structure seasonal water quality based
permit effluent limits for relevant pollutants.2" Such seasonal limits
235. See id.
236. See id. See also Metropolitan Dade County v. Coscan Florida, Inc., 609 So. 2d
644 (Fla. 1992). This decision involved the potential impact of a proposed marina
expansion on DO concentrations. See id The role of stratification and the flushing
action in and out of the marina on DO concentrations were assessed. See id. at 646.
The proponent of the marina expansion proposed to increase DO concentrations by
installing an aeration system which would supposedly break up the stratification and
increase flushing, positively impacting DO concentrations. See id
237. See Adler, supra note 33, at 221-22; City of Springfield v. Illinois EPA, PCB No. 93-
135, 1993 111. ENV LEXIS 1511 at *14 ((Il. Pollution Control Bd.) Dec. 16, 1993).
238. See Husar, supra note 74, at 8.
239. For instance, ammonia can be less toxic in winter due to lower pH and
temperature, along with higher streamflows. See OHio EPA, DivisioN OF SURFACE
WATER, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM: TIERED PERMITS, DSW-
0100.016 (1999).
240. See id. For example, see Amended Ammonia Water Quality Criteria Allow for
Aquatic Life Sensitivity Variances, 31 ENv'T REP. 2434, 2434-35 (2000) (referencing
Iowa's amendment of WQS for ammonia to consider seasonal variances in the
sensitivity of aquatic life).
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may in some situations allow the design and/or operation of a more cost-




The various federal and state environmental statutes have tradition-
ally focused on a single environmental medium or a particular
activity.24' The programs often require the installation and operation of
equipment to protect the water, air,242 or other media. Such pollution
control technologies may themselves transfer captured contaminants to
other media.243 The single media focus of many of the environmental
statutes and regulations tend to shuffle pollutants between media.2' In
other words, the various environmental programs, practices, or controls
may not reduce the net amount of pollution entering the environment.245
Regardless, Congress has not to date seriously considered proposals to
241. See Pamela Hill, Emerging Policy and Legal Directions at EPA, 33 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 625,626 (1999) (noting laws enacted early in the 1970s were generally structured
on a media-specific basis. For example, Subtitle I of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act regulates petroleum underground storage tanks ("USTs") while the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136-136Y, addresses
the manufacture and distribution of insecticides and related products.) See also Scott
R. Dismukes & Terry L. Schnell, Emerging Issues of Sustainability and Environmental
Trading, Presentation at the 93rd Annual Meeting of the Air & Waste Management
Association (June 2000); Wright & Henry, supra note 156, at 285-87. The RCRA UST
program is discussed in Walter G. Wright, Jr., In Storage Tank Funds We Trust: An
Analysis of Their Role in Protecting the Environment and Small Business, 13 U. ARK. LrrrLE
ROCK L.J. 417 (1991).
242. See generally Wright & Henry, supra note 156 (providing an overview of both
the federal and Arkansas air pollution control programs).
243. See Becker, supra note 136, at 3. An example is the treatment and disposal of
sewage sludge. Sewage sludge is the material extracted from the wastewater by a
treatment or removal process. Robert K. Bastian & Jay Benforado, Waste Treatment:
Doing What Comes Naturally, TECH. REV., Feb. 1983, at 58. Among other things, sewage
sludge may be sent to an incinerator, placed in a landfill, or dumped in the ocean. See
id. The combustion of sludge will result in air emissions.
244. One author notes that "[tihere is a growing understanding within the
environmental community and the EPA that the past and present regulatory efforts to
control pollutants in one environmental medium often merely transfer them to other
environmental media." Peter J. Fontaine, EPA 's Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The
Struggle to Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 33
(1993).
245. See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law:
What's Worked. What's Failed What Might Work, 21 ENvTL. L. 1549 (1991).
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consolidate or integrate environmental statutory/regulatory authorities.'
b. Cross-Media Water Pollution Control Transfers
Various water pollution control processes can themselves constitute
a potential source of environmental impacts. Many wastewater
treatment processes generate waste. This waste is the material that is
removed from the effluent or wastewater.247  The material is often
shipped off-site for disposal or reused in some manner.
Wastewater treatment processes may also be a source of emissions
into the ambient air.' The air pollutants emitted depend upon the type
of effluents treated. However, wastewater emissions are not simply
generated by POTWs and manufacturing facilities. 9 For example, the
treatment of groundwater generated by soil or groundwater remediation
activities also generates such emissions.'
246. See Fontaine, supra note 244, at 37. The creation of a single integrated
environmental statute has been discussed. See id. The passage of such legislation is
considered unlikely in view of the conflicts that arise from the amendment or
enactment of even a single media statute. See id. EPA has, however, utilized a multi-
media approach in its enforcement program. See generally Fontaine, supra note 244.
247. The same is true of many air pollution control devices. Bags or filters capture
and remove pollutants from the air. See generally Wright & Henry, supra note 156, at
285-87.
248. See 63 Fed. Reg. 66,084 (Dec. 1, 1998) (discussing various emissions from
POTWs and their collection systems).
249. In the last quarter century soil and groundwater have been added as
environmental media that require protection. A patchwork of federal and state statutes,
regulations, and policies address the prevention of contamination of such surface and
subsurface media. These authorities often require the investigation and removal of
contaminants that enter the soil or groundwater. Remediation can involve the removal
or treatment of groundwater. The treatment of groundwater will usually include its
removal and subsequent discharge to an adjacent waterbody or a sewer connected to
a POTW. The impact of such discharges can be a concern. See, e.g., Williams Pipeline
Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (describing various issues
associated with remediation ofhydrocarbon contamination includingNPDES permitted
discharges of treated groundwater); Petitions on the Permit Issued to Pall/Gelman
Sciences, Inc., NPDES No. M10048453, 2000 Mich. ENV LEXIS 10 (April 5, 2000)
(challenging the permit issued for discharge from groundwater treatment system
involving 1, 4 - dioxane); OHO EPA, DIVISION OF WATER, NATIONAL POLLUTANT
DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM; WASTEWATER DISCHARGEs RESULTING FROM CLEAN-UP
OF RESPONSE ACTION SITES CONTAMINATED WITH VOLATILE ORGANIC COMPOUNDS, DSW-
0100.027 (1999).
250. See Wright & Henry, supra note 156, at 287 (referencing use of air stripping
to remove certain contaminants from soil or groundwater, resulting in air emissions).
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IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BASELINE: THE FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT
A. Historical Development
1. Pre-1972
The current version of the CWA was enacted in 1972.2'1 The
primary focus of its immediate statutory predecessor 52 had been an
attempt to force the states to adopt ambient standards for their surface
waterbodies.2" These ambient objectives were (and still are) known as
WQS.2" The WQS did not identify and directly regulate pollutants.2"
251. The 1970s is the decade in which Congress enacted many of the principal
federal environmental statutes. See Lynn E. Blais, Beyond Cost/Benefit: The Maturation
of Economic Analysis of the Law and its Consequences for Environmental Policymaking, 2000
U. ILL. L. REv. 237 (referencing the late 1960s/early 1970s enactment of the Clean Air
Act, National Environmental Policy Act, and Endangered Species Act). The federal
agency possessing the primary authority to implement and enforce most CWA
programs is EPA. It was created in 1970 by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970. See
35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970).
252. The Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234. Congress previously
enacted federal water pollution control legislation in 1948. See Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155. See Scott D. Anderson, Comment:
Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Massachusetts Approach, 26
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 339 (1999). The federal legislation enacted in 1948 primarily
focused on preventing water pollution by providing states funds for technical grants and
construction of POTWs. See id. A detailed discussion of the work of the United States
Senate Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution's 1960s work on air and
water pollution control investigation is found in Blomquist, supra note 13.
253. See Vandenbergh, supra note 23, at 82 (noting 1965 federal water pollution
control legislation's requirement that states set ambient WQS). A detailed discussion
of this approach is found in Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality
Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1167 (1983). See also John
Harleson, What IsAntidegradation Policy: Does Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 37,
39 (1996). A federal district court described the 1965 statute's approach by noting in
part:
The 1965 Act required each state to classify its streams (or stream segments)
and waters according to their intended uses, such as agriculture, municipal
water supply, fish and wildlife, or recreation; and set water quality standards,
such as the allowable concentration ofdissolved oxygen or suspended solids,
appropriate for each category of use. The method of controlling water
pollution was to work backwards from the desired water quality for the
waterbody, and taking into account its capacity to assimilate pollutants,
attempt to determine which sources were responsible for pollution causing
violation of the standards.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (D. D.C. 1982).
254. A WQS is a pollution standard based on the resulting quality or condition of
a body of water. See Scott v. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 995 n.5 (7th Cir. 1984). In
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Instead, they simply described the desired condition of the
waterbody.2 6
This approach had several flaws. First, the states were "slow to
develop" 7 the required WQS. Second, the enforcement of such
standards was difficult. An agency was required to demonstrate that a
particular facility was responsible for a waterbody's exceedance of a
WQS. 59 Establishing causation between the discharge of certain
pollutants and the waterbody's failure to meet WQS was and still is a
complex task.2"
Finally, the prior statutory scheme focused primarily on a determi-
nation of the tolerable effects or level of water pollution. 6 Minimal
attention was paid to the preventable causes of water pollution.262
Consequently, facilities were provided few incentives to reduce their
discharges.263
contrast, compliance with an effluent limitation is measured only by the amount of a
pollutant entering the body of water. See id. A WQS prescribes the maximum amount
of pollutants which should be present in a sample of water from the waterbody. See id.
An effluent limitation regulates the amount of pollutant which may be legally
discharged into the body of water. See id.
255. See Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
256. See id.
257. Id. See also National Wildlife Fed'n, 530 F. Supp. at 1295. "[The] process was
inherently difficult and uncertain, combined with the slow progress at the states in
setting the standards." Id
258. However, a number of state WQS have been in existence for many years prior
to the 1965 enactment. See, e.g., Mississippi Comm'n of Natural Resources v. Costle,
625 F.2d 1269, 1273 (5th Cir. 1980) (referencing Mississippi Game & Fish
Commission's adoption in 1946 of a minimum DO water quality standard). See also
B lomquist, supra note 13, at 8 (referencing a 1957 Maine stream classification system
to upgrade water quality).
259. See Columbus & Franklin County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shanks, 600 N.E 2d
1042, 1052 (Ohio 1992). See also National Wildlife Fed'n, 530 F. Supp. at 1295.
"Pollution discharges did not violate the law unless they could be shown to cause the
waterbody to fail water quality standards." Id.
260. See Gaba, supra note 253, at 1179.
261. See EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200,202 (1976) (noting that the problem with
the approach taken by 1965 Act "stemmed from the character of the standards
themselves, which focused on the tolerable effects rather than the preventable causes
of water pollution").
262. See id.
263. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir.





The 1972 legislation represented a major shift in direction; after
1972, Congress amended the CWA significantly in 1977, 1981 , M and
1987.265 The primary water pollution control focus changed from
encouraging state ambient WQS to forcing individual facilities to
comply with national technology-based effluent limits. The legislation
established a federal baseline for the first time in the area of water
pollution control. As a result, a facility discharging into a small brook
in Alabama must at a minimum meet the same categorical effluent
limits as a similar type of plant discharging into a large river in New
York. This preemptive federal floor prevents to some extent a state
from sacrificing water quality in order to entice industrial
development.2'
The revised CWA's approach to water pollution control had some
advantages. Both enforcement and the determination of baseline
effluent limits were less complex. A regulated facility or activity must
obtain a permit which includes both effluent limits and a requirement to
assess compliance. To determine the facility's baseline effluent limits
the agency incorporates the applicable federal categorical limits or
standards into the permit. The direct restrictions on discharges
facilitated enforcement because the agencies were no longer required to
work backward from a waterbody that was violating WQS to attempt to
identify one or more responsible sources.26
B. Current CWA
The CWA allocates responsibility for the abatement of water
pollution between EPA and the states.268 The federal government is
deemed responsible for promulgation of the national technology-based
standards. The term "technology-based" means the limits or standards
are set based on the capability of specific wastewater treatment
264. See Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623. See also Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7.
265. An overview of the 1987 amendments is found in Lawrence R. Liebsman &
Elliott P. Laws, The Water Quality Act of 1987: A Major Step in Assuring the Quality of the
Nation's Waters, 17 ENvTL. L. REP. 10, 311-12 (1987).
266. See Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of
Environmental Law, 63 Miss. L.J. 403, 410 (1994).
267. See Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1977).
268. See Municipal Auth. of St. Mary's v. EPA, 945 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1991).
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technology or series of technologies to reduce pollutant discharges. 69
These limits or guidelines are developed for categories of point source
dischargers."' Consequently, identical plants located in different states
would be required to meet the same national categorical effluent limits.
The WQS continue to be the primary responsibility of the states.2 "
States, therefore, develop and maintain ambient standards for jurisdic-
tional waterbodies. Nevertheless, the CWA requires that state WQS
attain surface water cleanliness that is protective of public health and/or
the environment. The states have some discretion in the WQS choices
they make.2 3 EPA, however, is tasked to oversee this process. In fact,
the agency is provided the authority to replace state WQS deemed
deficient.
The CWA created the need for a federal or state permitting
bureaucracy by simply banning the discharge into most waterbodies of
a large universe of substances. 4 There is an exception to this apparent
absolute prohibition. Section 402(a)(1) authorizes a discharge if EPA
incorporates into a permit all applicable CWA requirements or such
conditions necessary to carry out the requirements of the statute. The
mechanism for ensuring that only CWA-compliant discharges are
authorized is the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. Facilities or activities encompassed by the relevant
CWA jurisdictional terms must obtain an NPDES permit.
2 7
The statutory prohibition of non-permitted discharges cannot be
waived. Neither EPA nor the states have any discretionary authority to
exempt sources fitting within the scope of the statute. Prior EPA
attempts to defer or exempt individual or classes of sources have
generally been invalidated by the courts.27 6 Consequently, a significant
269. See Gold, supra note 98, at 465 n.25.
270. They are often denominated categorical limits or standards.
271. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(1)(C) (1994); Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d
992, 995 (7th Cir. 1994).
272. See Scott, 741 F.2d at 995.
273. See 65 Fed. Reg. 31,682, 31,684 (May 18, 2000). "The CWA allows some
flexibility and differences among states in their adopted and approved water quality
standards, but it should be implemented in a manner that ensures a level playing field
among states." Id.
274. Section 301(a) states "[eixceptas in compliance with this section and Sections
1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by
any person shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (1994).
275. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994). Only the receipt of a permit authorizes a
discharge. A facility that has applied for a permit is nevertheless in non-compliance
if it is already discharging. United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16736 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
276. See Committee to Save the Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist,
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number of processes, facilities, and activities must obtain a permit prior
to startup if a jurisdictional discharge will occur.
The EPA utilizes both rulemaking and guidance documents to
implement its various CWA programs. The preambles accompanying
federal rulemaking often include information useful in interpreting a
rule or regulation. However, EPA also uses guidance documents to
provide information about a rule or program.2" The advantage to the
agency is the ability to issue the document without going through a
formal rulemaking process.278 These documents can therefore be
important sources of information about various issues that arise in the
EPA's programs.
The frequency of EPA's use of policy or guidance memoranda in
various programs has been criticized2" and occasionally challenged.28 °
The primary complaint has been that such documents are developed
without public notice and comment."' However, a contrary view is that
the expeditious issuance of such documents better enables EPA to
disseminate needed information.282
Many state environmental protection programs also use guidance
or policy documents. They are also occasionally challenged. An
example in the water pollution control context was South Carolina's
development of a trophic state index ("TSI"). The South Carolina
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8364 at * 17 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citing Carr v. Alta Verde Indus.,
Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding EPA has no discretion under the Act
to exempt classes or point sources from the permit requirement)); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding EPA
lacks statutory authority to exempt entire classes of "point sources" just because they
represent insignificant sources of pollution or are not amenable to numeric effluent
standards).
277. See Agency Needs Ability to Communicate Policy Without Rulemaking, Official Says,
31 ENV'T REP. 2267 (2000) [hereinafter Communicate].
278. See id.
279. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, PolicyStatements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311
(1992); Jonathon Martel, The Perils of EPA Lawmaking Through Guidance, 31 ENV'T REP.
2285 (2000).
280. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
281. See id. Regulated entities have on occasion challenged their validity.
Appalachian Power invalidated a key Clean Air Act guidance document. The EPA
stated that the Periodic Monitoring Guidance document had been issued to clarify the
monitoring requirements applicable to Clean Air Act Title V permittees. See id. at
1024. Various industry groups disagreed, arguing the policy amended existing
monitoring rules without proceeding through notice and comment rulemaking. See id.
The District of Columbia Circuit agreed. See id. at 1028.
282. See Communicate, supra note 277, at 2267. The article cites testimony of EPA
General Counsel Gary Buzy before the United States House of Representatives
Government Reform and Oversight Committee. See id.
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agency's use of this document was challenged. In the 1999 administra-
tive decision in Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority,283 a South
Carolina administrative law judge invalidated the use of the TSI by the
agency because it had not been adopted pursuant to a rulemaking. The
challengers complained that the TSI was used to determine whether to
place waterbodies on a CWA 303(d) list.2 '
C. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
An NPDES permit must be acquired if five jurisdictional elements
are present: (1) a person (2) adds a (3) pollutant (4) to navigable waters
(5) from a point source. The prohibition of point source discharges in
the absence of an NPDES permit is an obligation separate and distinct
from the requirement that the facility discharge comply with applicable
effluent limitations." The permit effluent limitations2 generally
constitute the restrictions applicable to a facility's discharge.
Congress gave EPA authority to issue NPDES permits. Neverthe-
less, it provided the federal agency the ability to delegate this program
to the various states, and in fact, encouraged them to do so. Therefore,
EPA will delegate the NPDES permitting authority if it determines the
state has developed an acceptable program." 7 Once the EPA delegates
the program, applicants must obtain NPDES permits from the relevant
state agency.2"8
1. Applicability of NPDES Permit Program
a. Person/Permittee
Facilities utilizing NPDES permits are often owned or operated
pursuant to commercial arrangements involving multiple parties. For
example, one entity might own a facility while another operates it. The
entity operating the facility might do so pursuant to a management
283. 1999 S.C. ENV LEXIS 102 ((ALJ Div. 1999) Sept. 22, 1999).
284. See id. at 55.
285. See Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 549, 550 (5th Cir. 1996).
286. See id. The CWA defines the term "effluent limitation" in part as "any
restriction established by a state or the administration on quantities, rates and
concentrations of chemical, physical, biological and other constituents which are
discharged from point sources into navigable waters...." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(ii) (1994).
287. See American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 1989).




agreement. This arrangement resembles a principal/contractor relation-
ship.289 In the alternative, an entity operating a plant may occupy it as
a lessee. The plant is operated for the lessee's own benefit. The facility
owner may not play a role in its operation and/or management. Also, in
some scenarios, a facility may utilize contractors to service or manage
equipment and/or processes encompassed by or related to the NPDES
permit. A number of other commercial relationships or arrangements
are of course possible.
An issue that must often be addressed in a given arrangement is
which entity or entities constitute the NPDES permittee(s). This is a
key question since the permittee is at a minimum2' held responsible for
facility CWA non-compliance.' Responsibility for such non-compli-
ance can be allocated among multiple parties pursuant to warranty and
indemnity provisions. Nevertheless, such contractual provisions do not
pose an obstacle to the initial imposition of liability on the indemnified
party through CWA enforcement if the entity is or should have been a
permittee.
An initial question is whether facility ownership is a prerequisite
for liability or responsibility for a discharge. The answer in most
scenarios is no. For example, the fact that a facility discharged
pollutants through a conveyance owned by another party has been
deemed irrelevant.' The more important question is who controls the
discharge.293 This may include more than one entity.
The issue of multi-party control was addressed in the 1999
Mississippi Court of Appeals decision in Barrett Refining Corp. v.
Mississippi Commission of Environmental Quality." In.Barrett, the
Mississippi Commission of Environmental Quality ("Commission")
issued an order assessing penalties and ordering that certain actions be
undertaken at a refinery that had allegedly violated the CWA, Missis-
sippi Air and Water Pollution Control Law, and other federal and
Mississippi statutes and regulations. 95 The crude oil refining facility
289. For example, a private for-profit entity might operate a municipal POTW.
290. Non-permittees involved in the operation or ownership of the facility may be
subject to CWA enforcement. The court in US. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp.
769 (D. Va. 1979), noted that "Section 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3), clearly states
that 'person[s]'--not permit holders--are liable for permit violations." Id. at 781.
291. See United States v. Municipality of Penn Hills, 6 F. Supp. 2d 432,437 (W.D.
Pa. 1998) (holding that municipality owning the POTW's NPDES permit is an
appropriate target for CWA enforcement action).
292. See Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir. 1991).
293. See Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 629 (D.R.I. 1990).
294. 751 So. 2d 1104 (1999).
295. See id. at 1106.
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was owned by Barrett Refining Corporation ("Barrett"). 29 Barrett held
both the NPDES and other permits. 2'
Barrett had entered into a refining agreement in 1995 with M&S
Petroleum, Inc. ("M&S").29 The agreement obligated M&S to buy
crude oil feedstock which Barrett would then process at the refinery.'
The crude oil was processed according to M&S's specifications, for
which Barrett was paid a per barrel fee." M&S would subsequently
sell the finished product.3"' The refining agreement also provided that
M&S would give Barrett monthly information concerning the
amount/type of feedstocks to be supplied, delivery date, and the
products that would be refined. °2
The agreement stated that Barrett retained control over refinery
operations. 3 However, in October of 1995, most of the Barrett refinery
employees left the facility.' M&S assumed responsibility for refining
operations through an oral agreement with a Barrett management
employee.3 5 Barrett employees became M&S employees and plant
safety and other operations became the responsibility of M&S.
3M6
Thereafter, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality
("MDEQ") performed an inspection of the refinery."' The agency was
told that while M&S was leasing the facility, Barrett continued to have
296. See id.
297. See id. at 1106-07.
298. See id. at 1107. The decision stated that M&S was a Texas petroleum
brokerage company. See id.
299. See id.
300. See Barrett, 751 So. 2d at 1107.
301. See id.
302. See id at 1107-08. Barrett retained the "right to reject and refuse delivery of
any Feedstocks which, in Barrett's sole discretion, may not be suitable for refining or
may contain contaminants which are harmful to machinery or personnel or which
Barrett may deem an environmental hazard beyond normal considerations applicable
to the straight distillation refining process." Id. at 1107-08.
303. See id. Item 18 of the Barrett/M&S agreement provided:
(c) Barrett Operations. Except as otherwise provided in this Refining
Agreement, Barrett and M&S agree and acknowledge that M&S has no right
whatsoever pursuant to the Refining Agreement, or otherwise, to direct,
control or otherwise affect Barrett's management and operation of the
Refinery, Storage Facilities or any procedures or methodology utilized by
Barrett in the Refining of Feedstock or other feedstock in or about the
Refinery.
Id.
304. See id. at 1109.
305. See id. at 1109.




operating control of the facility. 0 8 Additional MDEQ inspections were
undertaken.3  Ultimately, the MDEQ found the facility to be in
violation of various federal and Mississippi environmental statutes and
regulations."' The statutes allegedly violated included the CWA and
Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control Law.3t'
MDEQ held both M&S and Barrett responsible for various alleged
violations.312 M&S argued it should not be held responsible because
Barrett was the permittee (i.e., held the various NPDES and other
permits) and owner of the refinery.313 In assessing M&S's potential
responsibility, the decision noted that M&S described itself as a
subcontractor of Barrett."4 M&S argued that Barrett was therefore
responsible for facility compliance, and penalties could not be imposed
against parties other than the permittee. 315 The Commission responded
that liability was not precluded because M&S did not have a permit.36
The Mississippi Court of Appeals held that the amount of control
a company has over the operations of the facility determines whether it
may be held liable as an operator.37 The court noted that M&S operated
the refinery after the Barrett employee walkout.318  It also cited a
Mississippi statute which provided:
[A]ny person who causes pollution of the air or waters of the state or
places or causes to be placed any waste or other products or sub-
stances in a location where they are likely to cause pollution or
308. See id.
309. Seeid. at 1112-19.
310. See id.
311. See id. at lll7-19.
312. See Barrett, 751 So. 2d at 1117-19.
313. Seeid. at 1120.
314. See id. at 1120 n.6.
315. See id. at 1120.
316. See id,
317. See id. The court cited Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861
F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988). This Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals decision involved
an unsuccessful argument by a former owner of a Mena, Arkansas wood preserving
plant that a supplier of chemicals fit within the phrase "operator" as it is defined by the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (Supp. 11 1994). See id at 157-58.
318. See Barrett, 751 So. 2d at 1120. The court noted that M&S admitted hiring the
employees, "taking responsibility for safety, buying and controlling the feedstocks and
products, directing how feedstocks should be refined and paying all utilities." Id. The
court also cited a federal CWA regulation that provides "owner or operator means the
owner or operator of any 'facility or activity' subject to regulation under the NPDES
permit program." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2000). Id.
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discharge of substances into the air or water that exceed any applica-
ble federal or state standards has violated state law.31 9
Consequently, the Mississippi Court of Appeals held that M&S bore
some responsibility for violations that occurred while it operated the
refinery from October 3, 1995 through January 30, 1996.320 M&S was
therefore deemed liable for various penalties and other remedies.32'
Similar issues can arise in the operation of public facilities. In San
Francisco Baykeeper v. Friends ofSanta Clara County Creeks, 22 discharges
from storm drains were determined to be responsible for multiple CWA
violations. A federal district court determined that the City of Saratoga,
California was not liable for these violations because it did not own the
stormdrains.323 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, noting that EPA regulations may still impose liability if the
city "operates" the storm outfall. 24
b. Addition
The CWA does not define what constitutes the "addition" of a
pollutant. An issue that has arisen in various scenarios is whether the
return of a pollutant to the body of water from which it was withdrawn
fits within the term "addition." A corresponding question is whether an
agency issuing an NPDES permit must make "allowance" for pollutants
found in a facility's intake water.
The agencies and courts have periodically considered whether a
facility's atmospheric or stack emissions trigger NPDES permitting. 325
In Chemical Weapons Working Group v. United States Department of the
Army, 26 the court rejected an argument that a discharge into the air by
a chemical weapons incinerator is encompassed by the CWA stating in
part that "common sense dictates that Tooele's stack emissions
319. See Barrett, 751 So. 2d at 1120. The statute cited was Mississippi Code
Annotated section 49-17-29 (Rev. 1990).
320. See Barrett, 751 So. 2d at 1120.
321. See id.
322. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3942 (9th Cir. 1998).
323. See id. at *2.
324. See id. at *3. See also 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(3)(vi) (2000). This provision
states "Co-permittees need only comply with permit conditions relating to discharges
from the municipal separate storm sewers for which they are operators." Id.
325. See In re Florida Power & Light Co., Manatee Orimulsion Project, Application
No. 94-35, 1998 Fla. ENV LEXIS 208 at *44 (Fla. Siting Bd. 1998) (discussing issue
of whether power plant nitrogen oxide emissions are subject to WQS).
326. 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997).
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constitute discharges into the air-not water-and are therefore beyond
§ 301(f)'s reach." '327 A 2000 Florida administrative decision cited
Chemical Weapons Working Group328 in holding that air pollutants emitted
from a cement plant into an adjacent waterbody were not encompassed
by CWA. 329
c. Pollutant
The term "pollutant" is broadly defined and interpreted 3 to
include:
Dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage...
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or
discarded equipment, rocks, sand,33' cellar dirt, and industrial,
municipal and agricultural waste discharge into water . 3 " A substance
does not have to be encompassed by any of the substances listed in
the definition to be included.333
327. Id. See also Harris v. Oil Reclaiming Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212 (D. Kan.
2000); No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13919
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting argument that spraying as part of mosquito eradication
program violated CWA because sprayed pesticide moved into water).
328. Florida Chapter ofthe Sierra Club v. Suwannee American Cement Co., DOAH
Case No. 99-309, 2000 Fla. ENV LEXIS 85 at *46-47 (Fla. Dep't Envtl. Protection
2000).
329. See id. In dismissing the argument for application of the CWA to airborne
emissions, the decision cited the absurdity of the possibility that automobile emissions
would likewise require a permit. See id
330. One commentator noted that the term includes "virtually anything that humans
discharge into water." John C. Dembach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and
Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1997).
331. The reference to various natural earthen materials has meant that construction
clearing/land development activities will often cause the discharge of pollutants. In
Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11 th Cir. 1999), the court noted that sand and
silt were two of the constituents deposited in an off-site pond by timber harvesting and
land development. The discharge of these constituents triggered the need to obtain an
NPDES permit.
332. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1994).
333. Various decisions have applied the term to non-listed substances. See, e.g.,
Concerned Area Residents for Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 117 (2nd Cir.
1994) (finding that liquid manure is a pollutant because definitional list includes solid
waste, sewage, biological materials, and agricultural waste), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082
(1995) (internal quotations ommitted); United States v. PlazaHealth Laboratories., Inc.,
3 F.3d 643, 645 (2nd Cir. 1993) (finding that human blood is a pollutant because
definitional list includes biological materials), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994);
United States v. Schallom, 998 F.2d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that shotcrete and
cement are pollutants because definitional list includes solid waste, chemical waste,
and sand), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 902 (1993); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers
Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that dead fish and fish remains
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A few materials are excepted from the term pollutant. Uranium mill
tailings are "by product material" under the Atomic Energy Act 34 and
therefore deemed outside the scope of the term pollutant.335 The term
pollutant also excludes certain materials associated with oil and gas
production.336 However, EPA has determined that drinking water
contaminants that are regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act are
still encompassed by the term "pollutant.""3 7
The courts have clarified that most water conditions are not a
"pollutant." These conditions include low DO, cold, supersaturation,
are pollutants because definitional list includes biological materials); United States v.
M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 722 F.2d 1501, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that
redeposited vegetation and sediment are pollutants because definitional list includes
dredged spoil), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987); United
States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 110 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding that gasoline is a pollutant
because generic terms of definitional list evince congressional intent to encompass
substances covered under the Refuse Act of 1899, and Supreme Court had held that
gasoline was covered by the earlier statute); Higbee v. Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323, 330
(E.D. Ark. 1984) (finding that hog waste is a pollutant because definitional list includes
agricultural waste), aft'd, 782 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1985).
334. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(2).
335. See generally Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F.3d 1426 (9th
Cir. 1998). The court noted that EPA had excluded radioactive materials regulated
under the AEA from the definition of pollutant by looking at 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528,
13,530 (1973). See id. at 1428. A 1990 federal district court decision addressed a
possible conflict between the CWA and the SDWA. See Hudson River Fishermen's
Ass'n v. New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
336. The exclusion includes:
(B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate
production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or gas
production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate
production or for disposal purposes is approved by authority of the State in
which the well is located, and if such State determines that such injection or
disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water
resources.
33 U.S.C. § 136.2(b) (1994).
337. 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,591 (July 13, 2000). "EPA interprets the CWA
definition of pollutant to include in most cases, drinking water contaminants that are
regulated under section 1412 of the Safe Drinking Water Act." See id. See also Hudson
River Fishermen's Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
In Hudson River, the City of New York argued it was not required to obtain a NPDES
permit for pollutants discharged into a reservoir from a drinking water treatment plant.
It argued that the CWA was preempted by the SWDA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f, and that
beneficial chemicals (used in the water purification process) such as chlorine and alum
are not "pollutants." See id at 1099. The court determined that requiring the
acquisition of an NPDES permit for these discharges would not conflict with any
SDWA objectives. See id. The court also found that despite their beneficial properties,
chlorine and alum still constituted CWA pollutants. Id. at 1100-01.
2001] 599
UALR LAW REVIEW
and flow.338 An exception is heat. It is specifically included within the
statutory definition of "pollutant."
339
d. Navigable Waters
The CWA defines the term "navigable waters" as "waters of the
United States, including territorial seas."3" EPA has generally inter-
preted this term to include any surface waterbody capable of affecting
interstate commerce.34 ' Both the EPA and the courts have broadly
construed this term. It is, for example, irrelevant that a stream only
flows intermittently.342 A tributary to a "water of the United States" is
covered by the statute. 43 Further, a drainage ditch3 " and an irrigation
canal345 are encompassed within this definition as well.
The applicability of this definition to some scenarios is not always
clear. For example, a key question has been whether the CWA
encompasses groundwater. A few judicial decisions have found CWA
jurisdiction if the groundwater affects or is directly connected to surface
water. 3' A contrary view has been that the CWA's permitting provi-
sions do not apply to groundwater regardless of a connection to surface
338. EPA has noted in regard to low flow: "EPA does not believe that flow, or lack
of flow, is a pollutant as defined by CWA Section 502(6)." 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586,
43,592 (July 13, 2000).
339. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994).
340. Id. § 1362(7).
341. See Leslie Salt Co. v. Froelke, 578 F.2d 742,754-55 (9th Cir. 1978) (defining
the term navigable waters for the purposes of the CWA as the the broadest possible
interpretation under the Commerce Clause); Umatilla Water Quality Protective Ass'n,
Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 (D. Ore. 1997). A detailed
definition of the term "waters of the United States" is found in the federal regulations.
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1999).
342. See Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
343. See United States v. Edison, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir.
1974)).
344. SeeEdison, 108 F.3dat 1341.
345. In Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21569 (D.
Or. 1999), a federal district court found irrigation canals to be "waters of the United
States" because they were tributaries.
346. See Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 834 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo.
1993) (holding that discharges into "navigable waters" include discharges that reach
such waters through groundwater). See also Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC
Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1357-58 (D.N.M. 1995); Washington Wilderness
Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 989-90 (E.D. Wash. 1994). The
federal district court in Williams Pipeline Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1318




water.4 7 EPA has not squarely addressed the issue in its regulations or
guidance.348
An occasional question is whether a plant's internal waste stream
is encompassed by the term "waters of the United States." In other
words, does EPA have the authority to impose effluent limitations upon
internal wastewater streams? EPA stated in a 1979 policy document
that it has the authority to regulate the discharge of pollutants into
internal wastewaters if they are an integral part of the plant's treatment
system.349 A 1999 federal district court decision stated that the majority
position among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals is that EPA
has the authority to impose effluent limitations on internal wastewater
streams.3
347. See Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1106-07 (W.D. Mich. 1985)
(holding that Congress' intent was to leave regulation of contaminated groundwater to
states); Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438,
1451 (1 st Cir. 1992). In Coopers Indus., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, the court refused to
entertain a CWA citizen suit where the allegations cited the pollution of groundwater.
The groundwater was stated to, in part, circulate from a point source on the defendant's
property that was hydrologically connected to the pollution of a river. See id.
348. EPA in a 1990 preamble promulgating stormwater regulations did state that
"this rulemaking only addresses discharges to waters of United States, consequently
discharges to ground waters are not covered by this rulemaking unless there is a
hydrological connection between the ground water and a nearby surface water body."
55 Fed. Reg. 47,990,47,997 (1990).
349. See, e.g., Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 836 F.2d 1482 (5th Cir. 1988)
(noting that the term "waters of the United States" could include discharges into utility
plant settling ponds). However, the EPA has exempted by regulation "[wiaste
treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the
requirements of [the] CWA." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1999).
350. See United States v. Gulf States Steel, Inc. 54 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (N.D. Ala.
1999) (comparing Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 836 F.2d 1482 (5th Cir. 1988),
and Public Service Co. of Colorado v. EPA, 949 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1991), with
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
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e. Point Source35" '
The CWA defines the term "point source" to include:
[A]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stack, concentrated animal feeding opera-
tion, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or
may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural storm-
water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture." 2
Certain devices, structures, and equipment clearly constitute point
sources.353 Nevertheless, the term "point source" has been interpreted
to include devices, structures, or conditions that bear little similarity to
a pipe. " This is illustrated by scenarios involving non-agricultural
stormwater discharges.
Precipitation can mobilize soil/debris at construction/development
sites and substances on the ground or on outdoor equipment/inventory
at industrial/commercial facilities. These substances may migrate into
a waterbody that falls within the jurisdictional scope of the CWA. The
movement of these substances can differ, however, from active
processes because there may be no pipe or conveyance. Regardless, the
351. One commentator articulates a rationale for certain dischargers being
denominated "point" sources: "[t]hey are termed point sources because the point of
discharge is known; that is, discharges and potential contaminants the rein, can be
traced to a particular point, location, facility or activity." Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water
Quality Standards: Are There Any Limits, 7 DUKE ENV. L. & POL'Y F. 367 (1997). The
same commentator contrasts "non-point source."
Non-point source pollution, on the other hand, is pollution that occurs as
water drains across the land and picks up contaminants along the way. For
example, sheet flow across a golf course where pesticides are used may
pickup and carry residue, which will then continue to follow the drainage of
the watershed. Those pollutants will be added to contaminants from stock
yards or pasture land or urban runoff. It is difficult to trace a particular
contaminant to a particular point in the watershed, thus the terms, non-point
source pollution.
Id. See also Calvo, supra note 73, at 160 (describing non-point source pollution).
352. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994). The term excludes return flows from irrigated
agriculture. See id.
353. Two examples identified by the courts include man holes and sewer pipes. See
Georgia v. City of East Ridge, 949 F. Supp. 1571, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
354. In United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that "[t]he concept of a point source
was designed to further this scheme (to eliminate pollution of the nation's waters) by
embracing the broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from which
pollutants might enter the waters of the United States." Id. at 373.
602 [Vol. 23
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
courts and EPA have on occasion determined that such passive
movement can constitute a point source discharge.
There are limits to the scope of the term "point source." For
example, in UnitedStates v. Plaza Health Laboratories,3" the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to determine whether a
human being could constitute a "point source." An individual was
prosecuted for knowingly violating the CWA by placing vials of human
blood adjacent to a river.356 The vials were eventually washed into the
river.357 The individual was convicted.358 On appeal, the court decided
that the placement of this material by a human was not a discharge from
a point source.35 9
2. Determination of Permit Effluent Limits
An NPDES permit will specify limits for various "parameters" for
each outfall at a facility. A parameter is a particular attribute or
characteristic of a facility's wastewater discharge. The permit will
generally include parameters for specific chemicals or substances (such
as ammonia or copper, etc.). It will also likely contain generic pollutant
parameters such as BOD, COD, or color which simultaneously measure
the "effect" of specific pollutants.
The permit will restrict the quantity, rate, and/or concentration of
pollutants that the point source can discharge into the waterbody.3 ° A
schedule for compliance with the applicable effluents will be included.
Further, the permit is likely to contain provisions requiring various
measurements of the wastewater stream such as temperature or flow
rate.
The NPDES permits "transform generally applicable effluent
limitations and other standards . . .into the obligations . . .of the
individual discharger."36' The application of a particular parameter limit
or condition to a facility is driven by two CWA programs. They are the
355. 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993).
356. See id at 644.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id. at 649-50. The decision has been criticized. See generally Stephanie L.
Herperger, A Point Source of Pollution Under the Clean Water Act: A Human Being Should
Be Included, 5 DuKE J. ENVTL. L. POL'Y F. 97 (1996).
360. See National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 110 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
361. EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976).
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national categorical standards (technology-based limits) and state WQS
(water quality-based limits).
The CWA categorical standards generally represent the minimum
limits the facility's effluent must attain regardless of ambient waterbody
conditions. Some waterbodies will not attain compliance with the
applicable state WQS after implementation of the categorical limits.362
Sections 301363 and 302" of the CWA would therefore require the
imposition of more stringent effluent limits if the applicable categorical
standard(s) cannot ensure compliance with the WQS.365 To determine
whether more stringent limits will be required, an agency will simulate
or model the impact of the proposed discharge on the receiving
stream.3" The calculation will attempt to determine the maximum
amount of various pollutants that the receiving waters can assimilate
without violating the applicable WQS.367
A facility aggrieved by an agency's determination of the limits or
conditions to be included in a new or modified NPDES permit is
typically provided the opportunity to challenge them in an administra-
tive appeal process.368 The failure to identify and appeal one or more
objectionable conditions or limits can preclude subsequent challenges.
A facility may not, for example, be able to contest the validity of such
limits or conditions in a subsequent enforcement proceeding. 69
362. See Vandenbergh, supra note 25, at 837. See also Westvaco, Corp. v. EPA, 899
F.2d 1383, 1385 (4th Cir. 1990).
363. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(bXC) (1994).
364. Id. § 1312(a).
365. See Vandenbergh, supra note 23, at 837.
366. See Ex parte Fowl River Protective Ass'n, Inc., 572 So. 2d 446, 457 (Ala.
1990).
367. See id.
368. In General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 168 F.3d 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources issued a NPDES permit encompassing stormwater
discharges to a General Motors Corporation facility. A subsequent enforcement action
was instituted against the facility for violation of the NPDES permit. See id. at 1379.
The court held that the facility was precluded from challenging the validity of the
permit limits because it had failed to appeal them when initially issued. See id.
369. See Public Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1990) (by failing to challenge state-issued NPDES
permit under applicable state law, permittee lost "forever the right to do so, even
though [an enforcement action] might eventually result in the imposition of
[substantial] penalties"); United States v. CPS Chemical Co., 779 F. Supp. 437,453-54
(E.D. Ark. 1991) (demonstrating that failure to appeal 1984 federal permit limits
precludes subsequent challenge on grounds they were impossible to meet).
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a. Type of Permit Limits/Standards
An NPDES permit will contain various types of effluent limits,
standards and conditions.37 Permit "limits" are not always numeric
restrictions. Narrative language describing unacceptable conditions or
toxicity testing requirements may be included in a permit. The choice
of both the type37' and stringency of the permit limits can be an issue. 72
1. Numeric
Numerical limitations in a permit will usually restrict either the
concentration or mass of a particular pollutant in a facility's wastewater
discharge.
a. Concentration
Concentration limitations restrict the concentration of pollutants in
facility wastewater." They may be used if production and achievable
wastewater flow cannot be correlated nationally.37 4 These limits can
become important during low flow volume because high concentration
levels would not otherwise be restricted by mass limits.3"
b. Mass
Mass limitations restrict the total mass of pollutants that are
discharged.37 6 The rationale for the use of mass limits is the possibility
that a facility could augment or dilute wastewater to attain permit
370. The EPA is given the ability to place conditions in the permit it deems
necessary to assure compliance with applicable CWA requirements. See 33 U.S.C. §
1342(a)(2) (1994).
371. In Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. Washington, 9 P.3d 892 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000),
an environmental group argued that a state NPDES permit should not include numeric
limits because of Washington state statutory language requiring use of all known,
available, and reasonable pollution control methods. See id. at 893.
372. However, the EPA or state will have to include any applicable categorical
limits.
373. See Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
374. 64 Fed. Reg. 39,564, 39,570-71 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 403).
375. See id.
376. See Hercules, 598 F.2d at 102.
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concentration limits.3" Such limits discourage permittees from
diluting378 wastewater to meet concentration limits.379
The regulations require that certain NPDES permits include effluent
limitations expressed in terms of mass.38° These types of limits may be
based on the establishment of an allowable quantity of mass pollutant
per unit of production at a facility.3 ' The development of national
production-based standards requires that production rates be correlated
to achievable wastewater flows.3"
2. Narrative
Criteria established by a narrative standard do not have fixed
values. They are generally set by an agency on a case-by-case basis in
accordance with certain procedures, data assessment methods, and test
protocols.383 Agencies often apply narrative standards to those sub-
stances for which it is difficult to set numeric limits.'"
Examples of narrative standards include: (1) "No toxic pollutants
in toxic amounts;" (2) "Waters shall be free of substances that are
377. See In re AT&T Teletype Corp., 1986 EPA App. LEXIS, 20 2 E.A.D. 167 (Apr.
23, 1986) which notes that 40 C.F.R. § 433 13(c) and § 433.14(c) provide "no user
subject to the provisions of this subpart shall augment the use of process wastewater
or otherwise dilute the wastewater as a partial or total substitute for adequate treatment
to achieve compliance with these limitations." Id. at 12.
378. Dilution involves increasing the amount of process water to achieve
compliance with a concentration-based standard. See Gold, supra note 98, at 484
(defining dilution in pretreatment categorical standard context). The words of former
EPA Administrator William Ruckehaus are sometimes cited to succinctly summarize
the agency's position on the issue: "We don't believe that the solution to pollution is
dilution." See id.
379. See id.
380. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.45 (f)(1) (2000). Note that pollutants such as pH,
temperature, and radiation cannot be measured by mass. See OHIO EPA, supra note 214.
381. See 64 Fed. Reg. 39,654, 39,570 (1999). "EPA has used mass limits to
encourage flow reduction and to prevent dischargers from meeting concentration limits
by diluting their wastewater." Id.
382. See id. Some agencies will recommend the use of continuous flow monitoring
or totalizing if the permit will contain mass limits. See OrHO EPA, supra note 214.
383. An example might include a toxicity limit for which compliance is determined
through biomonitoring or toxicity testing of the point source's effluent.
384. By way of example, EPA stated 20 years ago that toxicity limitations are
useful when specific chemical limits are inadequate or infeasible. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,523
(1980) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 122-25). The Illinois Supreme Court has noted
"[t]he Agency has proposed, and we accept, what we believe to be an innovative and
constructive approach to defining what constitutes a 'toxic amount' for those
substances for which we cannot yet realistically specify a numeric standard." Granite




putrescent or otherwise objectionable bottom deposits;" (3) "Waters
shall be free of materials that cause odor, color or other conditions in
such a degree to cause a nuisance;" and (4) "Waters shall be free from
substances in concentrations or combinations harmful to humans or
aquatic life."'3 "
3. Best Management Practices
Best management practices may be appropriate in situations where
it is impractical or economically infeasible to meet numerical effluent
limits.
38 6
b. Categorical Effluent Limits
Section 301(b) of the CWA authorizes the EPA to promulgate
national categorical standards or limits387 to restrict discharges of
specific pollutants on an industry-by-industry basis."" The effluent
limits are derived from research regarding the pollution control
technology used in the industry.3" 9 The analysis will include the degree
of reduction of a pollutant that can be achieved through the use of
various levels of technology."l The applicable standard is dictated by
385. These examples were listed by the court in the context of a discussion of WQS
issues in American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
386. See OHIo EPA, supra note 149 (referencing desirability of using BMPs in
pretreatment context because of lowered limits (i.e., WQC) and improved analytical
methods).
387. These standards are sometimes called "guidelines." Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
EPA, 671 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982). Such a description is misleading; they are
mandatory requirements.
388. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1994).
389. Id. See also National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). In Georgia-Pacific, 671 F.2d at 1237, the court noted that in establishing
effluent limitation guidelines for a segment of the pulp and paper industry it had
examined the pollution control practices in the "bleached" segment ofthe industry. See
id.
390. An important issue is the ability of a facility to consistently attain a limit. A
facility in a particular industry category using the same treatment system may achieve
different pollutant removal efficiencies at various points in time. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted the reason for such variability: "[a] test
conducted one day may show a different concentration of the same toxic than are
shown by the same test the next day. This variability may be due to the inherent
inaccuracy of analytical testing, i.e., 'analytical variability,' or to routine fluctuations
in a plant's treatment performance." Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 228
(5th Cir. 1989). EPA must take such variability into account when establishing effluent
limits. See id. The issue of variability in the Clean Air Act context is discussed in
Wright & Henry, supra note 156, at 314.
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the kind of pollutant discharged (i.e., toxic, conventional, or non-
conventional)39" ' and whether a new or existing point source is
involved.3"
Facilities may on occasion use means other than pollution controls
to achieve prescribed limits. Pollutant reduction or minimization are
examples. A plant may in some circumstances eliminate or reduce a
wastewater discharge by fuel substitution, process redesign, and waste
minimization. 93
EPA estimated that as of June 2000, it had promulgated effluent
limitations guidelines for more than fifty industrial categories affecting
30,000 facilities.'" The industrial categories are often further divided
into subcategories. An example is a categorical standard promulgated
in 2000 for transportation equipment cleaning ("TEC") facilities.395 The
TEC category was divided into subcategories which include: (1) Tank
Trucks and Intermodal Tank Containers Transporting Chemical and
Petroleum Cargos; (2) Rail Tank Cars Transporting Chemical and
Petroleum Cargos; (3) Tank Barges and Ocean/Sea Tankers Transport-
ing Chemical and Petroleum Cargoes; and (4) Tanks Transporting Food
Grade Cargos.3" The effluent limits/conditions will be tailored to the
performance capabilities of the wastewater treatment or control
technologies utilized by the subcategory.
391. Few effluent guidelines include pollutants that are not encompassed by these
three categories. See Dembach, supra note 55, at 9.
392. See id. at 61.
393. See Mark C. Van Putten & Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean Water
Act, 19 U. MiCH. J.L. REFORM 863, 877 n.60 (1986). The Supreme Court of Washington
noted in the 1970s:
Pollution problems are usually an integral part of the production process.
Their control requires a plan carefully integrated into the entire operation of
the business. Nearly all industrial pollution can be controlled, and effective
control is best managed if the production process is designed to minimize
waste. Some methods of control are to substitute fuels or power sources;
substitute raw materials; use different production processes; change the
design of the product; capture pollutants before they leave the plant; change
disposal practices so as to encourage reclamation of waste products; and
recycle either waste products or resources used in the productive process.
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Department of Ecology, 545 P.2d 5 (Wash. 1976) (citing 1 A.
REITZE, JR., ENViRONMENTAL LAw 77-78 (1972)).
394. See 65 Fed. Reg. 37,783, 37,784 (2000). Ifthe pretreatment effluent guidelines
are counted the total increases to 45,000. See 65 Fed. Reg. 53,008, 53,009 (2000).
395. TEC facilities are defined by EPA as those engaged in cleaning the interiors
of tanks, including tank trucks, rail tank cars, intermodal tank containers, tank barges,
and ocean/sea tankers used to transport commodities that come into direct contact with
the tank or container interior. See 65 Fed. Reg. 49,666, 49,671 (2000) (to be codified




EPA's development of categorical effluent limits is an ongoing
process. 97 The federal agency continues to promulgate categorical
standards for facilities that have not been addressed.'" Existing
categorical standards are also assessed to determine if revisions are
warranted. The motivation for a change to an existing standard will
often be the need to incorporate technological developments in a given
industry. 3"
EPA has been criticized by some groups for the pace of this
program. In the late 1980s, the Natural Resources Defense Council
("NRDC") sued EPA arguing the agency failed to comply with section
304(m) of the CWA. NRDC and EPA entered into a consent decree
in 1992 that identified various point source categories for which final
action related to the establishment of effluent limitation guidelines must
be taken."' EPA argued for: (1) a schedule for revision of existing
effluent guides; (2) identification of categories of sources discharging
toxic or non-conventional pollutants for which EPA has not established
effluent guidelines; and (3) a schedule for promulgation of effluent
guidelines for sources identified in the prior category.' 2
1. The New/Existing Source Distinction
The CWA categorical effluent limits applied to existing and new
point sources will typically differ. The effluent limits imposed upon
existing facilities tend to be less stringent than those applied to new
facilities. 3 New sources are subject to new source performance
397. Section 304(m) requires EPA to publish an "Effluent Guideline Plan" every
two years. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(m) (1994). For example, EPA is developing effluent
guidelines for printed wiring board facilities. See Proposed Limits for Metal Industries
Called Costly, Threat to Voluntary Program, 32 ENv'T REP. 396 (2000) (referencing
industry disagreement with EPA regarding the cost of meeting proposed effluent limit
guidelines). However, EPA may on occasion decide not to issue effluent limits after
studying an industry. See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 45,072 (1999) (withdrawal of proposed
limits for industrial laundries category).
398. A discussion of proposed future EPA activities to establish categorical
standards for previously unregulated facilities is found at 65 Fed. Reg. 37,783 (2000).
The proposal was finalized on August 31, 2000. See 65 Fed. Reg. 53,008 (2000).
399. A discussion of future EPA activities to revise certain existing categorical
standards is found at 65 Fed. Reg. 37,783 (June 16, 2000).
400. See 65 Fed. Reg. 37,783, 37,785 (2000) (discussing NRDC lawsuit).
401. See id.
402. The decree's schedule has been modified several times. See id The decree
also required EPA to establish an Effluent Guidelines Task Force to make
recommendations for improvement to the effluent guidelines program. See id.
403. See, e.g., South Holland Metal Finishing Co. v. Browner, 97 F.3d 932 (7th Cir.
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standards promulgated pursuant to section 306 of the CWA, which
reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction achievable through the
application of best available demonstrated control technology.' In
contrast, existing sources are often subject to effluent limitations
representing the best practicable control technology, best available
technology, or best conventional technology.
The Congressional and agency rationale for this differentiation has
been the greater difficulty often involved in retrofitting new or addi-
tional pollution controls onto existing facilities. Incorporating pollution
control equipment into the initial design of facility processes tends to
reduce the cost and/or effort needed to attain certain limits.' Whether
a particular modification or change in the relevant components of an
existing facility will result in its reclassification as a new source" is
1996). An electroplating facility was required to meet more stringent categorical
pretreatment standards because it relocated. EPA and the State of Illinois took the
position that this relocation changed it from an "existing source" to a "new source."
See id. at 934.
404. 33 U.S.C. § 1306 (1994).
405. Facilities constructed after the promulgation of a categorical standard have the
opportunity to design and install the best and most efficient production processes and
wastewater treatment technologies. See 65 Fed. Reg. 3,008, 3,010 (2000) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 136 and 445). The legislative history of the section 306 "new
source" provision was discussed in National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d
104 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
406. The term "new source" is defined in 40 C.F.R. 403.3(k) as:
(1) [A]ny building, structure, facility or installation from which there is or
may be a Discharge of pollutants, the construction of which commenced
after the publication of proposed Pretreatment Standards under Section
307(c) of the [Clean Water] Act which will be applicable to such source if
such Standards are thereafter promulgated in accordance with that section,
provided that:
(i) The building, structure, facility or installation is constructed
at a site at which no other source is located; or
(ii) The building, structure, facility or installation totally
replaces the process or production equipment that causes the
discharge of pollutants at an existing source; or
(iii) The production of wastewater generating processes of the
building, structure, facility or installation are substantially
independent of an existing source at the same site. In
determining whether these are substantially independent, factors
such as the extent to which the new facility is integrated with
the existing plant, and the extent to which the new facility is
engaged in the same general type of activity as the existing
source should be considered.
(2) Construction on a site at which an existing source is located results in a
modification rather than a new source if the construction does not create a
new building, structure, facility or installation meeting the criteria of
paragraphs (k)(IXii), or (k)(1)(iii) of this section but otherwise alters,
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therefore a material issue. Consequently, facilities will usually attempt
to structure plant or process changes to avoid a reclassification as a
"new source" if possible.
A CWA reclassification issue can also arise when a facility changes
locations. In South Holland Metal Finishing Co. v. Browner, 7 an electro-
plating facility disassembled its four existing process lines and the
corresponding pretreatment equipment. 4°8 The process lines and
equipment were reassembled at the new location.4° The EPA and the
State of Illinois took the position that the facility should be reclassified
from an "existing" to a "new" source for purposes of the categorical
pretreatment standards. t °
2. Direct/Indirect Discharger Distinction
Categorical standards are established for both direct and indirect
discharges. They include standards for facilities discharging directly
into a jurisdictional waterbody (i.e., "direct dischargers") and those
whose effluent is routed to a POTW (i.e., "indirect dischargers" ["IU"]
discharging effluent into a POTW). The CWA required EPA to
establish "pretreatment standards" 4t' that an IU's wastewater must meet
replaces or adds to existing process or production equipment.
(3) Construction of a new source as defined under this paragraph has
commenced if the owner or operator has:
(i) Begun, or caused to begin as part of a continuous onsite
construction program:
(A) Any placement, assembly or installation of facilities or
equipment; or
(B) Significant site preparation work including clearing,
excavation, or removal of existing buildings, structures or
facilities which is necessary for the placement, assembly or
installation of new source facilities or equipment; or
(ii) Entered into a binding contractual obligation for the
purchase of facilities or equipment which are intended to be
used in its operation within a reasonable time. Options to
purchase or contracts which can be terminated or modified
without substantial loss, and contracts for feasibility,
engineering and design studies do not constitute a contractual
obligation under this paragraph.
See 40 C.F.R. § 403.3(k) (2000).
407. 97 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
408. See id. at 933.
409. See id.
410. See id. at 934.
411. Pretreatment is defined as:
The reduction of the amount of pollutants, the elimination of pollutants, or
the alteration of the nature of the pollutant properties in wastewater prior to
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prior to introduction into a POTW.42 Their purpose is to prevent the
discharge of pollutants that "pass through," "interfere with," or are
otherwise "incompatible" with the operation of a POTW or which are
not susceptible to treatment by the POTW.4 3 Pretreatment standards are
designed to ensure that wastewater from direct and indirect industrial
dischargers are subject to similar levels of treatment.414
EPA has promulgated two types of pretreatment standards that are
applicable to indirect discharges.4 " One set of pretreatment standards
establishes a general prohibition (i.e., non-numerical limit) on the
release of any pollutants by any non-domestic if these pollutants
interfere with or pass through a POTW.41 6 This prohibition "serves as
a back-up standard to address localized problems that occur." ' 7 It also
"establishes specific prohibitions which apply to all non-domestic users
and are designed to guard against common types of pollutant discharges
that may (1) create POTW fire/explosion hazards; (2) cause POTW
structural damage," 8 (3) obstruct POTW flow; (4) cause excessive flow;
or (5) cause excessive heat."'19
The other set of pretreatment provisions are national categorical
standards.42 The EPA has promulgated such standards for a number of
categories of industrial users. The categorical standards constitute
numerical, technology-based discharge limits derived from an assess-
ment of the types and amounts of pollutants discharged that typically
interfere with or pass through POTWs with secondary treatment
processes.42' POTWs are required to implement local pretreatment
or in lieu of discharging or otherwise introducing such pollutants into a
POTW. The reduction or alteration may be obtained by physical, chemical,
or biological processes, process changes, or by other means.
40 C.F.R. § 403.3(q) (2000).
412. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(bXl) (1994).
413. Id.
414. See 65 Fed. Reg. 3,008, 3,009 (2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 136 and
445).
415. EPA's development of the pretreatment categorical standards is discussed in
Gold, supra note 98, at 479-90.
416. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.5 (2000).
417. See 52 Fed. Reg. 1,586 (1987) and 40 C.F.R. § 403.5(a) (2000).
418. For example; the receipt of wastewater that is acidic may corrode some sewer
pipes. See 64 Fed. Reg. 1999 (Nov. 22, 1999). Consequently, the pretreatment
regulations specify a minimum pH for effluent. See id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 403.5(b)(2)
(2000).
419. See 52 Fed. Reg. 1586 (1987). See also 40 C.F.R. § 403.5(b) (2000).
420. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.6 (2000).
421. See 52 Fed. Reg. 1,586 (1987).
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limits applicable to their industrial indirect dischargers to satisfy any
local requirement.422
Congress revised the CWA in 1977 to establish a discretionary
program for POTWs to grant removal credits under certain circum-
stances to IUs. 4 3 A POTW's removal credit authority enables a POTW
to grant to an IU a "credit"--in the form of a less stringent wastewater
pretreatment standard424-to the extent that the POTW consistently
removes certain regulated pollutants from the indirect discharger's
waste stream. 425 These removal credits may be awarded only if(l) the
POTW "removes all or any part of such toxic pollutant," (2) the
POTW's ultimate discharge would "not violate that effluent limitation,
or standard which could be applicable to such toxic pollutant if it were
discharged directly rather than through a POTW," and (3) the POTW's
discharge would "not prevent sludge use or disposal by such [POTW]
in accordance with section 1 345. "426
3. Facility/Activity Categories
National categorical standards establish effluent limits for facilities
in specific industrial categories or on POTWs. Each categorical
standard describes the type of facility which it is intended to encompass.
The category may be further subdivided. For example, the "coil
coating" category is further subdivided into steel basis materials,
aluminum basis materials, galvanized basis materials, and cans.427
The applicability of a category to a particular facility is sometimes
unclear."" Both the preamble4 29 accompanying the promulgation of the
422. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.5 (2000).
423. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (2000).
424. In other words, the IU's discharge may be allowed to exceed the applicable
categorical pretreatment effluent limits. See 64 Fed. Reg. 39,564, 39,583 (1999).
425. See 40 C.F. R. §403.7 (2000). See also 64 Fed. Reg. 39,564, 39,583 (1999) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 403).
426. 33 U.S.C. § 1345 (1994).
427. See 40 C.F.R. § 465(A)-(D) (2000). This category was discussed in United
States v. Roll Coater, Inc., No. 89-828C, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8790, at *2 (S.D. Ind.
1991).
428. EPA has in some instances frankly noted the difficulty in determining the
applicability of a categorical standard to one or more facilities. See Memorandum from
Mark Ingle, Project Officer, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to Jeff Cullen,
Beverage & Diamond, EPA Applicability Interpretation Regarding Silk Screen Printing
and the Printed Circuit Board Manufacturing Process (May 31, 1996) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Interpretation Memorandum]. EPA noted in relevant part in this
memorandum: "[t]he applicability interpretation for the subject silk screen cleaning
process is not easily defined because the 40 C.F.R. § 433 regulation utilizes PCB
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effluent guidelines and the background43 or development documents43'
may be used to interpret the applicability of the categorical standard. If
there is doubt about the applicability of a category, EPA may in some
circumstances provide a determination. 432 Facilities that disagree with
the agency's view ofthe applicability of a particular categorical standard
may on occasion challenge the decision.433
a. Industrial
The EPA in the mid-I 970s commenced a new program to regulate
toxic discharges on an industy-by-industry basis.43 Standards would
be established based on the feasibility of control technology.435 The
toxics categorical effluent approach was sanctioned in a judicial
decree.436 This program was subsequently adopted by Congress as part
of the 1977 amendments to the CWA.437
manufacture as a "trigger" process for regulation." Id.
429. See In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., NPDES Appeal No. 92-5, 1993 EPA
LEXIS 2 1, at * 16 (1993) (referring to preamble in assessing the application of effluent
guideline to a facility).
430. A background document in the categorical standard context may be
denominated a "development document." See National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v.
EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 657-59 (3d Cir. 1983).
43 1. Both the term "background" and "development" document are used. See
Goodyear, 1993 EPA LEXIS at *12 (referencing Tire and Synthetic Segment of the
Rubber Processing Service Category of Development Document). Various other
documents may be prepared in developing the categorized standard. For example, in
promulgating a categorical standard for a class of landfills, EPA prepared an
"Economic Analysis for Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the
Landfills Point Source Category," "Statistical Support Document for Final Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Landfills Point Source Category," and
"Environmental Assessment for Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards
for the Landfills Point Source Category." See 65 Fed. Reg. 3,008 (2000).
432. 40 C.F.R. § 173.6(a) (2000).
433. See Modine Mfg. Co. v. EPA, 791 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1986) (considering a
challenge to the application of electroplating and metal finishing categorical standards
to facilities manufacturing automobile radiators and other heat transfer products).
434. See Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
435. See id.
436. National Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 ERC (BNA) 2120, 2122
(D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part on other grounds, National Resource Defenses Council v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
437. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1994).
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b. Public Owned Treatment Works
A separate set of categorical standards were developed for
discharges from POTWs.438 The CWA requires that all POTWs achieve
effluent limitations based upon secondary treatment. 39 EPA determines
what constitutes "secondary treatment." However, the 1981 amend-
ments"e ' to the CWA provide that certain biological treatment processes
constitute the equivalent of secondary treatment."2
POTWs with larger flows are required to develop and implement
an industrial pretreatment program ("IPP"). 3 The IPP is a binding
component of the POTW's NPDES permit." If an existing POTW
subsequently becomes subject to this program, its NPDES permit must
be re-issued or modified to incorporate the IPP." POTWs are required
to exercise some oversight over indirect dischargers classified as
significant industrial users ("SIU").'
438. A "POTW" is defined as "any device or system used in the treatment
(including recycling and reclamation) of municipal sewage or industrial waste of a
liquid nature which is owned by a 'state' or 'municipality."' This definition includes
sewers, pipes, or other conveyances only if they convey wastewater to a POTW
providing treatment. Whether a particular process or facility fits within the scope of
the term "POTW" is occasionally a contested issue. See, e.g., In re City & County of
San Francisco, 1993 EPA App. LEXIS 24 (1993).
439. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(d)(1) (1994). POTW secondary
treatment requirements are addressed at 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (2000). These
requirements were promulgated at 49 Fed. Reg. 36,986 (1984).
440. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (1994).
441. See Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623 (1981).
442. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d)(4) (1994). The phrase "biological treatment facilities"
means oxidation ponds, lagoons, ditches, and trickling filters. 49 Fed. Reg. 36,986
(1984). Whether a particular treatment process was equivalent to secondary treatment
was discussed in a New York Department of Environmental Conservation
administrative decision. See In re Application for a Renewal and Modification of a
State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit (NY 0020265) 1987 NY ENV
LEXIS 27 (Oct. 23, 1987).
443. An important EPA administrative decision addressing whether a POTW was
required to have developed an IPP is In re City of Yankton, 1994 EPA LEXIS 44 (1994).
See also United States v. City of Bearmont, 786 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
444. See United States v. City of Detroit, 940 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (E.D. Mich.
1996).
445. In City of Detroit, the city argued an IPP that had not yet been incorporated into
the permit was not an "enforceable condition." Id. at 1099. The court agreed, holding
that such a pretreatment program may only be enforced when incorporated in the
permit. See id. at 1100.
446. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.8 (2000). The required oversight includes sampling and
analysis of 1U effluent and inspection of their facilities. See Letter to Larry Tharnish,
Manager, Batesville Water Utilities from Myron 0. Knudson, Director, Water
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The IPP must include the development and imposition of limits on
IU's that are unrelated to categorical standards. These specific "Local
Limits" are intended to implement the general and specific pretreatment
standards."7 This can be a complex exercise because of the stringency
of certain WQS or the possibility that a target pollutant originates from
domestic background sources."'
Most municipal sewage systems, or POTWs, were designed and
constructed to treat domestic sewage and other biological waste.
However, IUs may discharge wastes into the POTW in concentrations
or volumes that cannot be adequately treated by its treatment process.
Such discharges can inhibit or disrupt a POTW, causing it to violate its
NPDES permit limits. The problems may include physical disruption
or inhibition of the treatment process. It is also possible to hydraulically
overload the plant so that proper settlement does not occur or wastes are
retained for too short a time to receive adequate treatment before
discharge.
Pollutants discharged by lUs which cannot be treated by the POTW
may pass through the plant in amounts or concentrations that exceed its
NPDES permit limits. Some pollutants may also contaminate the
sewage sludge that is a by-product of the POTW's treatment processes.
Such contamination may prevent the POTW from disposing or reusing
the sewage sludge in certain ways.
Congress recognized these threats. The CWA requires lUs to
pretreat wastes before discharging them into POTWs. Section 307(b)
requires the establishment of pretreatment standards "to prevent the
discharge of any pollutant through [POTWs], which pollutant interferes
with, passes through, or is otherwise compatible with such works."" 9
Management Division, EPA Region VI, Notice ofProposed Assessment ofClass I Civil
Penalty Docket No. VI-91-1647 (July 24, 1991) (on file with the author) (referencing
alleged violations by Batesville, Arkansas POTW, including failure to sample/analyze
IU effluent and to inspect such facilities).
447. See Gold, supra note 98, at 468.
448. The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency has stated "[tlhe complexity of
permitting industrial users with extremely low limits is not limited to mercury. POTWs
have also faced problems with issuing local limits for silver due to the low water
quality criteria, and sometimes for copper, due to elevated domestic background
concentrations." OHio EPA, supra note 149, at 2.
449. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(bX1) (1994). The Arkansas Poultry Federation challenged
the definitions of"pass-through" and "interference" promulgated by EPA arguing they
were inconsistent with the CWA and unconstitutionally vague. Arkansas Poultry Fed'n
v. EPA, 852 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 1988). The definitions were upheld. Id. See also EPA
v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1405 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding "interference"
and "pass through" are not unconstitutionally vague terms but adequately advised IU
that it was not to cause the POTW to violate its NPDES terms); 64 Fed. Reg. 39,564
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c. Water Quality Standards
Section 303 of the CWA requires that each state develop WQS for
jurisdictional waters of the United States within their borders." ° WQS
serve a dual purpose. They establish the water quality goals for a
specific body of water and also serve as the regulatory basis for the
development of water-quality based effluent limits45' and strategies for
individual point source discharges." 2 The particular WQS deemed
applicable to a waterbody can therefore be an important determinant of
the effluent limits a discharging facility will need to attain.'"
A WQS consists of three parts: (a) the designated uses of a
waterbody; (b) the water quality criteria ("WQC") that are necessary to
protect existing uses and to attain the beneficial uses designated by the
state; and (c) an antidegradation statement or policy to protect existing
uses and high quality water."'4 WQS may be expressed either as a
numeric concentration level or a narrative standard." They are
effective immediately upon promulgation."'
(1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 403) (revising pretreatment regulations); 60 Fed.
Reg. 3,008, 2,009 (2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 136 and 445).
450. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). A detailed discussion of WQS is found in David
S. Baron, Water, Rivers and Lakes: Emerging Issues, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559 (1995). The
WQS in some states may be applied to a broader media denominated "waters of the
state." See, e.g., Upper Chattahoochee River Keeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 986
F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (applying Georgia WQS to culverts from combined
sewer overflow treatment facility because of the breadth of the term "waters of the
state").
451. For example, an author illustrates the importance of the EPA recommended
DO WQC by noting that EPA and the states use it to set effluent limits for
approximately 15,000 POTWs. See Lewis, supra note 195, at 279 (citing ENvTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFiCE OF WATER REG. AND STANDARDS, PUB. No. 440/5-86/003,
AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR DISSOLVED OXYGEN (1986)).
452. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (2000). For example, in City ofBrighton Wastewater Treatment
Plant, 2000 Mich. ENV LEXIS 19 (Mich. Dep't Nat'l Res. 2000), a state
administrative law judge was required to decide whether an increase in a POTW's
discharge would threaten the recipient waterbody's ability to sustain its uses.
453. See In re Travenol Laboratories, Inc., NPDES Appeal No. 87-7, 1990 EPA
App. LEXIS 48, (EPA 1990). In Travenol, a facility challenged EPA's use of Puerto
Rico provisions restricting consideration of background pollutants/dilution in setting
permit limits. See id. The facility argued these provisions were not encompassed or
part of the Puerto Rico WQS. See id. at *8. The decision concluded the provisions
were part of the WQS and therefore lawfully considered by EPA in the determination
of the NPDES permit limits. See id at **10-11.
454. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (2000).
455. WQS are not themselves directly enforceable. Instead, the NPDES permits
issued for point source discharges on a waterbody will include the effluent limits
necessary to maintain applicable WQS. See id.
456. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Section 303(c) specifies that the adoption of WQS is primarily the
responsibility of the states. 57 The state must adopt uses consistent with
CWA objectives and WQC sufficient to protect the chosen uses.""'
However, EPA is required to ensure that state WQS, along with any
changes, meet the minimum requirements of the CWA. EPA will assess
whether the WQS protect state criteria and/or designated uses459 have
taken into account the water's use and value for public water supplies,
propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural,
industrial, navigation, and other purposes.' The CWA regulations
provide for EPA review of any state WQS changes. Therefore any state
WQS changes must be submitted to EPA.4"
The agency is required to make a determination of the legality of
the state standards within sixty days of submission. In the absence of
objections they become the standards for applicable waters of the United
States.462 EPA may promulgate WQS to supersede disapproved state
standards after providing the state notice and an opportunity to make
necessary revisions.463 The agency has utilized this authority on a
number of occasions.4"
A state may decide on its own initiative to add or revise WQS.
However, they are mandated by the federal CWA regulations to assess
their WQS at least every three years. This assessment is called a
15838, at *46 (S.D. Fla. 1998). The state of Florida enacted a statute that allowed
delayed compliance with certain WQS. See id. at *20 The court held that neither the
CWA nor Florida law authorized compliance schedules for WQS. See id. at **45-47.
457. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1994).
458. See40 C.F.R. §§ 131.5 (2000).
459. See 65 Fed. Reg. 31,682, 31,687 (2000).
460. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2XA) (1994).
461. See id.
462. See id.
463. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4) (1994). The federal agency's authority to
disapprove state WQS was upheld in Mississippi Comm 'n on Natural Resources v. Costle,
625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980) (disapproving Mississippi DO standard).
464. For example, note EPA's promulgation of a WQS for Arizona. See 61 Fed.
Reg. 20,686 (1996). EPA designated fish as a use for certain Arizona waterbodies.
EPA had disapproved of various Arizona WQS pursuant to 40 C.F.R- § 131.21 (2000).
EPA's alleged failure to promulgate superceding WQS for certain Arizona WQS was
the subject of a citizen suit challenge in Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp.
1342 (D. Az. 1995). See also 65 Fed. Reg. 41,216 (2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 131). EPA proposed a superseding WQS for the State of Kansas. It included a
requirement that all discharges to stream segments for which continuous flow is
sustained primarily through discharge of treated effluent protect the designated uses.
See also 65 Fed. Reg. 31,682, 31,719 (2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). EPA
promulgated aquatic life criterion for 23 priority toxic pollutants and numeric human
health criterion for 57 primary toxic pollutants.
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triennial review. The review is to include a determination of whether
new WQS should be promulgated or existing ones modified.45
1. Waterbody Uses
a. Designation of Uses
Section 303(c) of the CWA requires that the states specify one or
more uses for all waterbodies within their jurisdiction.'" States have
some latitude in specifying uses for various waterbodies." 7 Further,
states often adopt subcategories of uses for different ecosystems and
conditions.' A typical example is the establishment of use classifica-
tions for warm water and cold water fisheries.469
A use classification can either be an existing use4 or a higher
quality use that has not yet been attained (i.e., a "designated use").47
The designation of a higher quality use will require that water quality
conditions improve to the extent necessary to meet the applicable WQC
or standards necessary to support that use.47 A state may designate
several compatible uses for the same waterbody. 41
The designation of a particular use or uses for a waterbody can have
consequences for those facilities or activities whose discharges will
enter it. Some uses may have corresponding WQC or standards that
require the imposition of effluent limits on point source dischargers
more stringent than those imposed by applicable categorical standards.47
Consequently, the standards or criteria associated with the designated
use will be a key determinant of the assimilative capacity available in
465. See 33 U.SC. § 1313(c) (1994).
466. See id.
467. See Adler, supra note 33, at 209. This designation requires that certain
minimum beneficial uses be applied. Id.
468. See Baron, supra note 450, at 570.
469. See id.
470. An "existing use" is one that has actually been attained on a given body of
water after November 28, 1975.
471. See40 C.F.R. § 131.3(0 (2000).
472. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (2000).
473. See Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority, 1999 S.C. ENV LEXIS 102
(S.C. ALJ Div. Sept. 22, 1999), at * 19 (referencing the fact that states may designate
several compatible uses for the same waterbody). For example, a waterbody might
have public water supply, primary and secondary contact recreation, and
fishable/swimmable as designated uses.
474. Those circumstances would include waterbody conditions (flow, etc.), other
facilities or activities discharging into the waterbody, etc.
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the waterbody. The potential consequences that arise from a state's
choice will therefore occasionally trigger a challenge47" or debate. 76
b. Use Attainability
The CWA permits a state to remove a designated use if it can be
demonstrated that the attainment of this use is not feasible for certain
reasons.4" Uses are considered to be attainable if they can be achieved
(1) when certain effluent limitations are imposed on point sources, and
(2) when cost effective and reasonable best management practices are
imposed on nonpoint sources. 7 The use attainability analysis ("UAA")
involves evaluation of the physical, chemical and biological factors
through a waterbody survey and assessment.479 EPA reviews state UAA
determinations.' °
475. See, e.g., Northeast Ohio Reg. Sewer Dist.. v. Shank, 1988 Ohio ENV LEXIS
21 (Oct. 20, 1988) (setting out unsuccessful challenge to Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency's designation of a segment of the Cuyahoga River as "Warmwater
Habitat").
476. See Letter from Steve Hallstrom, Carnation, Washington, to the Seattle Times
(Aug. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Hallstrom Letter] (addressing disagreement related to impact
on City of Snoqualumie, Washington of reclassifying Snoqualumie River to a higher
use). City officials argued the proposed use would require costly upgrades to its
POTW. See Louis T. Consalett, Cities Fear Snoqualmie River Upgrade Would Slow
Growth, SEATrLE TIMES, July 29, 1991, at C1. An opposing argument was that
preservation ofthe river's water quality was a necessary cost because it was an amenity
that attracted people to the area. See Hallstrom Letter, supra. See also City of
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415,426 (10th Cir. 1996) (addressing Albuquerque's
challenge to EPA approval of tribal WQS based on argument they were unattainable
and would place an excessive burden on the city's POTW). The Albuquerque decision
is discussed in Baker, supra note 351.
477. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g) (2000). See also In re Petition of Town of Sherburne,
581 A.2d 274 (Vt. 1990) (addressing challenge to Vermont's use reclassification of
river).
478. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(d) (2000). The process for making this determination
is known as a use attainability analysis ("UAA"). EPA defines a UAA as a "structured
scientific assessment of the factors affecting the attainment of the use which may
include physical chemical, biological, and economic factors." 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(g)
(2000).
479. See 65 Fed. Reg. 41,216,41,221 (July 3, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
131).




2. Water Quality Criteria
a. Definition/Form
Water quality criteria ("WQC") are ambient48' water quality
conditions that are deemed protective of the uses established for a
waterbody.4 2 States are required to adopt WQC protective of the
designated uses." 3 The WQC must specify the maximum concentration
of pollutants that may be present in the water without impairing its
suitability for certain uses. 4 For example, a state could require that a
specific waterbody have a chloride concentration of no more than 250
milligrams per liter of water if its use designation is a fishing area.8"
WQC generally assume three forms. They include: (1) numerical
terms reflecting maximum concentration of a particular pollutant in the
receiving water;486 (2) bioassay or biomonitoring results which reflect
mortality rates of certain waterborne organisms relative to the concen-
trations of particular pollutants; or (3) terms narrative in nature.48 7 EPA
has indicated that biomonitoring or narrative WQC should only be used
"where numerical criteria cannot be established or to supplement
numerical criteria. ' Some numeric criteria might be expressed as
short-term and long-term averages. For example, EPA sets two-number
aquatic life criterion for the stated purpose of identifying average
concentrations which: (a) will produce water quality generally suited to
maintenance of aquatic life and designated areas; and (b) restricting the
481. Ambient standards should be contrasted with end of the pipe discharge limits.
482. In other words, criteria are the technical judgments as to the specific pollution
levels that are compatible with those uses. An example by an author is an EPA
recommended WQC for cyanide in drinking water which sets a maximum
concentration of 200 micrograms per liter. See Baron, supra note 450, at 572.
483. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 131.11 (2000).
484. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 131.11 (2000).
485. See Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th
Cir. 1980).
486. Numerical limits are used most frequently. See Costle, 625 F.2d at 1271. "For
most pollutants, criteria are expressed as specific numerical concentration limits." Id.
One author notes that the choice of numeric WQC is influenced by EPA criteria
documents. See Baron, supra note 450, at 572.
487. Gaba, supra note 253, at 1205. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 275,288 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Examples ofnarrative phrases are "produce
objectionable color, odor, taste or turbidity," Baron, supra note 450, at 575 and "no
floatable wastes," Adler, supra note 34, at 210.
488. See Baron, supra note 450, at 524 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.1 1(b) (2000)).
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duration of excursions over the average so that total exposures will not
cause unacceptable effects.489
b. Role of WQC
NPDES permits must incorporate the limitations necessary to
ensure the maintenance of the WQS applicable to the waterbody
receiving the wastewater.49  The complexity of this task will vary
depending upon the form of the WQS. For example, the establishment
of the limits necessary to meet numeric WQS is less complex. EPA has
noted that numeric WQC provide a more precise basis for deriving
water quality-based effluent limitation in NPDES permits and wasteload
allocations for total maximum daily loads to control toxic pollutant
discharges.49 The NPDES permit will limit the facility's effluent
discharge to the extent necessary to keep the concentration of the
relevant pollutant at or below the numeric benchmark.
Translating narrative standards or criteria into permit limits can be
more difficult. For example, what limits are necessary to ensure that a
waterbody has "no toxics in toxic amountsT' Likewise, the enforcement
of narrative standards can present a challenge.
c. Development of WQC
The scientific underpinning or rationale for a particular WQC is
obviously important.4" The WQC represent a judgment as to what
levels, concentrations, or conditions can support a. desired use. An
indication of the importance of the WQC is the CWA's requirement that
EPA periodically issue new or revised WQC. 493
489. 65 Fed. Reg. 31,862, 31,688-31,689 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 131).
490. See Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1385 (4th Cir. 1990).
491. See 65 Fed. Reg. 31,682, 31,683 (May 18,2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 131).
492. Concern has been expressed as to whether WQC are adequate to support some
aspects of certain uses. See Lewis, supra note 195, at 280. The author argues that an
EPA DO WQC is "based on solid information for only about a dozen of the 800 species
of the freshwater fishes that occur in the United States." Id. at 281. He also argues that
the "pool of information" supporting that particular WQC has changed very little in 20
years. Id.
493. See 33 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994). See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 68,354 (Dec. 10, 1998)
(compilation of national recommended WQC for 157 pollutants). See also 64 Fed. Reg.
71,974 (1999). The 1999 update of ambient WQC for ammonia contains the most
recent freshwater aquatic life criterion. See id.
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The WQC developed by EPA under section 304(d) of the CWA are
based solely on the relationship between pollutant concentrations and
environmental and human effects.4' They do not reflect consideration
of economic impacts or the technological feasibility495 of meeting the
required ambient concentrations t.4  The EPA WQC are frequently used
by the states in establishing or revising their WQS.497 However, since
they are not rules or regulations, states are free to adopt or develop their
own WQC.49  Further, states can promulgate WQS that are more
stringent than necessary to achieve relevant CWA requirements.4
Whatever their source, once a state adopts WQC, they must be
reviewed and approved by EPA.5" The EPA often uses its model or
recommended WQC to assess the adequacy of state WQS. If the state
WQC are approved, they become enforceable components of the state
WQS.
3. Antidegradation/Antibacksliding
The federal CWA has provisions restricting to a significant extent
the ambient degradation of waterbodies. °' These restrictions are
494. See 63 Fed. Reg. 68,354 (Dec. 10, 1998).
495. See id. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1994). WQC are required to reflect the
most recent scientific knowledge. See id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 131.11 (2000).
496. See 63 Fed Reg. 68,354 (Dec. 10, 1998).
497. See In re Town of Rockland Sewer Comm'n, NPDES Appeal No. 93-8, 1994
EPA App. LEXIS at46 (EPA Aug. 19,1994) (referencing Massachusetts incorporation
by reference of EPA "Gold Book" WQC in its WQS for chlorine and copper). See also
Baron, supra note 450, at 572 (discussing EPA "Gold Book"). Section 304(a) of the
CWA requires EPA to periodically issue new or revised WQC documents. See 33
U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1994).
498. State decisions and the accompanying rationale addressing various WQC
issues are often memorialized in their policy or guidance documents. See, e.g.,
COLORADO WATER QUALITY CONTROL COMMISSION POLICY, STATE HUMAN HEALTH-BASED
WATER QUALITY CRITERIA AND STANDARDS POLICY 96-2 (1996) (addressing Colorado's
methodology and rationale for establishing human health based WQC and standards for
state surface water and groundwater).
499. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 426 (10th Cir. 1996)
(limiting EPA review of WQS to a determination of whether they are stringent enough
to comply with the federal agency's recommended standards and criteria); Baron, supra
note 450, at 570.
500. In Mississippi Comm 'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir.
1980), the EPA questioned the adequacy of Mississippi's DO criteria. See id. at 1273.
The state refused to revise the DO criteria. See id. at 1274. EPA ultimately
promulgated replacement DO criteria. See id.
501. The CWA antidegradation policy is addressed at 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1999).
See generally John A. Chilson, Note, Keeping Clean Waters Clean: Making the Clean Water
Act's Antidegradation Policy Work, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 545 (1999).
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variously referenced as "antidegradation" provisions."° An Ohio court
succinctly stated the purpose of the CWA antidegradation provisions:
"[i]n essence, the antidegradation rule serves the purpose of ensuring
that bodies of water which have had their quality improved through
years of anti-pollution efforts are not permitted to backslide, reversing
those years of improvements, except under limited circumstances."' 3
Every state's WQS is required to include a statewide
antidegradation policy.' The policy must ensure the maintenance of
the level of water quality necessary to protect the existing uses. 5
Limited degradation of ambient water may be allowed if certain
procedural requirements required by the state's planning process are
undertaken.5" The amount of degradation permitted depends upon the
"tier"507 applied to the lake or stream.0 " The tiers include: (1) existing
in-stream water uses, and the level of water quality necessary to protect
502. Antibacksliding provisions restrict to a certain extent the increase in the
amount of a pollutant that can be discharged over previous NPDES permit limits. See
33 U.S.C. § 1342(o) (1994). A permit may not be renewed, reissued, or modified with
less stringent comparable effluent limits except in limited circumstances. See id. EPA
has opined that a reduction in monitoring might in some instances constitute
backsliding of a permit condition. See 65 Fed. Reg. 30,886, 90,893 (May 15, 2000).
The antibacksliding program is described in Melissa A. Thorme, Antibacksliding:
Understanding One of the Most Misunderstood Provisions of the Clean Water Act, 31 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,322 (2001). A very detailed discussion of the legislative/regulatory history
of the antidegradation requirements is found in the Appendix in Columbus & Franklin
County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio 1992). The antidegradation
portion of the 1987 amendments are discussed in Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus,
685 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Ct. Cm. PI. 1997). EPA promulgated antibacksliding regulations
subsequent to the enactment of the CWA. See 8 Fed. Reg. 14,146 (1983); 45 Fed. Reg.
33,516 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122-25) (establishing consolidated NPDES
permit requirements). The agency subsequently revised the antibacksliding regulatory
requirements to implement the 1987 amendments to the CWA. See 54 Fed. Reg. 246
(1989).
503. Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus, 685 N.E.2d 603,608 (Ohio Ct. Cm. Pl.
1997).
504. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (2000). A detailed discussion of how several
states address several common antidegradation issues is found in John Harelston, What
Is Antidegradation Policy: Does Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 33 (1996).
505. See id. See also American Wildlands v. Browner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68400
(Apr. 27, 2000); PUD No. I v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
506. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2000). The correct application of the antidegradation
regulations to a proposed discharge were addressed in Save the Lake v. Shregardus, 2000
Ohio ENV LEXIS 5 (Ohio Envtl. Bd. Rev. Apr. 13, 2000).
507. The "tiers" are discussed in Baron, supra note 450, at 576-577.
508. See generally Chilson, supra note 501. The CWA antibacksliding provisions
support the antidegradation program by prohibiting the renewal, reissuance, or
modification of an existing NPDES permit that contain effluent limits, permit terms,
limitations and conditions, or standards that are less stringent than those established in
the previous permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(l) (2000).
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them; (2) requires water quality better than necessary to protect fishable
and swimmable uses; and (3) protection of outstanding national resource
waters.509
4. Water Quality Certification
Section 401 of the CWA requires states to provide a water quality
certification before a federal license or permit can be issued for
activities that may result in any discharge into jurisdictional waters."' 0
Specifically, section 401 requires one applying for a federal license or
permit" ' for an activity "which may result in any discharge into the
navigable waters" to obtain state certification "that any such discharge
will comply with the applicable provisions of Sections 301, 302, 303,
306 and 307."'' Section 401(d) further provides that "any certification
... shall set forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and
monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant.., will
comply with any applicable effluent limitations, under section 301 or
302 . .. and with any other appropriate requirement of State law set
forth in such certification."5"' The limitations included in the certifica-
tion become a condition on any federal license.
14
5. Toxics/Toxicity
The CWA requires each state to develop WQS which include
standards for all toxic pollutants for which EPA has published criteria.
509. See Adler, supra note 33, at 213. Whether Michigan should have designated
a waterbody as an outstanding national resource water was addressed in National
Wildlife Federation v. Browner, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15321 ((D.D.C.) Oct. 11, 1996).
The type of tier applicable to a waterbody will affect the amount of assimilation
capacity available for the discharges.
510. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). A detailed discussion of section 401 is found in
Kristi Johnson, The Mythical Giant: Clean Water Act Section 401 and Nonpoint Source
Pollution, 29 ENVTL. L. 417 (1999); Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean
Water Act Section 401, 23 ECoLOGY L.J. 201 (1996).
511. The three federal permits and licenses typically affected by section 401 are
CWA sections 402 and 404 and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission permits. See
Johnson, supra note 510, at 422.
512. See33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1994).
513. See33 U.S.C. § 1341(d)(1994).
514. Section 401 prevents the federal government from ignoring or overriding state
WQS. See Johnson, supra note 510, at 419.
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a. Toxic Hot Spots
Section 304(1) of the CWA requires the states to identify and
control toxic hot spots.1 5 The states must submit to EPA lists of
polluted navigable waters and of dischargers of toxic pollutants. The
submitted information must generally include:
1. A list of all waters that, after the application of effluent
limitations, cannot reasonably be anticipated to attain
water quality for state designated uses due to toxic
pollutants;
2. A list of all navigable waters that, after application of
federal and state effluent limitations, the state does not
expect to meet the prescribed water quality standards due
to listed point sources;
3. A list of those point sources that are impairing the
achievement of those water quality goals as well as the
amount of pollutant each of those point sources produces;
and
4. A list of waters that cannot be anticipated to maintain
water quality that will assure protection of public health,
public water supply, agricultural and industrial uses, as
well as the protection of shellfish and recreational uses. 6
b. Whole Effluent Toxicity
Whole effluent toxicity ("WET") is a term used to describe the
aggregate toxic effect of an aqueous sample 5"7 as measured according to
the impact on an organism upon exposure to the sample. 8 The test may
be used to address the fact that individual numeric criteria do not take
into account synergistic impacts of combinations with other contami-
515. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994). See also 133 CoNG. REC. 1287 (1987) (statement
of Sen. Moynihan). An example of the application of this process to a particular
facility is found in Culbertson v. Coats Am., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(discussing ICS developed for Georgia textile facility alleged to be source of copper
and zinc impairing a creek's water quality).
516. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994). Issues associated with this program are
addressed in In reJ& L Specialty Products Corp., NPDES Appeal No. 92-22, 1994 EPA
App. LEXIS 42 (EPA June 20, 1994).
517. The term "aqueous sample" refers to a whole effluent wastewater discharge
or ambient receiving water.




nants.5 19 The WET test fills a potential gap.52 0 It uses organisms as
indicators or surrogates for the waterbody community that is to be
protected. The chosen organisms (fathead minnows, brine shrimp, or
similar creatures) are placed into the wastewater which has been diluted
to equate its mixing into the receiving waterbody.12' After a specified
period of time a determination is made as to the number of organisms
that survived the exposure." WET tests therefore attempt to reproduce
the total effect of actual environmental exposure of aquatic life to
effluent toxicants without requiring the identification of specific
toxicants.
There are two basic types of WET tests: an acute test (ninety-six
hours or less, endpoint: mortality), and a chronic test (seven day life-
cycle test, endpoints: growth, reproduction and mortality). WET
testing may be useful if all the pollutants entering a waterbody have not
been identified or if the combined effect of contaminants needs to be
determined . 2 Another motivation for such testing is the need to ensure
the protection of aquatic life and other uses if the categorical effluent
limits will not do so in relation to a particular waterbody"
WET testing may be included in NPDES permits to ensure certain
toxicity WQC (numeric or narrative) are attained. WQC for WET may
be expressed as either a numeric criterion or a narrative criterion (e.g.,
no toxics in toxic amounts). In the alternative, WET monitoring
requirements may be included in NPDES permits to generate WET data
for use in determining when the discharge causes, has the reasonable
potential to cause, or contributes to an in-stream excursion above the
narrative or numeric WQC for WET. The possible inclusion of WET
testing requirements has generated various issues. They have included:
1. Are the inclusion of WET testing requirements appropri-
ate, necessary, or justified for a particular discharger?
25
2. Should the testing requirement be included as a permit
limit or an information gathering requirement?
519. See Adler, supra note 33, at 211.
520. See id.
521. See Houck, supra note 162, at 321.
522. See id.
523. See Houck, supra note 266, at 411.
524. See id.
525. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, UNDERSTANDING AND
ACCOUNTING FOR METHOD VARIABILITY IN WHOLE EFFLUENT TOXICITY APPLICATIONS




3. If testing is included as a permit limit, what results (i.e.,
one or multiple failures) constitute a violation or
exceedance? 26
4. Can WET results be translated into reductions in the
volume or characteristics of certain effluents?
527
A facility that fails a specified number of WET tests may be required to
undertake a toxicity reduction evaluation ("TRE"). A TRE represents
a facility's attempt to identify measures that can reduce effluent
toxicity.5 2  Those measures might involve process changes, material
substitutions, etc.329
6. Mixing Zones
State WQS often include a provision known as a "mixing zone. 530
Mixing zones are an area or volume of water in which a point source's
discharge is permitted to exceed the applicable WQS. This is the area
or zone in which the initial effluent dilution occurs. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit described the rationale for mixing
zones in a 1987 decision:
We pause at this point to explain briefly the crucial notion of a
"mixing zone." Environmental agencies do-and under present
526. The EPA administrative decision In re American CyanamidCo., 1993 EPA App.
LEXIS 33 (EPA Sept. 27, 1993), involved facilities that objected to certain WET
requirements included in their NPDES permits. See id. at *4. The challenged permit
language included a provision stating "that greater than 50% mortality in any single test
with any single species conclusively establishes that the mill's effluent is toxic and that
the permit and Florida rules are violated." Id. at *5. A petitioner argued that toxicity
testing "cannot properly be applied as effluent limitation" because a test failure "does
not necessarily establish the lethality or toxicity of the wastewater effluent." Id. at * 13.
The decision upheld these conditions, citing Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Authority Dept.,
NPDES Appeal No. 91-14 (EAB, July 1992) decision. Id at *7. The City of Miami-
Dade in the previously cited decision had argued that toxicity testing is inherently
imprecise and the failure of a test does not necessarily mean that the effluent is toxic.
Id. at * 15. The municipality believed the test should instead be used as a screening
device for assessing the need for additional treatment or a wasteload allocation as
opposed to a limit. See id. This position was rejected because the toxicity test was
incorporated in the Florida WQS. See id. See also In re City of Jacksonville, District II
Wastewater Treatment Plant, 1992 EPA App. LEXIS 53 (EPA Aug. 4, 1992).
527. See Adler, supra note 33, at 222.
528. See id.
529. Telephone Interview with Doug Ford, P.E., Pollution Management, Inc. (Dec.
21,2000).
530. See Lake Cumberland Trust v. EPA, 954 F.2d 1218, 1220 (6th Cir. 1992)
(referencing Kentucky mixing zone regulation).
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technology, must-permit polluted effluents to be discharged into
natural bodies of water. By definition, the effluent itself does not
meet water quality standards; otherwise, it would not be considered
polluted. But the receiving water dilutes the effluent, and this dilution
increases as the plume of effluent gradually diffuses in the receiving
water. The "mixing zone" is simply the area of dispersal in the
receiving waters where the pollutants in the effluent are not suffi-
ciently diluted to meet water quality standards. It necessarily follows,
then, that the edge or outer circumference of the mixing zone is
defined as the boundary at which water quality standards are first met.
The size and configuration of the mixing zone is a crucial variable in
determining whether or not a given effluent can be discharged. If the
permitted mixing zone is tiny--say, one meter in diameter---any
effluent whatever will violate water quality standards; ifthe permitted
mixing zone is huge-say, 100 kilometers--a tremendously toxic
effluent can be discharged without violating water quality
standards. 3 '
A state generally has the discretion to determine whether mixing
zones are available, and if so the conditions for their use.532 Neverthe-
less, an agency will attempt to locate and size a zone to minimize its
impact on the waterbody. Models and/or dye studies may be used to
determine initial effluent dilution.533 Dilution may be affected by factors
such as outfall location, discharge velocity, water depth, and stream
velocity.
7. Total Maximum Daily Load Requirements
A waterbody can only assimilate a finite amount or "load" of
various pollutants before it will fail to attain the applicable WQS. This
pollutant loading limit is referred to as the total maximum daily load
("TMDL"). The EPA defines a TMDL in part as "a written, quantitative
531. Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 830 F.2d 1346, 1349 (5th Cir. 1987). The mixing
of the effluent and the receiving water may be facilitated by a device at the end of the
outfall known as a "diffuser." See Anderson, supra note 92 (describing diffuser as
bottom end of outfall consisting of 600 feet of pipe riddled with 200 holes about 4 1/2
inches round).
532. See 65 Fed. Reg. 47,871 (August 4, 2000) (noting states have discretion to
change mixing zone requirements as long as they ensure attainment of designated uses).
Note, however, an agency may not allow the use of a mixing zone for every pollutant.
For example, see 65 Fed. Reg. 67,638 (Nov. 13, 2000) (EPA rule amending the Final
Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System prohibiting mixing zones for
bioaccumlative chemicals of concern).
533. See generally Gayla, supra note 161.
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plan and analysis for attaining and maintaining water quality standards
in all seasons for a specific waterbody and pollutant ... .s34 Some
TMDLs must include the following elements:
" The name and geographic location of the impaired
waterbody;
" Identification of the pollutant and the applicable water
quality standard;
" Quantification of the pollutant load that may be present in
the waterbody and still ensure attainment and mainte-
nance of water quality standards;
" Quantification of the amount or degree by which the
current pollutant load in the waterbody, including the
pollutant load from upstream sources that is being ac-
counted for as background loading, deviates from the
pollutant load needed to attain and maintain water quality
standards;
* Identification of source categories, source subcategories,
or individual sources of the pollutant;
" Wasteload allocations;
" Load allocations;
" A margin of safety;
* Consideration of seasonal variations;
* Allowance for reasonably foreseeable increases in pollut-
ant loads including future growth; and
" An implementation plan. 35
Section 303 of the CWA requires each state to identify those waters
within its boundaries for which the technology-based effluent limita-
tions required by the CWA and defined by EPA are not stringent enough
to attain the applicable WQS 36 Waters so designated are known as
"water quality limited segments" ("WQLS") or "impaired waters." '
Each state is required to submit this list of waters to EPA biennially, on
April 1 of every even-numbered year (accompanied by listing determi-
nations).53
534. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(h) (2000).
535. Id.
536. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(a) (1994).
537. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(j) (2000).
538. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d) (2000).
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The list of WQLSs must consider all existing and readily available
information including any discharge dilution calculations or water
quality modeling information, available information from local, public
and academic organizations, and the state's section 319 nonpoint source
assessment reports.5 39  The state must also prioritize the identified
waters, "taking into account the severity of the pollution and the uses to
be made of such waters." 40  EPA is required to review and
approve/disapprove the submitted lists.
5 4'
The development and implementation of TMDLs provide a link
between WQS and effluent limitations. A TMDL quantifies the
maximum allowable loading of a pollutant to a waterbody and allocates
this maximum load to contributing point and nonpoint sources. 42 The
purpose of such allocations is to ensure WQC are not exceeded,
therebyfore protecting the waterbody's designated uses. A margin of
safety is included to account for uncertainty about the relationship
between pollutant loads and water quality.
In July 2000, EPA promulgated extensive revisions and clarifica-
tions to the regulatory requirements for establishing TMDLs.' 3 EPA
expressed concern that a significant percentage of the nation's surface
waterbodies were not meeting applicable WQS.5 " The federal agency
viewed the TMDL revisions as necessary to improve the program and
water quality.45
A potential problem occurs if a waterbody's impairment is due in
large part to nonpoint source contributions. The nonpoint sources may
539. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(5) (2000). It has been noted that the proper
development of a TMDL requires extensive information involving the fate, transport,
and attenuation of a particular pollutant in the relevant waterbody. See Western
Carolina Regional Sewer Authority, 1999 S.C. ENV LEXIS 102, at *29 (S.C. ALJ Div.
Sept. 22, 1999).
540. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994).
541. See id.
542. See Case, supra note 184 (discussing various models used in the TMDL
process).
543. See 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
122-124, 130).
544. See id. at 43,587.
545. See id. at 43,588. The adequacy of various states' compliance with TMDL
requirements and EPA's supervision of their efforts have been challenged by
environmental and other groups over the past several years. A number of these actions
have resulted in agreed or court-ordered expedited TMDL support activities. See
NRDC v. Fox, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing alleged deficiencies of
New York TMDL program). A South Carolina administrative decision notes that this
allocation has been analogized to a distribution by the government of frequencies on




not be subjected to enforceable state control mechanisms. If so, further
loading reductions must be obtained from the point sources. Many of
these point sources are already subject to effluent limits. Some
incremental reduction may be costly.
A key question has therefore been how TMDLs address
waterbodies that are polluted solely or partially by non-point sources.
In Pronsolino v. Marcus,' a federal district court noted that the CWA
applied TMDLs to point and non-point sources differently."' The court
concluded that TMDLs were authorized for non-point sources. 8 The
Department of Justice and EPA viewed the decision as an indication that
the CWA can provide a comprehensive solution to water quality
issues."
8. Effluent Trading
The renewed focus on ensuring that point source discharge permits
include effluent limits that are protective of WQS has generated interest
in "effluent trading." This is a type of a "tradable pollution allowance"
regime for which the government issues "allowances," authorizing the
holders to emit a certain amount of a pollutant over a given time.5 °
These allowances would be bought and sold pursuant to governmental
rules.5"' Allowances are used in the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide trading
program.
Effluent trading involves an agreement between a point source that
must meet WQS driven limits and another source discharging into the
same waterbody. One source... reduces its discharge of certain
pollutants more than required by law or its permit. This generates a
"'credit." A point source with WQS limits would under certain
circumstances be able to use this credit to achieve compliance.
Several effluent trading programs have been proposed or adopted
to address conditions in various watersheds. One example is a plan that
546. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
547. See id. at 1356.
548. See id. at 1355 (finding a TMDL prepared for the Garcia River in California
calling for the reduction of sediment by 60% as proper).
549. See U.S. Dept. of Justice & Envtl. Protection Agency, Federal Court Issues
Landmark Clean Water Decision, Press Release (April 5,2000) (noting that the court found
that the CWA is designed to provide a comprehensive solution to the nation's water
quality problems without regard to sources of pollution).
550. See Jonathan RemyNash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution
Allowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 465 (2000).
551. See id.
552. The other source could be a point or nonpoint source.
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Connecticut and New York have considered to reduce nitrogen in the
Long Island Sound Watershed ("Sound").- 3 Nitrogen loadings are a
significant problem in the watershed. A survey found that point
sources 5 were responsible for 79% of the nitrogen and nonpoint
sources 21% of the nitrogen received by the watershed." 5
Modeling was subsequently undertaken to determine the differential
impact of the various point and nonpoint sources discharged into the
Sound. Connecticut identified point sources within its CWA program
that were the primary contributors of nitrogen. 7 The state therefore
decided to require various point sources to reduce nitrogen discharges
by 70% and nonpoint sources by 10%."'
Connecticut, New York, and EPA engaged a firm to develop a
program for incorporating market-based incentives into geographic
targeting of nitrogen reduction actions for the Sound.5 9 The study
outlined a possible nitrogen credit trading system.' ° A nitrogen "credit"
would be created if a source reduced the amount of nitrogen it dis-
charged in excess of its permit limits." The credits generated would be
available for purchase by other sources. 2 The sale of a credit could be
transacted by the facilities themselves or through an organization that
would be denominated the "Nitrogen Credit Exchange."' Some
facilities were expected to be motivated to purchase credits in lieu of
constructing additional treatment capacity to meet the reduced permit
limits. 5"
553. See LONG ISLAND, supra note 191. A 58.5% reduction of nitrogen loadings into
this area over a 15 year period is an objective. See id. at ES-1. Long Island Sound is
located in a densely populated urban area between New York and Connecticut. See id.
at I-1. Nitrogen reduction is deemed necessary to address low DO levels in the Sound.
See id at 1-2. The two states have concluded that a reduction in the amount of nitrogen
entering the waterbody will increase DO levels. See id.
554. The term point source includes atmospheric deposition. See id. at 1-3.
555. See id.
556. See id. at 1-4.
557. See id. at 1-5. Eighty-four municipal wastewater treatment dischargers were
identified as key sources of nitrogen. Id at ES-i.
558. See LONG ISLAND, supra note 191, at ES-1. This reduction will be implemented
through the adoption of a TMDL for nitrogen. See id.




563. See LONG ISLAND, supra note 191, at 2-10.
564. See id. at2-1.
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The trading participants were projected to include all major
municipal wastewater treatment facilities discharging into the Sound.565
The program would also compare the impact values of the various
sources in determining exchange ratios.' The relevant point source
NPDES permits would be reissued to incorporate phased nitrogen
reductions over a fifteen year period.567 If a facility exceeded the annual
limit, it would be required to obtain the necessary amount of credits to
offset the exceedance or reduce the actual discharge. 68
d. Alternative Limits/Variances
1. Best Professional Judgment
Categorical effluent limits have not been developed for every type
or class of facility that discharges wastewater. How are technology-
based limits established for these facilities? Section 402(a)(i) of the
CWA provides that EPA, in the absence of categorical effluent
guidelines or regulations, may establish effluent limitations on a case-
by-case basis.569 The CWA regulations list the factors that the agency
permit engineer must consider in specifying the control requirements
applicable to a particular facility.57 They include: age of the equipment
and facilities involved, the process employed, engineering aspects of
control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent
reduction, and non-water quality environmental impacts (including
energy requirements).57 '
2. Fundamentally Different Factors
The development of the technology-based categorical standards
requires the collection and analysis of significant information about
565. See id. at 2-5.
566. See id.
567. See id 2-6, 2-7. Consequently, credits are created by the reduction of total
nitrogen below the annual limit. Id. at 2-9.
568. See LONG ISLAND, supra note 191, at 2-9 to 2-10. Trading a reservoir and ariver
basin respectively are described in Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Trading: Looking
Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 ENVTL. REP. 43 (1993). The described programs
involve trading between point and nonpoint sources. See id.
569. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1994). The EPA's authority to apply such
judgment is discussed in In re AT&T Teletype Corp., 1986 EPA App. LEXIS 20 (EPA
Apr. 23, 1986). See also Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984).




various aspects of the target industry."" All relevant industry informa-
tion cannot always be obtained." Consequently, section 301 (n) of the
CWA authorizes the development of effluent limits or standards
different from the otherwise applicable categorical requirements in
certain circumstances.574 Alternative limits may be developed if a
facility is fundamentally different with respect to factors considered in
establishing the categorical limitations or standards." This procedure
is known as a "fundamentally different factors" variance. 6
A facility may only obtain alternative limits if it demonstrates it is
fundamentally different from the "range of circumstances considered by
the agency .... "" Further, the alternative limitations or standards must
be not less stringent thanjustified by the difference. Also, the variance
must not cause markedly more adverse non-water quality environmental
impacts than the national limitations or standards.
3. Secondary Treatment Variance
In 1997 Congress amended the CWA to allow municipalities in
limited circumstances to forego secondary treatment if discharging
through deep ocean outfalls.578
3. Other Permit Conditions
a. Facility Sampling/Reporting Requirements
The NPDES permit will require the facility to periodically sample
its effluent and report the results to the agency. This requirement
provides the federal and/or state agency some assurance that at a given
point in time the facility is compliant with the NPDES permit limits.
Such testing can, however, be manipulated. For example, in United
572. See Gold, supra note 98, at 495; Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 1235
(9th Cir. 1982). "EPA examined a broad range of mills within the industry, including
Georgia-Pacific's Bellingham Complex, looked at the mills with the best pollution
control systems, and set BPT guidelines according to the average performance of those
exemplary mills." Id.
573. See Gold, supra note 98, at 496.
574. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(n) (1994).
575. See id.
576. A request by an Arkansas facility for an FDF variance is described in United
States v. CPS Chemical Co., 779 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
577. Georgia Pacific, 671 F.2d at 1243.
578. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h) (1994).
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States v. Sinskey," a meat packing plant doubled the number of hogs it
slaughtered.58 The production increase apparently caused the facility
to exceed its ammonia nitrate NPDES permit limit."'
The projected exceedances allegedly motivated the facility's
wastewater treatment plant manager and assistant manager to attempt to
mask it by manipulating the required testing in three ways. First,
facility flow was regulated so that low levels of effluent (and ammonia
nitrate) would be discharged when the required tests were undertaken." 2
Higher levels were discharged later in the week. 3 Second, the plant
effluent was sampled more frequently than required by the permit."
Only the results identifying acceptable levels of ammonia nitrate were
reported to the agency. 8 Third, reports showing false results were
submitted to the agency."
b. Sludge Management
The various control or treatment processes remove pollutants or
contaminants from the wastewater. The extracted material is often
known as sludge.58 The material must be dealt with in some manner.
Disposal or reuse of POTW sludge is regulated by section 405 of the
CWA.58 s The CWA required EPA to promulgate regulations addressing
this material.589 The part 503 regulations were promulgated to establish
general requirements, pollutant limits, operational standards, and
management practices as well as frequency of monitoring, record
keeping, and reporting requirements that apply to sewage sludge that is
land applied, placed on a surface disposal site, or combusted.in a sewage
sludge incinerator.5
579. 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997).





585. See Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 714.
586. See id. The manager and assistant manager were convicted of a criminal
violation of section 309(c)(4) of the CWA which penalizes a "person who knowingly
falsifies, tampers with or renders inaccurate any monitoring device or method required
to be maintained" by the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (1994).
587. Sludge is also known as "biosolids."
588. See 33 U.S.C. § 1345 (1994).
589. See 40 C.F.R. § 503 (2000). See also 58 Fed. Reg. 9,248 (1993).
590. See 40 C.F.R. § 503 (2000). The Part 503 regulations for sewage sludge do not
cover all types of sludge. They encompass scum or solids removed from primary,




Subsequent to the 1972 enactment of the CWA, EPA resisted
applying NPDES permitting requirements to stormwater discharges. 9'
The agency expressed concern that application of this program to such
discharges would potentially require the issuance of millions of
additional NPDES permits.592 EPA therefore attempted to exempt
uncontaminated stormwater from the NPDES permit program. 93
The 1987 amendments to the CWA resolved the issue.", They
confirmed that "storm water" discharges are encompassed by the
NPDES permitting program.95 However, because of the challenges
posed by including such discharges,5  Congress adopted a phased
approach. The purpose of this approach was to allow EPA and the
states to first focus their attention on the most serious stormwater
discharges.'"
The phased approach established a moratorium until October 1,
1992, on requiring permits for most stormwater discharges. 9 ' However,
"discharges associated with industrial activity" were excepted from this
sludge, and domestic septage. Other types of sludge are regulated under other federal
rules. For example, non-hazardous sludge generated during the treatment of industrial
process wastewater at an industrial facility, sludge generated at an industrial facility
during the treatment of industrial wastewater combined with domestic sewage, drinking
water treatment sludge, and grit or screenings generated during the treatment of
domestic sewage are regulated at 40 C.F.R. § 257 (2000). Some sludge fits within the
RCRA definition of "hazardous waste" and must be managed as required by that
program. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261, 264, 268 (2000). Finally, sewage sludge with PCB
concentrations of 50 ppm or greater is addressed by 40 C.F.R. § 761 (2000).
591. See generally Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 28 F.3d 1523 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
592. See id at 1524.
593. See id. A detailed history of EPA's prior attempts to address stormwater is
found at 53 Fed. Reg. 49,416 (1988).
594. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (1994).
595. See id
596. Stormwater often differs from process discharges in the timing of the release
of the pollutants. The unique aspect of stormwater is the fact that the highest pollutant
concentrations occur during the early part of the runoff event (also known as the "first
flush"). R.A. Allison, Innovative Technology Reduces Stormwater Trash, PUBLIC WORKS,
Feb. 1, 1999, at 28. See also United States v. City of Niagra Falls, 706 F. Supp. 1053,
1062 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting the first flush flows typically contain a higher
concentration of pollutants than later stormwater flows).
597. See National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir.
1992). Congress subsequently extended the exemption to October 1, 1994. See Public
Law No. 102-580, cited in Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.
1999).
598. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (1994).
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moratorium.5" Section 402(p)(2)(B) required that EPA, no later than
February 4, 1989, establish regulations setting forth permit application
requirements for industrial storm water discharges. Those seeking such
permits were to file an application no later than February 4, 1990, and
permit applications were to be rejected or accepted by February 4,
1991.600
Uncontrolled stormwater discharges can sometimes threaten water
quality. An example is described in Buchholz v. Dayton International
Airport.6" The decision involved an airport that allegedly discharged
deicing chemical into a nearby stream. 602 Downstream property owners
sought CWA and RCRA injunctive relief from the discharges.'S They
alleged the discharges caused fish kills, strong odors, and discolored
water.' The court enjoined the airport from further discharge except
as allowed by its NPDES stormwater permit.'
5. Combined Sewer Overflow
A combined sewer system ("CSS") is a wastewater collection
system owned by a state municipality or other entity that conveys
domestic, commercial, and industrial wastewaters together with
stormwater through a single-pipe system to a POTW facility.606 To
protect the POTW from being inundated beyond its capacity by
stormwater during wet weather, CSSs typically have outfalls at various
points upstream of the POTW, where excess flow within the system can
be discharged.'4
A combined sewer overflow ("CSO") is a discharge from one of
these outfalls. Because CSSs mix stormwater with wastewater, CSOs
often contain high levels of untreated sewage and other pollutants, the
discharge of which can cause exceedances of WQS in the receiving
599. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(pX2XB) (1994).
600. See id.
601. No. C-3-94-435, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9490 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 1995). The
chemicals were ethylene glycol and propylene glycol used for deicing aircraft and
potassium acetate and urea used for deicing runways. See id. at *9.
602. See id. at * 12.
603. See id. at * 1.
604. See id. at * 12.
605. Id. at *63. The court also found that the discharges by the airport were an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment and health within the
meaning of RCRA. Id. at *59.
606. See In re District of Columbia, No. 95-5, 1996 EPA App. LEXIS 10, at *5
(EPA May 3, 1996).
607. See id. at *5.
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waterbody. CSOs are treated as point sources subject to NPDES permit
requirements.' Therefore, these discharge points are subject to the
technology-based and water-quality-based requirements of the CWA.'
In 1994 EPA issued a policy statement titled "Combined Sewer
Overflow (CSO) Control Policy." 0 The policy's stated purpose was to
establish a consistent national approach for controlling discharges from
CSOs.' The 1994 policy addresses the actions a POTW can undertake
to establish compliance with applicable WQS. 611 It also outlined the
framework for establishing the technology-based requirements.1 3
6. Non-Point Source Provisions
Only point source discharges are required to obtain NPDES
permits.1 4 The responsibility for addressing pollutants associated with
activities other than point sources resides principally with the states. 61
However, Congress has not required states to establish federally
enforceable nonpoint source controls.
6t 6
The 1987 CWA amendments did focus additional attention on
nonpoint source pollution. They required that nonpoint source control
"programs" be "developed and implemented in an expeditious manner
so as to enable the goals of [the CWA] to be through the control of both
point and nonpoint sources of pollution."' The amendments also added
a state planning component for nonpoint source pollution. Specifically,
section 319 of the CWA required that states prepare reports that:
608. See id. at **5-6; see also Mann, supra note 101, at 865 (noting 1989 EPA policy
clarifying that CSOs are considered CWA point source discharges).
609. See In re District of Columbia, No. 95-5, 1996 EPA App. LEXIS 10, at *5
(EPA May 3, 1996). See also Ahearn v. Charter Township of Bloomfield, 879 F. Supp.
766 (E.D. Mich 1995) (describing application of NPDES permit requirements to
CSOs).
610. See 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688 (1994).
611. See id.
612. See Mann, supra note 101, at 866.
613. See id. at 867.
614. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
615. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994). See American Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp.
2d 1150 (D. Colo. 2000).
616. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir.
1990). However, one author suggests that the Prosolino TMDL decision may signal
the application of other CWA mechanisms to nonpoint source discharges. See Robert
W. Adler, Controlling Nonpoint Sources Water Pollution: Is Help on the Way (from the
Courts or EPA)?, 131 ENVTL. L. REP. 10270 (2001).
617. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(aX7)(1994).
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1. Identify waters which cannot reasonably be expected to
achieve state ambient water quality standards "without
additional action to control nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion;"
2. Describe a process for identifying "best management
practices" and other measures for reducing nonpoint
source pollution; and
3. Identify existing state and local programs for controlling
nonpoint source pollution.61
Various states either initiated or expanded their efforts to encourage
nonpoint sources to implement or improve best management practices." 9
7. Permit Acquisition/Modification/Renewal
a. Application Process
Acquisition of an initial NPDES permit or modification of an
existing one requires submitting an application to EPA or the delegated
state agency. The application form that will be used depends on the
type of facility seeking a permit."0 EPA recently extensively revised the
forms that POTWs and other facilities treating domestic sewage are
required to utilize. 21
b. Modification
A facility's NPDES permit provides it some certainty as to the
conditions and limits that it must attain for a specified term. The EPA
or a delegated state agency may, however, unilaterally modify the
permit under certain circumstances. An agency has, for example, the
authority to revise the permit effluent limits to reflect the identification
of additional water quality impacts caused by a facility.
618. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (1994).
619. See. e.g., Nita Chilton McCann, DEQ Hears Evidence of Water Pollution Caused
by Tree Farming, 16 Miss. Bus. J., Aug. 15, 1999, at 14 (referencing Mississippi's
initiation of an aggressive silvicultural BMP education program subsequent to the 1987
CWA amendments).
620. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(a)(2) (2000).
621. The final rule was published in the Federal Register at 64 Fed. Reg. 42,434
(Aug. 4, 1999). The revisions were originally proposed on December 6, 1995. See 60
Fed. Reg. 62,546 (1995).
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The facilities themselves sometimes seek permit modifications.622 A
facility may, for example, experience an increased demand for its product or
a request for a product it does not currently offer. Accommodating such
demands may change the quantity or type of wastewater discharged. This
could necessitate the modification of the permit. The facility's desire to
expeditiously change or add a process can conflict with the time it takes to
acquire a modified permit.6' The permitting process may increase in
complexity if the process involves other programs such as air emissions
permitting or multiple sources.624
c. Renewal
An NPDES permit generally has a term of five years.625 A
permittee must apply for a renewal of the permit at least 180 days prior
to its expiration to ensure a timely continuation.6' A renewal applica-
tion must be fully completed within this time period to ensure the
continuance of the existing permit if the agency is unable to issue a
renewal prior to expiration.6 It has not been unusual for either EPA or
the states to be unable to grant a renewal prior to the existing permit's
expiration. Agency staffing has often been insufficient 2 to address the
volume of applications.6'
622. An example is an Arkansas manufacturing facility's request to modify its
NPDES permit to accept wastewater from an independent cogeneration plant being
built on its property. See Letter from Dale Herendeen, EHS Manager, International
Paper Company, to Brent Kent Finch, Water Division, Arkansas Department of
Environmental Quality (Aug. 4, 1999) (on file with author). The application for an
NPDES permit modification will typically trigger an examination of only those
conditions which are proposed to be modified. See Dawson v. Alabama Dep't ofEnvtl.
Mgmt., 1986 AL ENV LEXIS I (Ala. Dep't Envtl. Mgmt. Jan. 8, 1986). See also
Costle v. Pacific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198 (1980), reh 'gdenied, 446 U.S. 947 (1980).
623. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in theAdministrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 15 (1997). "The slow pace of permitting makes it particularly burdensome
to industries in which production processes change rapidly and require modified or new
permits." Id.
624. See id.
625. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(lXB) (1994).
626. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 1(d)(2) (2000).
627. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.61(a) (2000). The EPA refers to this as an "administrative
continuance." See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,058, 46,079 (1999).
628. Some state agency staffing levels have been insufficient to issue permits in a
timely manner. See, e.g., Richard T. Sale, Are the Feds Coming?, HAW. INVESTOR, May
1995 (discussing how insufficient state resources slowed down wastewater permit
approval process in Hawaii).
629. The applications are for a permit for a new facility, permit renewal, permit
modification, and permit termination.
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A related issue has been the number of expired state NPDES
permits that are allowed to remain in place awaiting renewal. EPA has
expressed concern about its inability to exercise its veto authority in the
case of an expired permit that a state has failed to renew for some
630time. In 1999, the federal agency proposed a mechanism that would
allow it to trigger the federal review procedures63 for state permits that
have been expired for more than ninety days.
632
D. Enforcement
1. Information Acquisition Provisions
a. Investigative Authorities
Section 308 of the CWA provides EPA the authority to investigate
the discharge of pollutants from a point source into jurisdictional
waterbodies. 633 The agency is required to ensure that point sources
collect and maintain records, use monitoring equipment, sample
effluent, and submit reports on all compiled data.634 The CWA provides
EPA personnel the right of entry and access to records upon presentation
of credentials. " This authority is utilized by EPA to conduct routine or
random inspections to determine NPDES permit compliance.636
However, EPA occasionally conducts multimedia inspections that
encompass a number of permit programs (air, water, etc.).
637
630. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,058,46,079 (Aug. 23, 1999). "[A] lengthy administrative
continuance of a permit for a discharge into an impaired water can greatly delay the
implementation of needed water quality-based effluent limitations." Id.
631. The EPA review procedures are found at 40 C.F.R. § 123.44 (2000).
632. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,058, 46,079 (Aug. 23, 1999).
633. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1994).
634. See id. § 1318(a)(A).
635. See id. § 131 8(aXB). The ability of EPA to obtain certain information with or
without an administrative search warrant has been challenged on occasion. See In re
Alameda County Assessor's Office, Parcel Nos. 537-801-2-4-537-859-9, 672 F. Supp.
1278 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (authorizing EPA to enter property to determine existence of
"wetlands" as defined by section 404 of the CWA).
636. See Bill S. Forcade & Elizabeth D. Anderson, How to Minimize Civil Penalties




b. Discharge Monitoring Reports
A key federal CWA enforcement tool is the requirement that
facilities periodically prepare comprehensive self-monitoring reports.63
These documents are denominated Discharge Monitoring Reports
("DMRs"). Most facilities are required by their permit to sample or test
their effluent to determine the presence and quantity of various
pollutants. The DMRs identify the applicable facility NPDES permit
limits and compare them to the actual amount of discharges.639 These
documents are periodically submitted to the EPA or delegated state
agency as specified in the NPDES permit. The DMRs must be signed
by a responsible corporate officer.' ° The information contained within
the DMRs is analyzed by the receiving agency to determine if the
discharges are compliant with permit limits." The CWA requires that
the permitting agency make the DMRs available to the public." 2
DMRs play an important role in both federal/state and citizen suit
enforcement actions. Agencies, individuals, and organizations typically
use such documents to support arguments that permit limits have been
exceeded." 3 DMRs indicating permit limit exceedances will often
accompany motions for summary judgment on the issue of facility
permit non-compliance.' Facilities have periodically argued that
638. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1)(4) (2000); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc., v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1130 (1990).
639. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1X4) (2000).
640. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.22 (2000). The officer must certify that the reported
information was prepared by qualified personnel under his or her direction or
supervision and that the information is true, accurate, and complete. See id
641. EPA may categorize CWA violations in terms of their seriousness. The
serious violations are designated Significant Non-Compliance ("SNC"). See U.S.
PUBLIC INTEREST, DIRTY WATER SCOUNDRELS: STATE BY STATE VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT BY THE NATION'S LARGEST FACILITIES (1997). Four violations which will
place a facility in SNC status are (1) exceeding an effluent limitation, (2) failing to file
a DMR, (3) violating a compliance schedule, and (4) failing to submit a compliance
schedule report. See id. at 9-10. SNC enforcement is applicable only to major
industrial, municipal, and federal facilities. See id. at 10. It is estimated that
approximately 1,346 major facilities earned a SNC status during a fifteen month span
between the years of 1995-96, with over 100 of those entities maintaining its SNC
status for the duration of that time period. See id.
642. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(j) (2000).
643. Environmental organizations may systematically review such DMRs in some
instances. See Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co., 817 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1987) (referencing
systematic research program in Louisiana by Sierra Club in which DMRs submitted by
major industrial dischargers are examined).
644. See Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 813 F.2d 1480, 1492 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated
on other grounds, 485 U.S. 931 (1988),judgment reinstated, 853 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988).
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despite the results reported in its DMRs, laboratory errors render the
sampling results inconclusive. The success of this argument varies with
the jurisdiction."5 Facilities also occasionally challenge DMR results
by arguing the exceedances were the results of upsets/bypasses or were
caused by another source.'
2. Enforcement Authorities
a. Government Enforcement
CWA violators may be subject to civil penalties"" or criminal
sanctions"8 in appropriate circumstances. The civil and criminal
enforcement provisions are designed to promote both specific and
general deterrence of future violations. 9 Lead enforcement responsibil-
ity is allocated between EPA and the Department of Justice depending
on the CWA enforcement authority being utilized.
I. Civil Enforcement
The CWA civil enforcement regime utilizes a strict liability
standard for determination of violations." Consequently, whether
conduct was intentional, knowing, or negligent is irrelevant in the
645. See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Elf Atochem N.
Am., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1164 (D.N.J. 1993) (recognizing lab error as a partial defense);
Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 813 F.2d 1480, 1491-93 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on other
grounds, 485 U.S. 931 (1988) (disallowing permittee to impeach its own reports by
showing sampling error).
646. See Tennessee v. Duromatic Prod. Corp., 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 807 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1993) (discussing facility opposition to Tennessee environmental agency's
motion for summary judgment on certain NPDES permit exceedances on the basis that
drought conditions caused increase in concentrations and that another source
discharging into the stream affected the results).
647. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1994).
648. See id. § 1319(c).
649. See United States v. Municipal Auth. of Union Township, 929 F. Supp. 800,
806 (M.D. Pa. 1996). In Union Township, the court declared that a penalty exacted in
the pursuit of deterring future conduct must prevent a violator from receiving an
economic benefit as well as send a message to the general public. See id.
650. See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979)
(applying strict liability for unlawful discharge of pollutants into navigable waters);
United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding plaintiff is not
required to prove willfulness or negligence since liability is strict).
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context of CWA civil enforcement. 65' Further, the fact that a facility is
in substantial compliance is immaterial. 52
The federal government has a choice of two forums to pursue CWA
civil penalties. Penalties may be imposed either administratively653 or
judicially.654 EPA has the discretion to determine which penalty
provisions would be more appropriate.
a. Administrative Enforcement
EPA is empowered to administratively assess penalties. The
penalties can be deemed either Class 1655 or Class IU.656 If the agency
elects to pursue the administrative assessment of penalties, it may not
subsequently pursue civil penalties through a judicial action.6"7 The
administrative order will give the defendant notice of the pending
administrative order and an opportunity to request a hearing.6 8 The
failure to request a hearing renders the administrative order final thirty
days after the date it was issued.6 9
b. Judicial Enforcement
1. Forum/Monetary Penalty Calculation
The CWA also provides the federal government the opportunity to
seek penalties or injunctive relief through a judicial action.' Jurisdic-
tion for such actions lies with the federal district court in which the
facility is located or does business."' A federal district court can both
assess penalties and provide injunctive relief.
651. See Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1980).
652. See Union Oil Co., 813 F.2d at 1491.
653. See33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1)(1994).
654. See id. § 1319(b).
655. 33 U.S.C § 131 9(g)(1)(A) (1994) reads: "[tihe amount of a class I civil penalty
under paragraph (1) may not exceed $10,000 per violation, except that the maximum
amount of any class I civil penalty under this subparagraph shall not exceed $25,000."
656. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1)(B) (1994) reads: "The amount of a class II civil
penalty under paragraph (1) may not exceed $10,000 per day for each day during which
the violation continues, except that the maximum amount of any class II civil penalty
under this subparagraph shall not exceed $125,000."
657. See id. § 1319(g)(6).
658. See id. § 1319(g)(2)(A)-(B).
659. See id. § 1319(g)(5).
660. Seeid. § 1318.
661. See id. § 1319(b).
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In determining the appropriate amount of a penalty, a court is
required to consider the seriousness of the violation(s), the economic
benefit, the gravity of the violation, past violations, the economic impact
of the penalty, and any good-faith efforts to attain compliance. 2 The
United States Supreme Court noted in Tull v. United States 3 that the
prescribed formula delegates wide discretion to the trial judge to fix the
amount of the civil penalty to be imposed."
EPA utilizes both general and statute-specific policies to determine
the penalty amount it deems appropriate for one or more CWA
violations." 5 The agency's stated purpose in developing these policies
was to provide its staff a logical penalty calculation methodology and
to ensure consistent application of the statutory penalty provisions.'
An important focus has traditionally been ensuring that a violator did
not gain an economic advantage over its competitors. Therefore, EPA
noted in its 1995 Interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy
that a minimum penalty should be formulated to recover the economic
benefit gained from noncompliance" 7 as well as to establish a deterrent
for future violations,"8 subject to a $25,000 per day maximum. 9 The
penalty amount is also affected to varying degrees in these policies by
the significance of the violation, health and environmental harm,
number of violations, duration of noncompliance, history of recalci-
662. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1994). See, e.g., GAOENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT:
PENALTIES MAY NOT RECOVER ECONOMIC BENEFITS GAINED BY VIOLATORS (GAO/RCED-
91-166); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM CLEAN WATER ACT SETTLEMENT
PENALTY POLICY (1995); United States v. Municipal Auth. ofUnion Township, 150 F.3d
259 (1998).
663. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
664. There are various methods used by the courts to determine an appropriate
penalty. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 353-54 (E.D.
Va. 1997). The top down approach first determines the maximum penalty allowable
under the CWA then reduces this amount upon the presence of mitigating factors as set
forth in § 1319(d). See id. at 353. In contrast, in the bottom up approach, the economic
benefit derived from noncompliance is calculated and adjusted accordingly upon a
finding of mitigating or aggravating factors as established in § 1319(d). See id.
665. See generally Jon S. Paletto, Negotiating Resolution of Environmental Enforcement
Actions, 18 W. ILL. U. L. REV. 527 (1998).
666. See id. at 533.
667. See Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 348 (explaining that often a company
incurs a financial gain when it violates its permit limitations by reinvesting the money
in itself instead of in the operations which would bring them into compliance).
668. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM CLEAN WATER ACT SETTLEMENT
PENALTY POLICY (1995).
669. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A) (1994). A subsequent CWA specific penalty
policy was issued in 1986. See Memorandum from Lawrence J. Jensen, Administrator
for Water, EPA, to General Counsel, New Clean Water Act Civil Penalty Policy (Feb.
1, 1986).
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trance, ability to pay a penalty, and litigation considerations (i.e.,
risks). ° The CWA enforcement provisions have been interpreted as
authorizing the imposition of a separate penalty for each specific
effluent limitation violated on a single day.67
2. Injunctive Authority
Section 309(b) provides the authority to request "appropriate relief,
including a permanent or temporary injunction," and grants the federal
district court "'jurisdiction to restrain such violations and to require
compliance." The CWA has been held to provide at a minimum a full
range of traditional injunctive relief.6" The scope of the court's
discretion to fashion an equitable remedy can be an issue.
In United States v. Alcoa,674 EPA brought a judicial enforcement
action against a facility seeking both penalties and injunctive relief for
alleged CWA violations.67 The requested injunctive relief included
remediation of contaminated sediment.7 6 The court concluded that
under the circumstances:
[T]he court's authority to grant an injunction "to require compliance"
in Section 309(b) is mandated cleanup of contaminated sediments
where the sediments are contaminated as a direct result of NPDES
permit violations. However, for an injunction to issue for sediment
remediation under Section 309(b), the EPA must first establish that
the sediments are contaminated with a substance that was released by
the Defendant in an amount in excess of its NPDES permit. In
addition, it must show that the substance is hazardous to human health
and the environment; that it will not naturally break down over time;
and that it will continue to be released into the "waters of the United
670. See Memorandum from Lawrence J. Jensen, Administrator for Water, EPA, to
General Counsel, New Clean Water Act Civil Penalty Policy (Feb. 1, 1986).
671. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1137-39
(11 th Cir. 1990), cited with approval in Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & County of
Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1393-94 (D. Haw. 1993). The CWA does provide a
"single operational upset defense" which imposes a single violation for multiple
parameter exceedances related to such an event. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(cX5), (d), (gX3)
(1994). This provision is discussed in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc.
v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990). The term "single
operational upset" in the context of this section has been interpreted to mean an
"unusual or extraordinary event." Id at 77.
672. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1994).
673. See United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1036 (N.D. Ind. 2000).





States" at such a level as to contaminate the water and make it unsafe
for its designated uses.6"
3. POTW/IU Enforcement Authorities
The CWA enforcement scheme was amended in 1977 to address
situations in which an IU violates local limits or other restrictions
applicable to its discharge into a POTW. Section 309(f67 extended the
CWA enforcement authorities to such "indirect" discharges. An action
may be brought under this section in some circumstances against both
the POTW and IU 9 Prior to filing such an action, the government
must notify the POTW that pollutants are being discharged in violation
of section 307(d)' and that the facility has not undertaken enforcement
within thirty days."' Section 309(f) is intended to ensure the availability
of an enforcement mechanism if a POTW is reluctant to take action
against a company or facility. Many lUs are an important employer or
economic force in their community or region.
4. CWA Judicial Settlement Procedures
a. Settlement of Actions
CWA civil enforcement actions are often settled or resolved
through the execution of a consent decree or order that is executed by
the federal government and the alleged violator.6"2 The federal district
court may only approve ajudicial settlement if it determines the matter
is being resolved in a manner consistent with the public interest.6"3 The
court must also determine "whether the decree comports with the goals
of Congress."
677. See id. at 1039.
678. See 33 U.S.C. § 1309(f) (1994). See Gold, supra note 98, at 466.
679. See Gold, supra note 98, at 467.
680. See id.
681. See id.
682. Many consent decrees will encompass the settlement of other federal and state
environmental statutory causes of action in addition to the alleged CWA violations. See
65 Fed. Reg. 69,338 (2000) (discussing Department of Justice notice of proposed
consent decree resolving alleged CWA, RCRA, SDWA, CAA, and CERCLA
violations, along with Mississippi environmental statutory violations).
683. See United States v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 960 F. Supp. 298, 299 (N.D. Ga.
1996).
684. See Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola Corp. 673 F. Supp. 1555, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
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The public will be given notice or an opportunity to comment on a
proposed consent decree. The comments submitted do not always
originate solely from individuals and citizen groups. For example,
competitors have on occasion critiqued the remedial measures and
penalties that the federal government has proposed to impose upon a
settling defendant.685
The consent decree will contain provisions assessing penalties
and/or requiring the settling defendant to undertake certain actions.6 "
The agreed actions may include remedial measures or other actions to
bring a facility or process into compliance. 687  This will include a
commitment to undertake the actions by a specific date or on a phased
schedule. 6"8  The settling defendant may be required to periodically
report progress on the required activities or actions and pay stipulated
penalties for failing to adhere to the schedule.689
The consent decree will often involve the control or supervision of
work required to be undertaken by the settling defendant. These post-
settlement activities can generate disagreements.69' The consent decree
685. See Georgia-Pacific, 960 F. Supp. at 300 (discussing objections of competing
wood products facilities to a proposed settlement of CWA enforcement action against
competitor).
686. See Coca Cola, 673 F. Supp. at 1556 (providing an example of a CWA consent
decree).
687. The consent decree may simply provide that the party attain a particular CWA
requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Quanex Corp., Consent Decree, H-99-1633
(S.D. Tex. 1999). Paragraph V(9Xf) required that the company submit a stormwater
pollution prevention plan to the Region 6 Office of EPA within 90 days of the entry of
the consent decree. Other consent decree provisions may require that the facility itself
determine the appropriate method to attain compliance with a CWA requirement. For
example, paragraph V(9)(h) of the Quanex Consent Decree required that the company
conduct a feasibility study to determine the most appropriate means to optimize the
acid neutralization treatment system to meet relevant permit requirements. See id. The
Quanex consent decree provides EPA the opportunity to review the company's
recommendations. Id. Implementation of the recommendations are required to take
place within a specific time period after EPA Region 6's approval of the submission.
See id. See also 65 Fed. Reg. 64,235 (Oct. 26, 2000) (referencing consent decree's
inclusion of provision requiring Maryland Aviation Administration to reduce use of
deicing fluid as part of settlement of federal CWA enforcement action).
688. See, e.g., San Francisco Baykeeper v. Pinole-Rodeo Auto Wreckers, Inc., 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5016 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1997) (illustrating requirement to prepare
and implement CWA stormwater pollution prevention plan); United States v. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13206 (D. Mo. Sept. 29, 1990) (discussing
a consent decree that required the phased construction of a wastewater treatment
system).
689. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher, 1990 LEXIS 13206, ** 17-18.
690. See United States v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 106 F. Supp. 2d 216
(D.P.R. 2000) (resolving dispute between utility and EPA subsequent to execution of
consent decree over correct interpretation of federal Clean Air Act provisions).
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may include some type of dispute resolution provision. 9' It is also not
unusual for the consent decree to be amended to reflect a change in
circumstances that all parties agree necessitates a change.692
b. Monetary Penalty Alternatives/Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Projects
Supplemental Environmental Projects ("SEP") have been a
component of consent decrees resolving a number of federal CWA
enforcement actions. 69 3 A SEP is a project or action performed in lieu
of penalties to settle a filed or threatened enforcement action.6' EPA
and many states allow the use of SEPs in settlements.6' However, a
proposed SEP can only be used at the federal level if it meets certain
criteria. These criteria are identified in a 1998 EPA SEP policy. 6
EPA's use of SEPs to resolve enforcement actions involving many of its
programs is increasing.69'
Some CWA SEPs are fairly straightforward. They may involve the
voluntary installation of pollution control equipment not already
required by law, or a donation of property or cash for conservation or
other purposes. A few CWA SEPs appear to be designed to address
more complex or intractable problems. For example, the federal
government and Hudson Foods, Inc., executed a consent decree in 1998
to resolve alleged violations relating to a Maryland poultry processing
facility.6' The document included a requirement that the company fund
a "Nutrient Management Plan Project ("NMPP"). ' " The NMPP's
691. The Puerto Rico decision reviews a dispute resolution provision found in a
consent decree that had settled an enforcement action against the utility. See id.
692. See Cape Ann Citizens Ass'n v. City of Gloucester, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
21315, at *2 (1st Cir. Aug. 13, 1997) (addressing CWA consent decree requiring
municipality to extend sewer amended to allow construction of alternative type of
system).
693. SEPs are discussed in Wright & Henry, supra note 156 at 322-28.
694. See id. at 322.
695. See id.
696. See 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796-804 (May 5, 1998). The traditional federal SEP
criteria are addressed in Wright & Henry, supra note 156, at 322-28.
697. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle for the
Future of Environmental Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10803, 10812 (2000). A
discussion of various SEP issues in the CWA context is found in Quan B. Nghiem,
Comment, Using Equitable Discretion to Impose SupplementalEnvironmental Projects Under
the Clean Water Act, 24 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 561 (1997).
698. See United States v. Hudson Foods, Inc., Consent Decree, CCB-98-1468 (D.
Md. 1998).
699. See id. at 914(d).
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focus was the reduction of nutrient run-off into receiving waters in
portions of a three state area. Of particular interest is the fact that the
scope of the NMPP included both the Hudson Foods poultry processing
facility and its contract poultry growers in the area.'l The company
committed to provide staff and materials to contract growers to assist
them in preparing and implementing nutrient management plans."'
Further, the obligation to provide such assistance was automatically
extended to growers entering into contracts with Hudson Foods within
thirty-five months after the entry of the consent decree. 2
SEP proponents argue that these mechanisms are more likely to
benefit the environment than penalties. 3 They note that penalties are
simply deposited into the treasury.' ° Further, a settling defendant may
benefit from the substitution of a SEP for penalties in some circum-
stances. The advantages may be the goodwill derived from certain
projects0 . and reduced future environmental compliance costs.' 6 Some
settlements may even include multiple SEPs of various types. 7
The use of SEPs in settlements is not universally supported.0'




703. See Nghiem, supra note 697, at 566. An example of a SEP that arguably
benefits the environment is a $90,000 fish study that the Maryland Aviation
Administration agreed to perform as a component of a 2000 CWA consent decree. See
65 Fed. Reg. 64,235 (Oct. 26, 2000).
704. See Nghiem, supra note 697, at 566.
705. See id. An example is a SEP the Denver Water Board agreed to perform to
settle CWA violations. See 64 Fed. Reg. 38,694 (Aug. 11, 1999). The Denver agency
committed to revegetate certain banks of the South Platte River. See id.
706. See Nghiem, supra note 697, at 566. The facility will incur the costs necessary
to redesign a process to eliminate or reduce the volume or toxicity of a wastewater
discharge. However, the changes enable the facility to avoid the CWA compliance
costs (sampling, treatment, etc.) that are associated with this wastewater discharge. For
example, Texmark Chemicals, Inc. agreed to perform a SEP involving the replacement
of two steam jets at a facility with two vacuum pumps. See 64 Fed. Reg. 43,719 (Aug.
11, 1999). The benefits from this change were stated to be the fact that process
wastewater would no longer be generated in the production of a particular chemical.
See id. This was expected to reduce the average flow through facility outfall by
between 50% and 78%. See id. This reduction would presumably benefit both the
facility and the environment.
707. For example, Gulf States Steel, Inc. settled a CWA action by in part agreeing
to at least $206 million dollars in SEPs which included facility pollution prevention
measures, acquisition, and preservation of ecologically valuable property, and paying
for the cleanup of two waterbodies. See 65 Fed. Reg. 18,351 (Apr. 7, 2000).
708. See generally David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmental Enforcement
Reform: The Case of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1181.
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penalties.7 For example, a violator may propose a SEP that involves
the installation of pollution prevention or reduction equipment.1 This
equipment may provide the facility energy savings or reduced waste
disposal costs."" Thus, the facility receives a prospective operational
cost reduction." 2
2. Criminal Enforcement
Almost every federal environmental statute contains criminal
penalty provisions."3  The CWA provides criminal penalties for
negligent violations,"' knowing violations,"5 or knowing endangerment 16
violations. 77 Negligence means acts or omissions in violation of an
objective that were not knowingly performed or permitted to occur.718
Criminal environmental enforcement is a significant component of
the CWA and other federal pollution control programs. The EPA values
such actions because criminal penalties cannot be simply quantified as a
cost of doing business.7  The number of federal criminal environmental
709. See id.
710. See id. at 1192.
711. Some would view reduced demand for energy and pollution disposal as
laudable goals.
712. One group criticized the use of SEPs by the Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission. See TEXAS CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES, TNRCC
ENFORCEMENT: RECORDS OR RHETORIC? (1996). The organization alleged that some
Texas SEPs "merely involve renovation of the polluters' own facilities." Id. at 3.
713. See Kevin A. Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman, Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Laws, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 46-47 (1999) (detailing
federal criminal environmental enforcement program and associated issues).
714. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1994). See generally United States v. Freeze Bros.,
602 F.2d 1123, 1129 (3rd Cir. 1979) (holding failure to construct holding tank large
enough to accommodate wastewater causing surface runoff constitutes negligent
violation).
715. Businessman Gets Prison Sentence for Clean Water Act Violations at Plant, ENV'T
REP., June 6, 2000, at 1167. The article reports that in United States v. Marshall, No.
IPOO-3 I-CR/F (S.D. Ind. 2000), the court imposed a five month prison sentence, a five
month home detention period, a $5,000 fine, and one year supervised release for a
businessman's knowing violations of the CWA.
716. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1994) (defining knowing endangerment).
717. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1994).
718. See Jay G. Martin, Conducting a Successful Internal Investigation, 6 ENVTL. LAW.
673, 684 (2000). The author states that "negligent acts that manifest carelessness,
rather than an unlawful intent, are usually not aggressively pursued by EPA." Id.
719. See Katherine C. Kellner, Comment, Separate but Equal: Double Jeopardy and
Environmental Enforcement, 28 ENvTL. L. 169, 189 (1998) (citing Daniel J. Gibby &




actions had trended upward for much of the past decade.' 0 A survey of
federal environmental prosecutions from 1984 to 1990 found that twenty-
five percent involved CWA violations."
The statutory maximum for criminal sanctions for first time CWA
offenders is $25,000 per day for negligent violations,' $50,000 per
day for knowing violations,' and $1,000,000 for knowing endangerment
violations.' All subsequent convictions yield ceilings which double the
previously referenced statutory maximums.' Felony penalties of up to
three years and fifteen years imprisonment are potentially imposed for
knowing and knowing endangerment violations, respectively. 26
The type of CWA violations triggering criminal environmental
enforcement have not been limited to NPDES permit effluent limit
exceedances. A significant percentage of the cases prosecuted have
involved violations of monitoring, sampling, and/or reporting require-
ments.' Examples of conduct of this type that have triggered prosecution
include: (a) deliberate tampering with a facility's wastewater testing;728
(b) manipulating facility wastewater flow to achieve desired sampling
results;' and (c) falsification of DMRs and supporting lab records."3
720. See id. at 169 (citing EPA enforcement statistics noting the cases initiated from
525 in 1994 to 562 in 1995).
721. See Gaynor, supra note 712, at 42 (citing Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime
& Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1073 (1992)).
722. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(IXB) (1994).
723. See id. § 1319(c)(2XB).
724. See id. § 1319(c)(3)(A).
725. See id. § 1318(aXB).
726. See id. § 1319(c).
727. Other scenarios have simply involved the alleged release of material in a
manner that causes it to enter a jurisdictional waterbody. See, e.g., United States v.
Curtis, 988 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1993) (addressing allegation that fuels manager at airbase
directed the pumping ofjet fuel into pipeline knowing it would leak). This decision is
also of interest because it rejected an argument that the CWA does not apply to federal
employees whose alleged violations occurred in the course of their employment. See
id. at 948.
728. See United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1995) (addressing the
discarding of undesired sampling results and dilution of zinc sample with tap water to
reduce concentration).
729. See United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997) (sampling when
flow was reduced and subsequently increasing flow).
730. See United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991) (addressing the
recording of false sampling results); Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 714 (addressing sampling
when flow was reduced and subsequently increasing flow).
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3. Scope of CWA Liability Provision
The CWA provides that a "person,"'' 3 "responsible corporate
officer," ' 2 or "owner or operator"1 3 may be liable for a violation of the
statute. A "person" is defined as an "individual, corporation, partnership,
association, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of
a State, or any interstate body." 4 A "responsible corporate officer" is
included within the definition of "person" pursuant to the 1987 CWA
Amendments."5 Finally, an "owner or operator" includes "any person
who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a source."
736
An important question is the scope of these CWA and other similar
environmental statutory definitions. The focus is often the apportionment
of liability among individuals, companies, and affiliated entities. Parties
are motivated to discern the breadth of these provisions because this will
determine their risk of being a legitimate target of CWA enforcement.
The interpretation of the cited terms has primarily occurred in the
context of CERCLA1 7 litigation." Because several CWA terms are
somewhat similar, the interpretations given to these CERCLA provisions
are relevant. Various decisions have focused on the impact of CERCLA
on parent and subsidiary corporations, given the interpretation of "owner
or operator" and the difference between direct and indirect liability under
the statute."9 Similar attention has been paid to the potential liability of
individuals.
a. Affiliate Entity Liability
The CWA and CERCLA cases agree that while the general rule in
American corporation law provides for limited liability in the corporate
context, there are recognized equitable exceptions. For example, where
a parent totally dominates and controls its subsidiary, "operating the
subsidiary as its business conduit or agent," courts have been willing to
731. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1994).
732. Id. § 1319(c)(6).
733. Id. § 1316(a)(4).
734. Id. § 1362(5).
735. Id. § 1319(c)(6).
736. Id. § 1316(aX4).
737. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9607 (1994).
738. The disproportionate percentage ofdecisions involving CERCLA is likely due
to the significant liabilities typically imposed upon a party determined to fit within the
scope of the statute.
739. Stephanie M. Irby, Note, United States v. Bestfoods: CERCLA's Effect On
Climbing the Corporate Ladder of Liability, 52 ARK. L. REV. 613, 614 (1999).
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disregard the corporate entity in the interests of public convenience,
fairness, and equity.'"" In such cases, the parent is so closely intertwined
with the subsidiary that the two should be treated as a single entity."4
This doctrine is traditionally known as piercing the corporate veil, an
indirect form of liability. Piercing has also been said to be appropriate
when the court must "prevent fraud, illegality or injustice, or when
recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public policy or shield
someone from public liability for a crime."' 2
Different jurisdictions employ various methods to determine if the
corporate veil should be pierced, thereby subjecting the parent corporation
to liability for the subsidiary's violative acts. Cases and articles involving
CERCLA litigation have focused upon the various means used tojustify
piercing. The method of piercing the corporate veil based upon federal
common law has been used by a majority of courts to hold shareholders
of a corporation that owns a facility liable as "owners" under CERCLA.43
This allows for veil piercing to occur in two situations: first, when the
corporation is found to perpetuate a fraud or an illegal purpose; and
second, when the corporation is dominated by the shareholder to the
extent that the corporation is deemed to be merely an "alter ego or an
instrumentality" of the shareholder.7'
This doctrine considers several factors that are often considered by
state courts as well in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil.
These factors include, but are not limited to, the following:
740. United States v. Gulf Park Water Co., 972 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (S.D. Miss.
1997) (citing United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986)).
741. See United States v. Municipal Auth. of Union Township, 929 F. Supp. 800,
808 (D.C. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 150 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 1998).
742. Id.; see also Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16850, at *7 (D. Mont. May 24, 1995) (pointing out where the corporate veil could be
pierced to curb injustices resulting from the improper use of a corporate entity).
Montana has a two-prong standard for determining if the corporate veil should be
pierced. First, the party charged must be either the alter ego, instrumentality, or agent
of the corporation. Second, the corporate entity must be utilized as a subterfuge to
wrong, inconvenience, or otherwise perpetrate a fraud on the public. See id.
Montana's standard mirrors the federal common law approach. The Arkansas Supreme
Court has held that "one who seeks to disregard the corporate entity must show that the
corporate form has been abused to the injury of a third party." National Bank of
Commerce v. HCA Health Serv. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 59, 800 S.W.2d 694,
697 (1990).
743. See Eric B. Rothenburg, et al., Environmental Issues in Business Transactions




I. Adequacy of capitalization of the corporation or subsidiary;
2. Extensive or pervasive control by the shareholder or parent;
3. Intermingling of assets, properties, or accounts between the
entities;
4. Failure by the corporation or subsidiary to separately
observe corporate formalities;
5. Siphoning of funds from the corporation or subsidiary;
6. The absence of corporate records; and
7. Nonfunctioning officers or directors of the corporation or
subsidiary. 45
The specific facts within each case are examined closely in this determina-
tion. No single factor is dispositive.
Several jurisdictions look to individual state law, as opposed to the
federal common law, in making the piercing decision. In United States v.
Bestfoods,7 the United States Supreme Court specifically found that
nothing within CERCLA requires or indicates that state corporation law
is to be disregarded "simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based
upon a federal statute."'747 Therefore, the Court found that as long as the
elements are present allowing for piercing the corporate veil, either
according to federal common law or individual state corporate law, a
parent corporation may be held indirectly liable under CERCLA for the
acts of its subsidiary.'
Two of the four categories of potentially responsible parties under
CERCLA involve owners or operators. The first includes the current
owner and operator of the facility, and the second consists of any person
or persons who owned or operated the facility at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substances. 49 As such, the question of parent/subsidiary
liability and the apportionment of such liability was the subject of much
745. Id. at 122. A Kansas district court, in a recent case, also examined the
subsidiary's business outside that with the parent, the treatment of the subsidiary by the
parent (as a division or department or as a true subsidiary), the ownership of the
subsidiary's stock, and the payment of expenses and losses of the subsidiary by the
parent, in addition to other factors, in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil.
See Harris v. Oil Reclaiming Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212 (D. Kan. 2000). The Fifth
Circuit includes an examination of whether the parent or shareholder uses the
subsidiary or corporation's property as its own. See Gulf Park, 972 F. Supp. at 1061-62.
The cost-effectiveness of any of the mentioned factors is irrelevant to the piercing
issue. See id. at 1062.
746. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
747. See id. at 63 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)).
748. See id.
749. See Irby, supra note 738, at 618.
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litigation due to the vague and circular CERCLA definition of "owner or
operator"-"any person owning or operating such facility." 7" The
relevant CWA definitions are somewhat more clear, meaning that there
are fewer cases interpreting their applicability to parent and subsidiary
companies. Therefore, some understanding of CWA liability can be
better understood by reviewing the treatment of the analogous CERCLA
terms.
An unpublished 1996 case decided by a Florida district court cited a
distinction between the CWA and CERCLA in terms of the liability that
may be encountered as an "operator" of a facility under these statutes. In
United States v. Avatar Holdings, Inc.,"' the district court stated that
CERCLA and the CWA employ different standards in finding a parent
corporation752 liable for the acts of its subsidiary based on the interpreta-
tion of "operator" liability."3  In so finding, the court held that the
standard articulated under section 107 of CERCLA,"4 where a parent
corporation is liable as an "operator" when it "directly and pervasively"
controlled the subsidiary's actions to the extent of actual involvement in
the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary, does not apply to violations
under the CWA. 5
The exercise of control was deemed a factor by the Florida federal
district court."6 It determined that parent liability under the CWA is
predicated on a stricter standard of "directing or causing" the violations
in such a way so as to be considered a "person who violates" under
section 309(d) of the CWA,"7" despite the expansive definition given to
750. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994).
751. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12312 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 1996).
752. The various references to "corporations" in this discussion is not intended to
overlook the fact that businesses operate through a number of other entities such as
limited liability companies, limited partnerships, and limited liability partnerships.
With the exception of limited partnerships, these entities have simply not been the
subject of a body caselaw in which their status under the federal environmental statutes
is addressed. A discussion of these entities in the CERCLA context is found in Wright
& Morrissey, supra note 21, at 773-78.
753. See Avatar Holdings, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12312 at *45.
754. See 42 U.S.C. § 9707(aX2) (1994).
755. See id. (citing Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bemuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110
(1 th Cir. 1993)). The Bestfoods decision found that an "operator" under CERCLA
must "manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution."
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 67. In a proceeding below, the Florida district court specifically
stated that the "mere fact of being a parent exercising control over a violating
subsidiary does not properly subject the parent company to liability" under the CWA.
Avatar Holdings, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12312 at *45 (quoting Bernuth, 996 F.2d at
1110).




"operator" by the CWA.7' In finding that the actions of the defendant in
that case did not rise to the level of being considered a "person who
violates," the court noted that the parent corporation's role was limited to
that of overall financial review and long-term strategic planning, with no
operational decisions being made amounting to "directing or causing"
CWA violations.' 5 Subsequent cases cite Avatar Holdings, holding parent
corporations liable for their actions that transform them into a "person
who violates" under the CWA.7'
United States v. Tropical Fruit, S.E., 6 is a decision in which partners
were determined not to be the equivalent of an "owner" subject to
CERCLA liability. However, the court found that the partnership was a
potentially responsible or covered person under CERCLA, and the
partners could be held liable under the "operator" standard.62 To be liable
under this standard, the court held that the government must show that the
partner either "actually participated in operating the Site or in the
activities [that] result[ed] in the [pollution], or [a]ctually exercised control
over, or were intimately involved in the operations of the [partnership]."7 3
The court's holding equated derivative suits involving partnerships to
those involving corporate entities,7' with an analogy to the liability that
can be imputed to the parent for the wrongful acts of the subsidiary.76
758. Harris v. Oil Reclaiming Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Kan. 2000).
759. Id Furthermore, performance of a service by an entirely separate entity for
someone considered to be an owner or operator under the CWA, for which that owner
or operator is separately billed, does not expose the separate entity performing these
services to owner or operator liability under the CWA. See Beartooth Alliance v.
Crown Butte Mines, No. CV-93-154-BLG-JDS, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16850, at *7
(D. Mont. 1995).
760. United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 781 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(clarifying also that a corporation is a "person" liable under the CWA).
761. 96 F. Supp. 2d 71, 83 (D.P.R. 2000).
762. See id.
763. Id
764. See id. at 84.
765. The potential criminal liability under the environmental statutes of an affiliate
for parent or subsidiary activities is not a common issue. However, it has been
suggested that criminal liability may be imposed upon a parent for the illegal activities
of its subsidiary, particularly in cases where the subsidiary is considered to be the mere
agent of the parent. Although published case law supporting this theory is virtually
nonexistent, the well-known Exxon Valdez spill settlement likely was partially
predicated on threats of pursuing this theory as against Exxon Corporation for the acts
of Exxon Shipping Company. As discussed above, this type of liability is normally
reserved for civil actions, based upon either actions as an "owner or operator" or
through piercing the corporate veil when the subsidiary acts as an alter ego of the
parent. However, it appears that there is at least potential for the courts to allow
criminal liability to attach to the corporate parent for the violations of its subsidiary.
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It is also important to note that it has been held proper to consider the
financial condition of the parent corporation in evaluating the economic
impact of the CWA penalty imposed due to the actions of the subsidiary.
In United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township,7' the financial
statements of the parent were analyzed to ensure that the penalty assessed
would not be set at a level above the subsidiary's ability to pay. 7 The
subsidiary did not retain its revenues.7 ' Instead, it forwarded them to the
parent company, which made the finances of that entity especially
relevant.' Furthermore, the court noted the distinction between
examining the parent's financial condition and actually piercing the
corporate veil, as the subsidiary was the only entity penalized."
b. Individual Liability: The Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine
The common law has not generally held officers, directors, and
employees individually liable for the wrongful acts of the corporation."'
Various federal environmental statutes including the CWA have,
however, increased the instances in which officers, directors, and
employees may themselves be penalized for violations.m The relevant
federal environmental statutes provide descriptive terms that specify upon
which individual liability may be imposed. m Those terms include
"person," "person in charge," or "owner or operators."" 4
The responsible corporate officer doctrine" has been employed to
impose federal environmental statutory liability in the criminal context.
Three essential elements are required before this doctrine may be invoked:
first, the individual must be in a position of responsibility, able to
influence corporate affairs; second, there must be a link between the
individual's corporate position and the CWA violation so that the
individual could have influenced the corporation's actions leading to the
violation; and third, the individual's actions or inactions must facilitate the
766. 929 F. Supp. 800 (M.D. Pa. 1996), afftd, 150 F.3d 259, 268 (3rd Cir. 1998).
767. See id at 805-06.
768. See id. at 805.
769. See id.
770. See id
771. See Martin, supra note 717, at 689.
772. See id.
773. See id. at 691-92.
774. Id. at 691.
775. The responsible corporate officer doctrine was first introduced in United States
v. Dotterwich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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violation. 6 The doctrine contravenes general agency law which prohibits
individual or personal liability of an agent of a corporation when the agent
is acting on behalf of the corporation. Even using the doctrine, mere
knowledge of a violation of an environmental statute has been held
insufficient to impose personal liability." The officer must be shown to
have been "actively involved" in the alleged violation."
Two of the state environmental statutory decisions that have
addressed this doctrine have reached different results. In RLG, Inc.,' the
Indiana Court of Appeals addressed whether an individual that was the
sole officer and shareholder of a company operating a landfill could be
held personally liable under certain state environmental statutes.' The
Indiana Department of Environmental Management had sought civil
penalties under a state environmental statute against both the officer and
corporation."M The court held that the state did not present evidence to
establish a nexus between the officer and the violations. 2 The argument
that the "responsible corporate officer" should be imposed was rejected. 3
A different result was reached in Washington Dept. of Ecology v.
Lundgren,' which represents a state appellate decision imposing liability
upon an individual for state statutory water pollution control violations.
The Washington Court of Appeals found that a corporate officer of a
private sewage treatment facility was personally liable for state statutory
violations because it was established that he "controlled" the facility.7 5
He was held to be a responsible corporate officer.6
776. See Commissioner, Ind. Dep't of Envtl. Management v. RLG, Inc., 735 N.E.2d
290, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
777. See id. at 298.
778. See id. In fact, the government must show that the officer actually directed,
ordered, ratified, approved, or consented to the improper disposal. See id.
779. 735 N.E.2d 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
780. See RLG. Inc., 735 N.E.2d at 293.
781. See id.
782. See id. at 299. In other words, the decision suggests that the officer must have
had some personal involvement in the relevant activity. The absence of such
involvement by this individual is interesting since the individual was the only corporate
officer and shareholder. The opinion does not supply the facts necessary to understand
the role of the officer.
783. See id. at 298-99.
784. 971 P.2d 948 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
785. See id at 953.
786. See id. See also People ex rel. James E. Ryan v. Bishop, 735 N.E.2d 754 (Il.





EPA has on occasion targeted service entities or contractors in CWA
enforcement actions. An example is an EPA section 404 CWA enforce-
ment action referenced in a consent agreement styled In re Pollack
("RPS").Y' EPA alleged in the RPS consent agreement thatjurisdictional
wetlands were filled without acquiring the required 404 permit during the
construction of a house.' A subsequent CWA action sought penalties
from the property owner. However, EPA also targeted other parties who
were allegedly involved to some degree in the design or construction
activity. Those parties included an architect,' contractor,' and
excavator.7' The consent agreement alleges each of the three parties
"exercised responsibility, authority or control over performance of the
work and/or directly performed the work resulting in the discharge of
pollutants."' Each of the three parties agreed to pay a penalty.'
d. Asset/Stock Purchase Liability
Companies or facilities are often cited for multiple violations
allegedly occurring over a period of months or years. A company cited
for such alleged violations may not have owned the plant when some or
all of the violations allegedly occurred. Is the new owner of the company
787. No. CWA-8-2000-12, 2000 EPA Consent LEXIS 174 (EPA July 11, 2000).
788. See id. at *4; see also 33 U.S.C. § 404 (1994).
789. The RPS consent agreement stated in paragraph 5:
Roger Strout of RPS architects was the local architect hired by Ms. Pollak
to plan and design the Pollak residence. Mr. Strout acted as Ms. Pollak's
agent in obtaining local building permits and overseeing construction on her
behalf. As part of his general duties, Mr. Strout signed the building permit
application which disclosed the requirement for corps permits if the project
in question is in a wetland. The building permit application stated that it is
the responsibility of the builder to ensure compliance with corps
requirements.
See RPS, 2000 EPA Consent LEXIS 174 at **2-3.
790. The RPS consent agreement stated: "Goddard Construction, Inc., was hired
by Ms. Pollak as the General Contractor for construction of the Pollak residence.
Goddard Construction, Inc., is a Wyoming corporation .... Goddard performed a
portion of the earth work and subcontracted the rest to Schupman Excavation, Inc." Id.
at *3.
791. The RPS consent agreement stated in "Note I" of paragraph 6: "[O]n April
6, 2000, the EPA and Schupman Excavation, Inc., filed a Consent Agreement wherein
Schupman Excavation, Inc., agreed to pay a cash penalty of $20,000 for its role in the
CWA violations associated with the construction of the Pollak residence." Id.
792. See id. at *4.
793. See id. at *2 n. 1, *7.
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or facility liable for the CWA violations that allegedly occurred prior to
the acquisition? Does it make any difference whether the facility was
acquired through the purchase of stock or assets?
1. Asset
An asset purchaser generally does not acquire the liabilities of the
company that sold the assets. Therefore, an acquisition may be structured
as an asset purchase at least in part to attempt to minimize potential
environmental liabilities.' There are four commonly accepted exceptions
to this principle: (1) the parties agree to that effect; (2) the transaction
amounts to a de facto merger; (3) the transaction is fraudulently entered
into to escape liability; or (4) the purchasing company is merely a
continuation of the business enterprise of the seller.'
The likelihood of a company being held liable for CWA violations
that occurred at a facility it purchased prior to the transfer is uncertain.
Agency enforcement personnel and the courts will analyze the details of
both the transaction and the purchaser's subsequent operation of the
facility.m
2. Stock
A purchaser that acquires a company or facility by transfer of stock'
as opposed to assets is likely to assume the predecessor's liabilities and
obligations.'
794. See Charles P. Efflandt, When the Tail Wags the Dog: Environmental
Considerations and Strategies in Business Acquisitions, Sales and Merger Transactions, 39
WASHmuRN L.J. 28, 36 (1999).
795. See id. at 37; see also In re Heating Oil Partners, L.P., No. CWA-III- 199, 1998
EPA AL LEXIS 81 at *7 (1998); In re Gold Crest Chemical Corp., No. EPCRA-111-
0160, 1992 EPA ALI LEXIS 676, at *'9-10 (1992).
796. See United States v. Gulf States Steel, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1237 (N.D.
Ala. 1999) (referencing government "doubts" as to whether asset transfer is "bonafide"
and should therefore shield subsequent purchaser of steel mill from pre-transfer
violations).
797. The same principles are also applicable to both a merger and consolidation.
See Efflandt, supra note 794, at 36. This means the purchaser will likely assume
responsibility for facility environmental statutory/regulatory that occurred prior to the
acquisition, and a facility's CWA compliance history can therefore constitute a material




4. Concurrent Federal/State Jurisdiction
a. State Enforcement
State agencies are encouraged to develop their own CWA enforce-
ment programs.' Once EPA determines a state's enforcement procedures
are adequate, it may delegate such authority to the appropriate agency.'
If the state agency fails to maintain the requisites as set forth by the CWA,
EPA is empowered to revoke the program.)' Revocation of a state-
administered program is an unlikely response in most instances. The EPA
resources that would be diverted would probably make the assumption of
a state program an unwelcome prospect.'
b. Governmental Enforcement Overlap
An NPDES permittee is potentially subject to both federal and state
enforcement actions. A federal CWA action filed against a facility that
is already the subject of delegated state's enforcement is often denomi-
nated overfiling.' The federal government may choose to file an
enforcement action in a delegated state if it believes a violation has not
799. The state can develop their own inspection program. The section 308
provisions are simply a floor. Section 308(c) notes:
If the Administrator finds that the procedures and the law of any State
relating to inspection, monitoring, and entry are applicable to at least the
same extent as those required by this section, such State is authorized to
apply and enforce its procedures for inspection, monitoring, and entry with
respect to point sources located in such State (except with respect to point
sources owned or operated by the United States).
33 U.S.C. § 1318(c) (1994).
800. See id. The state must have in place the authorities "[t]o abate violations of the
permit on the permit program, including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and
means of enforcement... ." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7) (1994).
801. See Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in
the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1997).
802. See id. at 16. See generally U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 641.
803. See Ellen R. Zahren, Comment, Overfiling Under Federalism: Federal Nipping
at State Heels to Protect the Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373 (2000); Derek A. Yeo & Roy
A. Hoagland, United States v. Smithfield: 4 Paradigmatic Example ofLax Enforcement ofthe
Clean Water Act by the Commonwealth of Virginia, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 513 (1999); Calvo, supra note 73, at 412 (describing overfiling as "when the EPA
either steps into fix, change, undo, or add to what a state has already done or takes
action after a state has failed to act"). A discussion of overfiling under the RCRA,
CWA, and CAA is found in Jerry Organ, Environmental Federalism Part I: The History
of Overfiling Under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA Prior to Harmon, Smithfiend, and
CLEAN, 30 ENvTL. L. REP. 10615 (2000).
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been adequately addressed.' There is some belief that overfiling in the
CWA and other programs has increased in recent years.' A contrary
view is that overfilings remain rare.'06
A 1999 United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
decision examined overfiling in the context of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA").' In Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner,'
the court found that under RCRA a state authorized enforcement program
operates "in lieu of" the federal government's enforcement authority."°
The EPA had filed a RCRA action for civil penalties against Harmon
Industries, Inc. ("Harmon") after the company and the Missouri state
agency had already reached a settlement agreement."' 0 The agreement
with the Missouri state agency had been approved by a Missouri state
court."t,
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's grant of
summary judgment for Harmon. The court reasoned that RCRA grants
the states the right to act "in lieu of" the EPA. Therefore, the court held
the federal agency could not overfile since the state is authorized to
administer and enforce the RCRA program. The court also found that the
Missouri requirements for claim preclusion were satisfied." 2 The court
found that the EPA's right to revoke the state's authority to administer and
enforce the statute is the federal agency's remedy, as opposed to a
separate later action."s3 It therefore concluded that RCRA prohibited an
overfiling under this set of facts."" The decision has been the subject of
significant comment." 5 One view is that Harmon could impede EPA
804. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Virginia Seen as Undercutting US. Environmental Rules,
NY TIMES, Jan. 19, 1997, at 22 (referencing EPA CWA enforcement action against
facility that had already entered into consent order with State of Virginia).
805. See Scott R. Disnukes & Terry L. Schnell, Are You Prepared IfEPA Demands an
Inspection of Your Plant?, HYDROCARBON PROCESSING, Aug. 1, 1999, at 105 (stating that
"since 1997, EPA has shown an increased willingness to overfile in delegated states,
apparently in response to a perceived inadequacy in state enforcement efforts").
806. See Robert Worth, Asleep on the Bent, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Nov. 1, 1999, at
36 (stating that overfiling only happens a few times a year); Forcade & Anderson, supra
note 636, at 11032 ("overfiling has been an extremely rare event"); Calvo, supra note
73, at 412 (suggesting "half-dozen involve overfiling" annually).
807. See Harmon Indust., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999).
808. 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999).
809. See id. at 904.
810. See id. at 897.
811. See id.
812. See id. at 902-04.
813. See id. at 899-900.
814. See Harmon Indust., 191 F.3d at 902.
815. See generally Worth, supra note 805.
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enforcement in states failing to address serious environmental
violations.816
A key question is whether the rationale for the Harmon decision will
affect the functionality of the current federal-state enforcement relation-
ship under the CWA.817 The relevant language of RCRA and the CWA
are different.8 8 The RCRA statute specifically provides that a state
program is to act "in lieu of" the federal program, whereas the CWA
enforcement provisions do not contain such language. Section 309(a)(1)
of the CWA provides that an authorized state agency is to have primary
enforcement powers, making the EPA's enforcement authority secondary
and contingent upon the state's failure to initiate the appropriate enforce-
ment action."9 Unlike RCRA, the CWA states that "nothing in this
section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to
take action pursuant to Section 1319 of this title."8' The future of the
current federal-state enforcement overlap under the CWA depends on
whether its statutory structure is viewed as equivalent to the language of
RCRA. Consequently, it is unclear whether the rationale of Harmon will
apply to CWA overfilings. 2 Regardless, there will certainly be attempts
to apply the Harmon rationale to CWA EPA overfilings.82
816. See id. Note, however, that it is unclear whether Harmon will be followed in
other jurisdictions in similar RCRA enforcement scenarios. See, e.g., United States v.
Power Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo. 2000) (court declined to follow
Harmon and held federal RCRA enforcement proceeding against facility was proper
despite prior state action); In re Bil-Dry Corp., 2001 EPA App. LEXIS 1 (2001) (EPA
RCRA action could proceed because scenario was different that Harmon and did not
involve overfiling).
817. A 1999 article noted "Kansas City lawyer, Terry Satterlee, who represented
Harmon in the litigation, said some lawyers are speculating whether the case might also
affect the way EPA enforces its federal clean-air and clean-water laws. 'But that is yet
to be determined,' Satterlee said." Michael Mansur, Court Bars EPAfrom Acting Against
Blue Springs, Mo.-Based Manufacturer, KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept. 21, 1999, at B . The
potential effect of Harmon on similar issues in the CWA context are addressed in Calvo,
supra note 73.
818. See Zahren, supra note 802, at 404 (noting that the CWA does not contain the
RCRA "in lieu of' and "same force and effect" language).
819. See 33 U.S.C. § 1309(a)(1) (1994).
820. See Calvo, supra note 73, at 403.
821. See generally Zahren, supra note 802, at 403. The same question will arise in
Clean Air Act scenarios. See, e.g., United States Steel v. LTV Steel Co., 116 F. Supp.
2d 624 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that a facility's settlement with a local air authority
did not preclude a subsequent federal CAA enforcement action).
822. See Forcade & Anderson, supra note 636, at 11032. The authors note that the
defendant in a CWA and CAA citizen suit action raised a Harmon type issue (i.e. res
judicata and privity from a prior completed state enforcement action). See id. (citing
Citizens Legal Envtil. Action Network v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., 2000 WL
220464 (W.D. Mo. 2000)). The authors also note the United States opposed the
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The dual enforcement authorities found in the federal and state
environmental statutes can generate other potential conflicts. For
example, the criminal component of these statutes can pose a potential
constitutional problem. Specifically, does the double jeopardy provision
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution8" prohibit a
state statutory criminal action against a facility that has already been
subject to a similar federal action.'8 4 A similar issue potentially arises if
the timing of the federal and state actions are reversed."- The application
of the double jeopardy provision to such actions may be permitted by the
"dual sovereignty exception." 26 However, at least one commentator
argues the exception is inapplicable because the source of the authority for
federal and state actions is the same. 27 The argument is that the authority
to undertake both actions is derived from the federal statute. 28 This
exception applies where the actions involve "two sovereigns, drawing
power from different sources." 29
c. Citizen Suit Provision
Almost every federal environmental statute provides that in certain
circumstances a non-governmental entity or person may bring an action
in federal district court seeking various remedies against a violator.83 The
motion. See id. The challenge to EPA overfilings has not been limited to the judiciary.
Some states have viewed such actions as unjustified interference. See Calvo, supra note
73. at 410. A state organization known as the "Environmental Council of the States"
issued a resolution in 1998 that "calls on the EPA to consistently implement its policies
and agreements with state governments that are charged with enforcing the laws." Id.
A scenario that is arguably the reverse of the Harmon decision involved a state's
attempt to undertake CWA enforcement subsequent to a federal action against the same
violator. See Virginia Cannot Enforce Clean Water Act Following Federal Ruling. Company
Says, 31 ENV'T REP. 2382 (2000). The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the Virginia
Water Control Board was barred from pursuing a CWA action because it was in privity
with EPA. See State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 2001 Va. LEXIS 37
(Va. Mar. 2,2001).
823. "... Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
824. This question is addressed in Katherine C. Keller, Comment: Separate but Equal:
Double Jeopardy and Environmental Enforcement Actions. 28 ENVTL. L. 169 (1998).
825. See id.
826. See id. at 177-78.
827. See id. at 169.
828. See id.
829. Id. at 178 (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922)).
830. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 192.
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primary source of citizen suit activity has traditionally been the CWA.83
The CWA requirement that a facility periodically prepare discharge
monitoring reports and submit the results to an agency in a publically
available format eased the difficulties in proving violations .
32
There is perhaps an additional reason for the disproportionately
greater number of CWA citizen suits. Local and regional groups are often
formed to monitor and protect a particular waterbody. Various rivers,
streams, creeks,33 estuaries, and bayse' may be the focus of such
organizations. CWA citizen suit actions may be employed by such groups
to address perceived current or potential threats to the waterbody.
The CWA and other federal environmental statutes provide for two
potential citizen suit causes of action.'" One provision is utilized by
individuals or groups to compel agency compliance with statutory
duties. 36 Also, frequently employed is an action against an alleged
violator of certain CWA provisions in which the plaintiffs ask for
injunctive relief and/or monetary damages.3 7 Citizen suit defendants that
prevail in an action may be entitled to recover their attorneys fees and
costs.838
Prior to the commencement of an action, the CWA requires that a
citizen plaintiff give at least sixty days notice to the EPA, the state, and
the alleged violator.'" Some courts have dealt with the notice requirement
in a liberal manner, allowing a suit to continue even though the sixty day
requirement had not been met, while others strictly adhered to the notice
requirement.' The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in
831. See id. at 203.
832. See id.
833. An example is the Tobyhanna Conservation Association which is dedicated to
preserving and protecting the Tobyhanna Creek watershed in Pennsylvania. See
Tobyhanna Conservation Ass'n v. Country Place Waste Treatment Facility, 769 F.
Supp. 739, 741 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
834. An example is the San Francisco Baykeeper organization which was formed
to address threats to San Francisco Bay. Telephone Interview with Hank Bates,
McMath Law Firm, in Little Rock, Ark. (Dec. 12, 2000). Mr. Bates served as an
associate attorney with the Earth Justice Legal Defense Fund (formerly the Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund) from 1995 to 1997.
835. Wright & Henry, supra note 156, at 328.
836. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1994).
837. Seeid. § 1365(a)(1).
838. See id. § 1365(d).
839. See id. § 1365(bXlXA).
840. See DAVID SivE & FRANK FRIEDMAN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 308 (1987). These cases have repeatedly held that the notice requirement itself
is more crucial than the time span between notice and actual filing. See id.
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1989. The Court expressly held in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County9 that
where a party fails to meet the required sixty day notice period, a court
must dismiss the action as barred by the terms of the statute. 2
The notice must contain certain information. The regulatory
language promulgated pursuant to the CWA requires that the notice
contain the following:
[S]ufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific
standard, limitation, or order which has allegedly been violated, the
activity alleged to be in violation, the person or persons responsible for
the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation, the date or
dates of such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone
number of the person giving notice."'
The Eighth Circuit in Washington Trout v. McCain Food held that a
notice that does not contain all the necessary information prevents a
plaintiff from bringing a cause of action." 5
Another prerequisite for a citizen suit is that it may not be com-
menced if the EPA or the state is diligently prosecuting an enforcement
action against the alleged violator.' The issue of whether an agency is
diligently prosecuting a violator has been a source of much debate in
citizen suit actions."7 A Texas federal district court has outlined a two-
part apalysis for determining whether a state or agency is diligently
prosecuting a case."
The first part of the analysis requires the court to initially determine
whether an action against the alleged violator is pending in a state or
federal court at the time the citizen suit was commenced." 9 If there is a
pending action, the court must determine whether the two separate actions
seek compliance with the same regulation.' If the two actions seek
841. 493 U.S. 20 (1989).
842. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 33 (dismissing a citizen suit brought under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act when the plaintiff sufficiently notified the
defendant but failed to notify the EPA and the State sixty days prior to filing suit).
843. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a).
844. 37 F.3d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1994)
845. See Washington Trout, 37 F.3d at 1337 (dismissing an action because the notice
to the landfill-compost station did not include the results of the plaintiff's odor tests).
846. Miller, supra note 6, at 8.
847. See id.
848. See Glazer v. American Ecology Envtl Serv. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1035
(E.D. Tex. 1995) (setting forth the analysis of diligent prosecution without making a
final determination of whether the state was diligently prosecuting the action).
849. See id.
850. See id. (stating that a comparison of the pleadings from the two actions would
be sufficient for making this determination).
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compliance with the same regulation, the court may lack jurisdiction
depending upon the second part of the analysis. The second part of the
analysis requires the court to determine whether the previous actions were
diligently prosecuted."' The court stated that diligent prosecution by the
state or the EPA is presumed and that this presumption can only be
rebutted by persuasive evidence that the state's or the EPA's prosecution
of the defendant could be considered dilatory, collusive, or in bad faith. 2
The court also stated that primary reliance must be placed on the objective
evidence from the state's court file in order to resolve the issue of diligent
prosecution."'
Texans United for a Safe Economy Education Fund v. Crown Central
Petroleum Corp."s4 is an example of a court undertaking the first part of the
above analysis. The lower court had held that an administrative proceed-
ing was considered a court proceeding because there was substantial
equivalence between the remedy the administrative body could award and
the remedy that a court could award.'" 5 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling
and held that an administrative proceeding does not constitute a court
proceeding for purposes of this Clean Air Act citizen suit.'
Citizens Legal Environmental Action Network; Inc. v. Premium Standard
Farms, Inc.857 examined, under the second part of the above analysis,
whether two actions were diligently prosecuted. The plaintiff had sued
the defendant alleging violations of the CWA and the CAA. The
defendant had previously settled a CWA suit with the State. 8 In the
settlement, the State signed a document that released the defendant from
"any claims arising from facts known to the State at the time of the
settlement . . . .""" In determining whether the release precluded the
plaintiff's citizen suit, the court examined whether the State's action was
diligently prosecuted.' The court divided the plaintiff's claims into two
categories, those alleged by the State in its petition and those broadly
resolved based upon any facts known to the State at the time of
851. Seeid.
852. See id. at 1037.
853. See id.
854. 207 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 2000).
855. See id. at 794.
856. See id. at 795.
857. No. 97-6073-CV-SJ-6, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1990 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23,2000).
858. See id. at *2-3.
859. See id. at *3.
860. See id. at **43-44.
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settlement.M The court found that the State diligently prosecuted the
claims in the former category. However, with regard to the claims in the
latter category, the court reasoned that, because the document released the
defendant from obligations that the State's suit never sought to enforce,
the release's provision "evidences no prosecution at all, much less a
diligent one." 2 Additionally, the court pointed out that the defendant
may not have paid any penalties for the "purportedly 'resolved' viola-
tions.'S3
b. Defenses/Excused Exceedances
Various statutory provisions, common law theories, and policies may
in appropriate circumstances excuse or provide an affirmative defense in
the event of an NPDES violation. A few of the defenses, policies, and
theories are addressed in the following section. This list is not, however,
exhaustive.'
1. Standing and Mootness
Among the many judicial restraints placed on filing a viable suit in
the federal court system are the constitutional requirements of"standing"
and "mootness." In order to satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff
must show (1) it has suffered an "injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury could
861. See id. at **46-47.
862. See id. at *48.
863. See Premium Standard Farms, No. 97-6073-CV-SJ-6, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXiS
1990 at *49.
864. Examples are the doctrines of "laches" and "fair notice." See Allen's
Creek/Corett's Glen Pres. Group, Inc. v. Louis Caldera, 88 F. Supp. 2d 77 (W.D.N.Y.
2000) (discussing potential application of laches doctrine to CWA section 404 wetland
permitting issue). The use of this doctrine in environmental cases is disfavored. See
id. at 85 (citing Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 1975)). See also
United States v. CPS Chemical Co., 779 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Va. 1991) (refusing to
apply laches in CWA enforcement case). Defendants have attempted to invoke this
doctrine in CWA enforcement actions. See United States v. Edison, 108 F.3d 1336,
1342 (11 th Cir. 1997) (dismissing attempt to argue that CWA definition of pollution
is unconstitutional because it did not provide fair notice that discharging petroleum-
based products is prohibited); United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prod., Inc.,
487 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (finding CWA gave adequate notice that
"addition of any pollutant from any discrete container or conveyance to a water of the
United States is a prohibited act").
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be redressed should the plaintiff prevail.' Just as standing seeks to
ensure that the plaintiff has a valid case at the outset of litigation, the
mootness requirement enforces the idea that there must be a case or
controversy throughout the litigation. If, during the course of the
plaintiff's action, it becomes obvious that there is no longer any harm to
the plaintiff and that the wrongful behavior could not reasonably recur,
then the case has become moot.
Defendants have used these constitutional requirements to keep some
actions brought under citizen suit provisions out of federal court. The
United States Supreme Court has held that citizen-suit actions were
improper where the violations complained of had ceased by the time the
complaints were filed." Likewise, the Court has held that citizen suits
presented no case or controversy where complaints could only aver that
statutory violations resulted in ambiguous harm to an unspecified portion
of a large geographical area or that the violations damaged an area that the
plaintiff may someday want to use.'
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.' addressed a key CWA
citizen suit issue.' The specific issue was whether past violations could
support a valid cause of action under the citizen suit provision, or whether
the violations must be ongoing. The defendant argued that the citizen suit
could not be properly heard by the Court because it was based on past
violations of the NPDES permit.8' The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that
had found the plaintiff's case valid and held that "citizen suits... may be
maintained only to. enjoin or otherwise abate ongoing violations."' The
Court supported this decision by reasoning that the intent of the citizen
suit provision was to protect the "forward-looking" interests of the
plaintiff.' Therefore, the Court found that the citizen suit complaint must
allege ongoing violations. 3
865. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000).
866. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
56-63 (1987).
867. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-67 (1992).
868. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
869. See Brett A. Williams, Citizen Suits andthe Clean WaterAct: HasArticle llBecome
a Permanent Roadblock to Private Enforcement?, 7 MO. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 3
(1999).
870. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58-59.
871. See id. at 59.
872. See id
873. See id. at 64.
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The United States Supreme Court addressed significant citizen suit
standing issues in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment874 The Steel
Co. decision represents a concerted effort by the Court to lay down a
concrete approach for addressing Article III issues arising in environmen-
tal suits brought by private citizens under the federal citizen suit provi-
sions. 75 The Court held that an environmental group failed to satisfy the
redressability requirement of standing because the plaintiff could not
show any ongoing violations as a result of the defendant's actions. 6 The
Court also said that a private plaintiff's request for civil penalties did not
satisfy the redressability requirements of standing if there were no
ongoing violations, because the money damages went to the government
and, therefore, provided no relief for the alleged injuries.8" The Steel Co.
decision laid down a new precedent under which a more clearly defined
approach to the lingering standing issues was hammered out and by which
citizen suits would subsequently be measured before the door of the
federal courts would open wide.
Steel Co. left several questions unanswered. Defendants argued that
citizen suit plaintiffs failed to meet the redressability requirements of
standing, citing Steel Co. for the proposition that civil penalties paid to the
federal government can never redress their injury for Article III purposes
because the penalties are not paid to the plaintiff.' Some courts
distinguished Steel Co. by stating that it only applied to claims alleging
wholly past injuries and noting that Gwaltney held that a citizen suit
plaintiff may seek civil penalties if there was an allegation of continuous
or intermittent violations.
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
redressability controversy. In Friends ofthe Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services (TOC), Inc.,"s the plaintiffs, asking the Court to award civil
penalties, alleged ongoing violations of the CWA. Laidlaw, the defendant,
asserted that because the plaintiffs were no longer seeking injunctive
relief, their injury was not redressable because civil penalties, which are
874. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
875. See id. at 106-07.
876. See id. at 108-09.
877. See id at 106-09.
878. See San Francisco Baykeeper v. Vallejo Sanitation & Flood Control Dist., 36
F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1215 (E.D. Cal. 1999); L.E.A.D. Group ofBerks v. Exide Corp., No.
96-3030, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2672 at *47 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal.
1999).
879. See, e.g., San Francisco Baykeeper, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1215, L.E.A.D., No. 96-
3030, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2672 at *47; Southwest Marine, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
880. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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paid to the government under a citizen suit, provide no reliefto the private
citizen.81 However, the Court found that the imposition of civil penalties
adequately redressed the plaintiffs' injuries in the sense that the monetary
fine encouraged the defendant to discontinue the violations and deterred
it from committing future infractions.'
Friends of the Earth was distinguished from Steel Co. because it
involved a plaintiffs' standing to seek penalties for violations that
presented current threats of harm. 8 The Court held that private plaintiffs
had standing to file a citizen suit and seek money damages where the
violations were ongoing at the time of the complaint and may continue
into the future if undeterred.'
Laidlaw also argued that the plaintiffs had demonstrated no injury in
fact in light of the district court's finding that no proof of harm to the
environment could be shown to have resulted from its discharge viola-
tions.' However, the Court stated that the injury relevant for purposes
of constitutional standing was not a demonstrable injury to the environ-
ment but an injury to the plaintiff.m While acknowledging the plaintiff's
had only expressed "reasonable concerns" regarding Laidlaw's permit
violations, the Court nevertheless held they directly affected the aesthetic,
recreational, and economic enjoyment of the area, which was sufficient to
establish adequate injury in fact for environmental plaintiffs.'
The Steel Co. decision has also been cited for the proposition that,
once injunctive and declaratory relief were addressed, a plaintiff's request
for civil penalties under the citizen suit provision became moot. A few
courts have addressed this argument.' For example, the Fourth Circuit
in Friends of the Earth held that Laidlaw's actions, which *brought its
facility into compliance after the commencement of citizen suit litigation,
combined with the plaintiff's failure to appeal the district court's denial
of injunctive relief, rendered the civil penalty claim moot."9 Other courts
have held that the sole request for penalties does not cause a citizen suit
881. See id at 185.
882. See id. at 185-86; see also Texans United for a Safe Econ. Educ. Fund v. Crown
Central Petroleum Corp., 207 F.3d 789, 794 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Friends of the Earth
in support of its ruling that civil penalties adequately redress a plaintiff's injuries).
883. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 187-88.
884. See id.
885. See id at 181.
886. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181.
887. See id. at 183.
888. See Manuel Anderson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Kan.
1999).
889. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d
303, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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to become moot where the plaintiff claims continuing violations that
contribute to the alleged injuries.'5 These courts reasoned that money
damages distributed to the United States Treasury were sufficient to deter
ongoing and continuous violations causing harm to the plaintiff such that
it would have the equivalent concrete effect of an injunction."' Friends of
the Earth presented the Court with the factual situation in which to address
this confusion.
On appeal from the Fourth Circuit's ruling, Laidlaw asserted that
either its substantial compliance with permit limitations pursuant to the
action brought by the state agency or its subsequent complete shutdown
of the facility supported a finding that the case had become moot.' The
Court, however, stated that "a defendant's voluntary cessation of a
challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to
determine the legality of the practice."" The Court stated the defendant
must demonstrate "that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur" in order to prevail on an assertion that
voluntary cessation of the activity will cause the citizen suit to become
moot.s" The Court's determination that Laidlaw had maintained its
permit led it to conclude that a viable case and controversy existed,
presenting circumstances in which the defendant could engage in or
resume the harmful conduct.' Furthermore, the Court held that the
denial of injunctive relief did not necessarily present mootness obstacles
for an environmental plaintiff, because this does not mean there is no
prospect of a future violation for which civil penalties might provide
deterrance."'
2. Permit Shield
Section 402(k) of the CWA protects compliant NPDES permittees
from enforcement actions involving various provisions of the CWA.s9
890. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 39 F. Supp.
2d 1235 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
891. See id. at 1240.
892. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189.
893. See id. (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289
(1982)).
894. See id. (citing United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S.
199, 203 (1968)).
895. See id. at 190.
896. See id. at 189. A detailed discussion of this decision is found in Daniel A.
Farber, Environmental Litigation After Laidlaw, 30 ENVTL. L. RE'. 10516 (2000).
897. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1994). "[Cjompliance with a permit issued pursuant
to [section 402] shall be deemed compliance... with [the CWA] ... ." Id.
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This provision is often denominated the "shield provision." EPA has
noted that the availability of the 402(k) shield is predicated on: (1)
issuance ofa NPDES permit; (2) compliance with all applicable applica-
tion requirements; (3) satisfaction of agency information requests; and (4)
satisfaction of any applicable notification requirements.' The United
States Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of section 402(k) is
[T]o insulate permit holders from changes in various regulations during
the period of a permit and to relieve them of having to litigate in an
enforcement action the question whether their permits are sufficiently
strict. In short, § 402(k) serves the purpose ofgiving permits finality.""
Therefore, section 402(k) shields a facility from CWA liability if the
discharges remain compliant with the NPDES permit.'
EPA guidance interpreting this provision has concluded that a permit
provides a shield for certain pollutants resulting from a facility's processes
and waste streams discharged from specified outfalls if they were
identified during the application process." The three categories of
pollutants are said to include the following: (1) those limited in the permit
or which the permit, fact sheet, or administrative record explicitly identify
as controlled through indicator parameters; (2) those for which the agency
has not established limits or conditions but are identified in the permit
application as present in facility discharges; and (3) those which are
unidentified but which are constituents of waste streams or operations or
processes cleanup identified during the permit application process. 2 EPA
898. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.41,122.42 (2000). EPA addressed the CWA permit shield
in a 1994 memorandum. See Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Assistant
Administrator for Water et al. to Regional Administrators and Regional Administrators,
(July 1, 1994).
899. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).
900. See id. This provision does not apply to toxic pollutants addressed in Section
307 of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(c) (1994).
901. See Perciasepe, supra note 896, at 2. The EPA guidance notes that the
application process requires that the applicant provide various information about the
presence and quantity of a number of specific pollutants in the effluent. See id. The
section 402(k) shield is predicated on meeting all application requirements and
subsequent information requests. See id. EPA has noted that the information in the
permit application provides permit waters the information necessary to determine what
pollutants are likely to be discharged in significant amounts and set appropriate permit
limits. See 49 Fed. Reg. 37,988 (1984).
902. See id. EPA has also discussed the scope of the permit shield in the preamble
accompanying a final rule in which the agency revised the NPDES application forms.
See also 64 Fed. Reg. 42,440-42,442 (Aug. 4, 1999).
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indicates that the more detailed the NPDES permit application/associated
data, the greater the protection provided by the shield provision.'
Several judicial decisions have addressed the status of discharged
pollutants which were not identified in the facility's NPDES permit.
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,' rejected the
contention that only pollutants listed in the permit could be legally
discharged." The court found that the discharge of pollutants not
specifically identified in the permit is permissible if the appropriate
reporting requirements are met and there is compliance with any
subsequent limits.'
The permit shield was addressed in a different scenario in Williams
Pipeline Company v. Bayer. 7 In Williams, a company held an NPDES
permit that encompassed to some extent discharges associated with
soil/groundwater hydrocarbon remediation activities.' An industry
CWA citizen suit plaintiff argued in part that the remediation activities
caused discharges to a swamp which were unpermitted.' The argument
was premised on the fact that the NPDES permit "[r]egulates only the
discharge from the swamp to outfall No. 001, not the discharges of
pollutants into the swamp itself. ... 9 The defendant responded that the
NPDES permit encompassed the entire remediation system
The Williams court held that the activities were part of the remediation
system since "its design assume[d] that water discharges into the swamp
require[d] treatment.""9 2 The court noted that the state NPDES permitting
authority was entitled to use its expertise in pollution control in establish-
ing outfall locations and other permit restrictions/conditions." 3 Conse-
quently, the remediation activities' compliance with the permit were held
to trigger the shield provision."4
903. See Perciasepe, supra note 896, at 3.
904. 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993).
905. See id. at 357. This issue is also discussed in Amy E. Fortenberry, Comment,
Moving Violations: Violations of the Clean Water Act and Implications for CERCLA's
Federally Permitted Release Exception, 24 B.C. ENvTL. AF. L. REV. 821 (1997).
906. See Atlantic States, 12 F.3d at 357-58. A federal district court in Maryland
reached a different conclusion. See The Piney Run Pres. Soc'y v. County Comm'rs of
Carrol County, Md., 85 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D. Md. 2000). The alleged unpermitted
parameter was effluent that exceeded a specific temperature.
907. 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
908. See id. at 1310.
909. See id. at 1325.
910. Id.
911. See id. (referencing inclusion of swamp discharges).
912. Id. at 1326.




3. Statute of Limitations
The CWA does not specify a limitations period for enforcement
actions. As a result, the federal statutory default limitations provision for
fines and penalties applies to certain CWA enforcement actions.' 5 The
statute of limitations for CWA violations has therefore been held to be
five years.9t 6 This federal limitation provision applies to "actions, suits or
proceedings for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
pecuniary or otherwise. ' 117 In United States v. Telluride Co.,9"' the Tenth
Circuit determined that the limitation provision did not apply to a
government CWA enforcement action seeking injunctive relief."9
The limitations period begins to run when the DMRs listing the
violations are filed with the agency.' 0 In the case of citizen suit actions,
there is authority for tolling the limitations period sixty days before the
filing of the complaint to accommodate the required notice period."
4. Impossibility
A few cases have considered whether liability for an unpermitted
discharge can be excused or avoided if it would have been impossible to
obtain a permit. In United States v. CPS Chemical Co.,' the court rejected
an impossibility argument in a CWA enforcement case. In a few unique
scenarios, the concept of impossibility has been accepted. Hugheyv. JAE
Development Corp.' involved a situation in which land development
activities clearly triggered a requirement to obtain aNPDES permit for the
915. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).
916. See, e.g., United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1998);
Louisiana Envtl. Action Network, Inc. v. Evan Indust., Inc., No. 95-3002, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23573 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 1997).
917. 28 U.S.C. § 2642 (1994). The limitations period is also applicable to citizen
suits. See Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1522, (9th Cir. 1987);
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284, 287
(N.D.N.Y. 1986).
918. 146 F.3d 1241 (10thCir. 1998).
919. See id; see also United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916 (1 1th Cir. 1997). The
injunctive reliefsought in Telluride included the restoration of45 acres ofillegally filled
wetlands. See Telluride, 146 F. Supp. at 1243.
920. See Atlantic States Legal Found, 635 F. Supp. at 287; American Canoe Ass'n v.
City of Wilson Wastewater Treatment Plant, Nos. 5:96-CV-838-BR(2), 5:97-CV-471 -
BR(2), 5:97-CV-665-BR(2), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7766 at *22 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31,
1998).
921. See Sierra Club, 834 F.2d at 1524.
922. 779 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Va. 1991).
923. 78 F.3d 1523 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
2001] 677
UALR LAW REVIEW
resulting stormwater discharges. The State of Georgia at that point in
time did not have in place a viable CWA permitting mechanism for this
discharge.' The court noted that a county permit (unrelated to the CWA)
obtained by the developer required that various pollution control measures
be undertaken and that the stormwater discharge would be minimized.'
In refusing to penalize the developer, the court held:
Congress did not intend (surely could not have intended) for the zero
discharge standard to apply when. (1) compliance with such a standard
is factually impossible; (2) no NPDES permit covering such discharge
exists; (3) the discharger was in good-faith compliance with local
pollution control requirements that substantially mirrored the proposed
NPDES discharge standards; and (4) the discharges were minimal. Lex
non cogit ad impossibilia: The law does not compel the doing of
impossibilities.'
Driscoll v. Adamw9  reached a different result. Stormwater was
generated by the harvesting of timber and other activities associated with
the development of a property. 8 These activities resulted in discharges
that required an NPDES permit. No permit was obtained. 9
The property owner in Driscoll argued that he did not violate the
CWA because the Georgia Environmental Protection Division had not
been able to issue the type of NPDES permit (i.e., a general NPDES
stormwater discharge permit) that would authorize such activity.' The
court noted that the defendant failed to meet the Hughey exception. The
court cited the CWA ban on unpermitted discharges and indicated the
failure to comply with the narrow safe harbor provided by Hughey defeats
the impossibility argument.9 1
924. See id. at 1524.
925. See id. at 1526.
926. See id. at 1530 (quoting BLAcK's LAw DIcioNARY 912 (6th ed. 1990)).
927. 181 F.3d 1285 (llthCir. 1999).
928. See id. at 1287. These activities included grading roads, installation of storm
pipes, building culverts, etc. See id
929. See id.
930. See id.
931. See id. at 1289. Various groups and the Georgia Environmental Protection
Division subsequently entered into a settlement agreement which apparently now
provides for a general permit for construction activities generating stormwater. See
Georgians for Responsible Growth v. Reheis, Nos. OSAH-DNR-WQ-00-04568-060-
JRA, OSAH-DNR-WQ-00-04563-060-JRA, OSAH-DNR-WQ-00-04571-060-JRA,
2000 Ga. ENV LEXIS 1 (Ga. Feb. 23,2000). See also Mississippi River Revival, Inc.





The CWA and its implementing regulations excuse permit limit
exceedances if they fall within the scope of the terms "upset" or
"bypass." 2 These provisions potentially provide an affirmative defense
to imposition of CWA liability. However, these affirmative defenses or
other provisions are narrow in scope and do not apply unless the permittee
complies with certain notification/procedural requirements within
specified time periods.
a. Upset
The CWA regulations define an "upset" as:
An exceptional incident in which there is unintentional and temporary
noncompliance with technology based permit effluent limitations
because of factors beyond the reasonable control of the permittee. An
upset does not include noncompliance to the extent caused by opera-
tional error, improperly designed treatment facilities, lack of preventive
maintenance, or careless improper operation. 3
Permittees sometimes attempt to invoke this provision to excuse
exceedances. The upset defense has been held to not apply to
exceedances of water quality-based permit limitations.9" It is also
inapplicable to non-compliance caused by operator error."6 Improperly
designed facilities and/or inadequate treatment is likewise beyond the
scope of this provision.9"
Permittees occasionally argue that exceedances caused by tempera-
tures during a particular season constitute upsets. Such arguments have
had limited success. 8 The courts have generally declined to classify such
conditions as "exceptional incidents," especially if they are recurring."
Concern has been expressed that classifying such conditions as upsets
could discourage facilities from taking steps to prevent future non-
932. 40 C.F.R. §§ 403.16, 403.17 (2000).
933. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)(1) (2000).
934. See, e.g., United States v. Gulf States Steel, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1246-47
(N.D. Ala. 1999).
935. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)(1) (2000).
936. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n) (2000).
937. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4 1(n)(1) (2000).
938. See, e.g., GulfStatesSteel, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1233; Public Interest Research
Group v. U.S. Metals Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 237 (D.N.J. 1987); Student Public
Interest Research v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 642 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1986).
939. See, e.g., Gulf Steel, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1247.
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compliance.' To qualify for the upset defense, the permittee must also
comply with certain procedural requirements. Specifically, the incident
must be reported to the agency within twenty-four hours."'
b. Bypass
A "bypass" is generally defined as the intentional diversion of
wastewater from any portion of the treatment facility." ' A bypass is
prohibited unless:
1. Bypass was unavoidable to prevent loss of life, personal
injury, or severe property damage;
2. There were no feasible alternatives to the bypass, such as
the use of auxiliary treatment facilities, retention of un-
treated wastes, or maintenance during normal periods of
equipment downtime. This condition is not satisfied if
adequate back-up equipment should have been installed in
the exercise of reasonable engineering judgment to prevent
a bypass which occurred during normal periods of equip-
ment downtime or preventative maintenance; and
3. The permittee submitted notices as required under para-
graph (m)(3) of this section."
There has been little success in arguing that an action was a permitted
bypass if it was caused by inadequate capacity.9' Notice of a bypass must
be provided to the appropriate agency. Failure to provide such notice can
nullify the availability of the bypass provision."'
940. See U.S. Metals, 681 F. Supp. at 244.
941. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)(3)(iii) (2000).
942. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4 1(m) (2000).
943. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(m)(4)(i) (2000).
944. See, e.g., Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & County of Honolulu, 821 F.
Supp. 1368, 1342 (D. Ha. 1993) (noting that if recent plant expansion had been in
place, bypasses would not have occurred at the flow levels experienced). United States
v. Mun. of Penn Hills, 6 F. Supp. 2d 432, 437 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (stating preference for
construction of flow equalization tanks as alternative to bypasses).
945. See United States v. City of Toledo, 867 F. Supp. 603,609 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
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3. Environmental Audit/Violation Disclosure Policies
Various types of facilities or plants undertake non-routine and/or
systematic internal investigations of their operations. 6 A key focus of an
audit or assessment may be a determination of a facility's environmental
compliance status. 7 Identification of violations and/or adverse conditions
through a voluntary audit or assessment may facilitate their correction
prior to governmental or private party interest. The facility may be able
to avoid some or all of the costs and/or expenses associated with a
government or third-party action. 8
Different risks and benefits are associated with various types of
internal audits or investigations." 9 Issues involving confidentiality and
conflict of interest (between the business and employees) must be
addressed in planning or executing such investigations."' Many industries
and facilities considering undertaking an environmental audit or assess-
ment therefore recognize that these activities pose some degree of risk.
The primary concern in the environmental audit context is the
possibility the information generated might be used by the government in
an environmental enforcement proceeding or a common law plaintiff in
a third-party action. 5' The audit's usefulness to these potentially adverse
parties is derived from the fact that it will by definition delineate
violations and/or adverse conditions. Further, an audit provides the
facility owner or operator constructive or actual knowledge of
violations.952 Such knowledge can potentially generate criminal enforce-
ment exposure under the CWA and other federal environmental statutes
unless the violations are expeditiously corrected. In other words, the audit
results (i.e., violations) are brought to the attention of the company and its
management. If the non-compliance is not corrected, the argument can be
made that the identified non-compliance constitutes "knowing violations."
Finally, the discovery of certain conditions may trigger a self-executing
statutory or regulatory reporting requirement. 53
946. See generally Martin, supra note 717.
947. A variety of federal and Arkansas environmental audit issues are addressed in
Timothy T. Jones, Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Mary Ellen Ternes, Environmental
Compliance Audits: The Arkansas Experience, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 191 (1999).
948. See id. at 194-195.
949. See id. at 197-98.
950. See id. at 205-09.
951. See Keith M. Casto & Tiffany Billingsly Potter, EnvironmentalAudits: Barriers,
Opportunities anda Recommendation, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y, 233, 234
(1999).
952. See id.
953. Examples are the CERCLA requirement to notify the National Response
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There is general agreement that voluntary auditing should be
encouraged. Therefore, there has been interest in addressing some of the
perceived disincentives to auditing. The means of doing so is the subject
of debate. Both EPA and the Department of Justice have tried to some
extent to address industry concerns. In 1995 EPA issued a policy titled
Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction andPrevention
of Violations.954 The policy's stated purpose is to encourage regulated
entities to detect, disclose, and correct environmental non-compliance.9"
The policy provides incentives for auditing by potentially forgiving one
hundred percent of the gravity-based penalties that could be assessed for
the violations. Eligibility for penalty mitigation is dependent upon
meeting various conditions detailed in the policy.
The practical applicability of this audit policy to potential CWA
NPDES effluent limit exceedances is unclear. The impediment is
Condition 2 in the policy, which disallows the use of the policy if a
violation was identified because of monitoring, sampling, or auditing
required by a permit, statutory, or regulatory requirement.956 A facility's
NPDES permit requires the identification and reporting of effluent
limitations through periodic submission of DMRs. Exceedances
identified by these activities may therefore violate Condition 2.9 '
Other NPDES permit requirements or conditions not encompassed
by these reporting provisions may therefore be eligible. Also, facilities
Center if there is a release of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9626 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), or the RCRA UST regulations requirement to
report the discovery of a petroleum release to the implementing agency within 24 hours
of discovery. The CERCLA reporting requirements are found at 42 U.S.C. § 9603
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). These provisions are described at Wright & Morrissey,
supra note 21, at 764 n.4I. The RCRA UST reporting requirements are found at 40
C.F.R. § 280.10 (2000). See also Wright, supra note 241, at 417 (addressing various
UST issues).
954. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995) [hereinafter Audit Policy]. It was revised in 2000.
65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (2000) [hereinafter Revised Audit Policy].
955. See Revised Audit Policy, 65 Fed Reg. at 19,618 (April 11,2000).
956. See id. at 19,62 1.
957. See id. However, facilities sometimes undertake additional sampling that is not
required by a permit. See telephone interview with Doug Ford, P.E., Pollution
Management, Inc. (Oct. 19, 2000). The reasons for such sampling might include but
are not limited to verification of elimination of an exceedance or to confirm reliability
of a laboratory used for compliance monitoring through split sampling. See id. A key
question is whether such voluntary sampling results must be reported to the agency.
Some agencies have taken the position that such results must be reported. See, e.g.,
OHIO EPA, supra note 214. The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency stated, "[in
all cases with no exceptions, a permittee who monitors more often than required by his
permit must report the results, provided only that samples are collected, preserved, and
analyzed in accordance with approved methods." Id. at 5.
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subject to non-NPDES CWA programs have used this policy.958 These
non-NPDES programs have included the SPCC regulations.
V. THE ARKANSAS WATER POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS
The various Arkansas permitting programs that involve surface water
represent the principal command and control mechanisms the state has
developed to protect this resource. However, the state's efforts to
encourage water pollution prevention are not limited to mandatory
standards and controls. Non-prescriptive incentives to encourage water
pollution prevention include sales tax exemptions for the acquisition of
water pollution control equipment and tax credits for the creation of
wetlands.
A. Legislative History
The statutory forerunner of Arkansas' current water pollution control
authorities was enacted over fifty years ago.s' Prior to the Arkansas
General Assembly's 1949 legislative foray into water pollution control,
the Arkansas Supreme Court had recognized the state government's
power of intervention to protect its citizens from water pollution. For
example, almost twenty years before the first major state legislation
addressing the issue,' the Arkansas Attorney General sought a permanent
injunction against a gravel miner who was allegedly polluting a stream."'
958. See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 55,477 (1999) (providing public notice of settlement
between U.S. West and EPA related to CWA SPCC violations in which gravity
component of penalty was eliminated because of voluntary notification pursuant to
Audit Policy).
959. See J.W. Looney, Handling Administrative Proceedings Before the Arkansas
Pollution Control and Ecology Department and Commission, ARK. L. NOTEs 23 (1998). One
commentator has questioned whether the statutory regime has completely replaced the
common law "reasonable use" right to pollute explicated in the Arkansas Supreme
Court's earlier decisions. See John S. Grimes, Lex Aquae Arkansas, 27 ARK. L. REV. 429,
450-51 (1973). See also Arkansas v. Dow Chemical Co., 981 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Ark.
1997) (referencing 1949 enactment of legislation now known as Arkansas Water and
Air Pollution Control Act).
960. See Act of Mar. 29, 1949 Ark. Acts 472 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-4-101 to -409 (LEXIS 2000). The official title of the bill was "An Act to
Control, Prevent and Abate Pollution of the Streams, Lakes, Ponds, and Other Surface
and Underground Waters of the State; for the Establishment of a Water Pollution
Control Commission, and for Other Purposes." Id.
961. See Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney General, 181 Ark.
216, 219, 26 S.W.2d 57, 60 (1930). The court described the situation:
The water is no longer limpid and pure, but muddy and turbid, to the extent
that fish are unable to live there, and those that reach this stream from
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The court held in favor of the Attorney General and the state's right to
intervene on the grounds that the state's power extended beyond simply
regulating the taking of fish, but included the water in which the fish
lived. 2
The enactment of the State Water Pollution Control Act in 1949 was
Arkansas' first major pollution control effort. 3 This early legislation
continues to influence Arkansas pollution control in the sense that it was
the foundation for the general procedural framework for rulemaking,
enforcement, and appeals.' The Act created the Water Pollution Control
Commission ("WPCC") which was placed within the State Board of
Health. 5 It also granted the new Commission broad powers of adminis-
tration, enforcement, investigation, and regulation over water pollution
within Arkansas.6
The General Assembly directed the WPCC to create new pollution
standards and modify existing ones, 7 develop a detailed program for the
reduction of water pollution," 8 issue requirements for the discharge of
sewage, industrial, and other wastes,' 9 and approve or deny permits for
below must come to the surface to obtain necessary oxygen, and, after a
time, sink into the water only to die and be cast upon the shore. The pools
and lakes ... discolor and coat the bodies of bathers with an unpleasant
slime.
Id., 26 S.W.2d at 60.
962. See id. at 225, 26 S.W.2d at 261. The court reasoned that "[sluch power has
been recognized from earliest times to inhere in the State .... 'When the unrestrained
right to run a sawmill on the bank of a stream conflicts with the right of the public to
have fish live and increase in the water, the right of the mill proprietor must give way
to the right of the public ... .' Id.
963. See Looney, supra note 958, at 23.
964. See ARKANSAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK SERIES: WATER 9(Allan Gates
& Walter G. Wright, Jr. eds., 1990). The Act granted circuit courts the power to hear
appeals of WPCC decisions using a de novo standard of review. See 1949 Ark. Acts
472, § 5(7). In 1984, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the provision
violated the Arkansas Constitution and that the circuit court could consider only
whether the agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See Arkansas
Comm'n on Pollution Control & Ecology v. Land Developers, Inc., 284 Ark. 179, 181,
680 S.W.2d 909, 910 (1984). "If the interests are constitutionally or statutorily
preserved, or preserved by private agreement, de novo review is appropriate. If the
interests are less than fixed and their existence primarily depends on executive or
legislative wisdom, de novo review is inappropriate." Id. at 180-81, 608 S.W.2d at 910
(citations omitted). The General Assembly amended the statute to limit the circuit
court's ability to review agency decisions. See 1985 Ark. Acts 284.
965. See 1949 Ark. Acts 472 § 2(a).
966. See id. § 3.
967. See id. § 3(4).
968. See id. § 3(5).
969. See id § 3(6).
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the discharge of such wastes.97 The WPCC had therefore been operating
a water discharge permitting program for many years prior to the ADEQ
acquisition of the CWA NPDES permit program. The program required
that a facility submit an application to the WPCC which would include
information about facility construction/plans, project cost, the waterbody
receiving the discharge, pollutants to be discharged, and planned pollution
controls."'
The original WPCC was the predecessor to the modem Arkansas
Pollution Control and Ecology Commission ("APCEC"), and the makeup
of agency representatives serving as commission members remains
relatively similar to the 1949 statute. 972 The substance, and in some cases
the exact wording, of the broad definitional language of the Act continues
today.973 The foundation of the 1949 Act serves as the basis for the
continued regulation of pollution discharged into virtually any water in
the State.
974
Only minor statutory changes were made to the WPCC during its
first decade.975 The first major change occurred in 196 1. The legislature
sought to clarify ambiguous and inadequate provisions of the Act.976 In
addition to reconfiguring the definitions of "pollution" and "waters of
970. See id. § 3(8). See also ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF POLLUTION CONTROL &
ECOLOGY PROGRAM DESCRIPTION FOR PHASED APPROVAL OF FEDERAL NPDES PERMITFING
PROGRAM 18 (describing goals of the 1949 legislation) [hereinafter PHASED APPROVAL].
971. See ALLIED CHEMICAL & DYE CORP, GENERAL CHEMICAL DIVISION, WPCC
APPLICATION FOR PERMIT (1957).
972. Compare 1949 Ark. Acts472 §2 with ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-104 (LEXIS Repl.
2000)
973. For example, the Act continues to utilize the identical definitions for "disposal
system" and "treatment works" it used in 1949. Compare 1949 Ark. Acts 472 § 1(8)
with ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-102(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2000); 1949 Ark. Acts 472 § 1(7) with
ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-102(9) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
974. See ARKANSAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK SERIES: WATER9(Allan Gates
& Walter G. Wright, Jr. eds., 1990).
975. For example, the General Assembly added a representative from the State
Forestry and Parks Commission to the WPCC, which brought the total number of
commissioners to eight. See 1959 Ark. Acts 232 § 1.
976. See 1961 Ark. Acts 120 § 9.
977. See id. § 1. The statute modified the term pollution to include the following:
such contamination, of other alteration of the physical, chemical or
biological properties, or any waters of the State, or such discharge of any
liquid, gaseous or solid substance in any waters of the State as will or is
likely to create a nuisance or render such waters harmful or detrimental or
injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial,
industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to
livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other aquatic life.
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the state" 9 ' to the current statutory language,9  the 1961 amendment
granted the Commission the authority to require construction of new
sewage disposal systems and alteration of existing systems.' The statute
also authorized the Commission to set WQS98' and established a general
procedural and appellate framework governing the agency's administra-
tive actions.92 2
During the first fifteen years of these water pollution control efforts,
the growing scope of the WPCC's activities made Commission oversight
of the agency staff activities increasingly difficult. 83 Two years later, the
General Assembly began the centralization of decision-making at the
WPCC by requiring the Commission to appoint a director to serve as the
chief executive officer of pollution control activities within Arkansas.9 "
During the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s major structural
changes in pollution control took place in Arkansas.9 5 In 1965, the
General Assembly undertook an overhaul of all state agencies. One result
was the creation of the ADPC&E and the transfer of WPCC powers to the
agency.8 6 However, the General Assembly ensured that the WPCC and
other commissions retained their statutory powers.97 The 1965 overhaul
also reflected the increased specialization in pollution control by dividing
the Act into separate sections-one for air and one for water-and
978. See id. § 2. The General Assembly defined "waters of the state" to include "all
streams, lakes, marshes, ponds, water courses, waterways, wells, springs, irrigation
systems, drainage systems, and all other bodies or accumulations of water." Id.
979. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-102 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
980. See 1961 Ark. Acts 120 § 3. A 1992 United States Court of Claims decision
makes reference to the activities of this agency in the 1960s: "[iin the early 1960's, Van
Buren's sewage collection system was very old and inadequately served the city's
needs. The original system discharged raw sewage without treatment directly into the
Arkansas River. The Arkansas State Water Pollution Control Commission and the
Arkansas State Health Department [directed] Van Buren to stop discharging raw
sewage into the river." City of Van Buren v. United States, No. 298-75, 1982 U.S. Cl.
Ct. LEXIS 2495 (Mar. 9, 1982).
981. See 1961 Ark. Acts 120 § 3.
982. See id. § 6.
983. See ARKANSAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK SERIES: WATER (Allan Gates
& Walter G. Wright, Jr. eds., 1990).
984. See 1963 Ark. Acts 503 § 1.
985. The agency continued to operate an inspection and permitting program. See,
e.g., Memorandum from A. De Guzman, Engineer, Division of Water Pollution Control,
Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology, to Hugh G. Hannah, Division
of Water Pollution Control, Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology,
Wastewater Discharges of Ark-La Pineply at Gurdon, Arkansas (March 28, 1979)
(discussing facility inspection report noting unpermitted discharges).
986. See ARKANSAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK SERIES: WATER 7 (Allan Gates




changed the name of the Act from the State Water Pollution Control Act
to the Arkansas Water and Air Pollution Control Act."' In addition, the
Arkansas General Assembly gave the Soil and Water Conservation
Commission a seat on the newly named Arkansas Pollution Control
Commission ("APCC"), formerly the WPCC.' The authority to address
water pollution was split between the ADPC&E and the APCC.9'9
However, after the 1965 amendments, the APCC retained the authority to
select the Director of the ADPC&E. A 1973 statute nevertheless
arguably decreased APCC's influence over the ADPC&E.' This
statutory revision provided that the Director would be appointed by and
serve at the pleasure of the Governor."3
As part of an effort to qualify Arkansas for delegation of the federal
CWA NPDES program," the General Assembly expanded the duties of
the ADPC&E and segmented its increasing responsibilities into
divisions.' One of the divisions created was the Division of Water
Pollution Control.' The statute also removed the Chief Sanitary
Engineer of the State Board of Health from the position of Technical
Secretary to the Commission"' and renamed the APCC the Arkansas
Pollution Control and Ecology Commission ("APCEC").9"
The 1973 statute mandated that the ADPC&E develop administrative
procedures which would provide notice and a public hearing prior to
adopting new rules.' It also granted the ADPC&E the power to
implement rules and regulations regarding effluent matters, contaminant
discharge monitoring, and water quality standards." °
988. See 1965 Ark. Acts 183, pt. 1 § 6.
989. See id. §§ 1, 3.
990. See ARKANSAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK SERIES: WATER 7 (Allan Gates
& Walter G. Wright, Jr., eds. 1990).
991. See id. This provided some degree of ultimate control over agency decisions.
992. See 1973 Ark. Acts 262.
993. See id § 2.
994. See id. §§ 1,5. See generally Martha L. Noble & J.W. Looney, The Emerging
Legal Frameworkfor Animal Agricultural Waste Management in Arkansas, 47 ARK. L. REV.
159, 168 (1994). The Environmental Protection Agency granted Arkansas authority to
administer its own NPDES program in 1986. See id. (citing federal approval of
Arkansas' NPDES Program).
995. See 1973 Ark. Acts 262 § 2.
996. Id. The other divisions included the Division of Air Pollution Control,
Division of Solid Waste Management, Division of Environmental Preservation,
Division of Administration, and "such other divisions as may be hereafter established."
Id.
997. See id. § 3.
998. See id. § 2.
999. See id. § 4.
1000. See id Specifically, the 1973 amendment provided that, among other things,
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In 1975, the General Assembly again amended the Act to clarify that
"wastes" and "pollutants" included "sewage, industrial waste, and other
waste."'' Perhaps most significantly, the 1975 amendment granted the
Director broad power in regulating effluent limitations and set the
minimum standard for issuing a discharge permit at the federal
standard."o2 Furthermore, the amendments increased the maximum fine
for violation of the Act from $5,000 to $10,000.1003
In 1991, the General Assembly significantly increased the criminal
and civil penalties for violating state environmental laws" and applied
the Arkansas Criminal Code to violations of the Arkansas Water and Air
Pollution Control Act." °5 In 1995, the Environmental Variances Act
granted the Director of the ADPC&E authority to issue temporary
variances from the regulatory permit requirements, unless prohibited by
federal law."
In 1997, the General Assembly further delineated the roles of the
ADPC&E and the APCEC, the two governmental bodies which, through
historical evolution, had become primarily responsible for surface water
pollution control in Arkansas."o7 The General Assembly delegated water
pollution control enforcement and investigatory power to the ADPC&E
and rule-making authority to APCEC.' o  Finally, the 1999 statute
renamed the ADPC&E the Arkansas Department of Environmental
Quality ("ADEQ").' o
the ADPC&E had the authority to:
[Pirescribe (a) effluent standards specifying the maximum amounts or
concentrations, and the physical, thermal, chemical, biological, and
radioactive nature of the contaminants that may be discharged into the waters
of the State or into publicly owned treatment facilities; (b) requirements and
standards for equipment and procedures for monitoring contaminant
discharges at their sources (including publicly owned treatment facilities and
industrial discharges into such facilities), the collection of samples and the
collection, reporting and retention of data resulting from such monitoring;
and (c) water quality standards, performance standards, and pre-treatment
standards.
Id
1001. 1975 Ark. Acts 743 § 2.
1002. See id. § 5.
1003. See id. § 8.
1004. See 1991 Ark. Acts 1057 § 3.
1005. See id. § 5.
1006. See 1995 Ark. Acts 943 § 1.
1007. See 1997 Ark. Acts 1219.
1008. See id. § 5.
1009. See id. § 2(a).
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B. The Key Programs
1. The Arkansas NPDES Program
a. Acquisition of NPDES Permitting/Enforcement Author-
ity
Arkansas facilities had been required since the early 1 970s to obtain
both a federal NPDES'010 and an Arkansas water permit.'"'" However,
Arkansas obtained delegation of the CWA NPDES program in November
1986."02 Therefore, since 1986 Arkansas facilities have obtained NPDES
permits from the ADEQ as opposed to EPA.
In November 2000, the ADEQ issued a draft Strategic Plan identify-
ing various guiding principles, goals, objectives, and strategies for the
next ten years. 0 3 The Strategic Plan noted that the agency's efforts in the
past have focused on controlling point sources... 4 Nevertheless, the
agency believes that point source pollution control does not address the
majority of water quality impacts in Arkansas."1 5 Therefore, ADEQ
stated in the draft Strategic Plan that it will work with communities to
address the more complex and diffuse effluent sources such as waste
management practices, along with urban and agricultural run-off.
01 6
1010. The EPA Region 6 office in Dallas, Texas issued NPDES permits.
1011. See Letter to Dwight L. Fincher, Lectra Circuit, Inc., from Frank J. Stephens,
Inspection Engineer, ADPC&E (June 14, 1984) (stating "[w]astewater discharges from
manufacturing facilities to streams are governed by both Arkansas and federal laws and
regulations").
1012. See 51 Fed. Reg. 44,518 (1986). Arkansas had to develop various program
elements to obtain delegation. A key hurdle was acquisition of sufficient funding to
add the staff necessary to operate a delegated program. See id. The development of
these program elements is described in PHASED APPROVAL, supra note 969. The state's
commitment to implement and maintain the program elements necessary to operate a
NPDES permitting program were documented in a Memorandum of Agreement
("MOA") entered into with EPA. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the
Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Region VI Concerning Approval of the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program (1986) [hereinafter MOA].
EPA/State MOAs are discussed in Calvo, supra note 73, at 175-76. A CWA MOA
executed with EPA was discussed in Ohio Valley Environmental. Coalition v. Miano, 66
F. Supp. 2d 805 (S.D. W. Va. 1998). The ADEQ issues NPDES permits pursuant to
the authority of the Arkansas Water and Air Pollution Control Act.
1013. Strategic Plan, supra note 35, at 1.
1014. The Strategic Plan notes that ADEQ will work to refine and optimize the point





The draft Strategic Plan identifies three objectives that are relevant
to ADEQ's CWA programs. Those objectives include:
1. Ninety percent of assessed surface water in Arkansas will
meet WQS for all beneficial uses by 2010;
2. Issue all required Water Quality Management Plans by 2010;
and
3. Develop voluntary watershed management systems for all
impaired rivers and streams by 2010 to support the TMDL
implementation program.' 17
EPA Region 6 personnel have characterized their post-CWA
delegation relationship with Arkansas as one of oversight and review.
0 18
This role is defined by both the MOA the regional EPA office executed
with Arkansas and the CWA regulations addressing permit oversight and
review. 109
b. Incorporation of Federal NPDES Permit Provisions
A substantial portion ofthe substantive and procedural framework for
the Arkansas NPDES permit program is found in ADEQ Regulation No.
6. The regulation incorporates by reference 2° the majority of the federal
1017. Seeid.atl5-16.
1018. See Letter from Renea Ryland, Assistant Regional Counsel, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Region 6, to Ellen Carpenter, Attorney, Legal
Division, ADEQ (Oct. 4, 2000) (noting that after Arkansas' acquisition of NPDES
program in 1986, EPA's role in the permitting process has largely become "one of
oversight and review") [hereinafter Region 6 Letter] (on file with author).
1019. See id. The applicable CWA regulations are found at 40 C.F.R. § 123 (2000).
This oversight review includes the requirement that ADEQ provide EPA Region 6 a
copy of each draft permit it prepares. The EPA permit oversight regulations
contemplate the review of "proposed" permits. See MOA, supra note 1011, § ll.B.7,
cited in Region 6 Letter, supra note 1017. In 2000, Arkansas State Representative Jim
Milum submitted a series of questions to Arkansas Attorney General Mark Pryor
concerning the authority of EPA to regulate activities such as wastewater discharges
in the state of Arkansas. See Ark. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 1999-441, 2000 Ark. AG LEXIS
90 (Feb. 28, 2000). The Arkansas Attorney General's opinion outlined the
constitutional and federal statutory basis for EPA regulation of such activities on
privately owned property.
1020. The federal regulations are specifically incorporated by reference as opposed
to being cited as guidance. A rule or regulation will not constitute a reference
regulation unless words manifesting such intent are used. See Land v. Arkansas Dept.
of Health, 282 Ark. 191, 193, 667 S.W.2d. 651, 653 (1984) (addressing argument that
Arkansas Department of Health should not have approved water intake system because
alleged violated standard is identified in regulation as "guide").
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NPDES regulatory provisions. Consequently, the Arkansas NPDES
regulatory provisions track to a great extent the federal program.
Regardless, the state's operation of the CWA program places it in the
position of addressing interpretational questions 2' or making policy
decisions' 22 that inevitably arise on a periodic basis.
c. Arkansas NPDES Permit Procedures/Contents
The construction and operation of an activity and/or process subject
to the NPDES program requires the issuance of a two-part permit.'° One
permit authorizes the construction of the regulated machinery or
equipment. The other permit authorizes the discharge from the process
and/or activity.'" 4 This document is the NPDES permit.' 5 Both permit
applications are typically submitted simultaneously.' 26
The ADEQ NPDES permit applications are identical to those
developed by EPA.' 27 The information in the application is used by the
1021. For example, ADEQ answered a facility's query as to whether a particular
activity constitutes a "point source" discharge. See Letter from Jim Ross, Eastman
Chemical Company, to Mark Bradley, ADPC&E ( discussing discharge from traveling
screens at river water pump station) (Dec. 13, 1995) (on file with author). A Batesville,
Arkansas chemical processing facility asked the Arkansas agency to agree with its
conclusion that screens used to remove debris from White River water prior to being
pumped into plant pump wells were not subject to NPDES permitting requirements.
See id The facility noted that a high pressure spray was used to dislodge captured
debris which then re-entered the river through a 12-inch pipe 100 feet downstream of
the intake structure. See id. The ADPC&E confirmed that the activity did not require
an NPDES permit. See Letter from Mark Bradley, Engineering Supervisor, ADPC&E,
to Jim Ross, Eastman Chemical Company (Dec. 27, 1995) (on file with author). See
also In re North Little Rock Wastewater Utility, Permit Appeal Resolution, Docket No.
99-012-P (Oct. 17, 1999) (discussing ADEQ and municipality agreement that a "waste
stabilization pond" constitutes secondary treatment under 40 C.F.R. § 133.103(c)).
1022. For example, ADEQ stated in 1993 correspondence that it "discouraged" the
use of a copper sulfate as an algicide because of its belief that it posed potential toxicity
in receiving streams. See Letter from Carrie McWilliams, Staff Engineer, Water





1026. See id. If the application is for a permit renewal, it must be submitted in
suitable form prior to expiration of existing permit to maintain compliance. See Letter
from Mostafa Mehran, Water Division, ADPC&E, to Roger Q. Mills, City of Conway
(Jan. 4, 1996) (describing deficiencies in application that must be resolved to continue
expiring permit) (on file with author).
1027. The forms are available from the Water Division portion of the ADEQ website
at http://www.adeq.state.ar.us/water/npdes/npdes dat.htm. The CWA regulations
addressing permitting procedures were a part of a recently issued final rule that
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ADEQ to determine appropriate limits, conditions, etc. 28 The facility
may begin construction prior to the issuance of the NPDES permit under
the authority of a state construction permit.'0 29 However, the facility may
not discharge until the NPDES permit is issued.' 3°
The Director is in theory the senior employee at ADEQ that
determines whether an NPDES permit will be issued and the lim-
its/conditions it will contain. However, the ADEQ Director typically
delegates authority for signing a permit to the appropriate division
chief.'0 3' The Chief of the Water Division is the ADEQ employee
responsible for issuing NPDES permits.' 32
i. Effluent Limits
A permit may contain a condition requiring that a facility monitor a
parameter and provide ADEQ the results for a period of time in lieu of an
effluent limit. 33
2. Other Conditions
A permit will include conditions or requirements in addition to
effluent limits. The following discussion identifies a few examples.
streamlined various NPDES provisions. See 65 Fed. Reg. 30,886 (2000) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 117, 122-125, 144, 270-271). Consolidated permit application forms
were published by EPA on May 19, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,516 (1980) (codified at
40 C.F.R. pts 122-125).
1028. For example, see Letter from Mostafa Mehran, Water Division, ADPC&E, to
Roger Q. Mills, City of Conway (Jan. 16, 1997) (explaining that during permit renewal
process, ADPC&E suggests that POTW retest treated effluent because high
concentration of zinc was noted in priority pollutant scan submitted with application
for permit renewal).
1029. See id.
1030. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 ](a) (1994).
1031. See In re United States Dept. of the Army Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas
Pollution Control & Ecology Commission, Docket No. 99-002-P, Recommended
Decision, Order No. 16, § K, 115 (May 8, 2000).
1032. See, e.g., City of North Little Rock Wastewater Utility NPDES Permit No.
AR0038288 (Aug. 31, 1999).
1033. See In re City of Malvem Water Works, No. 96-005-P, Arkansas Pollution
Control & Ecology Commission, Order No. 6 (Sept. 11, 1996) (referencing Malvern





A facility may have multiple outfalls or point sources. One or more
outfalls may serve a single process unit, multiple units, or one or more
treatment facilities. The permit will identify these discharge points.
b. Flow
The permit application will initially seek information regarding what
processes contribute pollutants to water in the facility."° Some quantifi-
cation of flows will also have to be provided.' 35 The identification of
processes contributing to wastewater effluent will provide information
necessary to identify the standards applicable to the discharge.' 36 These
estimates may be based on current operation as opposed to potential
increases.' 37 Flow requirements and measurements will be required to
verify compliance with such conditions. These measures may also be
used to evaluate compliance with effluent loading."s
c. Toxicity Testing
The permit may contain a condition requiring WET testing. The
precise manner in which such testing is conducted may be the subject of
discussion between the ADEQ and the facility.' 39 The ADEQ also has
1034. For example, a permit application used by ADEQ will require the applicant to
supply information on flows, sources of pollutants, treatment technologies, effluent
characteristics, etc. See Letter from Dale Herendeen, EHS Manager, International
Paper Company, to Bernie Kent Finch, Water Division, Arkansas Department of
Environmental Quality (Aug. 24, 1999) (on file with author) (request for permit
modification enclosing EPA for 2C). See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,516, 33,534 (1980) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122-125).
1035. See id.
1036. See id.
1037. See id. at 33,535.
1038. See OHIO EPA, supra note 214. The Ohio EPA guidance also notes the use of
these measurements in determining the impact of the effluent and for water quality
modeling purposes. Another aspect of flow may be addressed in the permit. The
facility may be required to ensure a consistent discharge or flow. The purpose of such
a mandate may be to ensure the maintenance of a consistent effluent flow. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from David Orr, ADPC&E to Sam Ledbetter, ADPC&E (July 21, 1980)
(referencing requirement in Arkansas facility permit that it maintain "a release of at
least 2 cfs flow through spillway overflow, seepage, or pumping into Little Flint
Creek") (on file with author).
1039. See, e.g., Letter from C.S. Knott, Remington Arms Company, Inc. to William
Keith, NPDES Branch, ADPC&E (Aug. 7, 1990) (on file with author).
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some discretion as to how to interpret toxicity test results and the
appropriate response to them.' "
d. Waters of the State
The breadth of the term "waters of the state" is such that facilities
sometimes seek to delineate the plant areas encompassed by this term for
NPDES permitting purposes."' An express finding by the ADEQ of the
scope of "waters of the state" may in relevant circumstances eliminate the
need for one or more internal outfalls for a stormwater discharge into a
drainage ditch on the facility property.' " This delineation may simplify
monitoring of stormwater discharges under the Arkansas General
Stormwater Permit by requiring sampling at one discharge point just
above the "'waters of the state.'
043
A variety of Arkansas surface waters receive permitted discharges.
For example, a "losing stream" is one in which all or a portion of a
waterbody's volume moves subsurface to groundwater.'°" They may be
found in areas that have porous topography. An example of such an area
is found in northwest Arkansas.' 3 This area of the state includes geologic
formations that are readily penetrated by surface water.' "
1040. See Letter from Nathaniel P. Nehus, Water Division, ADEQ to Sammy Bates,
Remington Arms Company, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1999) (granting a request to suspend a
facility's toxicity reduction evaluation program) (on file with author).
1041. See, e.g., In re Minnesota Mining & Mfr. Co., No. 99-129, ADEQ Consent
Administrative Order (May 26, 1999).
1042. See id. at 2, 4.
1043. See id. at 4.
1044. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1450 (D. Ariz.
1996). An Illinois Pollution Control Board decision discussed the potential importance
of an intermittent stream:
The headwaters of a basin, even if an intermittent stream, as here, can be an
important part of the ecosystem. For example, they provide spawning areas
and nutrient loading. Many intermittent streams in northern Illinois "support
a variety of aquatic organisms," and "just because there is an absence of
visible water does not necessarily mean that the stream has no aquatic
organisms." In fact, a diverse aquatic community could be expected.
In re Proposed Site Specific Water Pollution Rules and Regulations Applicable to
Citizens Utilities Company of Illinois' Discharge to Lily Cache Creek, No. R81-19,
1983 !11. ENV LEXIS 278 at *6 (III. Pollution Control Bd. May 5, 1983).
1045. See generally EPA v. City ofGreen Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1399 (8th Cir. 1990).
The court described a sinkhole in a northwest Arkansas creek that consumed the
1,000,000 gallons a day discharged from the Green Forest POTW. See id.
1046. See id. The Green Forest court noted, "[s]treams frequently submerge and
reemerge. Streams having an intimate contact with the groundwater system through
sinkholes or other means are called 'losing streams."' Id. at 1399.
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d. Determination of Effluent Limits
I. Incorporation of Federal Categorical Standards/Limits
The federal CWA categorical standards are intended to constitute
minimum baseline limits regardless of the state in which a facility is
located. Therefore, ADEQ has limited authority to grant variances from
limits based on the categorical based standards. ' 7  Consequently,
Arkansas has for the most part incorporated by reference these
technology-based limits into its regulations."° However, as a practical
matter, the Arkansas operation of the program places ADEQ in the
position of interpreting the scope of these categorical provisions.
The computation of a technology-based permit limit based on plant
production levels is a relatively simple process. However, this categorical
standard is the minimum baseline limit for the facility. The CWA
requires that the facility NPDES permit incorporate more stringent
effluent limits if necessary to maintain the Arkansas WQS applicable to
the receiving waterbody.'0 9 Calculation of water-quality-based effluent
limits is a lengthier and more complex process.'" 5
a. Arkansas Water Quality Standards
1. Ecoregion Approach
In 1975 the ADEQ promulgated the Arkansas Water Quality
Standards for Surface Waters pursuant to the authority of the Arkansas
Water and Air Pollution Control Act.' 5' The original Arkansas WQS
contained three use classifications." 2  They also included specific
1047. See, e.g., Letter from Carrie McWilliams, Staff Engineer, Water Division,
ADEQ to Mike Luers, Pine Bluff Wastewater Utility (Oct. 20, 1993) (stating that the
30 mg/L BOD effluent standard for POTW is a technology-based limit which ADEQ
cannot vary.)
1048. See ADEQ Reg. No.
1049. Specifically, the CWA regulations provide that if a point source discharge
causes, has the reasonable potential to cause, or contributes to an exceedance of a
numeric or narrative WQS, the agency must develop permit limits as necessary to meet
the applicable WQS. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44 (2000).
1050. Telephone Interview with Doug Ford, P.E., Pollution Management, Inc. (Dec.
5, 2000).
1051. See ADEQ Reg. No.2(1975).
1052. Id. Class AA (extraordinary recreational and aesthetic value); Class A
(suitable for priority contact recreation); Class B (suitable for desirable species of fish,
wildlife and other aquatic life and semi-aquatic life, raw water source for public water
supplies, secondary contact recreation and other uses).
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standards for temperature,' color, turbidity, taste and odor, solids,
floating material and deposits, oil and grease, pH, DO, radioactivity,
bacteria, and toxic substances.' In addition, various waterbodies were
assigned individual mineral quality guidance concentrations grouped
according to state's six river basins."
The first significant revisions to the 1975 WQS were promulgated in
1984. °" The 1984 revisions to the WQS primarily modified the use
classifications by expanding the number of uses from three to nine and
adding nutrient standards.'057 The revisions also added a Use Attainability
Analysis methodology that could be utilized to remove or modify in
appropriate circumstances a designated use classification." 8
In January 1988, Arkansas revised its WQS in a manner that at the
time was considered somewhat novel.' 59 The focus of the WQS was
changed from individual stream segments or waterbodies to
"ecoregions."' Ecoregions are defined as "mapped regions of relative
homogeneity in land surface form, soil, potential natural vegetation and
1053. The temperature of a waterbody will affect the species offish that can inhabit
a given waterbody. The court in Public Interest Research Group. Inc. v. Magnesium
Elektron, Inc., No. 89-3193, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20748 at **26-27 (D.N.J. Mar. 9,
1995,) rev'd on other grounds, 123 F.3d I11 (3rd Cir. 1997) noted:
Temperature has a number of effects. One of course is as you warm or
change the temperature of a water body, you change what lives in it. The
classic example is taking a cold water fisheries, trout, salmon, adding warm
water, and making it impossible to maintain that fishery. It switches over to
bass and other fish of that type.
Id.
1054. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 (1975).
1055. See ADEQ Reg. No.2 §§ 3, 5, App. A (1975). The six river basins in Arkansas
are the Arkansas River Basin, the White River Basin, the St. Francis River Basin, the
Ouachita River Basin, the Red River Basin and the Mississippi River Basin.
1056. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 §§ 4, 6 (1984). In 1980 Georgia Pacific sought to
modify the use designation of Coffee Creek, a tributary to the Ouachita River located
near Crossett, Arkansas. Georgia Pacific successfully reclassified a stream which
lacked natural flow and was comprised of runoff from precipitation events and
wastewater from where the head waters extended thorough Georgia Pacific's mill
complex and the City of Crossett. See ADPC&E Regulation No. 2, Interim Revisions
(Jan. 25, 1980).
1057. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 §§ 4, 6 (1984).
1058. See id.
1059. Telephone interview with Vince Blubaugh, GBMc Associates (July 6, 2000).
Mr. Blubaugh was the ADEQ Water Division Chief from 1984 until 1989. See also
PC&E Outlines Possible Changes in State's Water Quality Standards, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Sept. 15, 1997. The article noted, " . . . the preliminary water quality
proposals will be 'precedent-setting on a national scale' since Arkansas is one of the
first states to complete the studies." Id.
1060. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 (1975).
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general land use."'' Ecoregions group waterbodies in a manner to
stratify variability across the state."'°2 The ecoregions correspond to fish,
water quality, and physical habitat in Arkansas streams. 16 3 The ADEQ
proposed the revised WQS in December of 1987, and the APC&EC
adopted them the following month."° The expeditious adoption of such
significant changes was due to extensive ADEQ assessment of Arkansas
surface waters during the previous seven years.'" 5
1061. Robert M. Hughes et al., Use of Ecoregions in Biological Monitoring, in
BIOLOGICAL MONITORING OF AQUATIC SYSTEMS 126 (Sanford L. Loeb & Anne Spacie
eds., 1994). A draft 1993 EPA reported noted:
Biologists have long noted that assemblages and communities can be
classified according to distinct geographical patterns (e.g. Wallace, 1969,
Arthur, 1972). We observe areas of the country within which there is
consistency and similarity in the types of ecosystems and their attributes
when compared to that of other areas.... Ecological regionalization (as one
type of regionalization) results in a map of ecological regions, or ecoregions.
Such maps bring spatial organization to ecological variability. They are
useful in a variety of ways. For example, to summarize the condition of
resources in a particular area, to identify potential or achievable ecological
conditions (e.g. regionally achievable biocriteria), to characterize typical
impact types and impairments, to develop protective and remedial
procedures that are tailored to unique regional characteristics, and to present
scenarios of conditions in particular regions.
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL
CRITERIA: TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR STREAMS AND SMALL RIVERs-DRAFr 30 (1993).
1062. See Hughes, supra note 1061, at 126. Various issues associated with the
ecoregion approach to setting WQS are discussed. See id.
1063. See id. at 126-27.
1064. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 (draft 1987).
1065. Telephone Interview with Chuck Bennett, Chief, Water Division, ADEQ,
(Nov. 9, 2000). ADEQ and its predecessor agency have in the past and continue to
devote substantial resources to the assessment of ambient conditions of the state's
streams, lakes, and rivers. These efforts have included the employment of chemists,
biologists, and other professionals to perform sophisticated sampling, analysis, and
associated interpretational activities. See id. ADEQ's investment has included the
establishment and operation of a laboratory. See id. This facility has enabled ADEQ
to analyze significant amounts of samples in a cost effective manner. See id. A
substantial portion of the water quality data utilized by ADEQ is obtained from its
operation of a monitoring network of over 200 sites. The agency has used the
monitoring network to gather data on a continuing basis for a number of years.
Approximately $400,000 is expended annually on these monitoring activities. See id.
ADEQ's monitoring network has provided several benefits. See id. First, the expansive
coverage of the network enables ADEQ to assess long-term water quality trends. See
id. Second, the data is used by the ADEQ to determine whether a stream segment is
compliant with applicable WQS. See id.
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The primary impetus for the ecoregion approach were DO'06 criteria
promulgated by EPA. '06 The EPA announced the final WQC for DO in
1986. '" EPA set WQC for DO at 5.0 mg/L for a seven day mean for cold
water, while the warm water criteria was 4.0 mg/L for a seven day mean.
EPA had previously promulgated other WQC specifically for toxics
pursuant to section 307(a)(1 ) of the CWA. 6 '
The ADEQ staff biologists determined through EPA funded studies
and prior experience that various areas of the state had DO concentrations
different than the criteria proposed by EPA."070 The agency observed that
the size of a water basin had a significant effect on DO concentrations."'
The ADEQ staff believed that the ecoregion approach was appropriate for
Arkansas because of the state's many small river basins.' Such
waterbodies become stagnant during the hot/dry season. However, certain
species were found to survive in such waterbodies even though they
contained DO levels lower than the WQC established by EPA.' 73 As a
result, ecoregions arguably classify fish assemblages more accurately and
consistently than delineations based on riverbasins."'74
EPA funding enabled the ADEQ to develop the background data to
implement ecoregion-based WQS.' 75 The ADEQ initially had difficulty
convincing EPA Region 6 of the value of the ecoregion approach.'076
Support from scientists from the EPA Research Center in Corvalis,
1066. Sufficient quantities of DO must be present in the waterbody to support a fish
population. Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, No. 89-3193,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20748 at * 18 (D.N.J. Mar. 9,1995), rev'd on other grounds, 123
F.3d I I I (3rd Cir. 1997). DO is also important to protection of the aesthetic aspects
of a waterbody. See id.
1067. See id. See also ADPC&E, MINERAL QUALITY STANDARDS PROJECTTEAM INTERIM
REPORT AND PRESENTATIONS OF ALTERNATIVES 1 (1996) (primary driving force for
initiative was Arkansas POTW limits) [hereinafter Mineral].
1068. See 51 Fed. Reg. 22,978 (1986).
1069. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1994). See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 79,318 (1980); 49 Fed.
Reg. 5,831 (1984).




1073. See id. Consequently, the CWA allows a state any EPA recommended WQC
upward or downward to reflect local environmental conditions and human exposure
patterns. See Western Regional Sewer Authority v. South Carolina Dep 't of Health & Envtl.
Control, 1999 S.C. ENV LEXIS 102 at * 21 (S.C. ALJ Div. Sept. 22, 1999).
1074. See Hughes, supra note 1055, at 132-33.
1075. See id. The work was funded by set-aside funds in ADEQ construction grants
programn. See Mineral, supra note 1061, at 1.
1076. Interview with Chuck Bennett, Chief, ADEQ Water Division (Nov. 9,2000).
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Oregon aided the ADEQ.'0" Ultimately, EPA agreed to support the
effort. 
0 7 8
The ADEQ ecoregion research provided the agency a tremendous
amount of data about the state's surface waters.'07 Arkansas developed
data for the least-disturbed streams in each ecoregion. °s The least-
disturbed reference streams are used to assure that biological species and
populations are maintained in a stream in an ecoregion when compared to
reference streams.""8 ' The least disturbed streams offer a realistic goal for
improved water quality."°2 However, reliance upon least disturbed
streams may be hindered by ecoregion heterogeneity." 3 The ecoregions
were devised based upon the physiographic influence of each region.
While a stream or river may cross several ecoregions, the ADEQ staff
found that there were distinct characteristics for each ecoregion. '
Very few states have based their water quality standards on
ecoregions. The ecoregion approach benefits the Arkansas program
because the data is based upon least-disturbed reference streams in each
ecoregion. s' The least-disturbed reference streams provide a historical
baseline of the health of streams based upon physical parameters and
biological data."° It becomes increasingly difficult to find and measure
undisturbed streams in developing areas. However, Arkansas already has
this data in place for the entire state."°s In contrast, many states lack a
state-wide monitoring program and others are now having difficulty
finding undisturbed streams."'
1077. See id.
1078. See id. ADEQ and EPA did subsequently debate the federal agency's desire
to include more referenced streams for each ecoregion. Telephone Interview with Dr.
Robert Blanz, CH2M Hill (Nov. 21, 2000). Dr. Blanz served as Deputy Director of the
ADPC&E from 1980-1987. EPA ultimately approved the regulation with the ADEQ
preferred number of referenced streams for each ecoregion. See 54 Fed. Reg. 18,696
(1989) (providing notice of EPA's approval of the ADEQ ecoregions on May 6, 1988).
1079. Interview with Vince Blubaugh, GBMc (July 6, 2000). Research began in
1984 using CWA section 2050) funding provided by EPA. See id.
1080. See id.
108 1. See id. The least-disturbed reference streams are representative of the health
of biological and physical-chemical water quality ecoregion. Id. Streams serve as a
reference point for future permitting decisions. Id
1082. See Hughes, supra note 1055, at 139.
1083. See id. at 138.







The ecoregion approach arguably benefits Arkansas in other ways.
First, it provides specific data for seasonal influence on the various uses
designated for surface waters. ' 9 Second, when Arkansas was delegated
the NPDES program in 1986, it was able to justify the criteria it believed
was necessary to support WQS in the state." Consequently, it was not
forced to adopt EPA's WQS that it believed were inappropriate for certain
areas of state.""' Third, the use of ecoregion-based WQS have arguably
better ensured consistent decisionmaking for similar surface water
throughout the state. 1092
2. Arkansas Water Quality Criteria
a. General
The WQC developed for the WQS include both narrative general
standards and numerical standards."°g Narrative limits exist for color,
taste and odor, solids, floating materials and deposits, toxic substances,
and oil and grease."9 The general and specific standards permit mixing
zones for all parameters except for bacteria or oil and grease."°g The
mixing zone will allow the effect of the wastewater on the receiving
stream to be determined after it has thoroughly mixed with the designated
area of the waterbody. "
The purpose of the general standards is to prevent interference with
the present or projected future uses of waters by the parameters subject to
the standards."°7 Specific standards provide numerical limitations for
temperature, turbidity, pH, DO, radioactivity, bacteria, toxic substances,
nutrients, oil and grease, and mineral quality."
1089. See id.
1090. See Blubaugh, supra note 1070.
1091. See id. An ADPC&E Water Division official, John Giese, noted that "[o]ur
baseline of knowledge is something we have measured now and it is a real world
situation, not something developed in Washington..." PC&E Outlines Possible Changes
in State's Water Quality Standards, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Sept. 15, 1987, at B 1.
1092. See Blubaugh, supra note 1070.
1093. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 §§ 2.401 to 2.511 (1984).
1094. See id. §§ 2.406 to 2.410.
1095. See id. § 2.404. General standards for toxic substances require consideration
of the zone of initial dilution as well as the mixing zone and critical flow conditions.
1096. See id.
1097. See, e.g., ADEQ Reg. No. 2 §§ 2.406, 2.407 (1984).
1098. See id. §§ 2.502 to 2.511. Temperature has a specific numeric limit while, pH
provides a range of acceptable values. On the other hand, DO concentration limits vary




For example, EPA has promulgated WQC for ammonia that may
affect NPDES permits issued by the ADEQ. " The WQC for ammonia
is extremely stringent for small streams with low critical flows."' The
projected numerical limitations could require additional treatment for
industries that pretreat prior to discharge into a POTW and direct
dischargers. "0'
b. Metals
EPA's determination of what it considers appropriate WQC for
various substances occasionally generates disagreements with the state
determinations. An example is the debate about the appropriate WQC for
metals. After the 1987 amendments to the CWA, EPA assessed" 2
whether the states complied with the requirement to include toxics WQC
in their WQS."' 3 EPA ultimately alleged that Arkansas and eleven other
states were not in compliance with section 303(c)(2)(B) of the CWA.I
' 4
Consequently, EPA published the National Toxics Rule ("NTR") which
became effective February 5, 1993.105
The EPA stated in the NTR that it had previously approved Arkan-
sas' WQS containing human health criteria." °6 Nevertheless, the EPA
disapproved of certain Arkansas WQS for failing to adopt WQC for toxic
pollutants adequate to protect aquatic life. "07 The NTR included numeric
WQC expressed for metals."'
1099. See 64 Fed. Reg. 71,974 (1999) (updating for 1999 the WQC for ammonia).
1100. Telephone Interview with Vince Blubaugh, Principal, GBMc & Associates
(Dec. 19, 2000).
1101. See id.
1102. See 57 Fed. Reg. 60,848, 60,854 (1992). This effort by EPA allowed states
time to incorporate changes in water quality standards through the triennial review
process.
1103. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B) (1994).
1104. See 57 Fed. Reg. 60,848, 60,856 (Dec. 22, 1992). The other states and
territories include the following: Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan,
Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Puerto Rico.
1105. See 57 Fed. Reg. 60,848 (1992).
1106. See 52 Fed. Reg. 60,848, 60,897 (1992).
1107. See id
1108. See id. Specifically, the NTR included aquatic life WQC for cadmium,
chromium, copper, lead, mercury, nickel, selenium, silver, zinc, and cyanide. See id.
The EPA did not promulgate aquatic life criterion for arsenic because Arkansas
monitoring data did not indicate that this substance would interfere with designated
aquatic life uses. See id.
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In response to legal challenges, EPA modified the NTR."0 The rule
based the numeric WQC on "dissolved" metals to more accurately reflect
the portion of the substances that could affect aquatic life."'" EPA also
issued an administrative stay during the time it received comments on the
1995 modified rule for the numeric criteria."" The modified rules were
necessary because NPDES permits were required to express metals in
terms of total recoverable. "'" The revised NTR rule provided a means to
implement the federal standards by employing translator mechanisms to
convert the dissolved metals WQC to total recoverable." 3
The Region 6 office of EPA provided an interim-final implementa-
tion guidance to the ADEQ to address these issues. 14 EPA informed the
ADEQ that it would not object to NPDES permits prepared according to
the guidance document provisions."' 5 EPA recognized that the final
implementation guidance document would be utilized to establish relevant
effluent limits in Arkansas until approved state WQS were adopted.'16
The publication of the guidance raised various implementation
issues. For example, concern was expressed about the critical flow
provisions applicable to metals WQC.""7 Other issues involved the
applicability to stormwater discharges and questions regarding the role of
mixing zones for lakes and reservoirs. "8 EPA subsequently modified the
guidance document to address some Arkansas concerns." 9 The changes
included the exclusion of stormwater, use of 7Q10 as a critical flow,
recognition of site-specific mixing zones for lakes and reservoirs, and site-
specific partitioning coefficients."2'
The ADEQ subsequently incorporated these metals WQC into the
Arkansas WQS." 2' Nevertheless, ADEQ believes that more research is
1109. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (1995).
1110. See id.
11L1. See id.
1112. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(c) (1999).
1113. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (1995).
1114. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.36 (1995).
1115. See Letter from Jack V. Ferguson, Chief, EPA Region 6 NPDES Permit
Branch, to Chuck Bennett, Chief, ADEQ Water Division (Jan. 31, 1996) (on file with
author).
1116. See id.
1117. See Letter from Forrest E. Payne, Ph.D., Aluminum Company of America, to
Ellen Caldwell, Operations Support Office, EPA (Apr. 2, 1996) (on file with author).
1118. See Letter from Randy Thurman, Executive Director, Arkansas Environmental
Federation, to Ellen Caldwell, Operations Support Office, EPA (March 24, 1996) (on
file with author).
1119. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.36 (1997).
1120. See id.
1121. See ADEQ Reg. No.2 § 2.508 (1998).
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needed to refine various metals WQC."22 It has been the state agency's
experience that several metals do not cause toxicity in some Arkansas
waterbodies at the concentrations specified by the federal WQC.' ," The
ADEQ has not, however, determined whether further research or
modification to such WQC will be undertaken." 4
The determination of appropriate metal limits to be included in an
NPDES permit (if any) can be a contentious issue for some facilities. For
example, in 1994 the Arkansas Wildlife Federation questioned the
ADEQ's proposed removal of zinc limits from a North Little Rock
herbicide and pesticide repackaging facility's individual stormwater
permit.' "' The organization questioned the agency's assumption of a zinc
background concentration of zero."26 The ADEQ ultimately determined
that the background zinc concentration of zero in stormwater was
representative and defensible if stormwater data was not available."2
b. Designated Uses
1. Categories
The establishment of Arkansas WQS are based upon present, future,
and potential uses of the surface waters of the state and WQS developed
from physical evaluations of past water quality conditions, along with a
comprehensive study of least-disturbed ecoregion reference streams.
They are designed to enhance the quality, value, and beneficial uses of the
water resources of the State of Arkansas, to aid in the prevention, control
and abatement of water pollution, to provide for the protection and
propagation of fish and wildlife, and to provide for recreation in and on




1125. See Letter from James M. Hecker, Arkansas Wildlife Federation, to Rhonda
Sharp, ADEQ (Jan. 13, 1994) (on file with author).
1126. See Mo Shafii, ADPC&E, Response to Comments Final Permit Decision,
Permit No. AR0042901, 7 (Feb. 19, 1997).
1127. See id. The Arkansas Wildlife Federation also contested the wasteload
allocation calculations for zinc loading from the facility's discharge. See Hecker, supra
note 1124. ADEQ maintained that it had correctly calculated the zinc limit in
accordance with its March 10, 1993, implementation strategy for water quality based
permit limits. See Shafii, supra note 1125, at 8. The calculation of the wasteload
allocation using the highest reported zinc concentration from three years of monitoring
by the permittee indicated the in-stream waste concentration of zinc was less than the




the water. 28 The Arkansas WQS include waterbody uses, criteria, and an
antidegradation policy."
The Arkansas WQS identify the designated uses for each jurisdic-
tional waterbody in the state."3" Eight different types of uses have been
designated."'" They include extraordinary resource waters, ecologically
sensitive waterbody, natural and scenic waterways, primary contact
recreation, secondary contact recreation, fisheries, domestic water supply,
industrial water, agricultural water supply, and other uses (e.g., hydroelec-
tric power generation and navigation)." 32  The designated use for a
waterbody may be altered/modified on a temporary or permanent basis."33
2. Use Attainability Analysis
The Arkansas program allows the permanent modification of a use
designation in certain circumstances. The primary means to effect such
a change is a use attainability analysis ("UAA").'"' A UAA is a scientific
assessment of whether it is feasible for a particular waterbody to attain a
particular use."35
UAAs have been submitted to the ADEQ to address WQS for a
variety of Arkansas waterbodies. They have addressed, for example,
1128. ADEQ Reg. No.2 § 2.102 (1984).
1129. See supra notes 1051 and 1097 and accompanying text. See also infra note 1140
and accompanying text.
1130. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2, App. A (1998). Appendix A identifies designated uses
for the streams in each of the six ecoregions of the state. See id.
1131. ADEQReg.No.2§2.302(1998).
1132. See id. These uses may be referenced in other ADEQ programs. For example,
ADEQ Regulation Number 15 (Arkansas Open-Cut Mining and Land Reclamation
Code) prohibits mining in streams designated as "Extraordinary Resource." See ADEQ
Reg. No. 15 § 15.301(c) (2000). The inability to construct a dam on an Arkansas
waterbody designated "Extraordinary Resource Waters" prompted some legislators to
introduce a bill in the 83rd General Assembly that attempts to remove this classification
from a portion of Lee Creek. See H.B. 2342, 83rd General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2001).
1133. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 §§ 2.303, 2.305, 2.306, 2.309 (1998). See also ADEQ
Reg. No. 2 § 2.105, App. B (1998).
1134. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 § 2.303 (1998).
1135. See4OC.F.R. § 131.3(g), 131.10(i)(1999).
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temperature"36 in receiving streams and site-specific seasonal variation to
the DO, WQS to reflect natural and existing background conditions.""
c. Antidegradation
Chapter 2 of Regulation No. 2 represents Arkansas' response to the
CWA requirement that each state establish an antidegradation policy." 8
The regulation includes an anti-degradation prohibition.' 9 It protects
existing uses and the water quality conditions necessary to support
existing uses."4 However, the anti-degradation policy allows lowering
water quality in certain instances where necessary to accommodate
economic and social development."4' Water quality may not be lowered
unless existing uses will be fully protected.""'
d. Short-Term Activity Authorization/Variance
Regulation No. 2 includes a procedure that under certain circum-
stances enables a facility to initiate a discharge without a permit for a
limited period of time. This procedure is denominated a "short term
authorization." Such activities may be authorized for a time period of
ninety days or less."43 The ADEQ may in certain circumstances authorize
1136. Southwestern Electric Power Company submitted a UAA to ADEQ to revise
the Arkansas WQS temperature of 89.6 degrees Fahrenheit for a particular stream. A
SWEPCO letter referencing this request'noted in part:
In November, 1990, Mr. Jay Pruett, Director of Environmental Affairs,
submitted the above mentioned Use Attainability Analysis to ADPC&E in
order to secure approval to elevate the established temp use of 89.6" F. The
UAA effectively demonstrated that the alternative limit would ensure
protection and propagation of a balanced indigenous population of fish and
wildlife in and on the waterbody.
Letter from Patrick Miller, Environmental Specialist, SWEPCO to Maria Jastrzebski,
ADPC&E (June 12, 1992) (on file with author).
1137. See GEORGIA PACIFIC, DISSOLVED OXYGEN USE ATrAINABILITY ANALYSIS (1996)
(addressing DO WQS for Ouachita River).
1138. See4OC.F.R. § 131.12(1999).
1139. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 §§ 2.201 to 2.204 (1984).
1140. See id. § 2.201.
1141. See id. § 2.202.
1142. See id.
1143. For example, the Remington Arms Company, Inc. facility in Lonoke, Arkansas
requested a short term authorization to change the location of an outfall prior to receipt
of a modified NPDES permit. See Letter from Sammy R. Bates, R.E.M., Remington
Arms Company, Inc. to Mark Bradley, P.E., NPDES Permits Supervisor, ADPC&E
(Jan. 28, 1995) (on file with author). The request to bypass was granted by ADEQ. See
Letter from Martin Maner, P.E., Interim Deputy Director, ADPC&E, to Sam R. Bates,
R.E.M., Environmental Coordinator, Remington Arms Company, Inc., Lonoke,
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a short-term activity which might cause a violation of the Arkansas
WQS."" The authorization will not be granted if it could impair
beneficial uses on a permanent or long-term basis. The short-term activity
authorization does not supersede existing state and federal permitting
processes."'
A temporary variance may be approved for a two or three year period
for specified constituents."' The general and specific standards may be
modified and subcategories of use may be established to allow a long-
term environmental improvement project that will significantly improve
the effects caused by industrial or mining activities."47
e. Total Maximum Daily Loads
On February 18, 1999, the Sierra Club and several other citizen
groups filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas alleging that EPA had failed to establish any TMDL
in water quality limited segments ("WQLS") in the state. 48 Arkansas
consequently joined a group of approximately twenty-five states in which
EPA was alleged to have failed to address TMDL issues."49  The
Arkansas (Feb. 20, 1995) (on file with author). The ADEQ was willing to grant the
request because it determined the wastewater discharge was of "minimal toxic
importance" and that the existing monitoring would continue. See Memorandum from
Bernie Kent Finch, NPDES Staff Engineer, ADPC&E to Mark Bradley, Engineering,
NPDES Permits, ADPC&E (Feb. 17, 1995) (on file with author).
1144. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 § 2.305 (1998). Activities eligible for the Director's
short-term activity authorization include wastewater treatment facility maintenance,
fish eradication projects, mosquito abatement projects, algae and weed control projects,
dredge and fill projects, construction activities, tracers used for hydrological studies,
and activities which result in overall enhancement or maintenance of beneficial uses.
See, e.g., Letter from Randall Mathis, Director, ADPC&E to Thomas Gathright,
Environmental Engineer, Georgia-Pacific Corporation, (Nov. 26, 1997) (authorizing
facility's exceedance of BOD and TSS NPDES permit limits during three week
dredging project)(on file with author); Letter from Randall Mathis, Director, ADPC&E
to Eugene Townsley, Batesville Wastewater Treatment Plant (July 29, 1998)
(authorizing POTW to bypass filters in order to effect their repair within a 90-day
period) (on file with author).
1145. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2 § 2.305 (1998).
1146. See id. § 2.309. The variance must be approved by both ADEQ and EPA and
applies to the applicant only, and not other discharges into the same waterbody. See id.
1147. See ADEQ Reg. No. 2, App. B (1998).
1148. See Complaint, Sierra Club v. EPA, Case No. LR-C-99- 114 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 18,
1999) [hereinafter Complaint]. In addition to the allegations related to TMDLs, the
complaint also contained allegations of the failure to establish total maximum daily
thermal loads ("TMDTL"). The following discussion of TMDLs includes TMDTLs.
1149. Telephone Interview with Hank Bates, McMath Law Firm, Little Rock, Ark.
(Dec. 12, 2000). While neither ADEQ nor the State of Arkansas was a named
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gravamen of the complaint was the alleged inadequacy of the list of
WQLSs ADEQ submitted to EPA in 1998 pursuant to section 303(d) of
the CWA." 50 The focus was the absence of TMDLs."" The plaintiffs
alleged that EPA had failed to perform its nondiscretionary duties under
the CWA by: (1) not disapproving the ADEQ's 1998 section 303(d)
submission; (2) not identifying and prioritizing all WQLSs in Arkansas;
(3) not disapproving ADEQ's submission of no TMDLs; and (4) not
establishing TMDLs for WQLSs in Arkansas." 2 They asked that the
court order EPA to correct these deficiencies.153
The plaintiffs requested that the court order modification, revocation
and reissuance, or termination of permits issued by the ADEQ as
necessary to establish TMDLs. In addition, they requested a prohibition
on discharges from new sources and new discharges from existing sources
in WQLSs unless sufficient load allocations existed in the stream
segment.""4 The potential effect of the TMDLs is unresolved. However,
they may significantly affect existing municipalities and industries as well
as future economic development.
After a series of negotiation sessions between the plaintiffs and EPA,
the lawsuit was ultimately settled."" The parties executed a consent
decree and settlement agreement which included specific requirements for
the approval or disapproval of Arkansas' next section 303(d) list."' The
defendant in the case, ADEQ did attend almost all of the meetings between the parties
for settlement purposes. See id. ADEQ did assist EPA in the litigation since much of
the information at issue related to submissions to EPA for which ADEQ would be
responsible. See id.
1150. See Complaint, supra note 1147. However, ADEQ believes its extensive
stream monitoring network will enable it to more accurately identify WQLSs than
contiguous states. Telephone Interview with Chuck Bennett, Chief, Water Division,
ADEQ (Nov. 9, 2000). The plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged that Arkansas has an
above-average monitoring network for ambient stream conditions focused on point
source discharges. Telephone Interview with Hank Bates, McMath Law Firm, Little
Rock, Ark. (Dec. 12, 2000). However, counsel views ADEQ monitoring as lacking for
lakes and nonpoint source pollution. See id.
1151. The Sierra Club complaint included a request for an order vacating EPA's
approval of the ADEQ's 1998 section 303(d) list. See Complaint, supra note 1147.
1152. See Complaint, supra note 1147.
1153. See id.
1154. See id.
1155. See Order and Consent Decree, Sierra Club v. EPA, No. LR-C-99-114 (E.D.
Ark. Feb. 18, 1999). According to the plaintiffs' counsel, the plaintiffs expectations
were realistic and sought settlement ofthe matter to promote the preparation of TMDLs
in the state. Telephone Interview with Hank Bates, McMath Law Firm, Little Rock,
Ark. (Dec. 12, 2000).
1156. See Consent Decree, Sierra Club v. EPA, No. LR-C-99-114 at 6 (E.D. Ark.
Feb. 18, 1999). The consent decree specifies a 60 day time limit for EPA to approve
or disapprove Arkansas's next section 303(d) list. See id. The consent decree also
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decree also included a schedule for establishment of TMDLs in
Arkansas." 7 EPA agreed to add thirty stream segments in the next
section 303(d) list. The decree requires the development of TMDLs
within two or three years of the listing depending upon how the stream
segment is identified in the consent decree."58 EPA is required to report
annually on its progress in meeting the requirements of the consent
decree."59
f. Mixing Zones
Arkansas defines mixing zones as areas where an effluent discharge
undergoes mixing with the receiving waterbody. " 6° "For toxic dis-
charges[,] a zone of initial dilution may be allowed within the mixing
zone."" 6' Mixing zones are allowed for most parameters.62 Regulation
No. 2 prohibits a mixing zone from including any domestic water supply
specifies studies and specific lists of waters and pollutants that ADEQ must consider.
See id The section 303(d) list in the consent decree places specific requirements for
justifying the omission of any waters specified in the Attachment A or B to the consent
decree. See id.
1157. See id. at 10. Arkansas must submit 10 TMDLs each year and at least 50 by
January. 15, 2003. See id. The first submission was due January 15, 2001. See id. EPA
must take steps to ensure completion of the TMDLs within one year of the scheduled
deadline for Arkansas. See id Arkansas must complete 180 TMDLs by January 15,
2009. See id. Since signing the Consent Decree, ADEQ has proposed TMDLs for the
L'Anguille River, Holman Creek, Hicks Creek, and Whig Creek. See Richard A.
Weiss, ADEQ Interim Director, Notice of Proposed Total Maximum Daily Load Plans
for Holman Creek, Hicks Creek, and Whig Creek (Jan. 25, 2001); Richard A. Weiss,
ADEQ Interim Director, Notice of Proposed Total Maximum Daily Load Plan for
L'Anguille River (Dec. 11, 2000). The TMDLs proposed for Holman Creed in
Madison County, Hicks Creek in Baxter County, and Whig Creek in Pope County
address nitrate issues. ADEQ found stream segments of the creeks impaired due to
excessive nitrate values in water quality data collected from the creeks. The
contaminate level in the stream segments impaired the domestic water supply use of
the three streams. The TMDLs proposed to limit discharges under the NPDES permit
process to no more than 10 mg/L nitrate nitrogen in each stream segment.
1158. See Consent Decree, Sierra Club v. EPA, No. LR-C-99- 114 at 12-13 (E.D. Ark.
Feb. 18, 1999).
1159. The report must be provided to both the plaintiffs and the court. See id. at 14.
1160. ADEQ Reg. No.2 § 2.106 (1998).
1161. Id. Zone of initial dilution is defined as an area within the mixing zone where
a toxic effluent discharge initiates mixing in the receiving waterbody. This is an area
where acute water quality criteria may be exceeded, but acute toxicity may not occur.
1162. ADEQ Reg. No. 2 § 2.404 (1998). Mixing zones are not allowed for the
parameters of bacteria or oil and grease, or where the background flow is less than the
critical flow or where the background concentration of a waste parameter exceeds the
specific criteria for that waste parameter. See id.
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intake. "'63 In lakes and reservoirs, the size of the mixing zones are defined
by the ADEQ on an individual basis and may be determined by site-
specific studies or using appropriate dispersion or jet-mix models. "' An
Administrative Hearing Officer Recommended Decision addressed
whether a mixing zone could be applied to the fecal coliform found in a
POTW's discharge into the Ouachita River."65
g. Water Quality Certification (Section 401)
Section 401 of the CWA requires that the State of Arkansas must
certify that a federal license or permit resulting in discharge is compliant
with WQS."' ADEQ supplies the 401 certification in Arkansas."67 The
primary federal permitting activities triggering certification in Arkansas
are section 404 (wetlands) permits"" issued by the Corps of Engineers
and permits issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for
dams."'69 The federal agency will forward a request to ADEQ for 401
certification."7" ADEQ will then review the proposed project to determine
whether it would violate the applicable WQS."7' The number of requests
for 401 certifications have declined in the past several years."' Most
projects receive the required certification from ADEQ."7
1163. Seeid.
1164. See ADEQ, CONTINUING PLANNING PROCESs DOCUMENT, APPENDIX D, D-12
(1999).
1165. See Malvern Letter, supra note 68, at 10.
1166. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
1167. See id. § 1341(A)(1).
1168. See id. § 1344.
1169. See 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(A) (1994).
1170. See Letter from Randall Mathis, Director. ADEQ, to the Hon. Parker Johnston,
Saline County Judge (July 27, 1990) (on file with author).
1171. Seeid.
1172. Telephone Interview with Steve Drown, ADEQ (Nov. 27, 2000). The State of
Arkansas generally receives approximately three hundred 401 certification requests per
year. The decline in requests is believed to be due to the expansion of the Corps of
Engineers' wetlands nationwide permits. The CWA section 404 nationwide permit
program is addressed in Wright & Morrissey, supra note 21, at 821.
1173. Telephone Interview with Steve Drown, Project Support Manager, ADEQ
(Nov. 22, 2000). There are notable exceptions. In 1992, the ADEQ refused to provide
a 401 certification for the Saline County Rural Development Authority for the
construction of a dam in the North Fork Saline River. See Letter from Randall Mathis,
Director ADEQ, to Col. Stephenson W. Page, District Engineer, Vicksburg District
Corps of Engineers (April 29, 1992) (on file with author). The state denied the
certification because the stream's classification under the Arkansas WQS as an
extraordinary resource and ecologically sensitive waterbody. See id.
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2. Continuing Planning Process
The federal CWA requires that each state operate a continuing
planning process approved by EPA."'74 The plan components must
include limitations upon effluents, schedules of compliance and incorpo-
ration of the elements of applicable area wide waste management plans. 175
ADEQ developed a Continuing Planning Process ("CPP") document a
number of years ago. This document provides guidance for the methods
ADEQ uses to calculate limits for NPDES permits."7 6 The CPP is not a
regulation. Nevertheless, ADEQ believes it provides a framework for
ensuring the permits it issues meet the Arkansas WQS and the Water
Quality Management Plan."7
3. Water Quality Management Plan
Pursuant to section 208"' of the CWA, ADEQ maintains a Water
Quality Management Plan ("WQMP")."1 The federal CWA regulations
define a WQMP as a state waste treatment management plan that
identifies water quality problems and contains the state's choices of
measures necessary to control specific sources of pollution."" The
WQMP is a compilation of all oxygen demanding point source discharges
in Arkansas." 8 ' The compilation is revised each time a new modified or
renewed NPDES permit is issued. The WQMP does not include non-
oxygen demanding discharges. ADEQ and EPA use the WQMP to
examine the cumulative effects of point source discharges on water
quality." 2 Draft permits that are submitted to EPA for their review will
include relevant modeling information."83
1174. See 33 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) (1994). The federal continuing planning process
is described in Adler, supra note 33, at 219.
1175. See id. See Jarack v. EPA, 513 N.E.2d 1007 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987) (resolving
dispute over amendment to Illinois Water Quality Management Plan).
1176. Telephone Interview with Mark Bradley, NPDES Permits Branch, Water
Division, ADEQ (Sept. 18, 2000).
1177. See id. The Arkansas CPP was discussed in an Administrative Hearing Officers
Recommended Decision. See In re City of Malvern Water Works, No. 96-005-P,
Arkansas Pollution Control & Ecology Commission, Order No. 6 (Sept. 11, 1996).
1178. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1994).
1179. ADEQ, WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN EFFLUENT LIMITS (2000)
[hereinafter WQMP].
1180. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.2(k), 130.0(c) (2000).







ADEQ uses a desktop-type modeling software that is not widely used
elsewhere.""' The software used to enter data is fairly straightforward and
basic.""5  However, EPA has begun to encourage the use of a more
comprehensive model." 6
The WQMP will be examined when an application for a new,
modified, or renewal NPDES permit is sought. An NPDES permit cannot
conflict with an approved WQMP."87 If a facility requests that ADEQ
add a discharge, it will be included in the WQMP. "8 Despite the lack of
a permit for the proposed discharge, it may continue to be listed on the
WQMP." 9 Therefore, proposed discharges that were never permitted
may in theory be considered or be a factor when a facility seeks a new or
modified NPDES permit.
The WQMP identifies the critical limits and seasonal limits"" for
both large and small facilities." 9 ' It also identifies the method by which
each facility's NPDES permit limits are justified."'  As of October 10,
2000, the Arkansas WQMP identified 934 facilities."93
1184. Telephone Interview with Vince Blubaugh, Principal, GBMc & Associates
(Dec. 19,2000). ADEQ and permittees model oxygen demanding wastes using multi-
SMP, which was developed by Limno-Tech, Inc., in 1986 and revised in 1992. See id.
1185. See id.
1186. See id. The BASINS model, which can account for point source and nonpoint
source influences, includes subprograms for modeling minerals (through QUAL2E) and
metals and organics (through HSPF). Also, EPA promotes the use of its program,
WASPS, for modeling metals and organics. See id.
1187. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.12(a) (2000).
1188. See WQMP, supra note 1178.
1189. See id.
1190. See id. For example, the Hamilton facility discharging into Champanolle Creek
in Calhoun County represents one of the larger differences in critical and seasonal
limits. See WQMP, supra note 1178. The critical limits for May through October are
10 mg BOD/L, 15 mg TSS/L, while the seasonal limits for November through April are
25 mg BOD/L and 90 mg TSS/L. See id.
1191. An example of a small facility is the Arkansas Highway Transportation
Department Rest Area at McGehee, with a flow of 0.001 million gallons per day. See
id. The Little Rock Adams Field treatment facility is at the other end of the spectrum
with a permitted flow of 36 million gallons per day. See id.
1192. See id. The WQMP identifies justification for the permit limits based upon a
calibrated model, design criteria, a desktop model, effluent policy, or a field verified
desktop model. See id.




a. Arkansas POTW Control Mechanisms
Arkansas POTWs use various mechanisms to control facilities
discharging into their system."' They include permits, agreements, and
ordinances.""95 These mechanisms will condition use of the system on
compliance with the relevant CWA pretreatment and other requirements.
The POTW will assure compliance by the use of various inspection,""9 IU
self-reporting, and enforcement procedures. This collection of require-
ments and procedures is arguably analogous to a state NPDES program.
The number of lUs (i.e., non-domestic wastewater discharges, etc.) in a
given municipality will vary." 97
1. Sewer Use Agreements
A POTW may simply enter into an agreement or contract with
facilities desiring to use the facility."" The contract will address the
responsibilities of the facility desiring to use the POTW.
1194. POTWs are in some circumstances subject to restrictions in addition to
requirement to obtain an NPDES permit. The construction of a POTW may in some
circumstances trigger programs in addition to the requirement to obtain an NPDES
permit. For example, Arkansas prohibits the construction of POTWs outside a
municipality's corporate limits unless certain conditions are fulfilled. The City of
Russellville challenged the City of Dover's construction of a sewage treatment facility
outside the Dover municipal limits on the basis that it violated Act 1336 of 1997. See
City of Dover v. A.G. Barton, 337 Ark. 186, 188, 987 S.W.2d 705, 707 (1999). The
court reversed and remanded, finding that the statute did not apply to the Dover project
because that would constitute a retroactive application. See id. at 191-92, 987 S.W.2d
at 709.
1195. A detailed discussion of the various aspects of the mechanisms, procedures,
and documents used by POTWs to control system users such as lUs is found in U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR POTW PRETREATMENT PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT (1993) [hereinafter Manual].
1196. See, e.g., Letter from Kim Redo, Industrial Pretreatment Coordinator, Van
Buren Municipal Utilities to Waste Management Systems (Aug. 4, 1997) (enclosing
copy of pretreatment inspection report of IU conducted by City ofVan Buren, Arkansas
POTW) (on file with author).
1197. For example, the Batesville, Arkansas POTW reported 7 "permitted industries"
in a 1997 report to ADPC&E. See Letter from Eugene Townsley, Superintendent,
Batesville Wastewater Treatment Plant to Allen Gilliam, NPDES Pretreatment
Coordinator, ADPC&E (Sept. 30, 1996) (on file with author).




Many Arkansas POTWs use permitting programs to regulate
discharges by IU into their systems. These permits or authorizations are
denominated by titles such as "waste contribution permit.""" They are
often somewhat similar in form and purpose to NPDES permits.
3. Ordinances
An Arkansas municipality will at a minimum have enacted an
ordinance authorizing the various inspection, reporting, and enforcement
requirements.' ° This ordinance will provide the authority for imposing
various responsibilities on system users and/or serve as codified require-
ments that must be met. An ordinance will often include a surcharge that
is imposed if a facility's discharge into the POTW exceeds a certain
volume. 1201
b. Inter-Municipality Treatment Agreements
Some Arkansas POTWs treat sewage generated by residents and
facilities in other municipalities or areas.' 02 Such relationships occasion-
ally present difficulties. For example, the question has arisen as to
whether a POTW is responsible for overflows released from a collection
system located in another municipality. In response, the ADEQ stated
that the POTW must report the bypass regardless of the fact it did not own
the collection system.
20 3
1199. For example, El Dorado Water Utilities utilizes a document titled "Wastewater
Contribution Permit." See El Dorado Utilities Wastewater Contribution Permit (Apr.
1, 1999).
1200. An example is Van Buren, Ark., Ordinance No. 3-1997 (Jan. 27, 1997). The
thirty-nine page ordinance establishes a detailed set of requirements for lUs using the
POTW.
120 1. See Letter from James D. Fredrick, Green Forest Municipal Water and Sewer
Department to Director, ADEQ (Nov. 16, 1999) (referencing City of Green Forest
ordinance sewer surcharge) (on file with author).
1202. Letter from Eugene Lewis, NPDES Enforcement Section, Water Division,
ADEQ to Mike Luers, Pine Bluff Wastewater Utility (Aug. 27, 1978). See also City of
Dover, 337 Ark. at 188, 98 S.W.2d at 707 (referencing City of Russellville's contract
to treat City of Dover sewage) (on file with author).
1203. ADEQ noted in 1998 correspondence in response to a query from the Pine
Bluff Wastewater Utility:
The Department has received your letter to Eric Fleming dated August 25,
1998. This letter is to clarify an apparent misconception as to the
responsibilities under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.
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The Pine Bluff Wastewater Utility's sewer system is permitted to discharge
under NPDES permit AR0033316. Your attention is directed to Part II,
Section A, Paragraph 1, Duty to Comply, which states "The permittec must
comply with all the conditions of the permit. Your attention is further
directed to Part II, Section D, Paragraph 6, which requires that the permittee
report all bypasses of the system to the Department.
Your attention is further directed to the Definitions Section §8-4-102
page 13 of the Arkansas Water and Air Pollution Control Act (the Act)
paragraph (5) which defines "Sewer system" to mean "pipelines or conduits,
pumping stations, and force mains, and all other constructions, devices, and
appliances appurtenant thereto, which are used for conducting sewage or
industrial waste or other wastes to a point of disposal". [sic]
While we understand that you have entered into an agreement with
White Hall, this does not relieve PBWU of the permit requirement to report
all bypasses of their system.
In the state of Arkansas, it is not unusual for one municipality to treat
the waste from another municipality. Much in the manner of Pretreatment
Agreements between permittees and the Industrial Users, each arrangement
is by agreement between the municipalities. Since there is no current way
for the Department to keep track of all the variables of the various
agreements (nor any current inclination to do so) the NPDES tracking system
holds the permittee responsible for the reporting of overflows. For the
system to work, overflow reporting must fall under a NPDES permit number.
By the way, this convention also crosses state lines. The municipal
treatment system in Texarkana, Texas is responsible to report some
overflows occurring in Arkansas.
For your information, many interjurisdictional agreements contain
language that requires the serviced city to report overflows to the servicing
city, so that they may be reported to meet NPDES requirements.
Letter from Eugene Lewis, NPDES Enforcement Section, Water Division, ADEQ to
Mike Luer, Pine Bluff Wastewater Utility (Aug. 27, 1998) (on file with author). The
ADEQ letter was in response to a letter from Pine Bluff Wastewater Utility
correspondence which noted in part:
This letter is in response to your August 19, 1998 letter concerning the
bypasses within the City of White Hall. Currently, the City of Pine Bluff
only accepts wastewater from the City of White Hall through their pump
stations. Our intergovernmental agreement with White Hall delineates the
responsibilities of the two cities with regard to maintenance of their
respective collection systems. Under the agreement, the City of Pine Bluff
has no authority to move crews and equipment or contract for services to
enter into or work on the White Hall collection system. Similarly, we have
no responsibility for maintenance, point repairs, cleaning, damage, or
failures of the White Hall collection system.
The Pine Bluff Wastewater Utility outlined this arrangement in our
letter dated April 5, 1998. IfADPC&E wishes to take action or order repairs
of the White Hall system it has ample authority under Act 472 of 1949, as
amended, and need not attempt to coerce the City of Pine Bluff to undertake
illegal acts outside our jurisdiction.
Letter from Mike Luer, Pine BluffWastewater Utility, to Eric Fleming, Water Division,
ADPC&E (Aug. 25, 1998) (on file with author). The State ofOhio specifically requires
that its environmental agency approve contracts between such entities for purpose of




A recurring problem in some municipalities in Arkansas and other
states are overflows from the sewer system. Discharges can originate
from parts of the system such as manholes, sewer inlets, or CSO
outfalls. 2° Such unauthorized overflows or discharges may include
solids, raw sewage, and other floatables.' °3 These discharges are likely
to draw attention from area residents and businesses. 16
The infrastructure associated with POTWs includes lines and drains.
Their purpose is to collect and transport the wastewater, stormwater and
other contaminants. An occasional problem for some POTWs and
municipalities is the tendency of lines, drains, and other conveyances to
collect contaminants from sources other than permitted discharges. In
Westfarm Associates L imitedPartnership v. International Fabricare Inst itutge20'
a Maryland POTW's sewer lateral was found to have received the
chemical perchloroethylene ("PCE"). The PCE allegedly originated from
a drycleaner whose personnel had poured the material into a sink drain."' 8
This drain was attached to a sewer line.' 2' The contaminated line
allegedly released PCE onto an adjacent property through sags, cracks,
and other openings. 21 ° The owner of the adjacent property brought
CERCLA cost recovery and common law actions against the POTW.1
21'
DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER, PROCEDURE FOR THE REVIEW AND PROCESSING OF JOINT
SEWER SERVICE CONTRACTS, PERMIT TO INSTALL GUIDANCE 1 (1996).
1204. See Community of Cambridge Envtl. Health & Cmty. Dev. Group v. City of
Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). This decision references such
alleged discharges from the City of Cambridge, Maryland sewer system. See id. at 552.
1205. See id.
1206. See id.
1207. 66 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 1995).
1208. See id. at 674.
1209. See id.
1210. See id.
1211. See id. at 678. The plaintiff argued that the federal CERCLA statute applied
to this scenario because the sewer infrastructure was allegedly "a facility" that released
a "hazardous substance" as those terms are defined by that statute. See id. See also
Lincoln Props., Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (addressing
allegation that California county's ownership of a portion of leaking sewers and wells
renders it a responsible party under CERCLA for remediation of hazardous substances).
These issues are addressed in Peter R. Hinckley, State and Municipal Sewer System
Authority Liability Under CERCLA: Who Should Payfor the Cleanup of Hazardous Industrial
and Commercial Sewer Discharges, 22 ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89 (1994). See also Wright &
Morrissey, supra note 2 1, at 763.
2001]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Other infrastructure problems include flooding or overflows during
stormwater events. A related problem is leakage or infiltration from or
through holes, cracks, or other openings.' 22 The advanced age of pipes
and drains can increase the likelihood of movement into or out of these
systems.2 13 Underfunding and/or inadequate maintenance can also lead
to infiltration and inflow.
121 4
The construction, operation, and maintenance of such lines and
drains can be expensive. Inflow and infiltration are often addressed by
replacement of the affected system.' 2 1 Inflow and infiltration can cause
overflows."216
d. Stormwater Treatment
In 1999, Arkansas House Bill 1987 proposed a facility user's fee for
each user's actual or estimated proportionate contribution to stormwater
runoff.2 7 The proposed legislation was primarily drafted by the City of
Little Rock to address its ongoing concerns with its separate storm sewer
discharges.2 |8 The legislation authorized municipalities to collect fees
from the stormwater users, and granted the power of eminent domain to
condemn property for stormwater facility and flood control improve-
ments. The bill also allowed municipalities to develop regulations to
accomplish these purposes. 2 9 The bill attracted the attention of commer-
cial and residential development interests.220 It failed to receive enough
1212. See Alexander Reid, Along Wollaston Beach, Optimism Rides Waterfront Rebound,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 2000, at I (reporting on sewage leaks that had threatened a
Massachusetts recreational area).
1213. See id. (referencing replacement of aging infrastructure).
1214. See id (reporting on Miami, Florida system problems stemming from deferred
maintenance).
1215. See Letter from John Lamb, Water Division, ADEQ to Steve Rand, Manager,
Warren Water and Sewer Commission (July 27, 2000) (referencing Warren, Arkansas
POTW's commitment to address inflow and infiltration by replacement of pipe, smoke
testing, and employment of additional personnel for sewer collection) (on file with
author). Smoke detection is used to identify leaks. Letter from Steve Rand, Warren
Water to Eugene Lewis, Enforcement Supervisor, Water Division, ADEQ (Oct. 1I,
1999) (on file with author). Another technique used to identify inflow and infiltration
is televised line inspections. See Wright, supra note 104.
1216. See Letter from James E. Rice, P.E., NRS Consulting Engineers to John W.
Lamb, Water Division (Aug. 23, 1999) (on file with author).
1217. See H.B. 1987, 82nd Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999).
1218. Telephone Interview with Steve Napper, Arkansas State Representative (Aug.
24, 2000).
1219. H.B. 1987, 82nd Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999).




votes to exit a House Committee, but the proposal is indicative of the
pressure that many Arkansas municipalities experience with regard to
stormwater discharges.'
Arkansas municipalities face the same challenges in maintaining
and/or rehabilitating their sewer systems. A recent illustration is a CWA
citizen suit by the Sierra Club.2. which alleged that the City of Little
Rock 223 violated the CWA through unlawful discharges of untreated
sewage from the city's sanitary sewer collection system. 224 The dis-
charges, commonly called sanitary sewer overflows ("SSOs"), allegedly
occurred 375 times between 1994 and 19 9 9 ." In its complaint, the
plaintiff alleged CWA violations for the SSOs, failure by the defendants
to report violations, and failure to perform an annual review of the Storm
Water Management Program."26 The plaintiff also alleged that the SSOs





i. Stormwater Associated with Industrial Activity
Pursuant to section 402(p) of the CWA'2
8 and the AWAPCA 229
owners and operators of facilities discharging stormwater associated with
industrial activity located in Arkansas must obtain permits for such
discharges. The Water Quality Act of 1987 added section 402(p) to the
CWA to provide a comprehensive framework for EPA to address
stormwater discharges.' ° The 1987 amendments listed five types of
1221. See id.
1222. See Sierra Club v. City of Little Rock, No. 4:00CV022 WRW (E.D. Ark.,
complaint filed Jan. 13, 2000).
1223. See id. The original defendants were the City of Little Rock, Little Rock Public
Works Department, Little Rock Sanitary Sewer Committee, and Little Rock
Wastewater Utility. See id.
1224. See id.
1225. See id. at 5.
1226. See id at 7-9.
1227. See id. at 9-10.
1228. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994).
1229. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-101 (LEXIS 2000).
1230. See33 U.S.C. § 1342(1994).
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stormwater discharges that were required to obtain a permit"" before
October 1, 1992.'
EPA subsequently promulgated proposed rules for NPDES general
permits and reporting requirements for stormwater discharges associated
with industrial activity." The agency determined that the issuance of
individual NPDES permit for many of these facilities would be burden-
some. It therefore proposed using "general permits" to initially cover the
majority of stormwater discharges associated with industrial activity. 2"4
The proposed rule for general permit requirements was finalized in April
1992.' A general permit for covered construction sites was issued in
September 1992.26 The final NPDES general permits for stormwater
discharges associated with industrial activity were promulgated on
September 25, 1992.' The language of both permits was adopted in
substantial part by DEQ."
The owner/operator of an affected Arkansas facility has three
permitting options for stormwater discharges. First, the facility may
address the stormwater discharge through acquisition of an NPDES
individual permit. 39 Acquiring an NPDES permit is more time consum
1231. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2) (1994). The five types of stormwater discharges
are as follows: a discharge with respect to which a permit had been issued prior to
February 4, 1987; a discharge associated with industrial activities; a discharge from a
municipal separate storm sewer system serving a population of 250,000 or more; a
discharge from a municipal separate storm sewer system serving a population of
100,000 or more but less than 250,000; or a discharge for which EPA or the state
determines that the stormwater discharge contributes to a violation of a WQS or is a
significant contributor of pollutants to the waters of the United States. See id.
1232. Congress later amended the Water Quality Act to change the date to October
1, 1994. See Pub. L. No. 102-580, 106 Stat. 4797 (1992).
1233. See 56 Fed. Reg. 40,948 (1991).
1234. See 56 Fed. Reg. 40,948, 40,954 (1991).
1235. See 57 Fed. Reg. 11,394 (1992).
1236. See 57 Fed. Reg. 41,176 (1992).
1237. See 57 Fed. Reg. 44,438 (1992). A detailed discussion of a dispute over
whether two facilities were in compliance with stormwater general permits is found in
EcologicalRights Foundation v. Pacific Lumber Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1999),
rev'd, 230 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).
1238. Telephone Interview with Chuck Bennett, Chief, Water Division, ADEQ (Nov.
9, 2000).
1239. See Arkansas NPDES Permit No. ARROOAOOO, Part I.C. (Aug. 31, 1998).
Apart from a facility seeking an NPDES individual permit for stormwater discharges,
the ADEQ director may require the facility to apply for an obtain an individual NPDES
permit. See id. In Scott Tie Co. v. Missouri Clean Water Commission, 972 S.W.2d 580
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998), the court affirmed the finding of the Missouri Clean Water
Commission and the Missouri Department ofNatural Resources denying an application
for a general pennit for a stormwater discharge at a facility that treats railroads with
creosote. Under Missouri regulations, the state agency could require a site specific
permit if the stormwater discharge is not in compliance with the conditions of the
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ing than the other two options.'24° A second option is to obtain authoriza-
tion for the discharge through a general NPDES permit. A general
NPDES permit affords coverage to discharges that meet certain eligibility
criteria."4' Finally, the facility may seek a general permit that covers
owners and operators of facilities discharging stormwater associated with
industrial activity. 242 There are, however, limitations on coverage for the
Arkansas general stormwater permit.2 43  For example, stormwater
discharges that are mixed with sources of non-stormwater are not covered
by the Arkansas general stormwater permit except where the non-
stormwater discharge is in compliance with a different NPDES permit and
is an authorized non-stormwater discharge.' 2"
general permit. See id. at 586.
1240. Telephone Interview with Doug Ford, Pollution Management, Inc. (Nov. 15,
2000).
1241. The eligibility criteria are specified in each general permit. The ADEQ has the
following general permits currently available: coal mining and coal exploration,
ARG040000; sanitary landfills, ARG160000; petroleum storage, ARG340000;
individual treatment, ARG550000; water treatment, ARG640000; hydrostatic testing,
ARG670001; car/truck wash, ARG750000; groundwater cleanup, ARG790000; self-
service laundry, ARG850000.
1242. The term "storm water associated with industrial activity" has an extensive
definition with eleven different subparts. The primary manner in which facilities are
identified is the standard industrial classification number for the facility. See Arkansas
NPDES Permit No. ARROOAOOO, Part I.B.4.
1243. See NPDES General Permit No. ARROOAOOO, Part l.B.3. Facilities which are
subject to existing effluent guideline limitations addressing stormwater where a
combination of stormwater and process water are ineligible for the Arkansas General
Stormwater Permit. These include cement manufacturing, feed lots, fertilizer
manufacturing, petroleum refining, phosphate manufacturing, steam electric, coal
mining, mineral mining and processing, or mining and dressing and asphalt emulsion.
If a facility has an existing NPDES individual or general permit where numeric
limitations exist, the facility is not eligible for the NPDES general permit. For
example, minor POTWs are not required to obtain a general stormwater permit. See
Letter from Steven G. Burghart, Engineer, ADEQ Water Division, to Jim Beazley, City
of Forrest City (Oct. 1, 1998) (on file with author).
A stormwater discharge associated with industrial activity from construction
activities are not eligible for this general permit. Stormwater discharges determined
to be contributive to a violation of a water quality standard are ineligible for coverage.
Stormwater discharges associated with industrial activities from inactive mining,
inactive landfills, or inactive oil and gas operations occurring on federal lands where
an operator cannot be identified are also ineligible. The general permit is not
applicable to discharges that would adversely affect listed endangered or threatened
species or its critical habitat. Finally, the stormwater discharges associated with
industrial activity that would effect property listed on or eligible for listing on the
National Register for Historic Places.
1244. See, e.g., In re Liquid Air Puerto Rico Corp., NPDES Appeal No. 92-1, 1994
EPA App. LEXIS 41 at *23 (May 5, 1994).
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In order to obtain coverage under the general permit for a stormwater
discharge associated with industrial activity, the applicant must submit a
Notice of Intent ("NOI") forty-eight hours prior to the desired coverage
period.245 The NOI provides ADEQ with basic information about the
facility such as its location and the existence of a stormwater pollution
prevention plan ("SWPPP"). 2" The SWPPP incorporates the various
measures the facility is undertaking to manage and/or otherwise control
facility stormwater discharges.'247 Many of the required measures are best
management practices as opposed to numerical effluent limits.2 8
Dischargers are given the discretion to choose best management practices
to address the stormwater discharges for their site or facility.' 49 A facility
must amend its SWPPP whenever a change in design, construction,
1245. See Arkansas NPDES Permit No. ARROOAOOO, Part II.A. (Aug. 31, 1998).
Note that oil and gas exploration, production, processing, treatment operations or
transmission facilities must submit an NOI within at least fourteen calendar days of a
discharge of reportable quantity of oil or hazardous substance where notification is
required pursuant to federal regulations. See id. Part II.A.2.
1246. See id. Part IlI.C. (Aug. 31, 1998). Except for oil and gas operations, the
SWPPP must be developed within 60 days of submitting and NOI. See id. Part
III.C. I.a.1.
1247. See id. Part IlI.C. (Aug. 31, 1998). At a minimum the plan includes the
following: identification of a pollution prevention team; description of potential
pollution sources; implementation of measures and controls for the facility;
comprehensive site evaluation; and consistency with other regulatory stormwater
management programs. There are additional requirements for discharges associated
with industrial activity to municipal separate storm sewers systems serving a population
of 100,000 or more; facilities subject to SARA Title i1l, section 313 requirements; and
facilities with salt storage piles. See id.
1248. See Telephone Interview with Doug Ford, Pollution Management, Inc. (Nov.
10, 2000). The only numeric limits contained in the general stormwater permit are for
coal pile runoff. See Arkansas NPDES Permit No. ARROOAOOO, Part IV (Aug. 31,
1998). Stormwater runoff containing any coal pile runoff shall not exceed total
suspended solids concentrations of 50 mg/I and must have a measured pH of 6 to 9
standard units. The permit does require that certain facilities undertake whole effluent
toxicity testing. In 1998, the ADEQ revised the permit to allow facilities to forego
whole effluent toxicity testing if it passes two consecutive testing periods. See id. Part
V.B. (August 31, 1998). Cf. Arkansas NPDES Permit No. ARROOAOOO, Part V.B.
(October 1, 1992). There was some amount of controversy regarding toxicity testing
requirements during the renewal of the Arkansas general stormwater permit for
industrial activity. Some commenters objected to the requirement of continued testing
for facilities that had failed to pass biomonitoring when new facilities were not subject
to the same requirements. The ADEQ disagreed. See Jim Floyd, ADEQ Response to
Comments; Final Permit Decision, Permit No. ARROOAOOO (July 24, 1998). See also
Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). For example,
municipal stormwater dischargers are not required to meet numeric limitations to
ensure strict compliance in meeting the WQS.




operation, or maintenance has a significant effect on the discharge of
pollutants in stormwater.'250
The Arkansas general stormwater permit also provides specific
monitoring and reporting requirements."' They vary depending upon the
type of facility. However, all facilities are required to report certain
events. For example, a release of a hazardous substance or oil in
stormwater in an amount equal to or in excess of a reporting quantity
established pursuant to the CWA'1 2 or CERCLA' 25 requires specific
responses of the discharger.'" The general permit mandates notification
to the National Response Center and submission to ADEQ of a descrip-
tion of the release and the circumstances leading to the release. The
facility must also modify the SWPPP within fourteen days of the release
to prevent recurrence of such a release.'
2. Construction Related Stormwater Permit
ADEQ issued a separate general stormwater permit for discharges
from construction sites. Permit coverage must be obtained ifconstruction
will disturb five or more acres of total land area.'256 The owner or operator
must obtain an Arkansas NPDES general stormwater permit for storm-
water associated with industrial activity from construction sites (hereinaf-
1250. See Arkansas NPDES Permit No. ARROOAOOO, Part III.C.3. (Aug. 31, 1998).
1251. See id. Part V (Aug. 31, 1998). Generally, sampling must occur at least once
per year and a discharge monitoring report is required for facilities identified in Part
V.B. I through V.B. 12 once per year. The monitoring and reporting requirements are
considered key components of the permit. The failure to monitor and report stormwater
discharges for the presence of SARA section 313 water priority chemicals has therefore
been a focus of federal enforcement. See In re Industrial Chemicals Corp., No. CWA-
02-99-3402, 2000 EPA ALJ LEXIS 58 (June 16, 2000). Note, however, many
Arkansas facilities are not required to perfonn sampling and/or monitoring.
1252. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 110.3-110.6 (2000).
1253. See 40 C.F.R. § 302(4) (2000). "
1254. See ARKANSAS GENERAL STORMWATER PERMITFOR INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY, PERMIT
No. ARR00A000, Part III.B. (Oct. 1, 1998).
1255. See id. See also Letter from Robert I. Van Heuvelen, Director, EPA Office of
Regulatory Enforcement to Robert Van Voorhees and Carol Lynn Green, Bryan Cave,
LLP (Aug. 2, 1996) (discussing CERCLA reporting requirements of releases for
ethylene glycol during deicing operations at airports with NPDES general stormwater
permits) (on file with author).
1256. See NPDES Permit for Discharges of Stormwater Associated with Industrial
Activity from Construction Sites Located in the State of Arkansas, Permit No.
ARRIOAOOO Part l(b)(1) (July 1, 1998). However, a stormwater permit for
construction may not be necessary where the discharge from the construction site is
directed through a treatment system covered by an individual NPDES permit. See, e.g.,
Letter from J.W. Ross, Environmental Associate, Eastman Chemical Company to Mark
Bradley, Water Division, ADEQ (May 3, 1996) (on file with author).
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ter "general stormwater construction permit"). The permit not only covers
construction sites but also stormwater discharges from support activities,
e.g., concrete or asphalt batch plants, equipment staging yards, material
storage areas, and excavated material disposal areas. 1
257
An owner or operator desiring coverage from the general stormwater
permit must submit a NOI to the ADEQ.'2 - The NO[ must be submitted
at least forty-eight hours prior to the commencement of work at the
construction site.'"'9 Prior to the submittal of a NOI, the facility must
prepare a SWPPP in accordance with good engineering practices.' 2 ° Like
the industrial general stormwater permit, the owner or operator using the
Arkansas general stormwater permit for construction activity must keep
the SWPPP current.'26 ' The requirements of the NOI and the SWPPP
generally mirror those continued in the Arkansas General Stormwater
Permit for Industrial Activity.' 262
The Arkansas general stormwater permit requires the SWPPP to
contain a description of the following: site characteristics, appropriate
controls, measures to control pollutants in stormwater discharges and
other controls, requirements specified in approved state or local plans for
sediment and erosion control, maintenance, and inspection.'263 The
required controls typically constitute best management practices. 1264
1257. See NPDES Permit No. ARRIOAOOO, Part I(B)(2). Eligibility for the general
stormwater construction permit for support activities requires that the support activity
(i) be directly related to the construction site, (ii) is not a commercial operation serving
multiple unrelated construction projects, and (iii) identify appropriate control measures
in the stormwater pollution prevention plan for discharges from the support activity
areas. See id.
1258. See id. Part II.
1259. See id.
1260. See id. Part III.D.
1261. See id. Part III.D.3 (May 31, 1998).
1262. See Telephone Interview with Doug Ford, P.E., Pollution Management, Inc.
(Nov. 10, 2000).
1263. See NPDES Permit No.ARRIOAOOO, Part lll.D.4. The erosion and sediment
controls required in the SWPPP include stabilization and structural practices.
Examples of stabilization practices include temporary seeding, mulching, geotextiles,
and sod stabilization. Examples of structural practices are silt fences, dikes, swales,
check dams, and sediment traps. See id. at Part III.D.4.b.
1264. A detailed discussion of various BMPs used in the stormwater context is found
in City ofNew York v. Anglebrook L.P., 891 F. Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In City of New
York, the city opposed construction of a private golf club near two of the city's many
reservoirs that serve as its water supply. The city objected to practically every portion
ofthe SWPPP the golf course developer had prepared for the general stormwater permit
issued by the New York Department of Environmental Conservation. Specifically, the
city challenged the provisions of the SWPPP calling for sodding on steep slopes, the
use of diversions, the spacing and length of silt fences and the amount of exposed soil
at any one time. In addition, the city objected to the stormwater management controls
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The construction stormwater permit requires the SWPPP to contain
a description of the same items as the Arkansas general stormwater
permit.' 261 If a party opposes the construction activity allowed by the
general permit, the party may question the implementation or suitability
of the various elements of the SWPPP.'
266
The responsibility for the preparation of the SWPPP and compliance
with the other applicable CWA stormwater requirements must be
allocated between the parties involved in the project or activity. These
regulated requirements have been in place for enough time that they are
now generally and routinely addressed in construction contracts.'267
Regardless, issues can still arise in various contexts. For example, in
United States ex rel. Ashok Bhatnagar v. Kiewett Pacific Co,'2" a qui tam
action was filed against a California state agency and a contractor under
the federal False Claims Act' 29 for allegedly improper claims arising out
of payment for stormwater pollution prevention measures. A key issue
was whether the contractor was due additional compensation under
contract because CWA SWPPP amendments were required during the
course of the project. 7
b. Phase II Requirements
The Phase II stormwater controls require all small municipal sewer
systems ("MSS") to establish a stormwater discharge control program that
meets six minimum control measures. '27 The minimum control measures
such as the use of the proper runoff coefficient and the methods of first flush control.
Finally, the city questioned the contents of the SWPPP for failing to protect against
thermal pollution from stormwater discharged into a trout designated stream, and the
inspection and monitoring requirements during the construction. See id. at 916-23.
Ultimately, the court rejected each of the issues the city raised. See id.
1265. See NPDES Permit No. ARRIOAOOO, Part III.D.4. The erosion and sediment
controls required in the SWPPP include stabilization and structural practices.
Examples of stabilization practices include temporary seeding, mulching, geotextiles,
and sod stabilization. Examples of structural practices are silt fences, dikes, swales,
check dams, and sediment traps. See id. Part lll.D.4.b.
1266. See, e.g., Anglebrook, 891 F. Supp. at 916-23.
1267. See Telephone Interview with Doug Ford, P.E., Pollution Management, Inc.
(Dec. 13, 2000). Contractual provisions addressing stormwater compliance on a
construction site are described in United States v. Kiewitt Pacific Co., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14400 at **17-20 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
1268. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14400 at **17-20 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
1269. See 33 U.S.C. § 3279 (1994).
1270. See Kiewitt, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14400 at *'17-20.




are public education outreach on stormwater impacts, public involvement
and participation, discharge protection and elimination, construction site
stormwater runoff control, post-construction stormwater management in
new development and redevelopment, and pollution prevention/good-
housekeeping for municipal operations. 2' If a governmental entity
operates a small MSS within an urbanized area, it is subject to the Phase
11 regulations. There are several counties and cities in Arkansas that may
be subject to these regulations. These governmental entities include cities
and towns within the following counties: Benton, Crawford, Crittenden,
Jefferson, Miller, Pulaski, Saline, Sebastian, and Washington. 2'
Concern has been expressed about the impact of this program on
Arkansas. 74 ADEQ's ability to staff and administer the program has
been questioned. 12 71 Also, the direct cost to cities for implementation and
administration of the program is thought to be significant. 276 The concern
has focused in particular on smaller communities because of their limited
tax base. 1
277
This program will also potentially affect smaller Arkansas municipal-
ities. ADEQ will be required to examine several Arkansas cities for
potential designation as small MSSs. 12' The following municipalities
have been identified based upon the 1990 census: Arkadelphia, Benton,
Blytheville, Conway, El Dorado, Hot Springs, Magnolia, Rogers, Searcy,
and Stuttgart. As a result of the possible impact on Arkansas municipali-
ties, the Arkansas House of Representatives Committee on City, County,
and Local Affairs has requested that the Arkansas congressional delega-
tion seek a delay of the implementation of the Phase II regulations. 279 The
1272. See id.
1273. See id. at 68,812.
1274. See Hearing before the Arkansas House and Senate Interim Committee on City,
County and Local Affairs (Sept. 29, 2000) (statement of Jim Beavers, City Engineer,
Fayetteville, Arkansas) [hereinafter Hearing]. Some cities believe that they may have
many other requirements for developing a stormwater management plan already in
place. See, e.g., Jean Bolduc, Carrboro Has Lead on New Stormwater Rules, CHAPEL HILL
HERALD, Oct. 9, 2000, at IA.
1275. See Hearing, supra note 1273.
1276. In 1995, former United States Representative Blanche Lambert Lincoln of
Arkansas quoted National League of Cities figures that estimated the cost for some
cities to obtain a pennit at $625,000. See 141 Cong. Rec. E 63 (daily ed. Mar. 16,
1995).
1277. See id.
1278. See 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,835 (1999).
1279. See Arkansas House and Senate Interim Committee on City, County and Local
Affairs, Minutes (Sept. 29, 2000).
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committee suggested that a study of the financial impact be undertaken in
lieu of implementation.1
20
e. No-Discharge Water Pollution Control Permits
I. Permits
The AAWPCA provides ADEQ broader statutory authority for
permitting purposes than found within the CWA. The agency may in
some circumstances require that permits be obtained for activities that will
not necessarily discharge pollutants directly into a waterbody. ADEQ
refers to these requirements as "no discharge" permits. A wide variety of
facilities undertake activities that necessitate obtaining such permits.
They include operations as diverse as car washes1 211 and hog farms.
2. Sludge Management
In Arkansas, most sewage sludge is managed pursuant to a state no-
discharge water permit issued by ADEQ.'282 Many Arkansas POTWs
transfer sludge to farming operations for application to crops pursuant to
a state permit. 12 3 The state uses the no-discharge water permit, which
incorporates many of the requirements of part 503 of the federal regula-
tions. "" However, EPA has proposed that ADEQ administer the sewage
sludge program pursuant to the CWA. 285 Consequently, EPA proposed
an NPDES general permit and reporting requirements for the beneficial
reuse or disposal of municipal sewage sludge in Arkansas.' 2' The ADEQ
1280. See id.
1281. See, e.g., Letter from Chuck Bennett, Chief, Water Division, ADEQ to Ira
Sims, Ira Sims Car Wash and Convenience Store (May 15, 1995) (enclosing permit to
operate car wash waste disposal system). The four bay carwash projected a 2,300
gallon per day wastewater flow that would be treated by sediment basins, grease traps,
48-hours of storage in septic tanks, and a leach field. See Letter from Mark A. Gross,
Ph.D., Rural Engineering Services, Inc., to Harold Seifert, Arkansas Department of
Health (Jan. 13, 1995).
1282. See Telephone Interview with Keith Brown, Manager, State Permits Branch,
ADEQ Water Division (Dec. 12, 2000).
1283. See Robert J. Smith, Fayetteville Weighs Optionsfor Sewage Sludge Disposal, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETE, Nov. 21, 2000, at I B (referencing sludge management practices
of various Arkansas cities).
1284. See, e.g., Wilcox Land & Cattle Co., Permit No. 4497-WR-2 (May 5, 2000).
1285. See 33 U.S.C. § 1345(c)(1994).
1286. See 63 Fed. Reg. 45,241 (1998).
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has submitted an application. 7 to EPA to administer the program
according to the requirements of the federal regulations.28
f. The AAWPCA Role As a Remediation Authority
The AAWPCA's role is not limited to simply authorizing the
Arkansas NPDES and other permitting programs. The jurisdictional
reach of this statute is broader than that provided by the CWA. The
Arkansas statute provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful to place any ...
wastes in a location where it is likely to cause pollution of any waters of
the state."'28 9 "Waters of the state" is defined as "all streams, lakes,
marshes, ponds, watercourses, waterways, wells, springs, irrigations
systems, drainage systems, and all other bodies or accumulations of water,
surface and underground, natural or artificial, public or private which are
contained within, flow through, or border upon this state or any portion
of the state.1'
'29
The key difference between the AAWPCA and the CWA is
jurisdiction. Arkansas and other similar state statutes have greater
jurisdictional reach than found in the CWA. The AAWPCA encompasses
any location containing contaminants that may pollute or impact waters
of the state. Unlike the CWA, waters of the state will usually not be
limited to surface waterbodies. The term may include groundwater and
other subsurface water. Also, the contaminants or pollutants do not
necessarily have to physically enter the waters of the state. Phrases such
as "likely to render such waters harmful" or "may cause pollution of
waters of the state" means a pollutant does not have to be present in a
waterbody to fall within the scope of the statute. For example, contami-
nants located on surface soil could constitute a violation if it can be
demonstrated they may migrate laterally to surface water or downward to
groundwater. 29
1287. Telephone Interview with Doug Ford, P.E., Pollution Management, Inc. (Dec.
14, 2000).
1288. See 40 C.F.R. § 503 (2000).
1289. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-217 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1290. A number of states have similar statutory authorities. See Cadlerock Properties
Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Envtl. Protection, 757 A.2d I (2000)
(describing Connecticut's use of state statute to address activities allegedly affecting
"waters of the state").
1291. The scope of these state statutory authorities is not unlimited. In Jerry Russell
Bliss, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 485 N.E.2d 1154 (III. Ct. App. 1985), the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency ("IEPA") alleged violation of such an Illinois statute.
It cited a company whose truck had sprayed liquids containing 10,000 parts per million
trichloroethylene into an area. See id at 1156-57. The court, reviewing the propriety
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The breadth of the AAWPCA is an important tool for the ADEQ.
Agencies can only address those activities or conditions for which the
jurisdictional elements of one or more environmental statutes exist. For
example, the discharge of a CWA pollutant will not be encompassed by
the NPDES program if it simply results in subsurface soil contamination.
Two subtitles of the RCRA might be applicable to such subsurface
contamination in certain circumstances. Subtitle C of RCRA may be
applicable to the liquids that are released if they constitute "hazardous
waste."' 2  If this jurisdictional element (i.e., "hazardous waste") is
absent, the program does not apply. However, if the source of the
subsurface contamination was a release of petroleum from an under-
ground storage tank, subtitle I of RCRA may be triggered. 93 If instead
the petroleum is released from an aboveground storage tank, Subtitle I is
inapplicable."
These scenarios demonstrate that the absence of any one jurisdic-
tional element precludes the CWA's and other statutes' use in addressing
certain activities and/or environmental conditions. These federal statutory
gaps and/or limitations tend to magnify the importance of state statutes
such as the AAWPCA since they often have broader jurisdictional
coverage. The AAWPCA terms "pollutant" and "waters of the state"' 95
of this action, noted:
Although TCE is listed by the Board as a toxic hazardous substance, a
principal draftsman of the Environmental Protection Act recognized that the
mere presence of a potential source of water pollutants on the land does not
necessarily constitute a water pollution hazard. In the present case it was
shown that TCE contaminated oil was deposited in a quantity sufficient to
puddle on the surface of the ground in an area which is located 1,200 feet
from the Mississippi River and which is prone to leaky artesian conditions.
It was also shown that this oil contained a TCE concentration in excess of
10,000 parts per million. However, no effort was made to establish that this
particular quantity and concentration of TCE was likely to create a nuisance
or to render the waters harmful, detrimental, or injurious. We therefore
conclude that the finding of the Pollution Control Board that respondents
were guilty of violations of sections 12(a) and 12(d) of the Environmental
Protection Act must be reversed.
See id. at 1156-57 (internal citations omitted). See also EPA v. Ayshire Coal Co., 1972
Ill. ENV LEXIS 278 * I (clarifying by the Illinois Control Board that its holding should
not be read to mean mere presence of water pollutants on the land necessarily
constitutes a "threat" of water in violation of section 12(a)).
1292. The term "hazardous waste" is defined at 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (2000).
1293. Subtitle I regulations are found at 40 C.F.R. § 280 (2000) The corresponding
Arkansas regulations are found in ADEQ Regulation No. 12. See also Wright, supra
note 241; Wright & Morrissey, supra note 21, at 290.
1294. There is neither a federal nor Arkansas investigation/remediation program for
AST petroleum releases analogous to the Subtitle I UST provisions.
1295. The agency believes that any number of water quality changes or conditions
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are more likely to encompass the activities and/or conditions described in
the previous scenarios. Consequently, ADEQ considers the AAWPCA
a key state environmental protection authority. 2' The agency will use
this statutory authority in its broadest context to prevent degradation of
state water quality.'297
g. Ancillary Provisions/Issues
1. Compliance Deferral/Interim Authorizations
a. Schedules of.Compliance/lnterim Limits
An NPDES permit issued by ADEQ will specify a point in time by
which various effluent limits and other requirements must be met.
Permittees sometimes seek to defer compliance or reduce the stringency
of effluent limits after a permit is issued. An important question is
whether ADEQ can grant such a request.
Some courts have declined to characterize the issuance of an order
allowing reduced effluent limits as a permit modification." Instead, the
action has been deemed an exercise by the agency of its enforcement
discretion.' 2" A key question is whether EPA or another party could
enforce the underlying permit limits despite ADEQ's exercise of such
enforcement discretion.1300
such as pH, BOD, turbidity, etc. can potentially constitute pollution to waters of the
state.
1296. Telephone Interview with Michelle Kinder and Ellen Carpenter, Attorneys,
Legal Division, ADEQ (Sept. 25, 2000).
1297. See id. It should be noted that the use of this authority is not limited to the
investigation and/or remediation of spills, releases, discharges, etc. that have or are
currently taking place. Instead, ADEQ believes it may in appropriate circumstances
order actions or measures that it deems necessary to prevent such events. See id. The
standard by which such mandates will presumably be measured is whether they were
necessary to prevent pollution to waters of the state. See id.
1298. See generally Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co., 861 F. Supp. 889
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
1299. See id. at 898-99.
1300. A related issue has been addressed in United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965




b. Interim Construction/Operating Authority
In 1995, amendments to the Arkansas Water and Air Pollution
Control Act 3°' by the Arkansas General Assembly authorized ADEQ to
grant interim authority (to construct and/or operate) or variances during
the permit issuance process.3 2 In 1999, the General Assembly provided
ADEQ criteria with which to consider requests for interim authority or
variances. 3' Unless the request is prohibited by federal law, the ADEQ
Director may grant "temporary variances from the requirements of any
permit issued by the Department; or interim authority to construct or
operate during the pendency of any applicable public notice period,
application review and permit issuance process. '
The ADEQ Director must consider "the environmental and public
health effects of the temporary variance; and any economic advantage
obtained by the party requesting the variance over other similarly situated
facilities operating in accordance with similar permit conditions which did
not request a variance."'3 5  The ADEQ Director may consider the
avoidability of the compliance problem, the effect denial of the request
would have on the business, the compliance history of the requesting
party, and whether the request is in the public interest.' This interim
authority and power to grant variances provides new or existing busi-
nesses a valuable tool to adjust for market and production fluctuations
during the permit application process. ADEQ also can be flexible in
crafting solutions by granting conditional variances that mandate some
additional action.
c. Consent Administrative Orders
NPDES permittees and their supervising agencies sometimes
negotiate and execute documents known as consent administrative orders
("CAO") to address compliance difficulties and/or resolve enforcement
actions. The ADEQ uses CAOs for these and other purposes. Of
particular relevance, however, is their use to defer30 7 compliance with
1301. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-101 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1302. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-230 (LEXIS Repl. 2000). See Wright & Morrissey,
supra note 21, at 816-817 (discussing statute).




1307. See Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(discussing Georgia Environmental Protection Division's modification of certain
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certain NPDES permit conditions/limits and/or revise 131 them. 3 A CAO
or similar mechanism may be the only option for a facility seeking to
modify its obligations under an NPDES permit condition or limitation
based on an Arkansas or federal regulation.," 0
Questions have arisen in other jurisdictions regarding the ability or
legality of a CAO provision that attempts to defer or revise federal CWA
provisions. 31 1 In Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc.,'3 2 a facility argued
that copper and zinc discharges that exceeded the corresponding permit
limits were not violations. 3  The basis for the argument was that the
Georgia Environmental Protection Division had extended the compliance
date for such limits through a unilateral order and a subsequent CAO."'4
The court ruled that the compliance extensions did not operate as a bar to
a citizen action for violation of the zinc and copper limits. 3t 5 It noted that
effluent limits contained in agency unilateral order (which previously modified NPDES
pernit)).
1308. See, e.g., Letter from Sammy R. Bates, R.E.M., Remington Arms Company,
Inc. to Eugene P. Lewis, NPDES Enforcement Supervisor, ADPC&E, Draft CAO (Feb.
5, 1998) (requesting that draft consent administrative order include interim/revised
limits for BOD).
1309. An administrative order was utilized to provide an Arkansas facility certain
interim effluent limits (BODs) during the pendency of an EPA evidentiary hearing. See
Memorandum from Myron 0. Knudson, Director, Water Management Division, EPA
Region 6, to Cynthia C. Daugherty, Director of Permits Division, EPA Region 6, CPS
Chemical Company, Evidentiary Hearing Negotiations (Oct. 21, 1994). The facility
apparently appealed an EPA denial of its request for a FDF variance. See id.
1310. An example is the Southwestern Electric Power Company's ("SWEPCO")
request to extend the compliance date for a permit condition setting a temperature
requirement for the facility's wastewater discharge. See Letter from Patrick Miller,
Environmental Specialist Southwestern Electric Power Company, to Maria Jastrzebski,
ADEQ (June 12, 1992). ADEQ was unwilling to grant the request stating in part:
SWEPCO requested that "monitoring and reporting only" requirement be
extended. However, based on Section I(D) of the Arkansas Water Quality
Standards 2, "... compliance with new water quality standards at the earliest
practicable time; but not to exceed three years from effective date of perm it."
Since the existing permit already gave the permittee two years and nine
months to achieve compliance, the Department must deny your request for
an extension of temperature requirements at outfall 40 1.
... However, your request may be considered and may be granted
through the issuance of a Consent Administrative Order.
See Letter from Chuck C. Bennett, Chief, Water Division, ADEQ to Patrick Miller,
Environmental Specialist, SWEPCO (July I, 1992) (on file with author).
1311. See, e.g., United States v. Wayne County, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18775 (Dec.
22, 1994) (illustrating the ability of a CAO to dictate the inclusion of certain provisions
in an applicable NPDES permit).
1312. 913 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
1313. Seeid. at 1579.
1314. See id. at 1579-80.
1315. See id. at 1579.
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the NPDES permit modification procedures'3 6 must be followed to extend
the compliance date.'37 Otherwise, such actions are simply statements by
the agency as to how it will exercise their prosecutorial discretion.'
a
1
d. Permit Appeal Resolution
Parties may on occasion appeal one or more terms/conditions found
in an NPDES, air, or other permit issued by ADEQ. These appeals are
usually resolved prior to a hearing on the merits of the appeal. 139 The
ADEQ and the facility may agree to alter some of the permit
terms/conditions. 3  A document denominated a "Permit Appeal
Resolution" is often used to provide the facility the authority to operate
under the different terms/conditions until the issuance of a modified
permit. 1321
2. Permit Transfer
The ownership and/or control of facilities holding NPDES and other
ADEQ water program permits often changes because of a sale, lease, or
other commercial transaction. A change in ownership and/or operational
control of the facility may require the transfer of the permits to the new
owner or operator. However, such transfers may only occur after certain
notification, disclosure, and other procedural requirements are met.
a. Transactions Constituting Transfers
In EnviroClean, Inc. v. Arkansas Pollution Control & Ecology Commis-
sion,1322 an Arkansas air permit was issued to a company that allowed it to
1316. Seeid. at 1580.
1317. See id.
1318. See Culbertson, 913 F. Supp. at 1580. See also United States v. City of Toledo,
867 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (pointing out state agency suspension of permit
limits does not affect federal enforcement).
1319. Interview with Mary Ellen Temes (Dec. 7,2000).
1320. See id.
132 1. See. e.g., In re El Dorado Chemical Co., No. 99-013-P, 2000 AR ENV LEXIS
15 (APCEC Mar. 15, 2000). Paragraph 4 of the "Agreement" section of the document
notes, "[b]eginning Monday, May 1, 2000 and until a final agency decision regarding
the draft permit attached hereto as Attachment "A" is issued by ADEQ, EDCC shall
operate in accordance with the terms and provisions of the draft permit attached hereto
as Attachment 'A."' Id. at *3. See also In re North Little Rock Wastewater Utility, No.
99-012-P (Oct. 17, 2000) (revising TSS limits by Permit Appeal Resolution).
1322. 314 Ark. 98, 858 S.W.2d 116(1993).
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construct a medical waste incinerator. Condition 12 of the air permit
specified that it was issued to the applicant and could not be transferred
to another party."323 One hundred percent of the stock of the company
holding the air permit was subsequently sold. 1324 Also, there was a
change in directors and officers. 3 z' Because of the changes in owner-
ship and control, ADPC&E revoked the permit based on a violation of
condition 12.1326
The company challenged this decision arguing that the transfer of
all of its stock did not result in a transfer of the permit.3 27 It cited
caselaw stating that the distinct identity of a corporation (separate from
its shareholders) is not lost because all stock is owned by a single
shareholder.3 28 ADPC&E responded that it was not necessary to apply
corporate law concepts and that the corporate entity could be disre-
garded.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the corporate form was
abused in order to transfer the permitted facility in violation ofcondition
12.1 29 It noted condition 12 enables the ADPC&E to determine who is
responsible for operational decisions of the facility. The court cited
various circumstances that it believed supported the state agency's
decision such as the fact that a practical change in control occurred.
330
ADPC&E's decision was therefore upheld.
b. Procedural Requirements
ADEQ regulations require that a thirty day notice be given to ADEQ if
a facility proposes to transfer an ADEQ permit.1331' This notification
requirement can pose a practical problem in a transactional context. The
date on which title or operational control will shift may not allow for a
thirty day notification to ADEQ. Therefore, the applicant for a permit
1323. Condition 12 of the permit stated, "[t]his permit is issued to the applicant
alone. It may not be transferred to another party. In the event of the sale of the
permitted facility, this permit shall expire and the purchaser must apply for a new
permit." Id. at 100, 858 S.W.2d at 117.
1324. See id., 858 S.W.2d at 117.
1325. See id., 858 S.W.2d at 117.
1326. See id., 858 S.W.2d at 117.
1327. See id, 858 S.W.2d at 117.
1328. See id. at 101, 858 S.W.2d at 118.
1329. See Enviroclean, 314 Ark. at 102-03, 858 S.W.2d at 119.
1330. As opposed to a simple change in shareholders.
1331. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 (2000).
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transfer may be required to request a variance 2 to continue operations
during the pendency of the permit transfer process. 3
c. Acquisition/Divestiture Liabilities
The status of ADEQ water program permits can be a material issue
in some transactions. First, the permits obviously authorize activities that
are critical to the successful operation of the plant or facility. If the
permits are not properly transferred, the new buyer or lessee may not hold
the permits necessary to operate the business.
It is equally important that the buyer determine whether the facility
will be able to comply with the permit limitations under future operating
scenarios. This assessment will include the projected capital and
operating costs to attain and/or maintain compliance with the permit
limits/conditions. The failure to do so presents the risk of acquiring a
plant that is more expensive to operate than expected. Of equal concern
is the possibility that a future operational scenario will require a permit
modification that is difficult to obtain.
334
Costs may also be generated by a facility or operation where a
permitted activity or process is or has been discontinued. Some water and
other permitting programs require that certain decontamination, investiga-
tion, and/or closure activities be undertaken when the permitted activity
is discontinued. An example might be a dairy that discontinues its waste
disposal system (pond) system. The system may be subject to an
Arkansas non-discharge water pollution control permit. A buyer that
acquires a dairy with a discontinued operation should ensure that closure
of the pond has been accomplished or budget for these expenses.
33 5
1332. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-230 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1333. See, e.g., Letter from Randall Mathis, Director, ADEQ, to Christopher Childres,
Garrison Operating, LLC, Request for Variance (Aug. 8, 2000) (granting variance to
continue facility operations during permitting process for transfer of air permit from
Garrison Industries to Garrison Operating, LLC).
1334. For example, assume a buyer is proposing to modify or expand a facility
process that will increase the amount of organic material that must be discharged into
an adjacent stream. ADEQ's willingness to modify this NPDES permit to allow the
increase will depend in part on the applicable WQS and the stream's assimilative
capacity. The amount of assimilative capacity will depend in part on the WQS
involved and the amount of relevant pollutants already being discharged into this
waterbody.
1335. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel P. Sawyer, Enforcement Administrator, Water
Division, ADEQ, to Bill Duncan, Hap Teter Dairy Farm, Closure Plan for Old Hap
Teter Dairy Property (May 30, 1997) (on file with author). ADEQ notified the buyer
of an inactive dairy farm with a permitted waste pond that certain closure activities may






Parties other than applicants are provided the right to appeal ADEQ
permitting decisions.' 37 Actions by such parties are known as third-party
appeals. However, such an appeal may only be prosecuted if the third
party participated in the notice and comment period associated with the
permit. Whether a third party petitioner complied with the prerequisites
for requesting review before the APCEC is often the initial issue contested
during an appeal. The prerequisites include a requirement to include in
the request for hearing "a complete and detailed statement identifying the
legal and factual objections to the permit action.' 338
An issue that sometimes arises is whether incorporating comments
by reference into a Request for Commission Review and Adjudicatory
Hearing sufficiently identifies the legal and factual objections to a permit
with the specificity and detail required by the applicable statute and
regulations. 39 Consequently, a petitioner may raise all issues identified
in its public comments and attach the public comments to the pleading
requesting commission review to ensure that every issue raised by the
petitioner is considered in the appeal.
establish a trust fund to close such ponds or lagoons that are "abandoned." See, e.g., Kim
Mcguire, Ecology Panel Rejects Animal- Waste Fund, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETIUE, Oct. 27,
2000, at I I B. ADEQ staff has stated: "[Tihey can't find any proof that farmers are abandoning
waste lagoons since it's in their best interest to clean up any messes before they sell the land in
order to preserve property values." Id. No agreement has been reached by the APCEC to
propose such legislation. See id.
1336. Various issues associated with the judicial review of federal and state
administrative actions are found in Wright & Henry, supra note 156, at 355-363.
1337. Note that a party must exhaust administrative remedies to pursue challenges
in ajudicial forum. See Romine v. Arkansas Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 342 Ark. 380,
__ S.W.3d __ (Oct. 18, 2000).
1338. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-205(b)(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2000); ADEQ Reg. 8 §
2.5.3(b)(2)(C) (2000).
1339. See In re Wilcox Land & Cattle Co., No. 00-003-P, Order No. 4 (Aug. 2,2000)
(finding petitioners incorporation by reference of its comments and the attachment of
the comments adequately identifies issues in conformance with the statutory
requirements); In re United States Dept. of the Army Pine BluffArsenal, No. 99-002-P,
Order No. 4 (June 3, 1999) (finding petitioners failed to properly raise two issues when
they were incorporated from over 100 pages of public comments attached to the




a. Acquisition of Federal CWA Enforcement Authority
The 1972 amendments initially allocated CWA enforcement
responsibilities to EPA. Consequently, beginning in the late 1970s and
continuing through the 1980s, the federal government had the primary
role for CWA enforcement in Arkansas and other states. The federal
government's CWA enforcement targets in Arkansas included both
municipalities and industrial/commercial facilities. 3 '
ADEQ assumed responsibility for CWA enforcement on the date of
program delegation.Y4" However, Arkansas' acquisition of the CWA
NPDES program did not end federal enforcement activity in the state.
The federal government retained control of investigations it had begun on
or before the 1986 delegation of the program to ADEQ. 4 Regardless,
1340. Representative examples ofthese actions include United States v. Hudson Foods,
Inc., 77-4088, 1978 EPA Consent LEXIS 34 (W.D. Ark. 1978) (addressing alleged
CWA violations by Hope, Arkansas poultry processing facility); UnitedStatesv. Missouri
Pac. R.R. Co., No. LR-C-78-398, 1981 EPA Consent LEXIS 64 (E.D. Ark. 1981)
(addressing alleged CWA violations by North Little Rock, Arkansas facilities); United
States v. Fort Smith, No. 83-2121, 1983 EPA Consent LEXIS 41 (W.D. Ark. 1983)
(specifying various remedial actions that must be undertaken by POTW to improve
treatment processes); United States v. City of W Memphis, No. 84-356, 19885 EPA
Consent LEXIS 181 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (specifying various remedial actions that must
be undertaken by POTW to improve and expand treatment processes).
1341. See Telephone Interview with Vince Blubaugh, Principal, GBMc & Associates
(Nov. 15, 2000).
1342. See id. Representative examples of post-delegation EPA enforcement actions
included United States v. City of Berryville, No. 87-3010, 1987 EPA Consent LEXIS 340
(W.D. Ark. 1987) (requiring that POTW expand and upgrade treatment processes and
refuse acceptance of IU influent non-compliant with certain standards); United States v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., No. 87-443, 1987 EPA Consent LEXIS 166 (E.D. Ark. 1987)
(addressing alleged CWA violations by Fordyce, Arkansas industrial facility); United
States v. Lennox Indus., No. 86-378, 1988 EPA Consent LEXIS 176 (E.D. Ark. 1988)
(addressing alleged CWA violations by Stuttgart, Arkansas commercial heating and air-
conditioning equipment manufacturing facility); UnitedStates v. CityofHarrison, No. 88-
3007, 1988 EPA Consent LEXIS 108 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (addressing alleged CWA
violations by Harrison, Arkansas POTW and requiring improvement of treatment plant
processes); UnitedStates v. City ofBlytheville, No. J-C-85-125, 1988 EPA Consent LEXIS
142 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (addressing alleged CWA violations by Blytheville, Arkansas
POTW and requiring improvement of treatment plant processes); United States v. City
of Monticello, No. PB-C-89-403, 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 588 (E.D. Ark. 1989)
(addressing alleged CWA violations by Monticello, Arkansas POTW and requiring
improvement of treatment plant processes); United States v. Tyson Foods. Inc., No. 87-
3010, 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 202 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (addressing alleged CWA
violations by Berryville, Arkansas chicken processing facility discharging into POTW);
United States v. Pine BluffWastewater Util. Comm 'n, No. PB-C-89-46 I, 1989 EPA Consent
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the vast majority of NPDES and all other water pollution control
governmental enforcement actions have been undertaken by the State of
Arkansas since 1986.
ADEQ's authority and responsibility to assure compliance with both
the CWA and non-CWA requirements is found in the AWAPCA. The
AWAPCA charges ADEQ with the responsibility to enforce laws and
regulations regarding the pollution of waters in Arkansas. 34 3 ADEQ has
several tools at its disposal to fulfill this duty. They include authority to
obtain information, assess penalties, and order that certain actions be
undertaken.
b. Information Acquisition Provisions
ADEQ has the authority to conduct investigations and gather data to
ensure that facilities 3" are complying with applicable regulations and
permit requirements."'s Specifically, the ADEQ Water Division conducts
investigations concerning water pollution measures through its inspection
branch. 3"' District field supervisors and inspector supervisors employed
within the ADEQ Inspection Branch inspect facilities to ensure permit
compliance,' investigate citizens' complaints against industries, respond
to chemical spills, investigate fish kills when environmental causes are
suspected, and collect water samples from Arkansas waters. 3"
LEXIS 587 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (addressing alleged CWA violations by Pine Bluff
Wastewater Utility Commission and requiring improvement of treatment plant
processes); United States v. Piper Indus., No. H-C-89-95, 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 589
(E.D. Ark. 1989) (addressing alleged CWA violations by Clarendon, Arkansas
electroplating facility); United States v. CPSChemical Co., Inc., No. J-C-90-43, 1992 EPA
Consent LEXIS 45 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (addressing alleged CWA violations by West
Memphis chemical manufacturing facility).
1343. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-201(a)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). State statutory
enforcement provisions other than the AWAPCA are utilized on occasion to protect
surface water. For example, the enforcement provisions of the Arkansas Solid Waste
Management Act ("ASWMA") were used in an enforcement action against an
individual that allegedly dumped waste near a waterway. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-6-
201 to -222 (LEXIS 2000). See also Renfro v. State, 331 Ark. 253, 962 S.W.2d 745
(1998).
1344. "Facility" means "the public or private area, premises, curtilage, building or
conveyance described as the subject of administrative inspection. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 8-I-107(b)(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1345. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-201(a)(2)(B) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1346. See ADEQ Water Division, Inspection Branch (visited Feb. 9, 2001)
<http://www.adeq/water/branch_inspection.htm>.
1347. To verify compliance with its permit, a facility must submit monitoring reports
to ADEQ. See id.
1348. See ADEQ Water Division, Citizen On-line Complaint Form (visited Feb. 9,
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Owners and operators of facilities that discharge wastewater into
Arkansas waters must furnish relevant information after a request by
ADEQ.'349 To enforce any law under the jurisdiction of ADEQ, autho-
rized employees of the agency may obtain records and conduct inspec-
tions at facilities.'"" ADEQ Water Division inspectors may randomly
inspect permitted facilities. 35' Also, if the agency has a reasonable belief
that a facility is violating a law under jurisdiction of ADEQ, it may
demand entry onto any property to inspect that facility.'" 2 In general, a
rebuttable presumption exists that ADEQ has jurisdiction to inspect a
facility.1' 3 Entities that deny the agency consent to enter their property
may be subject to prosecution if it is forced to obtain an administrative
inspection warrant from a judicial officer.'"" When imminent danger to
the environment or public health and safety is present, the AWAPCA
provides that ADEQ can enter a facility without an administrative
warrant. '"3
c. Enforcement Authorities
The ADEQ may pursue an enforcement action against a facility that
commits an unlawful action as defined in the AWAPCA.' 3  A person acts
unlawfully by causing pollution of any waters of the state' 357 or by
2001) <http://www.adeq/water/forms/complaint -online.htm>.
1349. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-216(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1350. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-107(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). The amount and
frequency of inspections depend on the nature of the permitted company and the
complexity of the plant's operation. See Mark Waller, Strategy: Give Firms Freer Rein.
Polluters Can Find, Fix Problems. Avoid Fines. ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 23, 1997,
at IA.
135 1. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-107(c)(3) (LEXIS 2000).
1352. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-107(c)(I)(A) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). ADEQ's
investigation must be limited in scope; only inspection of those parts of the property
that are vital to determine the cause which prompted the investigation is permitted. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-107(c)(1)(B) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). However, the statute states
"nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the department to forfeit the
element of surprise in its inspection efforts." ARK. CODEANN. § 8-1-107(c)(2)(LEXIS
Repl. 2000).
1353. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-107(c)(4) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1354. SeeARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-107(d)(f) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). One who exercises
"willful and unjustified refusal" to admit department employees may be charged with
a misdemeanor and subject to civil penalties. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-107(f) (LEXIS
Repl. 2000).
1355. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1 -I 07(e)(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1356. See generally ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-103 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1357. See ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-217(a)( ) (LEX1S Repl. 2000). AWAPCA defines
"pollution" as:
Such contamination or other alteration of the physical, chemical, or
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depositing wastes or causing wastes to be placed in an area likely to result
in pollution of any state waters.'5 Further, violating any of the following
provides valid grounds for ADEQ enforcement: provisions of AWAPCA;
any rule, regulation, or order promulgated by the APCEC under
AWAPCA; or conditions of a permit issued under AWAPCA by
ADEQ. 9 Similarly, any person that discharges sewage or other wastes
into state waters without first obtaining a permit from the agency engages
in an unlawful act in violation of AWAPCA 3" ° ADEQ may pursue
corrective action against any person who knowingly misrepresents any
information in documents submitted to the department under
AWAPCA 36' or who falsifies, tampers with, or inaccurately maintains a
monitoring device knowingly.362
biological properties of any waters of the state or such discharge of any
liquid, gaseous, or solid substance in any waters of the state as will, or is
likely to, render the waters harmful, detrimental, or injurious to public
health, safety, or welfare; to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses; orto livestock, wild animals,
birds, fish, or other aquatic life[.]
ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-102(6) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1358. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-217(a)(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). Randall Mathis,
former ADEQ Director, stated at agency administrative hearing that waters collected
at any point are "waters of the state." See In re Fred Eggeston, No. 97-014-NOV, 1988
AR ENV LEXIS 37 at * 15 (APCEC Apr. 30, 1998).
1359. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-217(a)(3)(LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1360. See id. § 8-4-217(b)(1)(E).
1361. See id. § 8-4-217(a)(4).
1362. See id. § 8-4-217(a)(5).
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I. Civil Enforcement
ADEQ has expressed a preference for encouraging facility compli-
ance through cooperative assistance as opposed to the assessment of
penalties. 63 The stated basis for this policy is the principle that the ideal
method of balancing economic growth with environmental excellence is
to work cooperatively with the regulated community. 3 Nevertheless,
ADEQ has the authority to assess penalties and obtain other relief through
the court system 1365 or an administrative action.'
3
1
1363. See Mark Waller, Pollution Regulators Offer 'Customer' Aid, but Critics Say
Enforcement of Rules Suffers, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Jan. 19, 1998, at I A. By
creating a customer service division, ADEQ furthered its mission to increase
compliance with the environmental rules. See id. Part of the goal of the Customer
Service Division is to prevent violations that warrant fines. See id. Companies contact
the division with questions or complaints concerning enforcement. See id. The division
then directs businesses to the proper experts in the regulatory sections of ADEQ to help
the companies understand the regulations applying to them. See id. The tendency of
many of the states to utilize compliance assistance in lieu oftraditional enforcement in
some is reviewed in Clifford Rechtschaffer, Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle
for the Future of Environmental Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10803 (2000). See J.W.
Looney, Handling Administrative Proceedings Before the Arkansas Pollution Control and
Ecology Department and Commission, 1988 ARK. L. NOTES 23,25. ADEQ has stated that
punishing violators is not the goal of the agency. See John Magsam, Contractor's
AllegedHog Waste DumpingCosts Tyson, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZE-1rE, July 29, 1999, at B5.
The statutes regarding water pollution are remedial in nature, seeking to correct the
recognized mistakes of the violators to advance public welfare. See Arkansas Dep't of
Pollution Control & Ecology v. B.J. McAdams, Inc., 303 Ark. 144, 147, 792 S.W.2d
611, 613 (1990) (Hays, J., dissenting). In furthering its aim to protect the environment
and promote compliance rather than collect penalties, Arkansas has passed laws to
shield companies from prosecution when the facilities find and remedy their own
environmental problems. See Michelle Boorstein, Industry Finds Relief Rebuke in Laws
Shielding Environmental Violators, Bus. NEWS, Aug. 11, 1997, at 1. Under the 1995
Arkansas Environmental Audit Report Act, company self-audits are treated as
privileged information to encourage businesses to report violations to the state. See
Seth Blomely, State Risking $3 Million Loss as Law Stands, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Aug. 31, 1998, at A l. Instead, ADEQ has stated it seeks to ensure that the environment
is protected and that the violations are corrected and not repeated. See id.
1364. See ADEQ, Customer Service Division (visited Feb. 9, 2001) <http://www.adeq.
state.ar.us/custsvs/default.htm>. ADEQ asserts that the environment ultimately
benefits from this cooperative approach. See Waller, supra note 1362, at IA. Former
ADEQ Deputy Director Jim Shirrel stated ADEQ performs its job of protecting the
environment more effectively by working with facilities than assessing penalties. See
id.
1365. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1366. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(c) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). Former ADEQ
Director Randall Mathis opined, "I think penalties have some deterrent effect[, b]ut
they may also have an effect we don't want them to-a company that may have
violations out there may be reluctant to report and start correcting them." See Gaynell
Terrell, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Jan. 31, 1996, at I B.
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ADEQ frequently employs these authorities. During the period July
1, 1999 through June 30, 2000, the agency assessed penalties totaling
$1,041,998.69.136' The ADEQ collected 418 penalties which totaled
$797,648.78 during the same period. 3" The assessments are, however,
not the sole focus of ADEQ enforcement. Almost every action will
include a request that the facility remedy the alleged violations.' 69
a. Administrative Enforcement
Two separate entities, ADEQ and APCEC, play roles in CWA
administrative civil enforcement actions. 370 Administrative enforcement
actions are initiated by ADEQ."' Appeals of ADEQ decisions are
decided by APCEC.'372 Consequently, APCEC's role is analogous to that





ADEQ may assess administrative civil penalties against persons who
violate permit conditions, provisions ofAWAPCA, or regulations or rules
that are promulgated pursuant to the AWAPCA.' 4 An administrative
enforcement action 7 5 against a facility is initiated by the issuance of a
1367. See Memorandum from Lisa McGuire, ADEQ to PC&E Commissioners,
ADEQ Penalty Assessment and Collections for Fiscal Year 2000 (July 6, 2000)
[hereinafter Penalty].
1368. See id.
1369. See Telephone Interview with Doug Ford, P.E., Pollution Management, Inc.
(Dec. 14, 2000).
1370. See David F. Kern, Incinerator Spat Tests PC&E's Power to Appeal Panel Rulings,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Dec. 6, 1994, at B2. APCEC is charged with the duty to
"promulgat[e] ... rules and regulations governing administrative procedures for
challenging or contesting department actions." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-201(b)(3)
(LEXIS Repl. 2000). ADEQ must provide the right to contest an administrative action
or an emergency order. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-201(b)(5) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). It
therefore promulgated Regulation No. 8 to provide needed administrative procedures.
All matters of procedure that are not addressed in Regulation No. 8 are governed by the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. See APCEC Reg. No. 8 § 2.5.11 (2000).
1371. See Meredith Oakley, Clarifying PC&E, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Apr. 11,
1997, at B9. This split of duties between ADEQ and the APCEC stems from the theory
that the same entity that issues administrative enforcement actions cannot impartially
hear an appeal on the same offense. See id.
1372. See id.
1373. See Looney, supra note 958, at 24.
1374. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(c) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1375. "'Administrative enforcement action' means any administrative proceeding
instituted by the Department against a person charged with violation of any law,




Notice of Violation ("NOV").'37 6 The NOV notifies a person in writing
of the suspected violations37 7 and requires that the person correct the
violations or answer the charges through the administrative hearing
process. 13 7' ADEQ must include the following in the NOV: the alleged
violations committed by the facility, the proposed civil penalty for each
violation, corrective actions which must be performed to remedy the
violations, any other proposed measure to be taken against the violator,
and the procedures that the alleged violator must follow to contest the
penalties.' 9
A person who commits a violation of AWAPCA provisions, a water
permit, or rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to AWAPCA may
be penalized by up to $10,000 per violation.' Each day that the
violation continues may be considered a separate violation in assessing
the penalty.'3"' ADEQ also has the authority to require a facility that
derived economic benefits from the violation to pay a civil penalty equal
to the related pecuniary gain. 1382
Several methods are employed in determining the amount of penalty
a violator should be assessed. 8 s ADEQ utilizes the Enforcement Penalty
Policy and Level System Penalty Calculation Guidelines, which classifies
violations and determines penalty amounts. ' 3 The purpose of this policy
is to ensure consistent treatment of all violators in determining the amount
of a penalty.3 5 According to this system, the gravity of the violation
determines its class: Class I violations are the most severe, Class II
1376. See ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-218(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1377. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 1.2.20 (2000).
1378. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-218(b) (LEXIS Repl'. 2000).
1379. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.2(b) (2000). The recipient of the NOV is required
to file a written response within 20 days after the NOV is received or ADEQ may issue
a Default Administrative Order ("DAO"), which formally affirms the assessment of
civil penalties. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.2(b)(5) (2000). The NOV is required to
explain that the violator must file a written response to the NOV within the designated
time to receive adjudicatory review of the allegations in the NOV. See ADEQ Reg. 8
§ 2.3.2(b)(6) (2000).
1380. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(c) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1381. See id.
1382. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(e) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1383. See In re Jerry Jay, No. LIS 93-028, 1994 AR ENV LEXIS 3 at *2 (APCEC
Jan. 7, 1994). However, when the policy behind the penalty assessment method and the facts
of the particular case are inapplicable, ADEQ may deviate from the penalty assessment
guidelines and exercise its own judgment. See id.
1384. See In re Larry Hughes Swine Farm-Lower Massey Unit, No. 97-01 5-NOV,
1998 AR ENV LEXIS 31 at *9 (APCEC June 12, 1998).
1385. See id. at **12-13. According to APCEC, "the Department may develop and
utilize formulas for the calculation of penalties for specific offenses, in an effort to
uniformly assign penalty amounts where practicable." ADEQ Reg. No. 7 § 9 (1992).
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violations are less serious, and Class Ill violations are the least serious.36
These classes are used by the ADEQ as guidelines for determining the
maximum penalty amount.'3 ' The maximum allowable penalties for each
class are $10,000 for Class I, $5,000 for Class i, and $1,000 for Class
111.1388
ADEQ must subsequently place the violation within a certain level
of the class to decide the penalty amount within the parameters of the
maximum dollar amount of the class.3 9 The level system utilizes a
percentage of the maximum dollar amount in the class to more closely
evaluate the penalty amount.""9 Five different levels ranging from 20%
to 100% constitute the allowable penalties within each class.'39'
In the final determination of the amount of civil penalty to assess a
violator, the ADEQ Water Division must also consider the criteria in
ADEQ Regulation No. 7.V3 These represent APCEC criteria for
assessing penalties in various programs. 393 This regulation requires that
the following factors be evaluated to determine whether the penalty
should be increased or decreased due to other circumstances: seriousness
of the noncompliance, including risk of public health caused by the
alleged violation; whether the violation was an accident that was
impossible to avoid; whether the violator cooperated promptly to correct
the violation; the person's history in correcting past noncompliance; the
person's history of past documented violations, even if formal proceed-
ings were never initiated; whether the violator committed the problem
intentionally; whether the person benefitted monetarily from the noncom-
pliance; whether enforcement action costs to the public have been
extraordinary; whether the noncompliance is due in part to the action of
state government; and finally, whether the violator has prolonged action
to correct the problem. 3 Ideally, the answers to the questions in
1386. See In re Larry Hughes Swine Farm-Lower Massey Unit, No. 97-015-NOV,




1390. See id. at **9-10.
1391. See id. at *10.
1392. See ADEQ Reg. No. 7 § 9 (1992).
1393. See In re Jerry Jay, 1994 AR ENV LEXIS 3, at *9. In fact, when ADEQ cannot
produce evidence that the factors in Regulation No. 7 were considered in determining
the amount of penalties assessed, the Administrative Hearing Officer must evaluate
whether the penalties should be reduced according to the Regulation No. 7 factors. See
id. at * 11.
1394. See ADEQ Reg. No. 7 § 9(a)-(j) (2000). See In re Larry Hughes Swine
Farm-Lower Massey Unit, 1998 AR ENV LEXIS 31 at *10.
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Regulation No. 7 should be used to determine the class and level of each
violation.
After ADEQ serves the person with the NOV, the violator may opt
to respond in writing to the notice.'395 If the violator files no response to
the NOV during the required period of time, then the allegations within
the NOV "will be deemed proven" and ADEQ may issue a Default
Administrative Order ("DAO").' 3% The DAO formally verifies the NOV
allegations as findings of fact, affirms the assessment of penalties, and
orders the violator to take the corrective actions stated in the NOV. 39 7 As
a final order of ADEQ, the DAO is immune from review on its merits by
APCEC unless APCEC elects to consider the DAO 398 or the violator files
a Request for Commission Review and Adjudicatory Hearing and "proves
that his failure to respond to the [NOV] was due to excusable neglect."' 1399
The violator's response in writing to the NOV initiates the APCEC
review procedure. This response enables the alleged violator to contest
the ADEQ action.'" The alleged violator is provided an opportunity for
a hearing. 40'
An Administrative Hearing Officer ("AHO")'" presides over all
adjudicatory hearings.4 3 The AHO generally performs the same duties
1395. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.3(a) (2000). The written response may be a
general denial or may admit and deny separate allegations, as well as contest proposed
penalties or corrective actions listed in the NOV. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.3(b)
(2000).
1396. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.3(a) (2000).
1397. See id.
1398. "The Commission may, by majority vote within thirty (30) days of the
effective date of... a Default Administrative Order, initiate adjudicatory review of the
order, even if the parties thereto do not." ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.5(a) (2000).
1399. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.4 (2000).
1400. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-203(b)(5) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1401. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(c) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). "The [APCEC shall
afford an opportunity for a fair hearing to the alleged violator[.]" ARK. CODE ANN. §
8-4-219(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). The only circumstance in which ADEQ does not have
to provide opportunity for a hearing to issue an order is in the case of an emergency
order. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-220 (LEXIS Repl. 2000). When ADEQ determines
that "an emergency exists requiring immediate action to protect the public health or
welfare it may, without notice or hearing, issue an order reciting the existence of such
emergency and requiring that such action be taken as it deems necessary to meet the
emergency." ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-220(a)(LEXIS Repl. 2000). The emergency order
is effective immediately, but the person to whom the order was issued must be afforded
a hearing within ten days after the violator requests a hearing. See ARK. CODE ANN. §
8-4-220(b)-(c) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1402. As an employee of APCEC. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-204(b) (LEXIS Repl.
2000).
1403. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.5.8(a) (2000). "The AHO shall be subject to
disqualification for bias, prejudice, interest, or for any cause for which ajudge may be
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as a judge in a hearing" and possesses the power to "administer oaths,
examine witnesses, and issue, in the name of the commission, subpoenas
requiring the.., testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence
... The AHO advises the APCEC on matters of law and
procedure. " The standard of proof in the hearing is preponderance ofthe
evidence. 407 ADEQ must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
alleged violator is liable and that the proposed administrative penalty is
justified."°
The AHO issues a "Recommended Decision" to the APCEC."4° APCEC
will enter a minute order stating whether it should be adopted, modified,
reversed, or remanded to the AHO for further proceedings. 4 10 The APCEC's
review of the AHO's recommended decision is de novo.'41 I However, it may
vote to consider additional evidence under certain circumstances 42 APCEC's
order is binding on all parties unless appealed within thirty days after it is
served.
413
Parties with standing may appeal the APCEC order to the circuit court of
the county in which the facility is located.'424 The appellant and APCEC are the
original parties to the appeal. 41' The State, through the Attorney General or
disqualified." ADEQ Reg. No. 8, § 2.5.8(b) (2000).
1404. See Looney, supra note 958, at 26.
1405. See ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-210(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). In addition, the AHO
may hold settlement conferences; conduct preliminary hearings; and rule on
interlocutory and evidentiary matters, discovery, and objections. See APCEC Reg. No.
8 § 2.5.8(cX5)-(6) (2000).
1406. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-204(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1407. See In re Larry Hughes Hog Farm--Lower Massey Farm, No. 95-01 1-NOV,
1996 AR ENV LEXIS 45 at *1 (APCEC June 12, 1998).
1408. See id.
1409. See APCEC Reg. No. 8 § 2.5.17 (2000).
1410. See APCEC Reg. No. 8 § 2.5.18(c) (2000). See also City of Malvern Water
Works, No. 95-020P, 1996 AR ENV LEXIS 8 at *1 (May 31, 1996).
1411. See APCEC Reg. No. 8 § 2.5.18(a) (2000).
If a party of record requests an opportunity to supplement the record with
additional evidence and is able to satisfactorily demonstrate to a majority of
the Commission that the evidence is material to the issues and was
unavailable at the time of the adjudicatory hearing despite the best efforts of
the party to procure the evidence, then the Commission may remand the
matter to the Administrative Hearing Officer to take further testimony and
evidence in the matter or direct that the Director reconsider the matter based
on the additional evidence before the matter is considered by the
Commission.
APCEC Reg. No. 8 § 2.5.20(a) (2000).
1412. See APCEC Reg. No. 8 § 2.5.18(a) (2000).
1413. See ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-221 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1414. See ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-222 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1415. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-224(a)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). The Attorney
General may represent the APCEC on appeals unless he or she intervenes pursuant to
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another person affected, may become a party by intervention in the appeal when
cause is shown.416 APCEC must file a response to the notice of appeal within
thirty days after service of the notice of appeal upon the APCEC 417
The circuit court review of the appeal is conducted without a jury.
14
18
Generally, the court's review is limited to the record from the administrative
action. The party appealing the action of the APCEC has the burden of proof in
the proceeding.'4'9 The APCEC decision is prima facie reasonable and valid,
and a presumption exists that it has complied with all legal requirements
regarding the taking of evidence.'420 Further, all factual findings of APCEC are
prima facie evidence of the matters at issue.42
The Circuit Court may affirm, vacate, or suspend the decision in whole or
in part. 14" However, it may only vacate or suspend APCEC's decision and
remand for further action under certain circumstances.'423 Specifically, the
court may reverse an action of the APCEC which violates constitutional
or statutory provisions 424 or exceeds the body's authority under the
statutes. 42 Also, an APCEC decision employing an unlawful procedure
to reach the result 426 or that is in error according to other provisions of law
may merit reversal by the circuit court.'4 27 Finally, the court may vacate
or suspend APCEC's decision if it is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record, 42 or if the action is "arbitrary, capricious, or
characterized by abuse of discretion."'429
ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-224(a)(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-
224(a)(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1416. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-224(a)(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1417. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-226(a)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). Upon cause shown
for the delay, the court may extend the period for filing a response for a maximum of
an additional 60 days. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-226(a)(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1418. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-227(c)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1419. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-229(c) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1420. See id. § 8-4-229(a).
1421. See id. § 8-4-229(b).
1422. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-227(d) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1423. See id.
1424. See id. § 8-4-227(d)(1).
1425. See id. § 8-4-227(dX2).
1426. See id. § 8-4-227(dX3).
1427. See id. § 8-4-227(d)(4).
1428. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-227(d)(5) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). The court must
review the record to determine if the decision of the administrative agency "is
supported by relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion" to decide whether the administrative action is supported by
substantial evidence. See Enviroclean, Inc. v. Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology
Comm'n, 314 Ark. 98, 102, 858 S.W.2d 116, 119 (1993) (citing Wright v. Arkansas
State Plant Bd., 311 Ark. 125, 842 S.W.2d 42 (1992)).
1429. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-227(d)(6) (LEXIS 2000). The standard of review




ADEQ may initiate a judicial action against a violator in a court of
competent jurisdiction.'43 The civil action may be used to enforce any
rule, regulation, order, or permit issued according to AWAPCA.'43' A
civil action could include a request to "affirmatively order that remedial
measures be taken as may be necessary or appropriate to implement" the
goals of AWAPCA,432 as well as to recover state expenses in enforcing
the provisions of AWAPCA 4 aa A civil action may be undertaken if the
person is violating the AWAPCA at the time ADEQ seeks the penalty.'
434
If the violation is no longer occurring, the APCEC must assess a penalty
administratively instead of filing a civil action.'
435
The statute of limitations applicable to Arkansas statutory environ-
mental actions has been an issue. In Arkansas v. Dow Chemical Co.,' 436 a
federal district court concluded that since the civil and criminal penalty
provisions within the AWAPCA are separate and distinct, and the civil
penalties serve a remedial rather than a penal function, the statute of
limitations for actions on penal statutes is inapplicable in civil actions
under the statute. 
437
is limited in scope. Such decisions will be upheld if they are supported by
substantial evidence and are not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an
abuse of discretion. Administrative action may be regarded as arbitrary and
capricious only when it is not supportable on any rational basis ....
[A]dministrative agencies are better equipped by specialization, insight
through experience, and more flexible procedures than courts, to determine
and analyze legal issues affecting their agencies.
Enviroclean, 314 Ark. at 101-02, 858 S.W.2d at 118 (quoting In re Sugarloaf Mining
Co., 310 Ark. 772, 840 S.W.2d 172 (1992)).
1430. See APCEC Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.1(b) (2000). "Nothing contained herein shall in
any manner abridge or interfere with the Department's ability to initiate civil
proceedings in courts of competent jurisdiction to restrain or abate any violation...
without first having instituted administrative enforcement proceedings hereunder." Id.
1431. See ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-103(b)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1432. See id. § 8-4-103(b)(2).
1433. See id. § 8-4-103(b)(3).
1434. See B.. McAdams, Inc., 303 Ark. at 147, 792 S.W.2d at 612. "The plain
wording of ARK. CODE AwN. § 8-4-103(b) only grants the trial court jurisdiction to hear
civil actions filed by the department 'to restrain any violation of, and to compel
compliance with, provisions of this chapter and any rules, regulations, orders, or
permits issued pursuant thereto."' Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(b)(1 ) (LEXIS
Repl. 2000)).
1435. See id. The administrative penalty must be assessed according to ARK. CODE
ANN. § 8-4-103(c)(1 ) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). See id.
1436. 981 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Ark. 1997).
1437. See State v. Dow Chem. Co., 981 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (E.D. Ark. 1997).
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The maximum amount of civil penalties recoverable in a civil action
for violations of AWAPCA or rules, regulations, or permits issued under
AWAPCA is $10,000 per day.'438 In addition, the violator may be
penalized an amount equal to any pecuniary gain from the violation. 439
Civil actions may also be utilized to recover the penalty amount assessed
by ADEQ in administrative actions."
ADEQ may bring an action for natural resources damages as a civil
remedy against a violator to recover costs to ADEQ in enforcing
violations under AWAPCA." Natural resources damages include
damages to "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, surface water, ground water,
drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed
by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the State
of Arkansas or local government. '
2. Criminal Enforcement
The AWAPCA'" 3 provides that criminal penalties may be assessed
against any person who commits an unlawful act." Also, persons who
violate a provision of AWAPCA or an order of ADEQ or APCEC may be
1438. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(bX4) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1439. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(e) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). Perhaps the legislature
was attempting to provide for a form of restitution to prevent unjust enrichment of
violators.
1440. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(bX5) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1441. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(b)(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). In State v. Dow
Chem. Co., the court explicitly stated that the State may institute claims for natural
resource damages under AWAPCA. See Dow Chem. Co., 981 F. Supp. at 1174. The
court reasoned that "the language of the statutes, the subject matter, the object to be
accomplished, the purpose to be served, as well as the remedy provided all evince the
legislative intent that the State may bring claims for natural resources damages under
• . . AWAPCA." Id.
1442. See ARK. CODEAN. § 8-12-102(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). A "Natural Resources
Damages Trust Fund" is established as a collection of payments to the state for
"restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition" of natural resources. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 8-12-103(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). The money in the fund is used to
restore, rehabilitate, replace, or acquire natural resources according to the will of the
Natural Resources Damages Advisory Board. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-12-103(3) to (4)
(LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1443. See ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-103(a)( )(A) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1444. Note that there have been several federal criminal prosecutions in Arkansas
involving various statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966
F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (reference to federal RCRA and CERCLA prosecution
involving Arkansas aircraft painting facility). Other Arkansas environmental statutes
are sometimes used to address threats to surface water. In Renfro v. State, the ASWMA
was used to charge an individual for allegedly dumping rotten potatoes near connecting
waterways. See Renfro v. State, 331 Ark. 253, 962 S.W.2d 745 (1993).
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prosecuted.'" 5 These violations are punishable as misdemeanors. " The
AWAPCA also provides for felony penalties for certain violations.1" 7
The maximum penalty is five years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to
$50,000.' 4" Unlawful acts potentially constituting felonies include the
following: leaving the state after the violation of a provision of
AWAPCA or of any order or regulation promulgated by ADEQ or
APCEC; "purposely, knowingly, or recklessly"'" 9 polluting state waters
in an unlawful manner, creating a "substantial likelihood of adversely
affecting human health, animal or plant life, or property;" and "purposely
or knowingly" misrepresenting the facts in any document submitted to
ADEQ, falsifying records, or rendering a device required for maintenance
inaccurate. '41
Criminal penalties are also applicable to those who "purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly" cause water pollution unlawfully, "plac[ing]
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury."'
45'
Such conduct is punishable by a maximum penalty of twenty years
imprisonment and/or a fine of $250,000. i452
1445. See ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-103(a)(l)(A)-(a)(l)(B) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1446. See id. The maximum punishment is one year imprisonment or a fine of
$25,000. For purposes of the fine, each day or part of the day that the violation
continues to occur or is repeated is considered a separate offense. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 8-4-103(a)(l)(B) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1447. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(a)(2)(B)(i) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1448. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(a)(2)(B)(ii) (LEXIS Rep]. 2000). Again, each
day or part of the day that the violation occurs constitutes a separate offense for
purposes of the fine. See id.
1449. These mental states are defined by ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202 (LEXIS Repl.
2000). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(h) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). Culpable mental
states are defined as follows:
A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such
a result .... A person acts knowingly with respect to his conduct or the
attendant circumstances when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature
or that such circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to
a result of his conduct when he is aware that it is practically certain that his
conduct will cause such a result .... A person acts recklessly ... when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and
degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(1 )-(3) (LEXIS Rep]. 2000).
1450. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(a)(2)(A) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1451. See id. § 8-4-103(a)(3)(A).
1452. See id. § 8-4-103(a)(3). Each day or part of a day when the violation is
continued or repeated is a separate offense for purposes of the fine. See id.
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The AWAPCA provides guidelines for penalties to be assessed
based upon the severity ofthe violation.' 45 3 A person convicted criminally
under AWAPCA may be sentenced to pay a fine of up to twice the
amount of monetary gain derived from commission of the offenses,
regardless of the limits expressly placed on the fines in the statute.'
454
Various Arkansas agencies in addition to ADEQ may become
involved in the criminal enforcement of Arkansas environmental statutes.
For example, the Arkansas State Police may play an investigative role.'
455
Further, the appropriate prosecuting attorney's office may be asked to
prosecute the alleged violations.456 A Senior Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney of the 6th Judicial District noted "[tihe decision to criminally
prosecute an Arkansas environmental statutory violation is subject to the
same decisionmaking process as any other alleged crime."
' 457
Several Arkansas and federal agencies recently developed a
procedure for investigating and instituting proceedings against possible
criminal violators in Arkansas.' 45 The basic process is initiated when a
citizen or a department of the state informs a state agency of a problem.'
459
An organization known as the Arkansas Environmental Crimes Task
Force ("Task Force") 41 meets periodically to vote on whether civil or
criminal enforcement should be undertaken." ' The Task Force consists
1453. See id. § 8-4-103(a).
1454. See id. § 8-4-103(a)(4). This section applies if a person is convicted of either
a felony or a misdemeanor under AWAPCA. See id.
1455. See Don Chaney, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, March 3, 1996, at Al (referencing
Mountain Home, Arkansas facility investigation).
1456. See, e.g., Letter from Julia Mehyou, Legal Division, ADPC&E to Larry Jegley,
Senior Prosecutor, Pulaski County Prosecuting Attorney (Dec. 13, 1994) (referring file
for possible CWA criminal prosecution).
1457. Telephone Interview with John Johnson, Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, 6th Judicial District (Nov. 16, 2000).
1458. Telephone Interview with Eric Estes, Assistant Attorney General, Office ofthe
Arkansas Attorney General (Nov. 17, 2000). A Memorandum of Understanding was
apparently executed between the Arkansas Office of Attorney General, Arkansas
Department of Environmental Quality, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of Arkansas, and the United States Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas to
establish the Environmental Crimes Task Force. See Memorandum of Understanding
(Apr. I, 2000).
1459. See Arkansas Environmental Crimes Task Force Environmental Crimes
Awareness Seminar, Arkansas Crimes Task Force Protocols/Operations Plan, at 2-3
(Sept. 27, 2000).
1460. The Task Force meets bi-monthly to address activities that may warrant
criminal prosecution. See Arkansas Environmental Crimes Task Force Environmental
Crimes Awareness Seminar, Arkansas Crimes Task Force Protocols/Operations Plan,
at 4 (Sept. 27, 2000).
1461. Telephone Interview with Eric Estes, Assistant Attorney General, Office ofthe
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of the Office of the Arkansas Attorney General, ADEQ, EPA Criminal
Investigation Division, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of Arkansas, the United States Attorney for the Western District of
Arkansas, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
The Task Force determines if criminal enforcement is warranted and
whether an Arkansas prosecuting attorney should be asked to initiate
proceedings against the alleged violator.'" 3 The Arkansas Attorney
General may be able to initiate the prosecution if the prosecuting attorney
uses the Arkansas Prosecutorial Assistance Statute to substitute that
office.'" 4 In the alternative, the prosecuting attorney may choose to




Many enforcement actions are settled both prior to or subsequent to
the filing of an NOV. These settlements are usually documented by the
execution of a CAO.'"6 The CAO is basically an administrative order to
which ADEQ and the APCEC must review and approve and the alleged
violator consent.' 7 The CAO may assess penalties and/or require the
facility to undertake certain actions to achieve compliance. It may also
provide interim relief for the facility from certain permit limits or
Arkansas Attorney General (Nov. 17, 2000).
1462. See Arkansas Environmental Crimes Task Force Environmental Crimes
Awareness Seminar, Memorandum of Understanding, at 2 (Sept. 27, 2000). The
representatives from each of the agencies are responsible for identifying allegations of
environmental crimes and referring the allegations to the agency which can most
appropriately assess the risk to the environment and public health. Id. at 3.
1463. Telephone Interview with Eric Estes, Assistant Attorney General, Office ofthe
Arkansas Attorney General (Nov. 17, 2000). "The ultimate decisions and authority to
prosecute remains with the appropriate attorney for either the State of Arkansas or the
United States." Arkansas Environmental Crimes Task Force Environmental Crimes
Awareness Seminar, Arkansas Crimes Task Force Protocols/Operations Plan, at 4
(Sept. 27, 2000).
1464. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-21-149 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1465. Telephone Interview with Eric Estes, Assistant Attorney General, Office ofthe
Arkansas Attorney General (Nov. 17, 2000).
1466. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.3(c) (2000).
1467. See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 1.2.11 (2000). For example, Tyson Foods, Inc.
entered into a CAO with ADEQ in which it agreed to pay civil penalties but neither
admitted nor denied the allegations in the order. See Magsam, supra note 1363, at B5.
See ADEQ Reg. No. 8 § 2.3.5(a) (2000).
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conditions. " The failure to comply with commitments made in the CAO
is a violation of the law." 9
2. Monetary Penalty Alternatives--State Supplemental
Environmental Project/In-Kind Payments
Generally, ADEQ follows the EPA SEP guidelines in determining
whether a proposed project is an acceptable SEP." The agency is not,
however, bound by the EPA's SEP guidelines and therefore may vary
from them."'4 Therefore, ADEQ may have more flexibility to consider
innovative SEPs than EPA.
141
ADEQ recognizes two forms of projects which violators may
implement to mitigate cash penalties: SEPs and in-kind services.'
4 7
Occasionally, in-kind services are considered to be SEPs. 74 More often,
in-kind services are separate and distinct mitigation projects from SEPs.475
The AWAPCA,'476 the Solid Waste Management Act, 47' and the
Hazardous Waste Management Act 4 "' do not reference SEPs. 4" Instead,
they reference in-kind services. 14' Because SEPs are not specifically
addressed by the relevant Arkansas statutes, ADEQ requires that a
1468. See In re City of Batesville, LIS 90-023 (Feb. 26, 1990) (allowing POTW to
meet less stringent NPDES effluent limits for an interim period).
1469. See In re Salem Sewer Improvement District #10 of Saline County, No. 93-111,
1995 AR ENV LEXIS 91 at *5 (APCEC Feb. 28, 1995). The ADEQ may attempt to
assess stipulated penalties if the requirements of the CAO are not met. See Letter from
Dennis Benson, NPDES Enforcement Section, ADEQ to Kelton Jones, Shirley Car
Wash & Laundry (Mar. 1, 2001) (on file with author) (referencing possible imposition
of stipulated penalties if required penalty payments are not made).
1470. See Telephone Interview with Michelle Kinder, Attorney, Legal Division,
ADEQ (March 15, 1997) [hereinafter Kinder Interview]; Telephone Interview with
Nelson Jackson, Attorney, Legal Division, ADEQ (March 15, 1997) [hereinafter
Jackson Interview].
1471. See Jackson Interview, supra note 1470.
1472. See id.
1473. See id. An example of an SEP negotiated in 2000 by a facility and the ADEQ
was the construction of a concrete wall to reduce fiigitive dust. See In re Frit Indus.,
Inc., LIS 00-167 (Sept. 15,2000). Note, however, that the ADEQ has accepted consent
orders that allow a facility to propose an SEP at a later date. See In re World Color
Press, Inc., LIS 00-188 (Oct. 2, 2000).
1474. See Kinder Interview, supra note 1469.
1475. See id.
1476. See ARK. CODEANN. §§ 8-4-101 to -314 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1477. See ARK. CODEANN. §§ 8-6-201 to -222 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1478. See id. §§ 8-7-201 to -226.




proposed SEP meet the same statutory criteria as that of in-kind services
in order for a project to qualify as a SEP.'48' ADEQ negotiated twenty-
three SEPs during the period July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000.142
e. Federal Oversight: EPA Review of Permit Lim-
its/Terms
Despite its delegation of the NPDES program to Arkansas, the
Region 6 office of EPA retains the right to review and reject permits
issued by the state. Both the CWA regulations' 48 3 and the MOA 14 "
executed by EPA Region 6 and ADEQ address the federal review of
Arkansas permits. The EPA has periodically used this authority to object
to the issuance of NPDES permits because they contain certain
provisions. 1485
EPA retains the right to object to a delegated state's decision to grant
a NPDES permit 4' if it does so within ninety days of its issuance.'48
EPA must solicit comments on its decision to object." 8 The agency must
subsequently modify, withdraw, or reaffirm its objections.489 If the EPA
reaffirms it objections, the state and the EPA may proceed in either of two
ways. The state may modify the terms of its proposed permit within thirty
days of EPA's decision to stand by its objections. If the state agrees to
modify the permit, it must again allow a comment period before issuing
1481. See Kinder Interview, supra note 1469. Those requirements are: (1) The
project can only be used to partially mitigate cash penalties. In-kind services and/or
SEPs cannot be performed by the violator to mitigate the entire cash penalty amount;
(2) neither the violator nor the ADEQ can retain any monetary benefit from the project,
however remote; (3) the in-kind services and/or SEPs cannot duplicate or augment
services already provided by the ADEQ through appropriations of the General
Assembly. See ARK. CODEANN. §§ 8-4-103(f)(3); 8-6-204(e)(3); 8-7-204(e)(3) (LEXIS
Repl. 2000).
1482. See Penalty, supra note 1366. In-kind service projects totaling $131,000 and
SEPs totaling $202,891 were negotiated during a period from the July 1, 1997 through
June 30, 1998. See Memorandum from Orr Dean, ADPC&E to PC&E Commissioners
(July 15, 1998).
1483. See40 C.F.R. § 123.44 (2000).
1484. See MOA,supra note 1011.
1485. See, e.g., Letter from Jack V. Ferguson, P.E., Chief, NPDES Permits Branch,
EPA Region 6 to Maria Jastrzebski, Manager, NPDES Program, ADEQ (Nov. 27,
2000) (objecting to ADEQ's issuance ofNPDES permit to North Little Rock, Arkansas
POTW).
1486. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1994).
1487. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(dX2) (1994).
1488. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(e) (2000).
1489. See id. § 123.44(g).
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the permit. The EPA may assume the exclusive authority to issue the
permit if the state refuses to modify it.' 4
f. Arkansas Environmental Audit Privilege Statute
Arkansas has an environmental audit privilege statute.'49 ' It allows
a facility to conduct a voluntary "environmental audit,"' 4" the product of
which is privileged information providing the statutory guidelines are
followed. The "environmental audit report" can contain such things as
"[flield notes, records of observations, findings, opinions, suggestions,
conclusions, drafts, [and] memoranda"'493 in addition to other types of
information. An audit report compiled by the auditor may also be
included in the protected "environmental audit report." This audit report
can contain: "(1.) [t]he scope of the audit; (2.) [t]he information gained
in the audit; (3.) [c]onclusions and recommendations; and (4.) [e]xhibits
and appendices[.]"j 49 The only other requirement is that the formal
"environmental audit report" be labeled "ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT
REPORT: PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT.' ' 9 5
The audit privilege is not absolute. An owner or operator may under
a variety of situations choose to waive the privilege in part or in whole.'
41
In addition, the privilege may not be asserted in a civil action for a
fraudulent purpose or when the "environmental audit report" indicates
violation of a federal or state provision and the person asserting the
privilege has not made a diligent effort to correct the violation. 497
The Arkansas Environmental Audit Privilege statute was addressed
by a court for the first time in Carr v. ElDorado Chemical.'4 s In Carr, the
1490. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1)& (4) (1994).
149 1. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-301 (LEXIS Repl. 2000). The Arkansas legislature
noted "that protection of the environment is enhanced by the public's voluntary
compliance with environmental laws and that the public will benefit from incentives
to identify and remedy environmental compliance issues." Id. The statute is addressed
in Wright & Morrissey, supra note 2 1, and Jones et al., supra note 946.
1492. "Environmental Audit" is defined in Arkansas Code Annotated section 8-1 -
302(3)(A) as "a voluntary, internal, and comprehensive evaluation of one (1) or more
facilities or an activity at one (1) or more facilities regulated under this chapter, or
federal, regional, or local counterparts or extensions thereof, or of management systems
related to that facility or activity, that is designed to identify and prevent
noncompliance and to improve compliance with statutory or regulatory requirements."
1493. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302(4)(A) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1494. See id. § 8-1-302(4)(B).
1495. See id. § 8- 1-302(4).
1496. SeeARK. CODEANN. § 8-1-304 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1497. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-307 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1498. No. 96-1081 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (mem.).
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plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production of two documents relating
to problems with the defendant's wastewater treatment system. 1499 The
defendant inadvertently produced a portion of the first document. 1500 The
plaintiffs then requested that the defendant produce the entire document
for in camera review by the court to determine whether the material was
privileged. This request subsequently became moot upon discovering that
what was thought to be a portion of the document was actually the entire
document. '
The defendant refused to produce the second document asserting that
"4an environmental audit conducted by Monsanto relating to the EDCC
[defendant] facility is a privileged communication and protected from
disclosure by virtue of the Arkansas statutory environmental audit
privilege codified at A.C.A. § 8-1-301 et seq., and the common law
critical self-analysis privilege .... " " The environmental audit privilege
statute was enacted in 1995, while the audit document in question was
produced March 29, 1993." °3 The ultimate issue for the court was
whether the privilege statute could be retroactively applied to a document
produced prior to its enactment. The court examined the statute's stated
purpose and found no evidence indicating an intent by the legislature for
retroactive application. In addition, the court found that the audit "could
not have been performed in reliance upon the fact that it would not be
subject to discovery.""'
g. Arkansas/EPA Overlap
EPA's monitoring of Arkansas NPDES activities includes its
enforcement activities. 5 On August 29, 2000, ADEQ and the Region 6
office of EPA executed a Memorandum of Agreement titled ADEQ-EPA
Continuing Statement of Shared Principles ("MOA"). 5 ' The MOA was
1499. See id. at 2.
1500. See id.
1501. See id.
1502. Id. at 3. The court also opined that the Eighth Circuit does not recognize a
"self-critical analysis privilege." Id. Such a finding tends to magnify the importance
of the Arkansas statutory privilege to companies undertaking environmental
compliance audits. See id.
1503. See id. at 6.
1504. See Carr, No. 96-1081 at 7.
1505. See Forcade & Anderson, supra note 636, at 11034 (noting EPA/state
partnership extends to monitoring the compliance status of facilities, identifying non-
compliance, etc.).
1506. Memorandum from Senior Managers to All Staff (Aug. 29,2000). The memo
notes that four general principles will guide both agencies' actions. See id. They
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apparently the result of a July, 2000 meeting between senior management
of both agencies.'5 7 The document stated that the meeting was intended
to reaffirm a mutual commitment with an effective working relationship
between the agencies. 150
The MOA also identified various issues that both EPA Region 6 and
ADEQ agree will be priority issues for cooperative efforts." Of
particular relevance is the document's reference to the Arkansas TMDL
program.'1  The MOA listed the following priority actions for the
Arkansas water program:
1. Conduct TMDL studies;1
5 1
1
2. Secure funding for TMDL studies;' 2
3. Build interstate cooperation on TMDL issues;15 3 and
4. Reduce non-point water pollution.
5 1 4
include:
(1) We will seek solutions based on our shared goals and values;
(2) We will enter into interviews presuming agreement rather than
disagreement;
(3) We will seek cooperative solutions to issues, in lieu of "winning" for
agencies;




1508. The EPA Region 6 Administrator stated the memo was part of an effort to
"solve environmental problems rather than defend the bureaucratic interests of
individual organizations." See EPA Pact with Arkansas Seeks to Provide Program
Flexibility, Enhance Cooperation, 31 ENVTL. REP., Sept 1, 2000, at 1836 [hereinafter EPA
Pact]. The former Director of ADEQ, Randall Mathis, noted he hoped the agreement
would give the ADEQ the flexibility to concentrate resources and efforts on the most
pressing environmental problems rather than satisfying a range of EPA programs, some
of which may have marginal benefit to Arkansas. See id.
1509. See id.
1510. See id.
1511. EPA agreed to provide guidance for administration of the TMDL program and
to perform a portion of the initial studies necessary to identify Arkansas water quality
concerns. See id.
1512. EPA pledged to attempt to secure funding for the TMDL assessment to be
undertaken by ADEQ. See id.
1513. EPA indicated it will attempt to foster interstate/inter-regional cooperation for
resolution of issues involving the Illinois River in northwestern Arkansas/northeastern
Oklahoma and the Upper White River System located in Arkansas and Missouri. See
id
1514. EPA has pledged to assist the low interest loan program ADEQ developed to
address non-point source pollution. See EPA Pact, supra note 1508.
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h. Wastewater Operator Licensing Requirements
It is unlawful in Arkansas to operate a public or private wastewater
treatment plant without an operator licensed by the ADEQ. 515 Licensure
requirements vary based upon the rating of the treatment plant.151 6 For
licensure, the operator must pass an exam applicable to corresponding
classification.5 7 Yearly renewal of the license requires continuing
education.
i. Treatment of Key Arkansas Agricultural/Silvicultural
Activities
Many activities related to agriculture are not subject to NPDES
permitting requirements. Under the CWA, a permit is not required for
discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture.1
518
In addition to returns from irrigated agriculture, the CWA excludes
agricultural stormwater discharges from the definition of "point
source."'5 19 Since agricultural stormwater discharges are distinguished
from point source discharges, the NPDES permitting requirements are
inapplicable to most, if not all, agricultural activities.""
In an effort to address the safe and proper disposal of abandoned
agricultural pesticides, the 1999 Arkansas legislature enacted the
Abandoned Agriculture Pesticide Disposal Act. 52' The act provides a
method for the Abandoned Agriculture Pesticide and Plant Regulator
Disposal Trust Fund to pay for contractors to collect and dispose of
abandoned agricultural pesticides. 22 Pesticides are "abandoned" where
there are chemicals which are no longer used and for which there is no
planned use. 5" The removal of some abandoned agricultural pesticides
will presumably help eliminate to some extent a possible threat to surface
water.
1515. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-5-203 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1516. See ADEQ Reg. No. 3 § 3.502 (2000). The rating is based upon the total points
accumulated by the classification factors applicable to the treatment plant. See id.
1517. See id. at § 3.301.
1518. . See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (1994). Specifically, the CWA provides as follows:
"The Administrator shall not require a permit under this section for discharges
composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture, nor shall the administrator
directly or indirectly, require any state to require such a permit." Id.
1519. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)(1994).
1520. See id.
1521. See ARK. CODEANN. §§ 8-7-1201 to -1206 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1522. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-1206 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1523. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-1203(l) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
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Arkansas does have some important agricultural and silvicultural
activities that receive attention from either the federal or Arkansas water
pollution control programs. The activities include swine, cattle, and
poultry operations as well as silvicultural practices. Discharges from
agricultural and silvicultural activities may be regulated under NPDES
categorical effluent limitations,' 24 an NPDES General Permit 525 or an
Arkansas state permit. 526
1524. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 412 (1999) (outlining effluent guidelines and standards
for feedlots).
1525. The NPDES General Permit (ARG010000) is required for all concentrated
animal feeding operations ("CAFOs"). To be considered a CAFO the facility must first
meet the NPDES definition of animal feeding operation, identified as a lot or facility
where "(i) animals . . . have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or
maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12 month period, and (ii) [where]
[c]rops, vegetation[,] forage growth or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the
normal growing season over any portionofthe lot or facility." 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1 )
(2000). A CAFO is an animal feeding operation where more than 1,000 animal units
are confined at the facility. 40 C.F.R. Part 122, App. B (2000) [hereinafter CAFO].
One thousand animal units are defined as follows:
One thousand slaughter or feeder cattle; 700 mature dairy cattle (whether
milkers or dry cows); 2,500 swine weighing over 55 pounds; 500 horses;
10,000 sheep or lambs; 55,000 turkeys; 100,000 laying hens or broilers when
the facility has unlimited continuous flow watering systems; 30,000 laying
hens or broilers when facility has liquid mature handling systems; 5,000
ducks; or 1,000 animal units from a combination of slaughters, steers and
heifers, mature dairy cattle, swine over 55 pounds and sheep.
Id. In addition, a facility which discharges pollutants into navigable waters either
through a man-made ditch, flushing system or other similar man-made device, or
directly into waters of the United States is a CAFO if 300 to 1,000 animal units are
confined at the facility. The facility is a CAFO when discharging in the manner
identified above if it is an animal feeding operation with more than the following:
Three hundred slaughter or feeder cattle; 200 mature dairy cattle (whether
milkers ordry cows); 750 swine weighing over 55 pounds; 150 horses; 3,000
sheep or lambs; 16,000 turkeys; 30,000 laying hens or broilers when the
facility has unlimited continuous flow watering systems; 9,000 laying hens
or broilers when the facility has a liquid manure handling system; 1,500
ducks; or 300 animal units (from a combination of slaughter steers and
heifers, mature dairy cattle, swine over 55 pounds and sheep).
Id. A federal district court decision involving a citizen suit action against a dairy is
notable because it broadly constructed the activities encompassed by the CWA at this
CAFO. Community Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosman Dairy, 65 F.
Supp. 2d 1129 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
1526. The state permit may be in the form of a state general permit or an individual
state permit. The state permits are for facilities that do not satisfy the criteria for CAFO
classification. The permits are issued pursuant to ADEQ Reg. No. 5 (2000), which
requires that all confined animal operations, regardless of size, utilizing a liquid waste
management system in Arkansas obtain a permit from the ADEQ. At this point,
confined animal operations that utilize a dry waste management system, e.g. poultry
litter, are not required to obtain a permit from the ADEQ but are subject to enforcement




The operation of certain swine farms are subject to some regulatory
requirements. 5 27 All confined 5 28 feeding animal facilities that utilize
waste management systems are required to be covered under a permit
issued by ADEQ, despite the size of the facility.5 29 All new and existing
concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFO")'53 may be covered
under Arkansas' NPDES General Permit after submitting a Notice of
Intent. 53 Permits are not, however, required for dry waste management
systems.532 In addition to the permit issued by the ADEQ, a swine CAFO
may be subject to the federal CWA effluent categorical standard for
feedlots. 533
Occasionally, land owners and residents near a proposed swine
growing facility will contest the issuance of an ADEQ permit for such a
facility."534 The appeal of the permitting decision often focuses on the
Keith Brown, P.E., Manager, State Permits Branch, Water Division, ADEQ (Dec. 1I,
2000).
1527. See, e.g., Higbee v. Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Ark. 1984); In re Larry
Hughes Swine Farm-Lower Massey Unit, No. 97-0150-NOV, 1998 AR ENV LEXIS
31 (APCEC June 12, 1998); In re Kent O'Neal Swine Farm, No. 95-018-P, 1996 AR
ENV LEXIS 22 (APCEC Apr. 4, 1996); In re Kenny Munn Pork Ill Farm, No. 95-016-
P, 1996 AR ENV LEXIS 38 (APCEC Mar. 21, 1996).
1528. The term "confined" is an indication that there has been a trend over the past
two decades of concentrating the livestock (hog, cattle, etc.) operation. See EPA Wants
Tighter Animal Feedlot Rules, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2000, at A15. This tends to
concentrate the waste from the animal enclosures. Id. For an article that posits a
spatial model of regional livestock production and certain environmental effects, see
Robert Innes, The Economics of Livestock Waste and its Regulation, 82 AM. J. OF AGRIC.
ECON., Feb. 1, 2000, at 97.
1529. See ADEQ Reg. No. 5 (2000).
1530. See id.
1531. See Telephone interview with Keith Brown, P.E., Manager, State Permits
Branch, Water Division, ADEQ (Dec. 11, 2000).
1532. See id.
1533. See4OC.F.R. §412(1999).
1534. See, e.g., In re R Gold Quarters, No. 94-017 (Aug. 26, 1994); In re Anna Carden
Farm, No. 95-021-P (July 9, 1996). The challenges to the issuance of these permits has
generated some interesting issues. For example, in one scenario, an applicant was
denied a permit to operate a liquid animal waste management system pursuant to
ADEQ Regulation No. 5, the applicant may later apply for a new permit for a different
type of operation. See Hampton v. Ark. Pollution Control & Ecology Comm'n, 333
Ark. 370, 969 S.W.2d 653 (1998) (finding the denial of the first permit application for
an "adult" hog farm would not bar a second permit application for a "nursery-pig" hog
farm at the same location based upon claim preclusion). The Arkansas Supreme Court
acknowledged that despite the fact that the second application would be located at the
same proposed site, it was an entirely different business operation involving less waste
and better retention in the larger waste-holding basins. See id.
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operational requirements 535 and siting requirements.1536 These facilities
are also subject to ADEQ enforcement for improper waste handling,
storage, or disposal. 5"
On December 15, 2000, EPA proposed regulations that would both
expand the number of animal (hogs, cattle, etc.) feedlots regulated and
impose stricter controls on them. 153S A unique aspect of the proposal is an
attempt to impose some regulatory responsibility on the supplier of the
animals to independent growers for compliance with the applicable CWA
requirements.' 39 The proposed rule is likely to be hotly debated by the
interested parties." ° The fate of the proposal will also depend on the
views of the Bush administration, which will make the final decision on
its fate.14
Under the proposed rule, an animal feeding operation is subject to the
CAFO regulations if it has 500 animal units.' 2 The principal changes
affecting Arkansas' procedures include the addition of dry manure
handling poultry operations and immature swine and heifer operations.' 3
The changes will also modify the efficient guidelines for CAFOs
accordingly." If the proposed regulation is finalized, it will be several
1535. See In re Kent O'Neal Swine Farm, No. 95-018-P, 1996 AR ENV LEXIS 22
(APCEC Apr. 4, 1996) (questioning the acreage available for land application of the
wastes); In re Fred Hale Hog Farm, No. 91-163 (June 8, 1992) (canceling the permit
due to concerns over contamnination of local groundwater and surface water).
1536. See In re Anna Carden Farm, No. 95-021-P (July 9, 1996) (challenging the
availability of fresh groundwater and siting within 1 00-year floodplain); In re Kenny
Munn Pork III Farm, No. 95-016-P. 1996 AR ENV LEXIS 38 (APCEC Mar. 21, 1996)
(dismissing permit request of permittee because liquid animal waste facilities sited in
1 00-year flood plain).
1537. See, e.g., In re Larry Hughes Swine Farm-Lower Massey Unit, No. 97-0150-
NOV, 1998 AR ENV LEXIS 31 (APCEC June 12, 1998); In re Early Fay Jackson, No.
95-007-NOV, 1995 AR ENV LEXIS 3 (APCEC July 27, 1995).
1538. See H. Josef Hebert, EPA Seeks Stricter Control of Feedlots. Poultry Farms, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Dec. 16, 2000, at 2D.
1539. See id
1540. A national environmental group criticized the proposal, stating, "[i]t will be
business as usual for industrialized agribusiness." Id (quoting a director of the Clean
Water Project for the Natural Resources Defense Council). An industry group
responded to the proposal with a statement noting that its members are "already
spending millions of dollars to find scientific answers to deal with pollution concerns"
and recognize their environmental responsibilities. Id. (referencing a statement by the
National Pork Producers Council).
1541. Id.
1542. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FACT SHEET: PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO
ADDRESS WATER POLLUTION FROM CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS, EPA
833-F-00-016 (2000) [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. For discussion of animal units, see
CAFO, supra note 1525.
1543. See FACT SHEET, supra note 1542.
1544. See id. For example, the effluent guidelines will include provisions for dry
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Non-NPDES Arkansas authorities may also apply to some cattle
operations. A facility may be subject to ADEQ Regulation No. 5 if it has
a liquid waste disposal system.' 6 In addition, if the operation is large
enough to be classified as a CAFO 7 it may be subject to the federal
CWA effluent guidelines for feedlots.'
3. Poultry
For the most part, poultry operations in Arkansas are not encom-
passed by ADEQ Regulation No. 5.' Major poultry companies have
sought to address potential issues by participating in voluntary programs
to prevent water pollution from manure disposal practices." 5 As a way
of encouraging proper practices, the poultry companies have placed
manure-disposal policies in their contracts with growers. 5 Nevertheless,
a facility may be subject to effluent guidelines for feedlots if it has a point
source discharge and the minimum number of animals subject the facility
to regulation."552
4. Silviculture
Traditionally, silvicultural activities in Arkansas have not been
subject to mandatory water pollution control requirements. However, on
August 23, 1999, EPA issued proposed rules establishing TMDLs that
would have affected forestry in Arkansas and elsewhere." The rule
manure handling for layer and broiler operations. See id.
1545. See id. As proposed, newly defined CAFOs will not be required to obtain a
permit until three years after the final regulation is published. This date is
approximately January 2006. See id.
1546. See ADEQ Reg. No. 5 (2000).
1547. See CAFO, supra note 1525.
1548. See 40 C.F.R. § 412.10 (2000).
1549. See ADEQ Reg. No. 5 (2000). Dry waste management systems for confined
animal operations are not required to obtain a permit under Regulation No. 5. See id.
1550. See Carol Griffee, Playing Chicken: Poultry Companies, Growers and Government
Agencies Square OffAs Animal Wastes Pile Up, ARK. Bus., May 11, 1992, at 16.
1551. See id.
1552. See 40 C.F.R. § 412.10 (2000).
1553. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,010, 46,012 (1999) (to be codified at40 C.F.R. pt. 130).
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would have allowed states to address specific discharges from forestry
operations that contribute pollution to impaired waters and required them
to have permits.'" 4 The timber industry responded with significant
information and comment which caused EPA to extend the comment
period on the proposed rule. Arkansas forestry opposition focused on the
fact that the state has a high percentage of operators already using
voluntary best management practices.'555 EPA issued a final TMDL rule
on July 13, 2000.556 The federal agency withdrew the part of the proposal
that would have potentially encompassed some timber operations."557
5. Aquaculture
Some states require permits for certain aquaculture activities.
15 58
Arkansas has no specific permitting program applicable to these opera-
tions." 9 However, EPA has indicated that it may establish CWA effluent
limitations guidelines for aquaculture operations.'5 6 Research is focusing
on the extent to which catfish aquaculture ponds are sources of nitrogen,
phosphorus, organic matter, and settleable solids."s ' The argument has
been made that "no studies [have been] conducted to directly determine
the impact of catfish pond effluents on the quality of receiving
1554. See id. See also Brendan O'Reilly, EPA, Lawmakers and Timber Fight to the End,
ARK. Bus., Dec. 11, 2000, at 24 (relying on David Gillespie, Assistant General Counsel,
EPA Region 6).
1555. See id. at 24. Examples of forestry BMPs include measures such as
establishing protected streamside management zones, locating roads on ridge lines
rather than slopes, inspecting and maintaining roads, directionally cutting trees, and
avoiding use of dry stream beds. See Nita Chilton McCann, DEQ Hears Evidence of
Water Pollution Caused by Tree Farming, 16 Miss. Bus. J., Aug. 15, 1994, at 14. The
purpose of such measures is to reduce sediment, organic materials, impact of water
temperature, and nutrients and pesticides. See id.
1556. See 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 14, 2000).
1557. See 65 Fed. Reg. 43,591 (2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-24,
130).
1558. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,911 (1999). See also Brennikmeyer. supra note 82, at 10 1
(referencing various requirements imposed by Minnesota upon some aquaculture
operations).
1559. See Telephone Interview with Keith Brown, Manager, State Permits Branch,
ADEQ Water Division (Dec. 12, 2000). See also Brennikmeyer, supra note 82, at 101
(noting Arkansas and Mississippi's mineral regulation of catfish farms).
1560. See 65 Fed. Reg. 55,522 (Sept. 14, 2000).
1561. See Craig S. Tucker & John A. Hargreaves, Effluents from Channel Catfish
Agriculture Ponds (vistited Feb. 9, 2001) <http://www.msstate.edu/dept/tcnwac/
effdoc.html>. The document was prepared in response to the EPA notice of proposed
effluent guidelines plan found at 63 Fed. Reg. 29,203 (1998).
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streams." '562 No effluent limitations guidelines for these operations are
expected in the near future.
2. Funding Water Discharge Permitting/Pollution Control Activities
a. Funding ADEQ Water Permitting Activities
ADEQ permitting, enforcement, and other activities are funded by
various sources such as permit fees, state appropriations, penalties
collected, and federal grants. While counterintuitive, many regulated
facilities are supportive of adequate agency funding and/or reasonable
fees for maintenance of environmental agency staff and facilities.'563 The
motivation for such support may include an interest in ensuring that an
agency has the personnel necessary to handle the projected volume of
permit applications and related tasks.'5" For example, a facility may need
to obtain a new permit or modify an existing one. The acquisition or
modification of these permits may be a prerequisite to engaging in a new,
changed, or expanded activity. Inadequate funding will impact the
number of agency personnel. available to review permit applications and
issue permits. A shortage of such personnel could impede the progress of
some projects or activities.
b. Funding Pollution Control Activities
The acquisition of funds to meet CWA and other federal/state
environmental statutory requirements is an important issue. Large capital,
operation, and maintenance costs may be needed to construct and operate
the facilities and install the controls mandated by various CWA require-
ments."~ A 1997 survey projected that over $875 million would be
needed to fund Arkansas public wastewater needs over the 1997-2002
1562. Id.
1563. See Telephone Interview with Randy Thurman, Executive Director, Arkansas
Environmental Federation (Dec. 18, 2000).
1564. See id.
1565. In the mid-I 990s a shortage of personnel was blamed for the delays in various
construction projects requiring permits in the state of Hawaii. See Richard T. Sale, Are
the Feds Coming?, HAW. INv., May 1995, at 29.
1566. For example, see Robert J. Smith, Fayetteville Council Votes to Issue Bonds to
Take Care of Sewer Costs, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 20, 2000, at 7B (referencing
$60 to $90 million needed by Fayetteville, Arkansas to build and improve POTWs to
meet the city's needs). A 1992 EPA report summarizes the agency's assessment of
various future projected POTW expenditures. See 1992 Report, supra note 93.
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period." 7 Few Arkansas municipalities have the ability to fund such
projects without substantial federal or state assistance. Private facilities
are also often challenged in obtaining needed funds because these
expenditures do not typically generate a return on investment1568
Some municipalities and other governmental entities around the
United States have responded to the large financial outlays required by
this program by privatizing certain aspects of their sewage treatment
operations.569 Larger cities have explored privatization of such facilities
in the past decade.57 The structure of the agreement with a contractor
will vary. The agreement must address key provisions such as contract
length57' and responsibility for capital repairs. 5
1. Federal/State POTW Grants/Loans
573
a. Federal Grants
A key component of the 1972 amendments to the CWA was the
inclusion of federal funds for public wastewater treatment facilities. 5 74
Subchapter 5 of the CWA authorized federal grants for construction of
POTWs 575  Grants could be awarded to a "state, municipality, or
1567. See ARKANSAS SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION COMM'N, ARKANSAS WATER,
WASTE DISPOSAL AND POLLUTION ABATEMENT FACILITIES (ACT607 OF 1997) AMENDMENT,
PLAN OF WORK FOR 1999-2001 BIENNIUM 3 (2000) [hereinafter POLLUTION ABATEMENT].
1 568. See, e.g., Wensloff, supra note 84 ("Few issues receive less respect and
attention around the winery than wastewater produced by wineries. This
unglamourous, inglorious byproduct of wine production does not produce revenue,
smells bad and would make everyone involved much happier if it would just go
away."); Roothaan, supra note 146, at 23 (". . . banks typically view environmental
equipment as more of a liability than an asset").
1569. See, e.g, New Orleans Proposed to Bid out its Sewer and Water Operations, NEW
ORLEANS CITY Bus., June 26, 2000, at 4.
1570. See id. However, some smaller communities began privatization efforts over
the past three decades. See id.
1571. The length of the contracts vary. New Orleans considered terms of ten to
twenty years. See id.
1572. For example, Atlanta addresses sewage treatment capital repair issues by
requiring the contractor to pay the first $10,000 in capital repair while the city picks up
the remaining costs with bond money. See id. Some cities shift all capital repairs to the
contractor. See id.
1573. This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive list of the sources of funds
for public or private water pollution control activities. For example, it does not address
the various federal agricultural programs that may address pollution control practices.
See Hoagland & Watts, supra note 8 1, at 646 (discussing federal agricultural cost-share
funds for farmers that implement soil conservation measures).
1574. See 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g) (Supp. 11 1972).
1575. The CWA provides that "it is the national policy that federal financial
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intermunicipal or interstate agency for the construction of publically
owned treatment works."'5 76 The program's goal was to upgrade and
construct POTWs to meet the secondary treatment standards. 1177
Arkansas and other states have been somewhat dependent upon
federal funds to finance public pollution control projects such as the
construction or upgrading of POTWs. 15 7' Federal sources of funds for
Arkansas projects have included EPA, USDA Rural Development,
Farmer's Home Administration, Economic Development Administration,
and Department of Housing and Urban Development. 5 79 A municipality
may only be able to access funds from a particular agency if the proposed
project meets its eligibility criteria."58
The amount of federal CWA funds available for POTW construction
has declined."" This has been a problem for Arkansas and many other
states. The procurement of funds to construct, upgrade, and operate
POTWs has been a particular concern for smaller communities. 582 A
assistance be provided to construct public owned waste treatment works." See 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1994).
1576. See 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g) (Supp. 11 1972). The development of POTWs was
often viewed as a three step process. A court described the process thus:
Projects for waste treatment works are divided into three steps. Step I is the
planning phase in which the overall facility plan for the project is developed.
This involves consideration of alternatives, the determination of the size and
scope of the project, and development of other required infonnation to
enable the actual design work to begin. This design work, in which
construction drawings and specifications are prepared, is Step 2. Step 3 is
the actual construction.
Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 954 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1992). Federal funding for
steps one and two was more difficult to obtain after enactment of the previously cited
1981 amendments to the CWA. See id. at 1204 (citing H.R. REP. No. 270, at 4,
reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2629, 2632; 40 C.F.R. § 35.920-3 (2000)).
1577. Private companies or facilities were not eligible for such grants. See Knopman
& Smith, supra note 29.
1578. See POLLUTION ABATEMENT, supra note 1567, at 3 noting, "[h]istorically, the
majority of financing for Arkansas water, waste disposal and pollution abatement
facilities has come from the federal government."
1579. See id.
1580. See id. Examples include: (1) USDA-RD--the municipality must have a
population less than 10,000; (2) EPA-the "funds must directly relate to creation or
preservation ofjobs;" and (3) HUD-the "funds must be directed to low to moderate
income families." Id. Not all projects meet the necessary requirements. See id.
1581. See New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Fenske, 591 A.2d 1362 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1991) (referencing declining amount of federal funds available to construct and
improve POTWs).
1582. See Emmett George, Ola Officials Work to Meet Deadline on Sewage System, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 14, 1990, at B I (referencing difficulty of communities with
limited financial base to fund POTW improvements).
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1992 EPA report concluded that smaller communities have less access to
private credit markets.
15 83
The 1987 CWA amendments converted the grant program to a state
revolving loan fund"" financed by federal appropriations.""85 These
amendments 5' provided a perpetual fund 8 7 for financing the construction
of wastewater treatment facilities for municipalities and other public
entities'5 8 through the ADEQ Construction Assistance Revolving Loan
Fund Program."5 89 The program is capitalized with federal grants and state
matching funds on a ratio of five federal dollars to one state dollar. 5 ' The
1583. See 1992 REPORT, supra note 93, at 15. These communities cannot rely on
economics of scale to the same extent as larger communities. See id.
1584. Various issues associated with the implementation ofthe State Revolving Loan
Fund are addressed in U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE CLEAN WATER STATE
REVOLVING FUND FUNDING FRAMEWORK-POLICY AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (EPA 832-B-
96-005) [hereinafter REVOLVING FUND].
1585. See Telephone Interview with Doug Ford, P.E., Pollution Management, Inc.
(Dec. 22, 2000).
1586. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).
1587. These capitalization grants are known as "state revolving funds." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1381 (1994).
1588. The amount of federal CWA SRF funds that should be allocated to the
respective states has been a subject of tension. For example, former United States
Representative Blanche Lambert Lincoln of Arkansas expressed concern in 1995 about
whether an alteration to the SRF which was included in proposed amendments to the
CWA was fair to less industrialized states such as Arkansas. Representative Lincoln
noted:
During consideration of H.R. 961, the House approved an amendment that
altered the allocation formula under the State Revolving Fund (SRF). Under
this new formula, the less industrialized states, like Arkansas, received
significantly less money than they currently receive. The base bill contained
a more equitable approach in its treatment of the allocation formula, but the
amendment adopted by the House gutted the original agreement reached by
the Committee.
Last year Arkansas received nearly $15 million under the SRF
allocation. Under the amended bill, Arkansas would receive $8 million-a
42 percent reduction.
Arkansas has a well run SRF program, leveraging two times the
amount of its SRF funding. Last year, Arkansas leveraged nearly $30
million from its $15 million allocation. The severe reduction in the amended
bill not only reflects a $7 million reduction of federal obligated dollars, but
it also adversely affects Arkansas' ability to leverage more funds. The bill's
cut in fact represents a $14 million total loss in funds that could be used to
finance much needed wastewater treatment plants and infrastructure needs
throughout the state. With the many federal requirements imposed on our
communities, they need the capital to comply with these national mandates.
141 CONG. REC. E. 1046 (May 16, 1995).
1589. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-5-901 to -906 (2000) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1590. See ADEQ, CONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE DIVISION, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT
ARKANSAS REVOLVING LOAN FUND (2000).
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ADEQ has served as the lead agency for the Construction Assistance
Revolving Loan Fund program and is responsible for performing
technical reviews, monitoring construction, and coordinating the total
management of the program.' 91  However, the Arkansas General
Assembly, in Act 459 of 2001, transferred this program from the ADEQ
to the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission.
The Construction Assistance Division of the ADEQ has used a
somewhat novel approach to increase the amount of money in the loan
program. Loan repayments to the fund are used as collateral to enable the
Arkansas Development Finance Authority ("ADFA") to sell bonds.'592
The proceeds from the bond sales constitute about fifty percent of the
funds available for the Construction Assistance Revolving Loan Fund."593
Federal grant money and state funds constitute the remainder. 5' The
Construction Assistance Revolving Loan Fund 95 made its first loan to the
City of Truman in 1990.' The program has received almost $103
million from EPA grants and $25 million from matched state funds.597
Bond proceeds, loan repayments, and investment earnings bring the
Revolving Loan Fund revenues since inception to over $314 million. "
The cumulative total through June 1999 of construction expenditures
binding commitments by the ADEQ is over $160 million. 5"
The loans originated with the ADEQ for the construction of
wastewater treatment facilities including new collection systems and
rehabilitation or expansion of existing facilities. The loans bear interest
rates ranging from 2.5% to 4.0%.'" All of the loans are collateralized by
sales and use tax bonds issued by the municipality, special assessments,
or user charges.'
1591. See id. These federal funds could not be disbursed until EPA and the state
executed an agreement establishing a procedure for the distribution of funds. See 33
U.S.C. § 1383(a) (1994).
1592. See Telephone Interview with Dave Fenter, ADEQ Construction Assistance
Division (Sept. 13, 2000).
1593. See id.
1594. See id.
1595. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-5-901 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1596. See ADEQ, CONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE DIVISION, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT
ARKANSAS REVOLVING LOAN FUND 21 (2000).
1597. See id. at 19. The amounts referenced are as of June 1999. The federal grant
dollars are $103,959,067 with a state match of $25,019,006.
1598. See id. The total through June, 1999 is $314,831,371. See id.
1599. See id. at 15. The cumulative totals for loan projects through June, 1999 is
$160,241, 675. See id.
1600. See id. at 7.
1601. See id. In 2001, the Arkansas General Assembly appropriated $3.8 million for
the period ending June 30,2003, for state matching grants for constructing wastewater
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b. Non-Point Source Loans
ADEQ has initiated a pilot program to provide low-interest loans to
address water pollution from agricultural non-point sources. The
Agriculture Water Quality Loan Program encourages conservation
practices such as stream channel stabilization, spring development,
construction of ponds or watering facilities, and development of waste
management systems.w 2 ADEQ efforts to date have been in Arkansas
watersheds that are impaired primarily by non-point sources. ' 3 ADEQ
has focused the Pilot Program on Benton, Carroll, Madison, and Washing-
ton counties."
Loan applicants are required to work with ADEQ, Natural Resources
Conservation Service ("NRCS") ofthe USDA, and the local Conservation
Districts to develop a conservation plan."S After submission of an
application to the local Conservation District, the NRCS technical staff
will approve or deny the request." If approved by the NRCS, the
applicant receives a certificate of qualification from the Conservation
District."w7 The applicant then contacts a participating bank to secure a
loan."S
The Agricultural Water Quality Loan Program limits loan amounts
to $100,000 per applicant." The loans bear an interest rate of three
percent. 61 0 The Construction Assistance Revolving Loan Fund pays the
difference in the participating bank's loan rate and the three percent rate
of the loans in this program.
161'
treatment facilities. See 2001 Ark. Acts 346.
1602. See ADEQ, CONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE DIVISION, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT
ARKANSAS REVOLVING LOAN FUND (2000).
1603. See Telephone Interview with Dave Fenter, ADEQ Construction Assistance
Division (Sept. 13, 2000). ADEQ examined the CWA 303(d) list to determine which
watersheds are impaired by such sources. Id.
1604. See id.
1605. See ADEQ, CONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE DIVISION, ARKANSAS AGRICULTURAL
WATER QUALITY LOAN PROGRAM (2000).
1606. See id.
1607. See id
1608. See id. The ADEQ sought participation from two banks in each of the four
counties identified above. Telephone Interview with Dave Fenter, ADEQ Construction
Assistance Division (Sept. 13, 2000).
1609. See ADEQ, CONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE DIVISION, ARKANSAS AGRICULTURAL
WATER QUALITY LOAN PROGRAM 3-5 (2000).
1610. See Telephone Interview with Dave Fenter, ADEQ Construction Assistance




The construction of a POTW may in some circumstances trigger
requirements in addition to obtaining an NPDES permit. For example,
Arkansas proscribes the construction of POTWs outside a municipality's
corporate limits unless certain conditions are fulfilled. 6 2
c. Arkansas Small Business Loan Program
Compliance with the federal and state environmental regulatory
requirements can in some instances require a relatively significant capital
outlay to purchase necessary equipment or controls. Small businesses
often have a limited ability to fund these required expenditures. Assis-
tance is sometimes available through the Small Business Revolving Loan
Fund'6 3 managed by ADEQ. The purpose of the loan fund is to provide
low interest loans to Arkansas small businesses to institute pollution
control measures required by state or federal law, or to institute pollution
prevention measures that reduce the quantity of pollution produced by
businesses.6 4
To be eligible, the Arkansas business must employ one hundred or
fewer individuals and have been profitable for at least two of the previous
three tax years. Activities eligible for the loan fund disbursements include
pollution control projects which are designed to correct or avoid violations
of state or federal environmental regulations, or pollution prevention
projects designed to reduce or eliminate the generation of pollution or
waste at the source.'
6 11
Pollution control loans had been available in amounts of up to
$10,000, with loan terms of up to five years.'6 6 Pollution prevention loans
had been available in amounts up to $15,000, with loan terms up to ten
1612. The City of Russellville challenged the City of Dover's construction of a
facility outside the Dover municipal limits. See City of Dover v. A.G. Barton, 337 Ark.
186, 187-88, 987 S.W.2d 705, 706 (1999). The court found that the cited provisions
did not apply to the Dover project because it would constitute a retroactive application
of the statute. See id. at 191, 987 S.W.2d at 708.
1613. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-5-801 (LEXIS Repl. 2000). See D. Keith Fortner,
Survey of Legislation 1995, Environmental Law. 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 327
(1996).
1614. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-5-804(a)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). In 2001, the
Arkansas General Assembly amended the statute to make waste reduction projects
eligible for loans. See 2001 Ark. Acts 213.
1615. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-5-803(5)(LEXIS Repl. 2000).
1616. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-5-806(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(B) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
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years. 16 7 Single businesses had been limited to a lifetime maximum of
$25,000. 1618
d. Arkansas Tax Credits
1. Pollution Control Equipment Sales Tax Exemption
Arkansas provides a limited sales tax exemption for the purchase of
pollution control machinery and chemicals. The scope of this exemption
has been addressed in several decisions. For example, in Heath v.
Research-Cottrell, Inc.,619 the Arkansas Supreme Court considered whether
a 'natural draft cooling tower at a power plant fit within the Arkansas
Compensating Use Tax exemption for machinery or equipment used to
prevent water pollution. 20 The court found the equipment was encom-
passed by the exemption.6 2'
A different result was reached in Southern Steel & Wire Co. v.
Wooten 6  where the court found the exemption inapplicable to a pH
recorder utilized at a manufacturing facility. The facility argued that the
device was necessary to monitor the discharge of waste materials.'6" The
court disagreed, stating that the device merely informed the facility of the
level of pollution." 4 The device was not deemed to "prevent or reduce
air and/or water pollution or contamination which might otherwise result
from the operation of such plant or facility as required by the statute."' 
625
A more recent decision addressing this tax credit is Aluminum Co. of
America v. Weiss.'626 The court considered whether the exemption applied
to leased heavy equipment used to mitigate environmental damages from
prior mining operations. The Arkansas Department of Finance and
Administration had determined that the leased equipment was ineligible
for the exemption because the equipment was used in a post-mining
1617. Seeid
1618. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-5-806(a)(2) (LEXIS Repi. 2000). In 2001, the
Arkansas General Assembly, in Act 213, revised the $10,000, $15,000, and $25,000
amounts to $20,000, $25,000, and $45,000 respectively. 2001 Ark. Acts 213.
1619. 258 Ark. 813, 529 S.W.2d 336 (1975).
1620. See id at 816, 529 S.W.2d at 337.
1621. Seeid. at 822, 529 S.W.2d at 340-41.
1622. 276 Ark. 37, 631 S.W.2d 835 (1982).
1623. See id. at 41-42, 631 S.W.2d 838.
1624. See id. at 42, 631 S.W.2d 838.
1625. Id. at41, 631 S.W.2d 838.
1626. 329 Ark. 225, 946 S.W.2d 695 (1997).
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reclamation project as opposed to reduction of pollution from ongoing
mining operations. The court agreed with the agency's position.'62'
2. Wetland Creation/Restoration Tax Credit
Because the majority of land suitable for wetlands and riparian zones
is privately owned, Arkansas has enacted tax incentives to encourage
these owners to create new wetland and riparian zones.'628 Pollution
control processes that include the construction of wetlands may be eligible
for a tax credit.' 6 Taxpayers who engage in developing or restoring
wetlands and riparian zones are entitled to a tax credit equal to the project
costs they incur.'630 The amount may not exceed the lesser of the amount
of individual or corporate income tax due, or $5,000.'631 Taxpayers are
allowed to carry over any unused tax credit for a maximum of nine
consecutive years following the year in which the credit originated.'632
The ASWCC administers the program.'633
3. Surface Water Utilization Tax Credit
Adequate water supplies are a critical component of residential,
commercial, and industrial development."6 The availability of significant
amounts of water can be an important issue for many projects. It may be
1627. See id. at 226-29, 946 S.W.2d at 695-97.
1628. See ARK. CODE ANN. §26-51-1502(c)(Michie Rep]. 1997).
1629. The Arkansas statute defines the term "wetland" as:
(A) An area that:
(i) Has water at or near the surface of the ground at some time
during the growing season, wetland hydrology;
(ii) Contains plants that are adapted to wet habitats, hydrophytic
vegetation; and
(iii) Is made up of soils that have developed under wet
conditions, hydric soils.
ARK. CODE ANN. §26-51-1503(8) (Michie Repl. 1997).
1630. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 26-51-1505 (Michie Repl. 1997).
1631. See id.
1632. See id.
1633. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-1506 (LEXIS Rep]. 2000). A bill was introduced
into the 83rd General Assembly that would provide a tax credit for the donation of land
such as riparian zones, floodways, wetlands, etc. See H.B. 2277, 83rd Gen. Ass., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2001).
1634. See generally Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Albert J. Thomas II, Water: A Checklist
ofArkansas Common Law and State Government Controls Applicable to Its Use, ARK. LAW.,
July 1996, at 34.
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a particular concern for areas of the state dependent on groundwater if this
resource is not being adequately recharged.' 6"
Certain activities involving utilization of surface water may be
eligible for a limited tax credit. These provisions are found in the
Arkansas Water Resource Conservation and Development Incentives
Act. 636 The Act provides tax incentives to encourage water users to invest
in constructing impoundments, convert from groundwater use to surface
water use when available, and practice land leveling.' 7 The ASWCC
administers this program.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal and Arkansas water pollution control programs remain
some of our most expensive and complicated environmental regulatory
requirements. Regardless, implementation of these programs has resulted
in the elimination of a significant percentage of the pollutants that were
formerly discharged into our waterways. These efforts have clearly
cleansed a significant number of rivers, streams, and lakes to the extent
that they are once again available for various uses and activities. These
reductions have, however, been driven to a great extent by the categorical
effluent limits applied to point sources. The advantage of this approach
has been that, for the most part, facilities covered by this program have
been easily identified and the effluent limits applicable to them fairly
clear. Further, the fact that these categorical standards apply nationally
has ensured that all similar point sources discharging nationally were
1635. The Arkansas Soil and Conservation Commission has designated Union,
Ouchita, Columbia, Calhoun, and Bradley counties in Southern Arkansas as a critical
ground water area, and has expressed concern that Arkansas, Jefferson, Prairie, Pulaski,
White, and Lonoke could conceivably be designated as critical ground water areas. See
ARKANSAS SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION COMMISSION. THE DESIGNATION OF THE
SPARTA AQUIFER WITHIN BRADLEY, CALHOUN, COLUMBIA, OUCHITA, AND UNION COUNTIES
AS A CRITICAL GROUND WATER AREA, No. CGWA 1995-1 (1995); ARKANSAS SOIL AND
WATER CONSERVATION COMMISSION, ARKANSAS WATER PLAN SUPPLEMENT: GROUND
WATER PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT REPORT FOR 1995 (1995). Projects eligible for
the tax credit include the construction, installation, or restoration of water storage or
water control structures of twenty acre-feet or more designed for agriculture, irrigation,
or industrial processes. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-51-I 003(7)(A) to 1005(a) (Michie
Repl. 1997). Water use, access, and conservation will likely be volatile issues in the
future in some parts of Arkansas. See Doug Thompson, Water Tax Surfaces in House
Committee, Lawmakers Discuss Levy to Save Waning Supplies, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Feb. 20, 1999, at 12A; Chuck Plunkett, Deadline Set for Signing on a Plan to Tap While
River, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 7, 2000, at I B.
1636. SeeARK. CODE ANN. §26-51-1001 (Michie Repl. 1997).
1637. SeeARK. CODE ANN. §26-51-1002(c)(Michie Repl. 1997).
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required to meet the same baseline effluent limits. The requirement that
point source discharges be authorized pursuant to NPDES permits has
ensured that both the enforcement agencies and the interested public have
understood what the facilities were discharging and whether the app] ica-
ble effluent limits were being attained. States such as Arkansas that have
been delegated this program for many years have generally become
proficient in issuing such permits and taking the necessary measures to
enforce compliance with their terms.
Despite the overall improvement in national surface water quality,
problems remain. A number of United States and Arkansas waterbodies
are not meeting the applicable WQS. Consequently, the challenge for
both the United States and Arkansas water pollution control programs will
involve an effort to move additional lakes, rivers, and streams into
compliance with WQS. The difficulty will be the fact that large aggregate
reduction of loadings (mandated by the categorical standards) for sources
has already taken place. The cost to achieve additional incremental
reductions by a number of point sources will be expensive. Further, the
significant loadings generated in some waterbodies by CSOs, CSSs, or
other wet weather flows may be key sources of pollutants in some
waterbodies. However, the public funds required to undertake installation
of the infrastructure necessary to achieve reductions is an impediment. In
addition, the costs, complexity, and/or political undesirability of imposing
mandatory controls on non-point sources renders further reductions from
these activities unclear.
Pressure will, however, continue to build under the CWA (as
currently structured) to achieve WQS. In the past several years, various
groups have rediscovered the CWA mechanisms put in place almost thirty
years ago to, in theory, require that every waterbody meet applicable
WQS. Specifically, both EPA and the states are, and will be, required to
set TMDLs for many waterbodies. This will be a time consuming and
expensive task. Equally important, however, is the fact that at the end of
this process hard choices may have to be made on how to achieve
compliance with WQS by a particular waterbody. None of the potential
items on the previously described menu are easy choices.
Arkansas faces the same dilemma as other states. The state is now
committed to a schedule for producing TMDLs. The information
generated by this process is likely to engender a spirited discussion about
the appropriate means to achieve WQS. In reality, the question will be
how assimilative capacity in a particular waterbody should be allocated
among the sources. There will be no easy answers. The conflict between
similar and dissimilar sources is a possibility. These potential conflicts
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may generate interest in concepts such as effluent trading programs or
watershed planning. Perhaps Arkansas is in as good or better position as
many states to address these issues. It has years of experience operating
the NPDES permit program and addressing the various issues that flow
from that process. Further, Arkansas has made significant investments to
better define the criteria necessary to support particular uses in a region.
This combination of expertise and a willingness to work together by the
disparate sources of loadings could lead to further gains in the protection
of one of the United States' and Arkansas' most precious
resources-water.

